Science and Government is a gripping account of one of the great scientific rivalries of the twentieth century. The antagonists are Sir Henry Tizard, a chemist from Imperial College, and Frederick Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), a physicist from the University of Oxford. The scientist-turned-novelist Charles Percy Snow tells a story of hatred and ambition at the top of British science, exposing how vital decisions were made in secret and sometimes with little regard to truth or the prevailing scientific consensus.
Tizard, an adviser to a Labor government, believed the air war against Nazi Germany would be won by investing in the new science of radar. Lindemann favored bombing the homes of German citizens. Each man produced data to support his case, but in the end what mattered was politics. When Labor was in power, Tizard's view prevailed. When the Conservatives returned, Lindemann, who was Winston Churchill's personal adviser, became untouchable.
Snow's 1959 "Two Cultures" Rede Lecture propelled him to worldwide fame. Science and Government, originally the 1960 Godkin Lectures at Harvard, has been largely forgotten. Today the space occupied by scientists and politicians is much more contested than it was in Snow's time, but there remains no better guide to it than Snow's dramatic narrative.
C. P. Snow (1905-1980) held several positions in the British Civil Service and was the author of many fiction and nonfiction books, most notably The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution.
A reflective and pondering rumination on a not-very-well-known backroom political drama which took place in Britain during WWII. It intrigues because it is at one-and-the-same-time, so obscure --and also so influential in its having determined the course of modern life.
C.P. Snow is an unusual author --himself, a government figure also in the war --and a man of keen, discriminating acumen. You may mark him well --and with enjoyment --for the clear, lucid language with which he conveys his ideas and analysis.
The real-life episode he treats here, gave him much material for his later works of fiction (I'm not acquainted with his skills in that realm). But this nonfiction exercise of his, is a small gem of thoughtfulness and ethics; and illustrates a side of history infrequently-presented in either literature or cinema.
The subject of the book is: bureaucracy. Snow patiently examines how the forces of science and the forces of government combine to produce the major --often unpleasant --changes in society.
The ugly truth is this: big decisions about how to run the world are often made by small, mean, grubby men. If you wish to know exactly how the globe often seems to get itself into such a dreadful muddle, this book is for you. The setting of these incident covered in the narrative is WWII, but --it may surprise you to know --this is still how things are done.
An acquired taste --slightly dry --but if you are interested in this kind of thing it is cogent and provocative. And of course the writing. It's a glimpse into a world of the past where language ruled.
the language used in this book make it unclear whether or not it’s supposed to be a gay love/hate story. otherwise, a pretty easy read for the amount of information in it, tells an interesting story to propose ideas about how the relationship between science and government has been and should be.
An interesting lecture and history lesson on what can happen when there is too much reliance on one person for scientific advice. Snow wants to point out the dangers of too much reliance from non-scientist policy makers on a single scientist, and, in general, how secret decisions are made by governments inevitably by a small number of people.
Snow uses a parable of Sir Henry Tizard and Lord Cherwell (Lindemann), where Tizard showed good instincts and judgments on how to allocate resources during WWII and Lindemann generally did not. The parable works fairly well, and is an interesting story in itself. It focuses on radar and strategic bombing.
Snow then explains the lessons, which are modest but I think the best that can be taken. Don't put too much faith in one expert. He also points out that because of science's increasing importance for policy decisions, it would be better to have more scientists or at the very least scientifically literate people in the government. This always sounds good in theory, but I am never as sure scientists would generally be good at policy, but Snow puts in the proper caveat that having more scientists would not necessarily lead to improvement, just that it may lead to more long-term thinking. Again, I'd agree that more scientific literacy is good, but I think it always just comes down to personalities and individual abilities. Indeed, this is another conclusion that Snow makes.
This was a good, quick read that lays out the problem for consideration and then examines some tentative answers. I'd recommend it to anyone who thinks about the proper relationship between government and science on policy, with especial regard to its handling of secret ("closed politics") research decisions.
Snow reviews historical documents surrounding the influence of scientists on British WWII strategy and outcome in the third printing of "Science and Government". The author expands on this to suggest a recommendation for improved scientific influence in government while discerning the dangers surrounding an individual scientist's impact as sole scientific contributor to non-scientific administrators in government.
The third printing includes critical review of the original lectures upon the publication of additional historical documents and adds additional insight to the recommendations previously purported by the author. The author seemed to welcome criticism and provides supporting evidence to each historical discernment. This insight may benefit any scientific, governmental, or WWII historical mind.
Wow. This ought to be required reading for anyone who wants to be leader of a country---and for that matter, leader of people at any level. This is genuinely insightful into how people actually run organizations. It's at a very high level, so it doesn't replace management books, but ought to be considered the background in which such are read.
If you want one brief, sharp look at how scientific expertise makes its way (or doesn't) into the political process, this isn't a bad place to start. I didn't learn much new here--I wrote my thesis on the general topic, and the specific case described is fairly obscure--but it's a well-told tale, and a good example of the general "process."