Complicity with Evil: The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide

by Adam LeBor

A seasoned foreign correspondent shows how the UN privileges its own neutrality and interests above its founding mission of protecting humanity, with predictably tragic consequences

From the killing fields of Rwanda and Srebrenica a decade ago to those of Darfur today, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to confront genocide. This is evinced, author and journalist Adam LeBor maintains, in a May 1995 document from Yasushi Akashi, the most senior UN official in the field during the Yugoslav wars, in which he refused to authorize air strikes against the Serbs for fear they would “weaken” Milosevic. More recently, in 2003, urgent reports from UN officials in the Sudan detailing atrocities from Darfur were ignored for a year because they were politically inconvenient.

This book is the first to examine in detail the crucial role of the Secretariat, its relationship with the Security Council, and the failure of UN officials themselves to confront genocide. LeBor argues the UN must return to its founding principles, take a moral stand and set the agenda of the Security Council instead of merely following the lead of the great powers. LeBor draws on dozens of firsthand interviews with UN officials, current and former, and such international diplomats as Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Douglas Hurd, and David Owen.

This book will set the terms for discussion when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan steps down to make room for a new head of the world body, and political observers assess Annan’s legacy and look to the future of the world organization.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction

352 pages, Hardcover

First published October 4, 2006

About the author

Adam LeBor was born in London and read Arabic, international history and politics at Leeds University, graduating in 1983, and also studied Arabic at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He worked for several British newspapers before becoming a foreign correspondent in 1991. He has reported from thirty countries, including Israel and Palestine, and covered the Yugoslav wars for The Times of London and The Independent. Currently Central Europe correspondent for The Times of London, he also writes for the Sunday Times, The Econdomist, Literary Review, Condé Nast Traveller, the Jewish Chronicle, New Statesman and Harry's Place in Britain, and contributes to The Nation and the New York Times in the States. He is the author of seven books, including the best-selling Hitler's Secret Bankers, which was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize. His books have been published in nine languages.

Reviews

[Pragya Singh · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is hard-hitting and heartbreaking. I had never imagined the United Nations to be a perfect, utopian organization but I was quite unprepared for the sheer apathy displayed at all ranks, the very high propensity towards inaction and their actual connivance with the realpolitik of the member states. The overarching question asked and answered in the book is whether the UN could have done something to prevent the genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur even as they faced uncertainty about the consequences of their decisions. Drawing upon his own experiences as a journalist covering the Yugoslav wars and the first-hand accounts of UN officials, diplomats and other journos, Adam Lebor concludes that the United Nations had enough information from people on the ground which should have adequately forewarned against the heightened probability of these massacres- the ever increasing impunity and aggressiveness of the Bosnian Serbs; the ‘genocide fax’ from General Dallaire in Rwanda giving clear, explicit warnings of the extermination plans of the Interahamwe; Mukesh Kapila’s repeated briefings and memos about the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis in Darfur- and yet, the UN chose to ignore it all and wait it out, ultimately costing millions of lives.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 sought to precisely define and criminalize genocide under international law, making it an obligation for member states to prevent and punish it. Perhaps, nobody in 1948 could have imagined the extremely perverse way in which this would eventually work out. Because acknowledging mass killings and scorched-earth policies (strategies causing destruction of livelihood and homes with the ultimate aim of the destruction of a group of people) of genocide perpetrators would demand some action, the United Nations spends a disproportionate amount of time denying these and refraining from using the ‘G’ word, sometimes even blaming the victim groups (e.g. Bosniaks) of perpetrating acts against themselves to generate ‘unwarranted’ international attention (Is anyone else reminded of Cornelius Fudge and the Ministry of Magic?). Another cover word behind which the UN frequently hides is its ‘impartiality’ which, in recent times, has become far more important than any of its humanitarian goals. An impartial United Nations is a useful thing only when all parties to a conflict are balanced in their strength and aggression, otherwise, it amounts to an unwillingness to differentiate between the victim and the aggressor and thereby a ‘complicity in evil’. In fact, a pattern has emerged in UN responses over time- exaggerate the offenses of rebel victim groups, soften the atrocities of the aggressors, claim that all parties are guilty, sit back and watch. The emphasis on impartiality is carried so far that in Bosnia, UN peacekeepers simply watched as Bosniak men were forced into Serb buses to be carried for execution.

Even though caution needs to be exercised with respect to direct military action (particularly with the US losing face over the Iraq war and every perpetrator state ready to cry out ‘western imperialism’ when questioned on its human rights record), there are other ways to get states to comply- economic sanctions that directly affect the pockets of government officials, threats to freeze assets abroad or impose travel restrictions etc. could be quite effective. Actual implementation of any such measures, however, remains a big challenge due to the fact that perpetrator states are often themselves members of the UN and band together (as in something like a ‘human rights abusers club’) to block any resolutions condemning their actions or imposing sanctions. It does not help that the promotion of senior UN officials seems to have nothing to do with their good or bad decisions. Some risk insurance is required and desirable for officials making difficult choices in the face of uncertain outcomes, but the current structure provides hardly any incentive for making the right calls.

All humanitarian considerations aside, doing nothing to stop genocide carries long term risks. As Madeleine Albright points out, these places are prone to become the hotbeds that create terrorists. Several of the 9/11 hijackers were Bosnian Mujahideen, radicalized by the Muslim massacres in Bosnia.

When I started reading the book, I only had a vague idea about the events in Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur. I found it useful to supplement the information in the book with other independent sources on the web. I was thoroughly impressed by Adam Lebor’s ‘City of Oranges’. This book is another journalistic masterpiece from the author who is rapidly becoming one of my favorite non-fiction writers.

[Adele · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very eye-opening to criticisms of the UN, particularly it brought my attention to the fact that the UN is an organisation with states that have their own interests when dealing with conflicts which do/do not concern them. It opened me up to the idea that many of the resolutions that the UN passes are extremely watered-down and fundamentally often do very little. It is really the power of international law and the basic principles of the UN which force it to act, even if this may often be late. My one criticism of the book would be that it is at times hard to follow the timeline.

[Stefanie · Rating 1 out of 5]

I wrote an 8-page book review on this for a Master’s class. While I will not rehash the whole review here, the key points are:
-This book took me over a year to read because it is so poorly written.
-The book has a lot of potential and is written on an incredibly important topic, but fell short for three main reasons 1. Lebor’s lack of credibility (he is not an expert in this field and t shows with #2), 2. Misfactual content and 3. Failure to expound on multiple elements.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

While the book mostly opens up with a typical "these are the sad things the UN has done/failed to do" complaint, it goes on to develop a complete narrative of the UN's roles in both Kosovo and Rwanda. Rather than simply finger point, the author analyzes individual decisions - both the motivations behind them and their unintended consequences - while simultaneously providing lessons that a decade of hindsight has allowed.

The last part of the book covers the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the author's belief that the current world leaders have failed to learn their lessons from both Kosovo and Rwanda. While his solutions to the conflict are far from unique or innovative, they are practical and realistic, and for that alone deserve praise. More importantly, his solutions involve working within the existing UN framework. To implement his ideas no radical charter rewriting needs to occur - simply an application of political and humanitarian will to Chapter VII of the UN charter.

A warning: the book requires a fair amount of existing political savvy. While many obscurities are explained, a general knowledge of the UN's make up and contemporary world politics is a must.

[Gwilym · Rating 5 out of 5]

Using this book as an aid for my dissertation which will discuss the role of the UN in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Darfur. Lebor provides an excellent analysis of how the failings of the internal UN apparatus has failed civilians on the ground, much to the regret of the peacekeeping generals and senior politicians such as Madeleine Albright.

Interviewing people from all arms of the UN and drawing on his own experiences as a journalist in Sarajevo during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, the argument Lebor puts across is both compelling and dark; much could be learnt from his words and applied to present situations like that of Darfur, perhaps ending the egregious crime of genocide before it is once more too late.

[Antonio · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is horrifying. It documents the UN's inaction to stop the three most recent genocides in Serbia, Rwanda and Sudan. It is a resounding condemnation of the politicized, fragmented workings of the UN. It seems the UN, like everything, is beautiful in principle, and atrocious in actual practice. Much blame is put on the P5 countries for failing to act and obstructing actual initiatives put for by non-P5 countries that gave a damn. It seems that the leaders of the world are extremely reluctant to prevent and strike against genocide. A must read if you give a shit.

[Ruth · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just another compelling book to get you angry and pissed at the U.N. (especially the P-5) for being so ignorant.