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The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation
"This is a must read book for all Military". What an interesting book from a closed out bookstore. Despite all the touching, handling and some fine shelf wear on DJ otherwise, the book remain clean and in a sturdy binding. We deliver within 4 - 10 working days. Great Customer satisfaction with money back guaranteed.
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First published January 1, 1950
About the author
S.L.A. Marshall
58 books40 followersS.L.A. Marshall (full name, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall) served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He authored some 30 books about warfare, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, The River and the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
May 28, 2024
recommend to anyone who works for the military
July 31, 2026
"There can be true economy of men's powers in war only when command reckons with man as he is and not as it would like him to be" (22).
In this short sentence, Marshall invites us to fight war with eyes unclouded by wishful thinking and preconceived notions. "Know your Marines and look out for their welfare."
In war, it is important to know that "fear and fatigue are bout the same in their effect on an advance" (44). "I saw madness in these men, the madness that comes from bodily exhaustion combined with the most abject terror" (38). Therefore, extra weight's "real curse on tactics is that it kills fire right at the fire base" (52). In sum, marching under load for training VS marching under load into war are NOT the same thing. Fear destroys men--both in command, which takes counsel of its fears and so dumps heavier and heavier packs on men for every possible contingency, and in the soldier, who biologically suffers under loads more than 1/3 of his body weight. Most modern packs are way heavier than 1/3 of a man's body weight. This load pushes men over the edge, destroying their mobility and speed, the golden apple of Sun Tzu.
"We will not have swift and agile movement, rapidity and assurance of thought--nor even stronger and accurate fire--as long as we cling to the superstition that under danger men can be expected to have more than their normal powers, and that they will outdo their best efforts simply because their lives are at stake" (74). It is indeed true that terror, shock, and pain cloud the mind. Instead, let us be free. "The development of tactical mobility is almost wholly in the realm of the human spirit, since battle remains the freest of all free enterprises. Inwardly the fighting man has not greatly changed since the time of the Greeks and Romans.... Superior movement on the battlefield is the result of good leadership. The ability to command the loyalties of your men, to learn to think rapidly and resolutely in their behalf while teaching them to do likewise, and to strive always to avoid wasting their force and energy so that it may be applied in strength at the vital time and place--that is leadership of the highest possible caliber" (75). This ancient truth, that has been heard from Sun Tzu, remains true today, even in the age of mechanization. "The real stuff of fighting mobility is not to be found in the troop carrier, the airplane and the tank. It remains where it has ever been--in the heart, muscle and brain of the average soldier" (76).
In terms of the mobility of a nation, Marshall references the Russians: they were strong men, capable of carrying tremendous loads, and yet they never carried them into combat but instead fought as light as a feather. They were also hardy men who did without the niceties and luxuries of life, just as a soldier should. It is in this environment that men know and see what is important and so rush toward it with unbending will and an ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome. Contrast this with the Americans who were shipping over buttloads of, not ammunition, but trivialities. "This lack of balance not only deprived the fighting line of necessities; it handicapped the rear in its effort to support combat," as the mountain of stuffs transformed into a swamp, forcing "Special missions [to] fly back to the United States to plead for more ammunition or more QM supplies" (91). This is unsurprising given that the "profligacy of our everyday civilian habits is bound to carry over in some measure into the military establishment and militate against raising the standards of regulating its economy" (91). What this calls for is true generalship that contends "vigorously for a system of thought and action that will enable our forces to travel light, hit hard and keep on going," and this is a form of moral strength (92).
Men do not need lollipops and distractions. "So long as men are treated with respect and dignity, they will find and rejoice in a new sense of unity with new companies, and this will become a stronger feeling than that of missing their old associations. This is the basis of moral integrity in military forces" (93).
"No matter what Napoleon or Foch said about the relation of the material to the moral forces in war, they need mainly to be considered as one indivisible whole. The efficient conservation of men's powers, from which flows morale, can come only of an equal efficiency in the use of all material resources. That is the foundation of national military strength. There must be, too, inspired and imaginative leading" (117). What is important is not considering the measures to weaken possible enemies but to keep ourselves strong, for "whatever is done in an army should always aim at increasing and strengthening its moral power" (118).
Finally, "all of war is a gamble and its chief rewards go to the player who, weighing the odds carefully as he moves from situation to situation, will not hesitate to plunge when he feels by instinct that his hour has arrived. The commander who follows no better rule than caution and playing his cards close to his midriff will be nickeled-to-death in combat as certainly as in penny-ante. This is a game not for fools and suckers but for those who have the courage to dare greatly" (118). Indeed, "the finest young battalion and company officers ... have been men [who were] sedulous in planning and preparation. They made their dispositions painstakingly [and] insisted on personal reconnaissance to a point where it nettled their subordinates. Thus they had at all times the feel of their own situation, which is half of the battle. But at the opportune moment they were ready to shoot the works.... It is a quality of the spirit which any man may bring forward in himself, provided that he has become truly the master of his work. But if he is careless of detail, his spirit will be possessed of a false bravado, rather than a well-placed self-confidence, and he cannot even make the start. The spirit of thoroughness combined with daring is the mainspring of action in all military forces" (119). This is also the resounding message of Sun Tzu (know yourself and your enemy) and of Duffer's Drift (personal reconnaissance so that YOU KNOW).
As Lieutenant General Martel, Britain's great tank commander, said, "Willingness to take a chance will usually pay off, presupposing good judgment." This is exactly what Rommel did to the British, and it cost the British much blood. Rommel was ready to "exploit a situation to the limit, regardless of the risk involved; this led him time and again into positions of fantastic danger and yet enabled him to win every ounce of advantage, especially against an irresolute enemy" (120). He was bold and willing to take a superb chance, as he had total command responsibility. "When these qualities of mind and spirit are conjoint with the exercise of true economy in all supply operations, the result inevitably is mobility in the hitting force" (120).
This is all personal to me, having suffered through Marine OCS as an individual rucking about 50% of her bodyweight. 35 lbs is the limit? HA, I practice with 50 lbs, and it's only going to get worse. This book was incredibly vindicating to me. It is not a question of machismo but rather of common sense and basic biological understanding.
In this short sentence, Marshall invites us to fight war with eyes unclouded by wishful thinking and preconceived notions. "Know your Marines and look out for their welfare."
In war, it is important to know that "fear and fatigue are bout the same in their effect on an advance" (44). "I saw madness in these men, the madness that comes from bodily exhaustion combined with the most abject terror" (38). Therefore, extra weight's "real curse on tactics is that it kills fire right at the fire base" (52). In sum, marching under load for training VS marching under load into war are NOT the same thing. Fear destroys men--both in command, which takes counsel of its fears and so dumps heavier and heavier packs on men for every possible contingency, and in the soldier, who biologically suffers under loads more than 1/3 of his body weight. Most modern packs are way heavier than 1/3 of a man's body weight. This load pushes men over the edge, destroying their mobility and speed, the golden apple of Sun Tzu.
"We will not have swift and agile movement, rapidity and assurance of thought--nor even stronger and accurate fire--as long as we cling to the superstition that under danger men can be expected to have more than their normal powers, and that they will outdo their best efforts simply because their lives are at stake" (74). It is indeed true that terror, shock, and pain cloud the mind. Instead, let us be free. "The development of tactical mobility is almost wholly in the realm of the human spirit, since battle remains the freest of all free enterprises. Inwardly the fighting man has not greatly changed since the time of the Greeks and Romans.... Superior movement on the battlefield is the result of good leadership. The ability to command the loyalties of your men, to learn to think rapidly and resolutely in their behalf while teaching them to do likewise, and to strive always to avoid wasting their force and energy so that it may be applied in strength at the vital time and place--that is leadership of the highest possible caliber" (75). This ancient truth, that has been heard from Sun Tzu, remains true today, even in the age of mechanization. "The real stuff of fighting mobility is not to be found in the troop carrier, the airplane and the tank. It remains where it has ever been--in the heart, muscle and brain of the average soldier" (76).
In terms of the mobility of a nation, Marshall references the Russians: they were strong men, capable of carrying tremendous loads, and yet they never carried them into combat but instead fought as light as a feather. They were also hardy men who did without the niceties and luxuries of life, just as a soldier should. It is in this environment that men know and see what is important and so rush toward it with unbending will and an ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome. Contrast this with the Americans who were shipping over buttloads of, not ammunition, but trivialities. "This lack of balance not only deprived the fighting line of necessities; it handicapped the rear in its effort to support combat," as the mountain of stuffs transformed into a swamp, forcing "Special missions [to] fly back to the United States to plead for more ammunition or more QM supplies" (91). This is unsurprising given that the "profligacy of our everyday civilian habits is bound to carry over in some measure into the military establishment and militate against raising the standards of regulating its economy" (91). What this calls for is true generalship that contends "vigorously for a system of thought and action that will enable our forces to travel light, hit hard and keep on going," and this is a form of moral strength (92).
Men do not need lollipops and distractions. "So long as men are treated with respect and dignity, they will find and rejoice in a new sense of unity with new companies, and this will become a stronger feeling than that of missing their old associations. This is the basis of moral integrity in military forces" (93).
"No matter what Napoleon or Foch said about the relation of the material to the moral forces in war, they need mainly to be considered as one indivisible whole. The efficient conservation of men's powers, from which flows morale, can come only of an equal efficiency in the use of all material resources. That is the foundation of national military strength. There must be, too, inspired and imaginative leading" (117). What is important is not considering the measures to weaken possible enemies but to keep ourselves strong, for "whatever is done in an army should always aim at increasing and strengthening its moral power" (118).
Finally, "all of war is a gamble and its chief rewards go to the player who, weighing the odds carefully as he moves from situation to situation, will not hesitate to plunge when he feels by instinct that his hour has arrived. The commander who follows no better rule than caution and playing his cards close to his midriff will be nickeled-to-death in combat as certainly as in penny-ante. This is a game not for fools and suckers but for those who have the courage to dare greatly" (118). Indeed, "the finest young battalion and company officers ... have been men [who were] sedulous in planning and preparation. They made their dispositions painstakingly [and] insisted on personal reconnaissance to a point where it nettled their subordinates. Thus they had at all times the feel of their own situation, which is half of the battle. But at the opportune moment they were ready to shoot the works.... It is a quality of the spirit which any man may bring forward in himself, provided that he has become truly the master of his work. But if he is careless of detail, his spirit will be possessed of a false bravado, rather than a well-placed self-confidence, and he cannot even make the start. The spirit of thoroughness combined with daring is the mainspring of action in all military forces" (119). This is also the resounding message of Sun Tzu (know yourself and your enemy) and of Duffer's Drift (personal reconnaissance so that YOU KNOW).
As Lieutenant General Martel, Britain's great tank commander, said, "Willingness to take a chance will usually pay off, presupposing good judgment." This is exactly what Rommel did to the British, and it cost the British much blood. Rommel was ready to "exploit a situation to the limit, regardless of the risk involved; this led him time and again into positions of fantastic danger and yet enabled him to win every ounce of advantage, especially against an irresolute enemy" (120). He was bold and willing to take a superb chance, as he had total command responsibility. "When these qualities of mind and spirit are conjoint with the exercise of true economy in all supply operations, the result inevitably is mobility in the hitting force" (120).
This is all personal to me, having suffered through Marine OCS as an individual rucking about 50% of her bodyweight. 35 lbs is the limit? HA, I practice with 50 lbs, and it's only going to get worse. This book was incredibly vindicating to me. It is not a question of machismo but rather of common sense and basic biological understanding.
September 4, 2023
Great Logistics book causing one to think of everything required to move and sustain the soldier all the way down to the amount of ounces he's carrying on his back as he walks onto shore for the start of a mission and how long that weight will last him. How to make every ounce count towards warfighting effectiveness without bogging the man down with excess weight. Highly recommend for all who study war or logistics.
May 7, 2019
A must Read. Simple, Short, and Impactful.
April 8, 2016
Remembering reading this when I was a infantry squad leader in the 82nd ABN Div. SLA Marshal, commonly reffered to as SLAM wrote a lot of good common sense military books. Nothing in this one I'd fault. Kept it upper most in mind through out all my leadership positions.
Foot marches were an of course for us, as were more protracted movements to contact.
There was always a tussle between leadership and the line on how much to pack and carry. Many of your officers are collage level athletes in elite units and draw on their own personal abilities vs those of their soldiers. Most need to be taken down a peg or two and that's where good NCO's were handy.
The worst tussle I witnessed was in Saudi Arabia prior to deployment in Iraq. Commanders had put out "the" packing list, live ammo included, tailored to individual duty positions, (Sqd leader, team leader, rifleman, AG's, MGrs, radio men. Load slightly different for each). Must of been some arguments going on through out the chain of command. The then Brigade Sergeant Major (had him as Bn SGM he eventually became the XVIII ABN Corps SGM McFowler), had a dress rehearsal. Assembling demo units to foot march around a simple race track with the proposed packing list as the BDE's leadership, officers and NCO's, watched. I don't remember the weights but I do remember at reading the packing list there was no way. During this dress rehearsal assembled teams could not negotiate walk with the packs on their backs more than thirty minutes without troops starting to straggle and fall out. The demo was finished after 45 minutes. Few were still walking.
For final deployment into Iraq we were met with a MA NG 5ton unit where the packs remained fastened to the side of the trucks for the duration of operations in Iraq. Call it a comprise. We still had everything in the packing list, but it wasn't on our backs.
Other notes on this. FM 21-18 covers foot marches. Not sure what was written into in newer versions but in the 80's they had it right. Problem is leadership never reads the manuals.
Regardless rule of thumb has always been above 35lbs your asking for trouble, though some duty positions require much more to be carried (RTO's and members of gun teams). Pack light and freeze at night. XO's and 1sGs must be relied to ferry equipment. You can't pack for every contingency, load must be tailored to the specific mission.
As a war correspondent during WWII, SLA Marshal saw most of it first hand. He also talked heavily in this book about the effects of stress (someone is shooting at you) on the amount of weight that can be carried. He came under attack for some of his views/advice but for the most part he was correct.
Foot marches were an of course for us, as were more protracted movements to contact.
There was always a tussle between leadership and the line on how much to pack and carry. Many of your officers are collage level athletes in elite units and draw on their own personal abilities vs those of their soldiers. Most need to be taken down a peg or two and that's where good NCO's were handy.
The worst tussle I witnessed was in Saudi Arabia prior to deployment in Iraq. Commanders had put out "the" packing list, live ammo included, tailored to individual duty positions, (Sqd leader, team leader, rifleman, AG's, MGrs, radio men. Load slightly different for each). Must of been some arguments going on through out the chain of command. The then Brigade Sergeant Major (had him as Bn SGM he eventually became the XVIII ABN Corps SGM McFowler), had a dress rehearsal. Assembling demo units to foot march around a simple race track with the proposed packing list as the BDE's leadership, officers and NCO's, watched. I don't remember the weights but I do remember at reading the packing list there was no way. During this dress rehearsal assembled teams could not negotiate walk with the packs on their backs more than thirty minutes without troops starting to straggle and fall out. The demo was finished after 45 minutes. Few were still walking.
For final deployment into Iraq we were met with a MA NG 5ton unit where the packs remained fastened to the side of the trucks for the duration of operations in Iraq. Call it a comprise. We still had everything in the packing list, but it wasn't on our backs.
Other notes on this. FM 21-18 covers foot marches. Not sure what was written into in newer versions but in the 80's they had it right. Problem is leadership never reads the manuals.
Regardless rule of thumb has always been above 35lbs your asking for trouble, though some duty positions require much more to be carried (RTO's and members of gun teams). Pack light and freeze at night. XO's and 1sGs must be relied to ferry equipment. You can't pack for every contingency, load must be tailored to the specific mission.
As a war correspondent during WWII, SLA Marshal saw most of it first hand. He also talked heavily in this book about the effects of stress (someone is shooting at you) on the amount of weight that can be carried. He came under attack for some of his views/advice but for the most part he was correct.
February 13, 2009
This book looks at what a soldier carries on his back when going into battle and how it affects his performance. It takes a spartan approach to the fighting load, noting many examples of past armies who carried unnecessary weight which affected their combat effectiveness. Reminds me of my grandpa telling me how he had to walk uphill both ways in the snow.
February 23, 2008
This book addresses what should be an infantryman's basic load. It addresses a lot of logistical issues that most people don't think about. I thought it was very informative.
March 19, 2010
Gen. Marshall basically repeats the same maxim in several different ways in this book. BL don't overload your men with shit they don't need. Some interesting vignettes though.
February 10, 2018
Our leaders should read this book before they determine our packing lists for combat. 80-120 pounds is a ridiculous amount of weight to expect a man to carry into combat.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews