What do you think?
Rate this book
Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement
Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on our urgently finding ways to bring about radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our own human nature. We have rewritten our own moral agenda by the drastic changes we have made to the conditions of life on earth. Advances in technology enable us to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. But our moral psychology lags behind and leaves us ill equipped to deal with the challenges we now face. We need to change human moral motivation so that we pay more heed not merely to the global community, but to the interests of future generations. It is unlikely that traditional methods such as moral education or social reform alone can bring this about swiftly enough to avert looming disaster, which would undermine the conditions for worthwhile life on earth forever. Persson and Savulescu maintain that it is likely that we need to explore the use of new technologies of biomedicine
to change the bases of human moral motivation. They argue that there are in principle no philosophical or moral objections to such moral bioenhancement. Unfit for the Future challenges us to rethink our attitudes to our own human nature, before it is too late.
to change the bases of human moral motivation. They argue that there are in principle no philosophical or moral objections to such moral bioenhancement. Unfit for the Future challenges us to rethink our attitudes to our own human nature, before it is too late.
154 pages, Hardcover
First published June 29, 2012
4 people are currently reading
209 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
April 6, 2020
I can’t believe someone wrote this down and I had to read it with my own eyes
November 19, 2014
(what follows is a short summary, not a review)
The statement of the 2012 book by Persson and Savulescu Unfit for the Future is simple: there is an urgent need for moral enhancement of humanity by traditional, biological, and genetic means, since there is a great gap between the technological level of development the human race has already reached, and the moral level of development at which it still is.
The technological progress of humanity has been very rapid over the past decades and centuries. Nowadays, humanity has greater powers than ever to change its environment and its own present and future condition. The actions of even a single individual can relatively easy have a huge effect on the environment, on the rest of humanity today, or on future generations. However, without a proper level of moral development of humans, it is to be feared that this greater power in the hands of people would be for the worse, as it is much easier to do harm to a complex system, than to benefit it. (Persson and Savulescu argue for this latter point at some length, but suffice it here to give an example of theirs: one can easily get into a car and drive it into a crowd, killing and injuring a great number of people; however, one cannot easily save the lives of that many people and ensure their continued existence.) The need to make sure that people don’t abuse the great power that technology provides them is extreme, especially since in the middle of twentieth century humanity has reached the point where it has acquired the technological means to destroy itself. And whereas before potentially destructive technologies (eg nuclear weapons) have been in the hands of only few select individuals, the means and knowledge to acquire or create such technologies are getting progressively accessible to anyone on the planet, meaning that the risk is getting higher that a random fanatic in a random corner of the planet, successfully kills a great number of people. To summarise the point about the technological progress of humanity: whereas in Paleolithic times a complete freak could, worse come to worse, kill a few tribesmen before getting killed themselves, today or in the very near future a complete freak can in the worst case scenario inflict a significant harm to the environment or wipe out the entire humanity.
The moral progress of humanity, on the other side, hasn’t been able to catch up with its great technological one. For example we are still subjects to a lot of cognitive and moral biases some of which might have been useful and biologically advantageous in the kind of environment and communities humanity lived in during most of its history. However, today people no longer live in small communities possessing no powerful technologies, but in an interconnected world where the actions of one person here can directly influence the well-being of people in faraway places, and also the actions of one person now can directly influence the well-being of future generations. Therefore it becomes vital that people overcome their inherent bias to think almost exclusively for the very near future and start taking into consideration longer-term effects of their actions; it is also vital that people learn to extend their sympathy not only to their kin, but to people living in faraway places that they have perhaps never seen.
Another important factor to take into account is the social institution of liberal democracy which, as Persson and Savulescu argue, is the best social system since alternatives to it can too easily slide into morally abject states. However, there are two things: first, since liberal democracies are ideologically neutral, they tolerate diversity of mindsets, which makes it easier for a group of fanatics who decide to wipe out humanity to form and become active into a liberal democracy more than it would have been into other more homogeneous social institutions. Somehow against this spirit of tolerance as it might seem, Persson and Savulescu argue for the importance of increased surveillance and of therefore giving up the legal right to privacy which as they argue is not grounded in any moral right. Second, in liberal democracies a lot of important decisions are being handled by the vote of the majority, which makes it difficult that morally informed choices are passed unless the majority of people themselves becomes more moral. For example, a government that proposes to reduce humans’ impact on climate change might not be elected until the voters are willing to sacrifice in part their consumerist life-style, which they would be unwilling to do unless they were more moral. The only way then of making morally informed political choices is if each and every individual is morally enhanced.
Further, the need for biological or genetic moral enhancement is great for traditional methods of moral enhancement like moral education, are not by themselves very efficient. This is obvious for example from the fact that since the first great moral teachers (like Buddha, Confucious, and Socrates) appeared some 2500 years ago, humanity has not made much moral progress. The difficulty with traditional methods of enhancing morality in humans comes in part from the huge gap between accepting a moral doctrine, and internalising it, i.e. being actually motivated to act according to it. In order to achieve the latter some biomedical means of enhancement might be more effective. And whereas some adversaries might oppose this kind of enhancement arguing that it would limit the individual’s freedom, it is not clear why this should be so. We don’t normally think of traditional moral teachings as interfering with the individual’s freedom, nor do we think that the moral person is less ‘free’ than the immoral one for when confronted with a choice they would always go for the morally right one, so the objection against moral bioenhancement is ungrounded.
In short, the greater technological capabilities of humanity imply greater responsibility to not bring about some great and potentially irreparable damage to the environment or the human race. This means that enhancing the morality of people is of extreme importance if we don’t want to run the great risk of bringing about those damages. Research into biomedical means of moral enhancement is therefore crucial, and so will be the use of such means when they are discovered.
The statement of the 2012 book by Persson and Savulescu Unfit for the Future is simple: there is an urgent need for moral enhancement of humanity by traditional, biological, and genetic means, since there is a great gap between the technological level of development the human race has already reached, and the moral level of development at which it still is.
The technological progress of humanity has been very rapid over the past decades and centuries. Nowadays, humanity has greater powers than ever to change its environment and its own present and future condition. The actions of even a single individual can relatively easy have a huge effect on the environment, on the rest of humanity today, or on future generations. However, without a proper level of moral development of humans, it is to be feared that this greater power in the hands of people would be for the worse, as it is much easier to do harm to a complex system, than to benefit it. (Persson and Savulescu argue for this latter point at some length, but suffice it here to give an example of theirs: one can easily get into a car and drive it into a crowd, killing and injuring a great number of people; however, one cannot easily save the lives of that many people and ensure their continued existence.) The need to make sure that people don’t abuse the great power that technology provides them is extreme, especially since in the middle of twentieth century humanity has reached the point where it has acquired the technological means to destroy itself. And whereas before potentially destructive technologies (eg nuclear weapons) have been in the hands of only few select individuals, the means and knowledge to acquire or create such technologies are getting progressively accessible to anyone on the planet, meaning that the risk is getting higher that a random fanatic in a random corner of the planet, successfully kills a great number of people. To summarise the point about the technological progress of humanity: whereas in Paleolithic times a complete freak could, worse come to worse, kill a few tribesmen before getting killed themselves, today or in the very near future a complete freak can in the worst case scenario inflict a significant harm to the environment or wipe out the entire humanity.
The moral progress of humanity, on the other side, hasn’t been able to catch up with its great technological one. For example we are still subjects to a lot of cognitive and moral biases some of which might have been useful and biologically advantageous in the kind of environment and communities humanity lived in during most of its history. However, today people no longer live in small communities possessing no powerful technologies, but in an interconnected world where the actions of one person here can directly influence the well-being of people in faraway places, and also the actions of one person now can directly influence the well-being of future generations. Therefore it becomes vital that people overcome their inherent bias to think almost exclusively for the very near future and start taking into consideration longer-term effects of their actions; it is also vital that people learn to extend their sympathy not only to their kin, but to people living in faraway places that they have perhaps never seen.
Another important factor to take into account is the social institution of liberal democracy which, as Persson and Savulescu argue, is the best social system since alternatives to it can too easily slide into morally abject states. However, there are two things: first, since liberal democracies are ideologically neutral, they tolerate diversity of mindsets, which makes it easier for a group of fanatics who decide to wipe out humanity to form and become active into a liberal democracy more than it would have been into other more homogeneous social institutions. Somehow against this spirit of tolerance as it might seem, Persson and Savulescu argue for the importance of increased surveillance and of therefore giving up the legal right to privacy which as they argue is not grounded in any moral right. Second, in liberal democracies a lot of important decisions are being handled by the vote of the majority, which makes it difficult that morally informed choices are passed unless the majority of people themselves becomes more moral. For example, a government that proposes to reduce humans’ impact on climate change might not be elected until the voters are willing to sacrifice in part their consumerist life-style, which they would be unwilling to do unless they were more moral. The only way then of making morally informed political choices is if each and every individual is morally enhanced.
Further, the need for biological or genetic moral enhancement is great for traditional methods of moral enhancement like moral education, are not by themselves very efficient. This is obvious for example from the fact that since the first great moral teachers (like Buddha, Confucious, and Socrates) appeared some 2500 years ago, humanity has not made much moral progress. The difficulty with traditional methods of enhancing morality in humans comes in part from the huge gap between accepting a moral doctrine, and internalising it, i.e. being actually motivated to act according to it. In order to achieve the latter some biomedical means of enhancement might be more effective. And whereas some adversaries might oppose this kind of enhancement arguing that it would limit the individual’s freedom, it is not clear why this should be so. We don’t normally think of traditional moral teachings as interfering with the individual’s freedom, nor do we think that the moral person is less ‘free’ than the immoral one for when confronted with a choice they would always go for the morally right one, so the objection against moral bioenhancement is ungrounded.
In short, the greater technological capabilities of humanity imply greater responsibility to not bring about some great and potentially irreparable damage to the environment or the human race. This means that enhancing the morality of people is of extreme importance if we don’t want to run the great risk of bringing about those damages. Research into biomedical means of moral enhancement is therefore crucial, and so will be the use of such means when they are discovered.
November 20, 2012
The core thesis of Unfit for the Future is that human morality evolved to allow cooperation and altruism in small groups, but that we today face challenges requiring extensive global coordination. Challenges such as weapons of mass destruction and climate change require both individual humans and nation-states to make various kinds of sacrifices for the benefit of all, but it is currently very unlikely to get everyone to actually make such sacrifices. Humans do have moral emotions such as a sense of justice and fairness that cause them to willingly make sacrifices in order to benefit those they know, but international cooperation requires trusting and helping faceless strangers - and humans have also evolved to be naturally suspicious or even xenophobic towards people outside their tribe. Since traditional moral education isn't enough to overcome these challenges, we need to engage in "moral enhancement" and alter our biological moral dispositions.
The tone of the book is very academic and rational: there are few if any appeals to emotion, and logical reasoning from first principles is almost purely the style of argument. This makes the authors' train of thought relatively clear to follow, though it also makes for a rather dry reading, and things are occasionally expressed in needlessly convoluted ways.
The best part of the book is the explanation of the coordination challenges involved with international cooperation, of why rational self-interest isn't enough to overcome the challenges, and how our commonsense morality has evolved to solve some of these problems. The reader is assumed to already be mostly on board with the notion of risks from climate change and WMDs: some time is spent on explaining these risks, but probably not enough to sell the topic as a really extreme one for someone new to it.
Surprisingly, the book spends relatively little time (one chapter) talking about actual moral enhancement, and few concrete enhancement methods are proposed. Rather, there are a few examples of developing technologies that could be useful for moral enhancement, and a suggestion that more research be dedicated to developing more enhancement methods. Some criticisms of moral enhancement are discussed and argued against. The book concentrates on establishing the need for moral enhancement, not on proposing specific enhancement methods.
The main weakness of the book is that it does not always seem to engage with the strongest possible opposing arguments. A minor thesis that's offered is that we should be ready to give up our privacy in order to prevent terrorists with WMDs, because of the untold damage that those terrorists could cause. The authors move to dismiss people having any moral right to privacy in only four (!) pages, and do so by considering two possible defenses for privacy: that violating privacy requires violating property rights, and that having one's privacy violated makes one uncomfortable. The former is rendered irrelevant by the possibility of privacy violations that do not violate property rights (such as mind-reading devices or scanners that could see and hear through walls). The latter is rejected on the grounds that if you could forbid people from knowing something about you simply because it made you feel uncomfortable, "you could acquire very extensive rights against others just by being extremely sensitive about what others think of you".
Leaving aside the fact that the latter argument is excessively simplistic, there is no absolutely no discussion of the fact that privacy gives people the chance to do harmless things for which they might nonetheless be discriminated against. Homosexual acts are the classic example, but even if one made the (false) assumption that liberal democracies - in the context of which the authors mostly frame their discussion - no longer exhibited homophobia, there are plenty of more examples to be found. Perhaps a person became sexually aroused by looking at (entirely non-sexual) pictures of children or animals, or enjoyed violent pornography, but would nevertheless never harm a soul. Ironically, a major part of the authors' argument is that it is easier to destroy than to create, and that we find potential harms to be more pressing than an equivalent amount of potential gain. It is exactly because of such reasons that people who were thought to be possibly dangerous would be harshly and unfairly discriminated against - because even if the risk of them actually harming anyone would be small, few people would be willing to take that risk.
Nor do the authors discuss the fact that a lack of privacy could lead to excessive self-censorship, with even people who wouldn't be discriminated against for acting according to their desires restricting their behavior just in case (again, the potential for harms outweighing the potential for gains). And once people could perfectly observe the behavior of everyone else, and see that everybody was acting conservatively, then even behavior that was previously within normal bounds might be come to be seen as suspicious, leading to an ever-more conformist, cautious, and unhappy society. The human suffering of such a development gives reason to believe in a strong moral right to privacy, and the suffering in question might easily outweigh the suffering from even several nuclear terrorist attacks. But aside for briefly mentioning that a fear of terrorism might cause some ethnic minorities to be unfairly discriminated against, the authors consider none of this.
It might also be somewhat distracting for some that the authors are clearly left-wing, which leads them to occasionally make ideological claims which are not very well-defended. For example, the authors briefly mention prevailing economic inequality as an example of one of humanity's moral failings, citing differences between the poorest and richest nations as well as the poorest and richest people within some Western countries. None of the arguments for economic inequality of this form not necessarily being a bad thing are addressed. Fortunately, for the most part the left-wing digressions are minor points, and possible disagreement with them does not detract from the book's major theses.
Overall, the book makes a nice argument for its core thesis, but could have been made much stronger by improving the strawmannish discussion of privacy, removing or better supporting ideologically contentious points, making the risk from WMDs better argued for, and by spending more time discussing moral enhancement itself, not just the need for it.
The tone of the book is very academic and rational: there are few if any appeals to emotion, and logical reasoning from first principles is almost purely the style of argument. This makes the authors' train of thought relatively clear to follow, though it also makes for a rather dry reading, and things are occasionally expressed in needlessly convoluted ways.
The best part of the book is the explanation of the coordination challenges involved with international cooperation, of why rational self-interest isn't enough to overcome the challenges, and how our commonsense morality has evolved to solve some of these problems. The reader is assumed to already be mostly on board with the notion of risks from climate change and WMDs: some time is spent on explaining these risks, but probably not enough to sell the topic as a really extreme one for someone new to it.
Surprisingly, the book spends relatively little time (one chapter) talking about actual moral enhancement, and few concrete enhancement methods are proposed. Rather, there are a few examples of developing technologies that could be useful for moral enhancement, and a suggestion that more research be dedicated to developing more enhancement methods. Some criticisms of moral enhancement are discussed and argued against. The book concentrates on establishing the need for moral enhancement, not on proposing specific enhancement methods.
The main weakness of the book is that it does not always seem to engage with the strongest possible opposing arguments. A minor thesis that's offered is that we should be ready to give up our privacy in order to prevent terrorists with WMDs, because of the untold damage that those terrorists could cause. The authors move to dismiss people having any moral right to privacy in only four (!) pages, and do so by considering two possible defenses for privacy: that violating privacy requires violating property rights, and that having one's privacy violated makes one uncomfortable. The former is rendered irrelevant by the possibility of privacy violations that do not violate property rights (such as mind-reading devices or scanners that could see and hear through walls). The latter is rejected on the grounds that if you could forbid people from knowing something about you simply because it made you feel uncomfortable, "you could acquire very extensive rights against others just by being extremely sensitive about what others think of you".
Leaving aside the fact that the latter argument is excessively simplistic, there is no absolutely no discussion of the fact that privacy gives people the chance to do harmless things for which they might nonetheless be discriminated against. Homosexual acts are the classic example, but even if one made the (false) assumption that liberal democracies - in the context of which the authors mostly frame their discussion - no longer exhibited homophobia, there are plenty of more examples to be found. Perhaps a person became sexually aroused by looking at (entirely non-sexual) pictures of children or animals, or enjoyed violent pornography, but would nevertheless never harm a soul. Ironically, a major part of the authors' argument is that it is easier to destroy than to create, and that we find potential harms to be more pressing than an equivalent amount of potential gain. It is exactly because of such reasons that people who were thought to be possibly dangerous would be harshly and unfairly discriminated against - because even if the risk of them actually harming anyone would be small, few people would be willing to take that risk.
Nor do the authors discuss the fact that a lack of privacy could lead to excessive self-censorship, with even people who wouldn't be discriminated against for acting according to their desires restricting their behavior just in case (again, the potential for harms outweighing the potential for gains). And once people could perfectly observe the behavior of everyone else, and see that everybody was acting conservatively, then even behavior that was previously within normal bounds might be come to be seen as suspicious, leading to an ever-more conformist, cautious, and unhappy society. The human suffering of such a development gives reason to believe in a strong moral right to privacy, and the suffering in question might easily outweigh the suffering from even several nuclear terrorist attacks. But aside for briefly mentioning that a fear of terrorism might cause some ethnic minorities to be unfairly discriminated against, the authors consider none of this.
It might also be somewhat distracting for some that the authors are clearly left-wing, which leads them to occasionally make ideological claims which are not very well-defended. For example, the authors briefly mention prevailing economic inequality as an example of one of humanity's moral failings, citing differences between the poorest and richest nations as well as the poorest and richest people within some Western countries. None of the arguments for economic inequality of this form not necessarily being a bad thing are addressed. Fortunately, for the most part the left-wing digressions are minor points, and possible disagreement with them does not detract from the book's major theses.
Overall, the book makes a nice argument for its core thesis, but could have been made much stronger by improving the strawmannish discussion of privacy, removing or better supporting ideologically contentious points, making the risk from WMDs better argued for, and by spending more time discussing moral enhancement itself, not just the need for it.
July 17, 2014
An interesting read definitely, but for me a bit too dry. Alot of words to say very little, a well thought out yet simultaneously convoluted argument style. In fairness though I'm probably not the intended audience, I was using the book as background research for my fiction!
October 16, 2020
Not really a book on the questions surrounding moral bioenhancement (with the exception of a part of the last chapter, which is pretty good). Since the book is an adaptation of a series of lectures, most of the book is an overly simplistic and sometimes factually incorrect explanation of two major problems: First, the risk of technological progress providing more and better means to cause harm (e.g. bioterrorism, nuclear warfare). Second, global collective action problems, such as anthropogenic climate change.
This is more of a pamphlet that urges for change more than a rigorous philosophical analysis or a serious explanation of particular issues. At the end of the day, there are no real thesis or positions that the authors defend (e.g. liberal democracy is ill equipped, but authoritarianism is no better. Biomedical enhancements are needed.. or maybe not. It is impossible to predict the future, because we can use those predictions to change our behaviour), other than the fact that moral bioenhancement is compatible with freedom.
This is more of a pamphlet that urges for change more than a rigorous philosophical analysis or a serious explanation of particular issues. At the end of the day, there are no real thesis or positions that the authors defend (e.g. liberal democracy is ill equipped, but authoritarianism is no better. Biomedical enhancements are needed.. or maybe not. It is impossible to predict the future, because we can use those predictions to change our behaviour), other than the fact that moral bioenhancement is compatible with freedom.
May 18, 2025
The authors argue that humans have advanced technologically far beyond what they are morally advanced enough to handle safely and that moral enhancement is the only hope for our long-term survival. Then, oddly, they suggest the key to fast enough moral enhancement is.......technological, through what they call biomedical moral enhancement.
This is a depressing book. I think it's wrong on a few points which makes me more optimistic than they are. For one, current population forecasts have left the unending growth model. For another, forecasts of resource shortages of the earth have almost uniformly been wrong. I am more optimistic that humans are better off now than they seem to think and we have done a better job of making hard changes as needed than they seem to think we have or can.
Perhaps most disturbing was their dismissal of liberal democracy and call for some form of benevolent authoritarian control to implement the behavioral changes they see as necessary. That kind of thinking has led to horrifying events.
This is a depressing book. I think it's wrong on a few points which makes me more optimistic than they are. For one, current population forecasts have left the unending growth model. For another, forecasts of resource shortages of the earth have almost uniformly been wrong. I am more optimistic that humans are better off now than they seem to think and we have done a better job of making hard changes as needed than they seem to think we have or can.
Perhaps most disturbing was their dismissal of liberal democracy and call for some form of benevolent authoritarian control to implement the behavioral changes they see as necessary. That kind of thinking has led to horrifying events.
November 20, 2019
more like 2.5 stars but I'm being generous with three. it's a very dry read. the core thesis is a solid one and well expounded: humans evolved certain biases and behaviors that were useful when we lived in small tribal bands, but our astonishing population growth and technological prowess--accelerating far more quickly than biological evolution can keep up--have put us in a very dangerous situation (esp re: climate change and WMDs) and we cannot rely on traditional moral exhortations if we want to survive this century. and I can buy their argument that we need to engage in bio-enhancement of our morality, but they offer so few examples of how that can actually be done (the science isn't even close yet!) that it feels like a moot point. they do at least address some potential arguments against bio-enhancement, but overall...it just feels like they point out a problem and fail to offer any real solutions!
February 7, 2022
The authors presented a solid case for why the future is bleak and liberal democracies aren't up to the challenge, but the proposed solution, using drugs like oxytocin to make people more mild-mannered and cooperative, didn't seem that promising. I was sold enough though that I would support massively expanding research into bioenhancement of human morality - I'm not that hopeful it will prove useful, but it seems worth a shot to look into.
January 19, 2021
I cannot believe that anybody could read this book and not hear eerie echoes of concentration camps in the thinking. Advancing an argument to eliminate groups that don't conform to your particular moral worldview, whether it's done by gene editing and drugs or by guns, is nothing short of outrageous.
June 19, 2019
Although short, this is a heavy read. Packed to the brim with uncomfortable truths and compelling arguments.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews