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A History of the Peninsular War V6: September 1,1812 to August 5,1813 the Seige of Burgos,the Retreat from Burgos,the Ca
Between the autumn of 1812 and the late summer of 1813 campaigning in the peninsula took on a new aspect. From being a defence of Portugal and those parts of Spain not under French control, it became an effort by the British, Spanish and Portuguese forces to drive the French out completely. Operations at the end of 1812 included the unsuccessful British siege of Burgos and the subsequent retreat; renewed campaigning on the east coast of Spain, including Murray's actions around Tarragona; and the beginning of the final offensive against the French, including the epic battles of Roncesvalles, Maya and Sorauren.
795 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1996
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About the author
Charles Oman
493 books48 followersSir Charles William Chadwick Oman was a British military historian of the early 20th century. His reconstructions of medieval battles from the fragmentary and distorted accounts left by chroniclers were pioneering. His style is an invigorating mixture of historical accuracy and emotional highlights, and it makes his narratives, though founded on deep research, often read as smoothly as fiction, especially in his History of the Peninsular War. Occasionally, his interpretations have been challenged, especially his widely copied thesis that British troops defeated their Napoleonic opponents by firepower alone. Paddy Griffith, among modern historians, claims the British infantry's discipline and willingness to attack were equally important.
He was born in India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University, where he studied under William Stubbs. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career.
He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, in succession to Montagu Burrows. He was also elected to the FBA that year, serving as President of the Royal Historical and Numismatic societies, and of the Royal Archaeological Institute.
His academic career was interrupted by the First World War, during which he was employed by the government Press Bureau and Foreign Office.
Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.
He became an honorary fellow of New College in 1936 and received the honorary degrees of DCL (Oxford, 1926) and LL.D (Edinburgh, 1911 and Cambridge, 1927). He died at Oxford.
Two of his children became authors. Son Charles wrote several volumes on British silverware and similar housewares. Daughter Carola was notable for her biographies, especially that of Nelson.
He was born in India, the son of a British planter, and was educated at Oxford University, where he studied under William Stubbs. In 1881 he was elected to a Prize Fellowship at All Souls College, where he would remain for the rest of his career.
He was elected the Chichele Professor of modern history at Oxford in 1905, in succession to Montagu Burrows. He was also elected to the FBA that year, serving as President of the Royal Historical and Numismatic societies, and of the Royal Archaeological Institute.
His academic career was interrupted by the First World War, during which he was employed by the government Press Bureau and Foreign Office.
Oman was a Conservative member of Parliament for the University of Oxford constituency from 1919 to 1935, and was knighted in 1920.
He became an honorary fellow of New College in 1936 and received the honorary degrees of DCL (Oxford, 1926) and LL.D (Edinburgh, 1911 and Cambridge, 1927). He died at Oxford.
Two of his children became authors. Son Charles wrote several volumes on British silverware and similar housewares. Daughter Carola was notable for her biographies, especially that of Nelson.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
August 22, 2019
What fluency of writing that still reads so well after a century of language development. What depth of research, analysis and reconstruction. What a magnificent story unraveled. The greatest work of history ever written!
Oman returns to the Peninsular war after the hiatus of the first world war. Oman mentions in the preface the stringencies of the post war period restricted the number of plates and indeed at times a few more maps (although not critical) would have been helpful. While the end-foldout map although excellent is most unhelpful for reference alongside reading. Also there are sometimes problems with the map spellings being at variance with the text. I used Robertson's atlas alongside the book to carefully follow critical movements.
What themes come through? One is the tenacity of the French as fighters. Like the pillaging, rapacious horde that is was; French armies could be repulsed, disordered, mauled but always coalesce back into the battle-ready swarm with a semblance of control. In contrast the British are less likely to spontaneously coalesce, thus are more prone to reverses (or indeed Vittoria's loot), but whose steadiness and ability summon forth hidden morale for any fight is unsurpassed.
This volume is also both a contrast and a parallel of military genius. On the one hand the ridiculous attempt of Napoleon to do everything himself from distance ruined his cause. On the other hand Wellington's tactical, operational and strategic accomplishments mark him as a general of the first order. Nevertheless even for Wellington on the spot the toll after all these years is showing. The reverses of Burgos and the retreat at the end of such a year of triumph lead to ill temper and frustration (as does the Vittoria aftermath). Then after one of the greatest strategic envelopments in history there is over caution and probably too much exhaustion to finish the job by utterly annihilating the French.
In the lead up to Vittoria the French tenacity in achieving concentration in the face of Wellington's grand sweep testifies to their character and ability. The French toy with a Napoleonesque 1796ish radical response, but in the end follow the conservative approach. Tactically Vittoria was conceived and delivered as a battle to utterly destroy the combined French army. However astounding victory though it was, it falls short. Oman makes much of Graham's failure to close and encircle the French right, but strangely ignores right under Wellington's direct control the failure to launch Cole's 4th Division as a coupe de grace through the French centre when total collapse was assured. Then of course there is the failure to release the fresh and abundant cavalry to rout the defeated enemy.
After this political restraints bring a pause before Soult's incompetent and ill conceived offensive again provided opportunity after opportunity to utterly annihilate all French armies on the Spanish border, yet Wellington always pulls his punches. Had these opportunities been take how different and decisive would have been the 1814 campaign and how unsurpassed would have been Wellington's reputation then?! In the end it is a volume of lost opportunity which I put down to the twin factors of caution on Wellington's part due to past experience of French fighting ability and secondly fatigue at the end of a long and brilliant endeavour when everything- far too much - rested upon Wellington and him alone.
Oman returns to the Peninsular war after the hiatus of the first world war. Oman mentions in the preface the stringencies of the post war period restricted the number of plates and indeed at times a few more maps (although not critical) would have been helpful. While the end-foldout map although excellent is most unhelpful for reference alongside reading. Also there are sometimes problems with the map spellings being at variance with the text. I used Robertson's atlas alongside the book to carefully follow critical movements.
What themes come through? One is the tenacity of the French as fighters. Like the pillaging, rapacious horde that is was; French armies could be repulsed, disordered, mauled but always coalesce back into the battle-ready swarm with a semblance of control. In contrast the British are less likely to spontaneously coalesce, thus are more prone to reverses (or indeed Vittoria's loot), but whose steadiness and ability summon forth hidden morale for any fight is unsurpassed.
This volume is also both a contrast and a parallel of military genius. On the one hand the ridiculous attempt of Napoleon to do everything himself from distance ruined his cause. On the other hand Wellington's tactical, operational and strategic accomplishments mark him as a general of the first order. Nevertheless even for Wellington on the spot the toll after all these years is showing. The reverses of Burgos and the retreat at the end of such a year of triumph lead to ill temper and frustration (as does the Vittoria aftermath). Then after one of the greatest strategic envelopments in history there is over caution and probably too much exhaustion to finish the job by utterly annihilating the French.
In the lead up to Vittoria the French tenacity in achieving concentration in the face of Wellington's grand sweep testifies to their character and ability. The French toy with a Napoleonesque 1796ish radical response, but in the end follow the conservative approach. Tactically Vittoria was conceived and delivered as a battle to utterly destroy the combined French army. However astounding victory though it was, it falls short. Oman makes much of Graham's failure to close and encircle the French right, but strangely ignores right under Wellington's direct control the failure to launch Cole's 4th Division as a coupe de grace through the French centre when total collapse was assured. Then of course there is the failure to release the fresh and abundant cavalry to rout the defeated enemy.
After this political restraints bring a pause before Soult's incompetent and ill conceived offensive again provided opportunity after opportunity to utterly annihilate all French armies on the Spanish border, yet Wellington always pulls his punches. Had these opportunities been take how different and decisive would have been the 1814 campaign and how unsurpassed would have been Wellington's reputation then?! In the end it is a volume of lost opportunity which I put down to the twin factors of caution on Wellington's part due to past experience of French fighting ability and secondly fatigue at the end of a long and brilliant endeavour when everything- far too much - rested upon Wellington and him alone.
April 28, 2021
Best volume yet. One more to go.
August 11, 2024
Still the best and best written account of the campaign. Each volume (and there are seven) is long and detailed but the pace rarely flags and. It is detailed, analytical and definitive, a prodigous work of scholarship and style
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews