What do you think?
Rate this book
Riigikaitse raamatukogu
The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle
The Art of Maneuver is an important theoretical study of an issue that is currently the subject of much discussion in professional military journals and symposia.
330 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1955
35 people are currently reading
375 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
January 14, 2015
Leonhard's first book was very approachable. My shelf copy has become so worn from re-reading that I can't use it any more (I broke down and bought a Kindle version) I started reading it as a young Army officer and so many of the problems he had were things I saw. I was considered a bit weird and an outsider for being well-read on strategy and tactics both by my peers and superiors. Leonhard's book made me hope that there were others out there who thought being an officer meant more than having a great PT score.
The book itself lays out some excellent tenets of maneuver warfare while giving a history lesson of US Army doctrine development. Leonhard asks excellent questions and lays out clear points for what maneuver warfare should be. His writing style is not academic or dense at all (a problem with many writers in the military strategy field.)
The content is a bit dated as it focuses directly on US Army strategy (specifically cold war doctrine), but the ideas are still very relevant. Just as Liddel Hart is still relevant today, so is Leonhard's book. If you are a young soldier trying to learn more, an academic studying military science, or just someone who's interested in military strategy; I recommend picking this up. It's at the top of my list.
The book itself lays out some excellent tenets of maneuver warfare while giving a history lesson of US Army doctrine development. Leonhard asks excellent questions and lays out clear points for what maneuver warfare should be. His writing style is not academic or dense at all (a problem with many writers in the military strategy field.)
The content is a bit dated as it focuses directly on US Army strategy (specifically cold war doctrine), but the ideas are still very relevant. Just as Liddel Hart is still relevant today, so is Leonhard's book. If you are a young soldier trying to learn more, an academic studying military science, or just someone who's interested in military strategy; I recommend picking this up. It's at the top of my list.
January 29, 2022
If Sun Tzu was the Jedi master, Robert Leonhard would likely be counted as amongst the former's foremost apprentice of the 20th & 21st centuries A.D. The author is not necessarily referring to maneuver on the part of friendly forces (although it is expected that most movements will be such) but also the ability of the friendly commander to compel the enemy's forces to "maneuver" into unfavorable terrain, thus forcing dislocation or disruption, even if friendly forces are not on the move. He emphasizes that "war is not a mathematical exercise. It is a psychological contest".
Regarding Soviet doctrine, many blinded by the collapse of the Soviet Union (not via military means) & their withdrawal from Afghanistan (confronted by an asymmetrical form of warfare that negated Soviet superiority), are thus educated by Robert Leonhard. He maintains that the Red Army's operational doctrine, typically stereotyped & perceived as rigid or dependent only upon masses of firepower, are actually maneuver-based despite its command-push orientation. In other words, NATO forces then might not have prevailed had Soviet Union considered that an invasion was more likely to succeed based upon the Red Army's doctrine of overwhelming forces racing towards the strategic & operational rear depth of the Western European theater.
'Art of Maneuver' eminently deserves a place next to 'The Art of War', neither eclipsing nor shadowed by the latter, but as Leonhard himself would describe it, supplants & reinforces the lessons expounded in the 5th century B.C. As a non-military reader, I would highly recommend this book for armchair generals & diehard fans of Sun Tzu. #Goodreads
Regarding Soviet doctrine, many blinded by the collapse of the Soviet Union (not via military means) & their withdrawal from Afghanistan (confronted by an asymmetrical form of warfare that negated Soviet superiority), are thus educated by Robert Leonhard. He maintains that the Red Army's operational doctrine, typically stereotyped & perceived as rigid or dependent only upon masses of firepower, are actually maneuver-based despite its command-push orientation. In other words, NATO forces then might not have prevailed had Soviet Union considered that an invasion was more likely to succeed based upon the Red Army's doctrine of overwhelming forces racing towards the strategic & operational rear depth of the Western European theater.
'Art of Maneuver' eminently deserves a place next to 'The Art of War', neither eclipsing nor shadowed by the latter, but as Leonhard himself would describe it, supplants & reinforces the lessons expounded in the 5th century B.C. As a non-military reader, I would highly recommend this book for armchair generals & diehard fans of Sun Tzu. #Goodreads
March 1, 2025
Leonhard’s book on Maneuver Warfare was surprising approachable and interesting despite the academic rigor and how dense the book itself is. A lot of basic concepts of Maneuver Warfare was explained in simple but detailed ways that even a layman could understand.
However, I have my fair shares of skepticism towards full Maneuver Warfare as the future of warfare due to what we have already seen in Russo-Ukrainian War. Of course, the author explained the danger of maneuver for the sake of maneuver and Russia was definitely lacking capabilities and mastery to execute maneuver warfare.
In my personal opinion, I don’t think maneuver warfare could be implemented in totality as the author would suggested. I’d figured, given the nature of current world, maneuver warfare could be used more freely and effectively in campaigns but not in the entirety of the war.
Let’s be real for a second, our military is full of underpaid, undermanned, undertrained officers that are either lacking in experience or focus only on the tactical side of the war. To reform the military to utilize the intellectual rigor would mean a lack of quantity of officers in a short period of time which is quite a risk to take when you can’t predict the academic capabilities of officers involved. The geniuses might perform at their peak but what about your average officers? Geniuses only make up like 5-10% of cream of the crop while average officers make up the remaining percentage. Maneuver warfare can’t be executed masterfully by those average officers. How do we overcome these weaknesses?
However, I have my fair shares of skepticism towards full Maneuver Warfare as the future of warfare due to what we have already seen in Russo-Ukrainian War. Of course, the author explained the danger of maneuver for the sake of maneuver and Russia was definitely lacking capabilities and mastery to execute maneuver warfare.
In my personal opinion, I don’t think maneuver warfare could be implemented in totality as the author would suggested. I’d figured, given the nature of current world, maneuver warfare could be used more freely and effectively in campaigns but not in the entirety of the war.
Let’s be real for a second, our military is full of underpaid, undermanned, undertrained officers that are either lacking in experience or focus only on the tactical side of the war. To reform the military to utilize the intellectual rigor would mean a lack of quantity of officers in a short period of time which is quite a risk to take when you can’t predict the academic capabilities of officers involved. The geniuses might perform at their peak but what about your average officers? Geniuses only make up like 5-10% of cream of the crop while average officers make up the remaining percentage. Maneuver warfare can’t be executed masterfully by those average officers. How do we overcome these weaknesses?
July 22, 2025
Short and comprehensive introduction to maneuver warfare, albeit somewhat US specific and dated for now - written in 1991, this book obviously doesn't take into account the increased amount of visibility on the battlefield due to unmanned systems, satellites etc the complete dissolution of battlefield areas - effectively everything everywhere is a target now. Otherwise good reading for military professionals.
October 7, 2019
This book is often cited as a business book even though it is quite literally written about the battlefield. It is a very good analysis of Maneuver Warfare Theory and how it has been successful throughout battles in history. The historical battle analysis was very interesting. Other parts of the book can be quite dry.
October 15, 2023
Insights on momentum and decisive events were good.
February 14, 2025
30 years later deserves to be read by all officers. To search defeat and not destruction of the enemy. The author also underlines the importance of speed in command and control.
April 24, 2025
As the title suggests, this is a book about tactics and doctrine. Discussion on what was known as AirLand Battle Doctrine in the 1980s. Good read if you doctrine studies.
May 23, 2008
Among the most approachable books on maneuver warfare. Takes a bit of extrapolation to see 4th generation warfare in these terms, but you won't get anywhere on 4GW without first understanding this material.
October 11, 2007
The better written maneuver warfare tactics book... Lots of valuable information...
April 24, 2010
A modern classic of military theory. The examples are a bit dated now, but the theory is still solid.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews