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Why the Confederacy Lost
After the Civil War, someone asked General Pickett why the Battle of Gettysburg had been lost: Was it Lee's error in taking the offensive, the tardiness of Ewell and Early, or Longstreet's hesitation in attacking? Pickett scratched his head and replied, "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." This simple fact, writes James McPherson, has escaped a generation of historians who have looked to faulty morale, population, economics, and dissent as the causes of Confederate failure. These were all factors, he writes, but the Civil War was still a war--won by the Union army through key victories at key moments.
With this brilliant review of how historians have explained the Southern defeat, McPherson opens a fascinating account by several leading historians of how the Union broke the Confederate rebellion. In every chapter, the military struggle takes center stage, as the authors reveal how battlefield decisions shaped the very forces that many scholars (putting the cart before the horse) claim determined the outcome of the war. Archer Jones examines the strategy of the two sides, showing how each had to match its military planning to political necessity. Lee raided north of the Potomac with one eye on European recognition and the other on Northern public opinion--but his inevitable retreats looked like failure to the Southern public. The North, however, developed a strategy of deep raids that was extremely effective because it served a valuable political as well as military purpose, shattering Southern morale by tearing up the interior. Gary Gallagher takes a hard look at the role of
generals, narrowing his focus to the crucial triumvirate of Lee, Grant, and Sherman, who towered above the others. Lee's aggressiveness may have been costly, but he well knew the political impact of his spectacular victories; Grant and Sherman, meanwhile, were the first Union generals to fully harness Northern resources and carry out coordinated campaigns. Reid Mitchell shows how the Union's advantage in numbers was enhanced by a dedication and perseverance of federal troops that was not matched by the Confederates after their home front began to collapse. And Joseph Glatthaar examines black troops, whose role is entering the realm of national myth.
In 1960, there appeared a collection of essays by major historians, entitled Why the North Won the Civil War , edited by David Donald; it is now in its twenty-sixth printing, having sold well over 100,000 copies. Why the Confederacy Lost provides a parallel volume, written by today's leading authorities. Provocatively argued and engagingly written, this work reminds us that the hard-won triumph of the North was far from inevitable.
With this brilliant review of how historians have explained the Southern defeat, McPherson opens a fascinating account by several leading historians of how the Union broke the Confederate rebellion. In every chapter, the military struggle takes center stage, as the authors reveal how battlefield decisions shaped the very forces that many scholars (putting the cart before the horse) claim determined the outcome of the war. Archer Jones examines the strategy of the two sides, showing how each had to match its military planning to political necessity. Lee raided north of the Potomac with one eye on European recognition and the other on Northern public opinion--but his inevitable retreats looked like failure to the Southern public. The North, however, developed a strategy of deep raids that was extremely effective because it served a valuable political as well as military purpose, shattering Southern morale by tearing up the interior. Gary Gallagher takes a hard look at the role of
generals, narrowing his focus to the crucial triumvirate of Lee, Grant, and Sherman, who towered above the others. Lee's aggressiveness may have been costly, but he well knew the political impact of his spectacular victories; Grant and Sherman, meanwhile, were the first Union generals to fully harness Northern resources and carry out coordinated campaigns. Reid Mitchell shows how the Union's advantage in numbers was enhanced by a dedication and perseverance of federal troops that was not matched by the Confederates after their home front began to collapse. And Joseph Glatthaar examines black troops, whose role is entering the realm of national myth.
In 1960, there appeared a collection of essays by major historians, entitled Why the North Won the Civil War , edited by David Donald; it is now in its twenty-sixth printing, having sold well over 100,000 copies. Why the Confederacy Lost provides a parallel volume, written by today's leading authorities. Provocatively argued and engagingly written, this work reminds us that the hard-won triumph of the North was far from inevitable.
209 pages, Paperback
First published April 2, 1992
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About the author
Gabor S. Boritt
27 books9 followersGabor S. Boritt was the Robert Fluhrer Professor of Civil War Studies and Director of the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
December 8, 2021
An excellent book of essays presented at a conference at the Gettysburg Civil War Institute in 1991 addressing the most important question of the Civil War that's accessible to a lay reader that addresses issues that Civil War historians continue to raise thirty years later.
As historian Richard Current replied in an earlier book to the question Why the Union Won, "as usual, God was on the side of the heaviest battalions." Each essay here tries to explain why lacking the heaviest battalions was necessary but not sufficient for the Confederacy to lose.
James McPherson starts out by rejecting many common explanations for the war's outcome, including lack of Confederate "will" to see the war through. McPherson then asserts the necessity of military history, even as historians look at causes for the war's outcome that are external, whether political, economic or social.
Then, Archer Jones talks about how difficult it is to separate the military from the political, arguing that both presidents and generals planned and fought battles not just to win on the battlefield but also to appeal to the folks at home. In some cases, battles made little military sense but carried a big symbolic punch, as at Gettysburg. One thing that Lincoln had in common with Jefferson Davis was that he couldn't leave the war to his generals but had to worry about public opinion, finding himself "caught between the professional soldiers' views of military reality and the civilian perspective, which tended to see war almost exclusively in terms of battles. So the populace demanded battles from generals when most of them realized the ineffectiveness of a combat strategy."
In the book's most interesting essay, "'Upon Their Success Hang Momentous Interests': Generals," Gary Gallagher argues that generals played a major role in the outcome and that only a small group of leading generals were indispensable: Grant, Sherman and Lee.
Grant and Sherman are why the Confederacy Lost. But Lee is why it took so long to happen.
The Union certainly boasted the heaviest battalions. But after Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans know that weighty forces don't guarantee victory over a weaker foe. The Union was not able to leverage its advantage in men and guns until the right generals came along, generals committed to moving forward at all cost, even if that cost was fearful. That's what Grant and Sherman brought to the war that previous Union commanders lacked: a willingness to spend blood and treasure and never sound retreat.
Famously, through no fault of his own, Lee had fewer resources but did enjoy the home field advantage. He could have leveraged that advantage more by fighting a war of defense and retreat as George Washington did to win the Revolution or even as his fellow Confederate commander Joseph Johnston did in the Civil War, especially his own brilliant retreat from Sherman that kept his army in the field even after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox.
But Lee did not fight a defensive war. Instead pursued a strategy of aggressive offense, pushing twice into the North. From a purely military perspective, offense was often a mistake. But it gave the Confederate public the showy victories they demanded while hurting morale in the North. Lee hoped that following this strategy would embarrass Lincoln and the war party so much that they'd lose enough elections, especially the presidential race of 1864, to embolden Copperheads in the North who would force Washington to sue for peace.
And the Southern public, like the Northern one, demanded battlefield victories. Early in the war, before he was able to lead Confederate armies into bold offensives, critics tarred him with the nickname Granny Lee. But after daring campaigns at Antietam and Gettysburg, Lee became not merely a battlefield hero with nearly godlike status, but his name became synonymous with the Confederate war effort. So much so, that as long as Lee remained in the field, no amount of Confederate defeats, whether in the western theater or even back east, could entirely bust home front morale. On the other side, once Lee surrendered, it didn't matter that Johnston and other commanders remained at large. To the Confederate public, the end of Lee meant the end of the war.
Lee was neither old fashioned nor too aggressive in his battlefield tactics, according to Gallagher. "Far from hastening the demise of the Confederacy, Lee's generalship provided hope that probably carried the South beyond the point at which its citizens otherwise would have abandoned their quest for nationhood."
And while critics have accused Lee of myopia and favoring his home state to the detriment of the whole war effort, ignoring the western theater, refusing to share troops with other commanders and insisting on devoting the maximum of resources to Virginia, Lee was in fact thinking nationally by focusing on the war in the East. He knew that the "Confederacy would lose the war in either the West or the East, but it could win the war only in the East," since that's what both sides, as well as the European powers, really cared about. Lee was also hesitant to deplete his army by sharing troops, since he was afraid that they'd be wasted by less competent commanders like Braxton Bragg in Tennessee or Georgia or John Pemberton in Vicksburg.
The book concludes with another strong essay, "Black Glory" by Joseph T. Glatthaar on the contribution of 180,000 Black soldiers and sailors who filled Union regiments and manned federal ships just when white people up North were failing to enlist in large enough numbers and had to be drafted, an unpopular policy that led to urban draft riots and imperiled Republican candidates in elections at the state and federal levels. Glatthaar also explains the important contribution to the war effort of runaway slaves who withdrew their valuable labor from the Confederacy and contributed it to the Union.
The strong performance of US Colored Troops at Miliken's Bend and other battles during the Vicksburg Campaign convinced Grant that emancipation along with black enlistment was "the heaviest blow yet given the Confederacy."
Much more interesting to a lay reader than the average collection of essays based on papers at a conference, "Why the Confederacy Lost" remains worthwhile three decades after its original publication.
As historian Richard Current replied in an earlier book to the question Why the Union Won, "as usual, God was on the side of the heaviest battalions." Each essay here tries to explain why lacking the heaviest battalions was necessary but not sufficient for the Confederacy to lose.
James McPherson starts out by rejecting many common explanations for the war's outcome, including lack of Confederate "will" to see the war through. McPherson then asserts the necessity of military history, even as historians look at causes for the war's outcome that are external, whether political, economic or social.
Then, Archer Jones talks about how difficult it is to separate the military from the political, arguing that both presidents and generals planned and fought battles not just to win on the battlefield but also to appeal to the folks at home. In some cases, battles made little military sense but carried a big symbolic punch, as at Gettysburg. One thing that Lincoln had in common with Jefferson Davis was that he couldn't leave the war to his generals but had to worry about public opinion, finding himself "caught between the professional soldiers' views of military reality and the civilian perspective, which tended to see war almost exclusively in terms of battles. So the populace demanded battles from generals when most of them realized the ineffectiveness of a combat strategy."
In the book's most interesting essay, "'Upon Their Success Hang Momentous Interests': Generals," Gary Gallagher argues that generals played a major role in the outcome and that only a small group of leading generals were indispensable: Grant, Sherman and Lee.
Grant and Sherman are why the Confederacy Lost. But Lee is why it took so long to happen.
The Union certainly boasted the heaviest battalions. But after Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans know that weighty forces don't guarantee victory over a weaker foe. The Union was not able to leverage its advantage in men and guns until the right generals came along, generals committed to moving forward at all cost, even if that cost was fearful. That's what Grant and Sherman brought to the war that previous Union commanders lacked: a willingness to spend blood and treasure and never sound retreat.
Famously, through no fault of his own, Lee had fewer resources but did enjoy the home field advantage. He could have leveraged that advantage more by fighting a war of defense and retreat as George Washington did to win the Revolution or even as his fellow Confederate commander Joseph Johnston did in the Civil War, especially his own brilliant retreat from Sherman that kept his army in the field even after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox.
But Lee did not fight a defensive war. Instead pursued a strategy of aggressive offense, pushing twice into the North. From a purely military perspective, offense was often a mistake. But it gave the Confederate public the showy victories they demanded while hurting morale in the North. Lee hoped that following this strategy would embarrass Lincoln and the war party so much that they'd lose enough elections, especially the presidential race of 1864, to embolden Copperheads in the North who would force Washington to sue for peace.
And the Southern public, like the Northern one, demanded battlefield victories. Early in the war, before he was able to lead Confederate armies into bold offensives, critics tarred him with the nickname Granny Lee. But after daring campaigns at Antietam and Gettysburg, Lee became not merely a battlefield hero with nearly godlike status, but his name became synonymous with the Confederate war effort. So much so, that as long as Lee remained in the field, no amount of Confederate defeats, whether in the western theater or even back east, could entirely bust home front morale. On the other side, once Lee surrendered, it didn't matter that Johnston and other commanders remained at large. To the Confederate public, the end of Lee meant the end of the war.
Lee was neither old fashioned nor too aggressive in his battlefield tactics, according to Gallagher. "Far from hastening the demise of the Confederacy, Lee's generalship provided hope that probably carried the South beyond the point at which its citizens otherwise would have abandoned their quest for nationhood."
And while critics have accused Lee of myopia and favoring his home state to the detriment of the whole war effort, ignoring the western theater, refusing to share troops with other commanders and insisting on devoting the maximum of resources to Virginia, Lee was in fact thinking nationally by focusing on the war in the East. He knew that the "Confederacy would lose the war in either the West or the East, but it could win the war only in the East," since that's what both sides, as well as the European powers, really cared about. Lee was also hesitant to deplete his army by sharing troops, since he was afraid that they'd be wasted by less competent commanders like Braxton Bragg in Tennessee or Georgia or John Pemberton in Vicksburg.
The book concludes with another strong essay, "Black Glory" by Joseph T. Glatthaar on the contribution of 180,000 Black soldiers and sailors who filled Union regiments and manned federal ships just when white people up North were failing to enlist in large enough numbers and had to be drafted, an unpopular policy that led to urban draft riots and imperiled Republican candidates in elections at the state and federal levels. Glatthaar also explains the important contribution to the war effort of runaway slaves who withdrew their valuable labor from the Confederacy and contributed it to the Union.
The strong performance of US Colored Troops at Miliken's Bend and other battles during the Vicksburg Campaign convinced Grant that emancipation along with black enlistment was "the heaviest blow yet given the Confederacy."
Much more interesting to a lay reader than the average collection of essays based on papers at a conference, "Why the Confederacy Lost" remains worthwhile three decades after its original publication.
December 23, 2008
Gabor Borritt has a knack for gathering the papers of leading Civil War scholars and bundling them into short, interesting books that are good gateways towards deeper reading on this topic. "Why the Confederacy Lost" does just that, bringing in one volume analysis by James McPherson, Archer Jones, Gary Gallagher, Reid Mitchell and Joseph Glatthaar. they agree the South lost, but how? Each has a different answer.
McPherson, well known for his Pulitzer Prize-winning "Battle Cry of Freedom," ascribes some role to "contingency." Each battle or campaign victory would boost morale on one side, degrade it on the other. So much of the war see-sawed as either side enjoyed "winning streaks." But eventually the tally weighed to the North's favor after Atlanta and Lincoln's re-election. Either side could have won, McPherson contends, but it depended on generals and armies doing the right thing at the right time, over and over again.
Archer Jones, who co-authored two in-depth ACW books, "How the North Won" and Why the South Lost", turns his attention to how both sides formulated and executed their strategies. He considers North and South roughly equal to the task. Both sides eventually had to discard their interpretations of Napoleonic strategy, with the North executing its raiding strategy on a massive scale (Sherman's march), eventually producing victory.
Gary Gallagher sees the war through the prism of leadership, only rating Lee, Grant and Sherman as the only generals as "excellent." Lee pursued a Napoleonic strategy, either outflanking invading Union armies (Second Manassas, Chancellorsville), or seeking decisive victory on northern soil (Antietam, Gettysburg). It was his only viable option given the situation and the means at hand. But Grant could picture the war as the interplay of multiple theaters and serial battles, not as a decision obtained by a single battle. He could bring force to bear on that basis. Sherman understood the political dimension of the war better than his commander, his march to the sea bringing the war home to southerners, demoralizing their war effort.
Reid Mitchell sees morale as the ultimate factor deciding the conflict. The soldier saw his army as an extension of his family, fighting for his country on that basis. But in the end, the safety of the actual family outweighed duty in the mind of the average Confederate soldier, many of whom deserted to protect hearth and home.
In explaining southern defeat, Joseph Glaathaar places greater weight on the slaves deserting the South to serve in the Union Army. Slavery allowed the South to enroll more white soldiers, knowing the home front would remain productive. But advancing northern armies acted like a magnet on slaves, pulling them away from plantations, thus depriving the South of its productive labor. Upon enlisting in the Union Army, ex-slaves then added their decisive number in manpower to the northern war effort--some 190,000--thus obtaining victory.
Many readers well-versed in the ACW can come up with their own mix of reasons why the outcome was so. "Why the confederacy Lost" "Why the Confederacy Lost" is still a worthy addition to the book shelf of any Civil War buff, deepening understanding for the experienced reader and the beginner alike, while still getting is points across in (mostly) accessible prose.
McPherson, well known for his Pulitzer Prize-winning "Battle Cry of Freedom," ascribes some role to "contingency." Each battle or campaign victory would boost morale on one side, degrade it on the other. So much of the war see-sawed as either side enjoyed "winning streaks." But eventually the tally weighed to the North's favor after Atlanta and Lincoln's re-election. Either side could have won, McPherson contends, but it depended on generals and armies doing the right thing at the right time, over and over again.
Archer Jones, who co-authored two in-depth ACW books, "How the North Won" and Why the South Lost", turns his attention to how both sides formulated and executed their strategies. He considers North and South roughly equal to the task. Both sides eventually had to discard their interpretations of Napoleonic strategy, with the North executing its raiding strategy on a massive scale (Sherman's march), eventually producing victory.
Gary Gallagher sees the war through the prism of leadership, only rating Lee, Grant and Sherman as the only generals as "excellent." Lee pursued a Napoleonic strategy, either outflanking invading Union armies (Second Manassas, Chancellorsville), or seeking decisive victory on northern soil (Antietam, Gettysburg). It was his only viable option given the situation and the means at hand. But Grant could picture the war as the interplay of multiple theaters and serial battles, not as a decision obtained by a single battle. He could bring force to bear on that basis. Sherman understood the political dimension of the war better than his commander, his march to the sea bringing the war home to southerners, demoralizing their war effort.
Reid Mitchell sees morale as the ultimate factor deciding the conflict. The soldier saw his army as an extension of his family, fighting for his country on that basis. But in the end, the safety of the actual family outweighed duty in the mind of the average Confederate soldier, many of whom deserted to protect hearth and home.
In explaining southern defeat, Joseph Glaathaar places greater weight on the slaves deserting the South to serve in the Union Army. Slavery allowed the South to enroll more white soldiers, knowing the home front would remain productive. But advancing northern armies acted like a magnet on slaves, pulling them away from plantations, thus depriving the South of its productive labor. Upon enlisting in the Union Army, ex-slaves then added their decisive number in manpower to the northern war effort--some 190,000--thus obtaining victory.
Many readers well-versed in the ACW can come up with their own mix of reasons why the outcome was so. "Why the confederacy Lost" "Why the Confederacy Lost" is still a worthy addition to the book shelf of any Civil War buff, deepening understanding for the experienced reader and the beginner alike, while still getting is points across in (mostly) accessible prose.
March 10, 2017
Here are five essays purporting to tell why the Confederacy lost the Civil War (War Between the States, the Late Unpleasantness, the Rebellion….).
I enjoyed James M. McPherson’s (Battle Cry of Freedom) essay, “American Victory, American Defeat” the most. He says why best: the Union had better leadership. Hang on Dixie fans: sure, the South had St. Robert of Lee, Stonewall, and “Jeb,” but they were only masters of the operational art and didn’t do a damn thing for any place other than Virginia. The North provided the leadership—Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—which won the war. The Union also provided superior leadership and management of logistics. And, at the very top, there was one Abraham Lincoln.
Archer Jones (How the North Won) discusses strategy as seen by the leadership of both sides in Military Means, Political Ends: Strategy. To tell the truth, I found it a little hard to follow.
Gary Gallagher’s (The Confederate War, many others) “Upon Their Success….” compares Grant, Sherman, and Lee. Grant and Sherman get due credit for winning and Gallagher defends (justly, in my amateur opinion) Lee’s aggressiveness.
In “The Perseverance of the Soldiers,” Reid Mitchell (Civil War Soldiers) credits Federal Soldiers for staying the course and reelecting Lincoln while the Confederate armies were plagued with desertion.
“Black Glory: The African-American Role in Union Victory” by Joseph T. Glatthaar (The March to the Sea and Beyond), credits black soldiers, in great numbers with helping to achieve victory, something which is often overlooked or unknown.
Having read it, I wondered in places that the book shouldn’t have been titled Why the Union won. Perhaps the Confederacy lost because it didn’t or couldn’t do what the Union did to win. Regardless, a good read.
I enjoyed James M. McPherson’s (Battle Cry of Freedom) essay, “American Victory, American Defeat” the most. He says why best: the Union had better leadership. Hang on Dixie fans: sure, the South had St. Robert of Lee, Stonewall, and “Jeb,” but they were only masters of the operational art and didn’t do a damn thing for any place other than Virginia. The North provided the leadership—Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—which won the war. The Union also provided superior leadership and management of logistics. And, at the very top, there was one Abraham Lincoln.
Archer Jones (How the North Won) discusses strategy as seen by the leadership of both sides in Military Means, Political Ends: Strategy. To tell the truth, I found it a little hard to follow.
Gary Gallagher’s (The Confederate War, many others) “Upon Their Success….” compares Grant, Sherman, and Lee. Grant and Sherman get due credit for winning and Gallagher defends (justly, in my amateur opinion) Lee’s aggressiveness.
In “The Perseverance of the Soldiers,” Reid Mitchell (Civil War Soldiers) credits Federal Soldiers for staying the course and reelecting Lincoln while the Confederate armies were plagued with desertion.
“Black Glory: The African-American Role in Union Victory” by Joseph T. Glatthaar (The March to the Sea and Beyond), credits black soldiers, in great numbers with helping to achieve victory, something which is often overlooked or unknown.
Having read it, I wondered in places that the book shouldn’t have been titled Why the Union won. Perhaps the Confederacy lost because it didn’t or couldn’t do what the Union did to win. Regardless, a good read.
October 11, 2011
“Hi. I'm Gill, and I'm a Civil War buff. "
August 12, 2011
Essays 3 and 5 are good. The rest are dull and offer nothing exciting and even rely on old myths, like McClellan as a peace candidate in 1864, when there is no evidence to support such a claim.
August 22, 2020
This book of essays is an excellent introduction to some of the historical theories why the South lost the American Civil War.
June 11, 2023
Classic Civil War Literature!!!
August 17, 2009
Different perspectives by five historians on why the Confederacy lost.
Obviously I recall the last one the best, and he indicated in his thesis that it was the of black soldiers that put the Union over the top much like the American doughboy in WWI did not win the war for the Allies per se, but gave that extra push that put them over the top.
Obviously I recall the last one the best, and he indicated in his thesis that it was the of black soldiers that put the Union over the top much like the American doughboy in WWI did not win the war for the Allies per se, but gave that extra push that put them over the top.
July 11, 2011
A collection of five essays by well-known historians. Ballanced and fair coverage of the political, economic and military reasons why the south lost the war.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews