War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics

by Emile Simpson

In the wars in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and in recent conflicts more generally, liberal powers have blurred the line between military and political activity. 'War From The Ground Up' offers a distinctive perspective in its consideration of the concept of contemporary warfare.

Genres: Politics, Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction, History, Military History, International Relations

540 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2012

Reviews

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an important and thoughtful book, and I admire Simpson for his ambition in taking it on. He deals with basic, fundamental questions about the enduring nature and changing character of war in a way that is not common in the modern age, doing his best to reconcile his own subjective experience of war with an objective appreciation of history and theory. I wish more people would write books like this.

Ultimately, though, the book over-promises and under-delivers. What begins as a reasonably clear (if certainly contentious) thesis about the evolution of war's relationship to politics eventually descends into a welter of odd analogy and unconvincing, vaguely postmodern theory, and the concluding chapter suffers for the loss of rhetorical (narrative?) focus. Simpson has clearly thought deeply and read widely, and his understanding of Clausewitz is flawed—but also sophisticated.

I do hope this isn't the last we hear of Emile Simpson. I hope, too, that the acclamation of so many prominent admirers won't obscure the flaws of this book and keep him from clearer thinking and writing the next time around.

[Aaron Crofut · Rating 4 out of 5]

For many of us, this book will change how you view the conflicts we are currently involved in and those which inevitably will entangle us. Simpson seems like a nice guy and so wouldn't put things as bluntly as I do, but this follows from his work: if you believe the Afghanistan War is between us and the Taliban, you have already dangerously oversimplified the conflict. In any particular area of Afghanistan, you are going to find most Afghans do not see the conflict in those terms. Their local tribal affiliations may run deeper than their interest in either the Taliban or the government in Kabul. Their interests in these "foreign groups" (ISAF is obviously foreign, but the Taliban are often seen as Pakistani rather than native to Afghanistan) probably comes second to their desire to survive the winter. Destroying opium makes sense to us, but doesn't to the farmer who literally depends on that crop for his survival. Simpson describes their culture and politics as a kaleidoscope, and that is exactly right. It is constantly evolving into something new, something unpredictable, something unstable, and something fraught with new challenges. We are not going to come up with a military end state here, because we are no longer in the realm of the military, but of politics. Armed politics, to be sure, but politics. Politics doesn't end.

This book is not a repudiation of Clausewitz, but an update. With apologies to Edwin Starr, war is good for something, or more accurately, for someone, which is why people have conducted them since time immemorial. It is a form of communication: you'll give in to our demands or face the costs of conflict. It is absolutely not random destruction. That would be counterproductive for state actors. Because it is communication, it involves only a small number of parties, the communicator and the receiver of the message. The destruction of your armed forces indicates that you have lost. Responsible governments surrender to protect their now defenseless civilian populations.

We live in a very different age than Clausewitz, though, and Simpson is right that we have not updated our thinking appropriately. War is a performance, battle is the stage, and all who see it are the audience. In the past, the audience was pretty well limited to those directly involved, but now with advancements in communication, a targeted bombing against Hamas can be viewed worldwide within a span of seconds. The response of the audience will come from their value judgements, their history, their desires, not ours, and if we wish them to act in a way that is beneficial to us, we must take this into consideration. But that requires us in turn to have a clear idea of what it is we mean to accomplish.

There is more in this book than I can unpack here. Some particular things worth considering from this book:

~The distinction between subjective and objective is extremely important in communication, even (or perhaps especially) if that communication is war. Objectively, side A might kill X number of side B's troops, whereas side B barely inflicts any damage to side A, but subjectively, side B might credibly claim victory by merely surviving. War's advantage in the past was that both sides (there being a polarity) defined victory as opposing outcomes: X or not X determined who wins. When you have X, not X, Y, Z, 1, %, and click-clack as potential interpretations of any objective action, it becomes difficult to send a message.

~Machiavelli should have been quoted in this book. A centralized enemy might be harder to beat on the battlefield, but if you convince that one audience they have lost, the war ends. Decentralized enemies are like fighting a herd of cats. Sure, you can whoop up on any one pretty easily, but the rest scatter and come back at their convenience. "The" Taliban is a misnomer. The central leadership in Pakistan barely has any control over many "Taliban" factions, to the point where organizing support between different Taliban groups is almost impossible. While this makes concerted, nationwide efforts against us difficult, it also means we have no one to really negotiate an end with. Even if the central leadership wanted an end to the shooting and we gave them decent terms, they couldn't enforce it on all the various groups that have taken up the label and who often have cross purposes with each other.


~Because of the multiple audiences having different interpretations, we end up with the whole kaleidoscope thing. Simpson calls it a Mosaic theory of conflict. In these situations, our high up civilian leaders cannot make all of the policy calls. They cannot possibly keep track of the various political factors and factions in every various village of a country. This means the military, right down to the lowest ranking officers, are going to have to make political decisions based on the information they have on the ground. And not being involved in politics isn't an option where every action you take will have a political reaction from the locals you need to win over.

~One of the multiple exclamation points notes I have in the book involves the need of flexibility in strategic narrative (aka why you are fighting). Think of it this way: your average Democrat thinks of Iraq in terms of 2003, because defining the purpose of the war in those terms suit them best politically today, namely by bashing Bush over trying to create democracy or about the lack of WMDs. Your average Republican wants to talk about 2010, when Obama pulled our troops out, perhaps rashly and prematurely. Nobody seems interested in talking about Iraq circa 2015 and what we mean to accomplish there today. The purpose of a war may very well change depending on how that war ends up happening, and politicians need the flexibility to do that without suffering career ending criticism. That said (and largely agreed with), I think Simpson needed to deal with the obvious challenge against this, namely, that granting flexibility to politicians to change the meaning of war will be done with the interest of said politician in mind, not necessarily the nation.

~A point Simpson somewhat addresses but that I noticed since reading Adrian Goldsworthy in 2010: the ancient historians were not being obtuse when they went into detail on the political situation of every little town in ancient Greece or Rome. It mattered because their wars were one of multiple audiences, where the "us vs. them" dichotomy fails. Each city-state could join one of the opposing sides, or not, and it largely depended on the internal politics of the city, that city's past relationships with the various combatants, its physical strategic situation and ability to resist should one side take umbrage at their decision, how the combatants treated other neutral or potentially convertible city-states in similar situations, etc. When dealing with these low intensity conflicts, Livy, Polybius, and Thucydides are actually more relevant than historians of the Second World War.

~If we mean to win hearts and minds in these various far off places, our State and Defense Departments need to make real efforts to learn their local history, culture, traditions, etc. Not a new point to me, but brought again to my attention in terms of Afghanistan. I've mentioned to my high school classes the failure of the US to learn anything about Vietnamese culture, which we greatly insulted by the strategic hamlet program, removing people from their ancestral homelands, upsetting their notion of filial piety, and creating a great many enemies in the process. My understanding of Afghanistan's political, cultural, and historical background is near zilch (the hell if I have any idea who the Aliqzai or Ishaqai are, or who Dost Mohammed was).

About the only thing I can knock this book for is its own lack of clarity in various parts. There was no need to shoehorn his rhetoric argument around Aristotle. The relationship between the rational and emotional made sense, but Simpson becomes muddled in finding a clear break between ethos and pathos. And then there is the academic speak. The author is quite interesting when telling things from his point of view like he would to a friend, but at other points (in particular near the end) it breaks into academic journal formality that is not impressive, entertaining, or informative.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Emile Simpson provides a framework to view and compose strategy for contemporary conflict. Borrowing heavily from Clausewitz, he contextualizes On War for conflict that exists between more than states employing traditional military means only.

For me, Emile’s framework provides a structure for my thoughts on the war in Afghanistan. While I didn’t find his analysis to be highly original, he provides a common language and structure to interpret the (few) successes and failures at the strategic level.

His section (last portion of the book) on strategic narrative is reason enough to read the book. I appreciated many ideas, but of note are comparing Clausewitz’ trinity to the need to hold logos (rational argument), ethos (moral standing), and pathos (emotional appeal) in tension when crafting a strategic narrative. Also recognizing that multiple audiences have different needs but that in meeting these needs, the strategist must still demonstrate a linked thread between myriad micro narratives.

The only reason I didn’t give this five stars is because the language and sentence structure are unnecessarily difficult to the point of inhibiting understanding. However, it is worth working through this frustration because the content is good.

[Jonathan Z. · Rating 3 out of 5]

The advertising on the book declares, "Deserves to be seen as a coda to Clausewitz' 'On War'" which is a statement from Sir Michael Howard (a big deal in history circles and who translated Clausewitz' "On War" into English). I must disagree and feel it only adds three things to "On War". 1. The idea that tactical actions have strategic manifestations, 2. One must control the narrative of an event as a form of strategy, and 3. Know how actions are perceived by different audiences - that too should be part of strategy.

[The Warfighting Society · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent grunt’s-eye-view of the complexities of insurgency, coupled with one of the best Clausewitzian analyses of conflict I’ve ever read. Simpson emphasizes the need for a positive conflict narrative to counter adversary narratives; whether that narrative comes over social media, traditional media, or simply personal interactions with the local population, the narrative still needs to be there.

[Ben · Rating 5 out of 5]

War From the Ground Up is dense and academically written but it is a must-read for any military or national security professional. Its reevaluation of Clausewitzian conceptions of war are essential to modern policy-making.

[Reidar · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an important and highly thought provoking book about contemporary warfare. The book will reward the reader with basic knowledge of Clausewitz and strategic thought coupled with operational experience from the last decades. This book investigates and discusses the western approach to the ‘long war’ and the questionable strategic narrative and dialogue with tactical actions. For the military student this is a must read!

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book results from the hands-on experience in Nepal and Afghanistan by a British infantry officer. It certainly demands attention because of that.

As usual, Clausewitz owns the post position, but Simpson's point has better purchase out of the gate. Contemporary "warfare" does not enjoy the simple us/them, state-on-state determination of winner and loser. What I found most enlightening was the comparison of situations like those in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere to the problems of local politics in which the various constituencies need identification and evaluation to see who might receive the "strategic narrative," who might be persuaded to accept it, and who were beyond its reach.

The book has more complications than this, but the central point focuses on the need for adaptation, the avoidance of ideological rigidity, and the awareness of constantly shifting parameters so that the "strategic narrative" has a chance of acceptance across the gamut of interested parties, whether on the ground or within hearing.

Though the main focus is Afghanistan, Simpson draws examples from ancient Rome through Vietnam, indicating the problems associated with preconceptions and what I have heard called "Generals fighting the last war." In Afghanistan, he notes, "Taliban" becomes a term that covers everyone struggling to maintain his position, warlords, narcos, etc, so that the various conflicts can be assembled for the consumption of the target audience, at home, etc.

Critically, the points remains that the troops on site carry the weight, having to make the critical political decisions in the process of acting to fulfill orders and to achieve active acceptance from the people. The audiences of the conflict begin at this level and move outward in what I should describe as concentric circles, ultimately not simply to the Afghans and the home nations of the Western forces but to the world at large. One might think of the use of drones as one such issue.

The book is, of course, repetitive as it is a kind of war college textbook, but it is worth reading as it undermines the generally non-analytical versions presented by governments and their media outlets. I put it in with my stack of counter-insurgency volumes and books critical of the US attitude toward the application of violence, like Gen. Smith's The Utility of Force.

[TheF7Pawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

The subject is complex but the writing is lucid and compelling. Simpson argues for a place for counterinsurgency in the west’s quiver but is dubious about employing it as a one-size-fits-all global strategic posture. As he demonstrates with historical examples and personal experience, the local politics and contextual factors are too arcane and the perceptions too likely to be skewed by misunderstandings and counter-narratives. He likens war in the ungoverned spaces to armed domestic politics where western forces are merely another partisan factor to add into the balance. He simultaneously rejects those who would dismiss counterinsurgency as a strategic distraction as well as those who believe it can be distilled into a handful of doctrinal bromides and readily applied to any situation. Whether western policymakers and military leaders can find an effective way to operate between these two extremes is an open question. Simpson seems to think we can, but his case for this is not strong. For example, he places much emphasis on the power of narrative and perception, but rarely discusses it from a domestic point of view. Moreover, how hard it is to please one group let alone multiple groups. Nevertheless, this is highly recommended not only as a good primer on Clausewitz and strategic theory, but also as a fairly effective counter-argument to those such as Gian Gentile who would categorically cede low intensity conflict to our adversaries.

[Gordon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Heavy and profound. A seminal work. Emile Simpson takes on Clausewitz and applies his principles to limited war in complex social contexts, conducted by liberal democracies under the modern conditions of globalized information. An incredible undertaking that is made even more so by the conclusions he comes to about what it means for military and political leaders. Key take-aways for me were on the importance of strategic narrative and coherence with strategy, the importance of feedback from operators to policy-makers (strategic dialogue in Emile's terms) to refine & adapt strategy, the fact that in counter-insurgencies and limited war violence at the tactical level is as political as it is military in nature, and the importance of distinguishing between operational approach and strategy. Sound simple? Well, think of the Clausewitz saying - "All things in war are simple, but even the simplest is difficult." If you found Clausewitz difficult to read, then approach this work forewarned and with patience. I had to read the book twice in its entirety to make the big ideas sink in. I participated in a discussion with Emile in London a few months back and found he speaks exactly as he writes! A brilliant man with a bright future.

[notabattlechick · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first book this year that I've read twice. Some really insightful observations about contemporary warfare; a reasonable critique of Clausewitz that doesn't throw the baby out with the bathwater; some compelling descriptions of the war in Afghanistan. The argument that the framework of war itself is what has fallen apart in the last decade is interesting and compelling - that we are now seeing armed force/organized violence toward directly political ends, rather than armed force/violence directed in a polarized military framework toward political ends - is definitely worth consideration, even if it turns out not to be right. Then, there's lots of discussion about strategic narratives, audiences and "sides" and agents in war/violence. and it's all worth reading. probably twice.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 5 out of 5]

If there's one book I'd recommend reading for the modern conflict/warfare/political strategist, it's this one.

Simpson profoundly brings Clausewitz forward into contemporary, globalized, fragmented, and directly-political conflict and international politics. His recognition of the centrality of the strategic narrative is unique and much-needed.

While Simpson does not provide any checklist-type solutions, he provides a relevant theoretical approach to contextualizing military force.

This is my favorite of the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies curriculum so far, but I have to admit that I'll need to read it a few more times -- this was a weighty read at times.

[T. Fowler · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is another book that I looked forward to reading, based on newspaper reviews that I had seen. But, like Kiev 1941, I was disappointed when I got through the first chapter. Maybe I'm getting slower, but I found the content too academic and the style of writing made it hard to grasp the thesis of the book. Too bad.

[Mallory · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of contemporary conflict and the necessity of adapting strategy to match it instead of the Clausewitzian paradigm of war. Simpson interlaces personal experiences to highlight his points making the reading both informative and personal.

[Erik]

Michael Howard strongly recommends this book: http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/a.... Look forward to reading it.

[Adelaido Godinez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Must read for strategists and warriors. Understanding the theory and practice useful. Will go on my short shelf.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book should be required reading for company commanders and above. It will reshape how you view combat.

[Jason Burkhardt · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a tough read. Comes off as scholarly but I feel there is much less depth to it than the author wishes there to be.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book adds much to the discussion of the impact of the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars to politics, strategy, and operational warfare. Provides this context within the framework of Clausewitz.

[Sam Ratner · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rating caveat: Emile is a mentor and friend, but this is a first rate intellectual memoir and includes some real strategic wisdom.

[Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great read that uses the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan as a case study to provide a greater understanding of Clausewitz's theories.

[JB Ballard · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some good points.

[Yassar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just finished the book. Deals with strategy, strategy narrative and strategy dialogues in counter insurgency. Auth has bought slightly new dimension to Counter terrorism.