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Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society
Science and technology have immense authority and influence in our society, yet their working remains little understood. The conventional perception of science in Western societies has been modified in recent years by the work of philosophers, sociologists and historians of science. In this book Bruno Latour brings together these different approaches to provide a lively and challenging analysis of science, demonstrating how social context and technical content are both essential to a proper understanding of scientific activity. Emphasizing that science can only be understood through its practice, the author examines science and technology in action: the role of scientific literature, the activities of laboratories, the institutional context of science in the modern world, and the means by which inventions and discoveries become accepted. From the study of scientific practice he develops an analysis of science as the building of networks. Throughout, Bruno Latour shows how a lively and realistic picture of science in action alters our conception of not only the natural sciences but also the social sciences and the sociology of knowledge in general.
This stimulating book, drawing on a wealth of examples from a wide range of scientific activities, will interest all philosophers, sociologists and historians of science, scientists and engineers, and students of the philosophy of social science and the sociology of knowledge.
This stimulating book, drawing on a wealth of examples from a wide range of scientific activities, will interest all philosophers, sociologists and historians of science, scientists and engineers, and students of the philosophy of social science and the sociology of knowledge.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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About the author
Bruno Latour
161 books747 followersBruno Latour, a philosopher and anthropologist, is the author of Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Our Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, and many other books. He curated the ZKM exhibits ICONOCLASH and Making Things Public and coedited the accompanying catalogs, both published by the MIT Press.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 46 reviews
February 1, 2009
One of my favorite books.
It approaches the process of the progress of science and the development of "facts" from the human and social perspective. Latour starts out the book by chronicling the discovery of DNA and the development of the Eclipse MV/8000 computer. He shows how "facts" are black boxes that become fact through a process of competition that involves building networks of references until people start to refer to your theory as a fact and use it to build their facts. In fact, black boxes can be re-opened, but it becomes increasing difficult and costly to do this. I felt this very much when working at ECD. We worked in the area of disordered materials. Most devices are/were made of solid state crystalline materials. It is very difficult to get people think about devices in other ways. In this way, ECD discovered huge bodies of amazing materials with amazing properties, but convincing the world of the reality of this alternative universe took decades and the resistance was phenomenal. (It took Stan Ovshinsky, an amazing leader with the combination of a scientific mind and the will of a political activist to convince the world.)
Latour writes about how many scientists believe that "Nature" can tell us if the facts are true. He explores laboratories and their methods and shows us that "Nature" doesn't really "tell us" anything. Nature proves something only after something becomes a fact. Laboratories are design to prove or support facts and the design of the experiment and the interpretation of the data are ambiguous and always disputable. It costs a great deal of money to open a "black box" and to create a laboratory to create or debunk scientific facts. The more "scientific" one gets, the more ambiguous the facts become and the higher the costs become. Because of the time and the costs involved, this questioning of fact and creation of fact becomes an enterprise that require a great deal of funding and thus a great deal of political and non-scientific activity.
He makes an interesting point about scientific papers which I will quote :
"There is something still worse, however, than being either criticized or dismantled by careless readers: it is being ignored. Since the status of a claim depends on later users' insertions, what if there are no later users whatsoever? This is the point that people who never come close to the fabrication of science have the greatest difficulty in grasping. They imagine that all scientific articles are equal and arrayed in lines like soldiers, to be carefully inspected one by one. However, most papers are never read at all. No matter what a paper did to the former literature, if no one else does anything with it, then it is as if it never existed at all. You may have written a paper that settles a fierce controversy once and for all, but if readers ignore it, it cannot be turned into a fact; it simply cannot.
You may protest against this injustice; you may treasure the certitude of being right in your inner heart; but it will never go further than your inner heart; you will never go further in certitude without the help of others. Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts. As we will see later in Chapter 3, one of the main problems to solve is to interest someone enough to read at all; compared to this problem, that of being believed is, so to speak, a minor task."
It approaches the process of the progress of science and the development of "facts" from the human and social perspective. Latour starts out the book by chronicling the discovery of DNA and the development of the Eclipse MV/8000 computer. He shows how "facts" are black boxes that become fact through a process of competition that involves building networks of references until people start to refer to your theory as a fact and use it to build their facts. In fact, black boxes can be re-opened, but it becomes increasing difficult and costly to do this. I felt this very much when working at ECD. We worked in the area of disordered materials. Most devices are/were made of solid state crystalline materials. It is very difficult to get people think about devices in other ways. In this way, ECD discovered huge bodies of amazing materials with amazing properties, but convincing the world of the reality of this alternative universe took decades and the resistance was phenomenal. (It took Stan Ovshinsky, an amazing leader with the combination of a scientific mind and the will of a political activist to convince the world.)
Latour writes about how many scientists believe that "Nature" can tell us if the facts are true. He explores laboratories and their methods and shows us that "Nature" doesn't really "tell us" anything. Nature proves something only after something becomes a fact. Laboratories are design to prove or support facts and the design of the experiment and the interpretation of the data are ambiguous and always disputable. It costs a great deal of money to open a "black box" and to create a laboratory to create or debunk scientific facts. The more "scientific" one gets, the more ambiguous the facts become and the higher the costs become. Because of the time and the costs involved, this questioning of fact and creation of fact becomes an enterprise that require a great deal of funding and thus a great deal of political and non-scientific activity.
He makes an interesting point about scientific papers which I will quote :
"There is something still worse, however, than being either criticized or dismantled by careless readers: it is being ignored. Since the status of a claim depends on later users' insertions, what if there are no later users whatsoever? This is the point that people who never come close to the fabrication of science have the greatest difficulty in grasping. They imagine that all scientific articles are equal and arrayed in lines like soldiers, to be carefully inspected one by one. However, most papers are never read at all. No matter what a paper did to the former literature, if no one else does anything with it, then it is as if it never existed at all. You may have written a paper that settles a fierce controversy once and for all, but if readers ignore it, it cannot be turned into a fact; it simply cannot.
You may protest against this injustice; you may treasure the certitude of being right in your inner heart; but it will never go further than your inner heart; you will never go further in certitude without the help of others. Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts. As we will see later in Chapter 3, one of the main problems to solve is to interest someone enough to read at all; compared to this problem, that of being believed is, so to speak, a minor task."
October 22, 2020
This is a fantastic book. I want to turn over a few of his closing statements:
First: "No one has ever observed a fact, a theory, or a machine that could survive outside of the networks that gave birth to them."
Throughout, Latour builds a case for viewing technoscience as a network. When we follow scientists doing 'science', we find they are embedded in complex human relations. As Latour states earlier in the book: "Understanding what facts and machines are is the same task as understanding who the people are." Facts and machines do not arrive from nowhere, they come from somewhere, and someone.
Putting this into a concrete example:
"...we tend to think that a poorly funded workshop is more tied to outside interests than a well-funded one, whereas it is poor because it is less tied; conversely, when we visit a gigantic cyclotron we tend to think that it is more remote from anyone's direct interest, whereas it is remote only because of its tight links with millions of people."
The cyclotron cannot come from nowhere and no-one, it comes from many places and many people. It's existence is contingent on a million other happenings, while the small workshop only relies on a few.
Second: "...when everything works according to plan it means that you do not move an inch out of well-kept and carefully sealed networks."
How useful is a map without road signs, or a clock without another clock to check it by, or a car out of fuel? Once we are outside the network, chaos ensues.
Third: "Metrology is the name of this gigantic enterprise to make of the outside a world inside which facts and machines can survive."
Metrology is the scientific study of measurement. Metrology is concerned with making the world measurable. It attempts to represent the world in a paper world. Latour says: "Many things can be done with this paper world that cannot be done with the world." Yes, this is true. A king can divide his kingdom on a map, while he cannot (without great difficulty) in practice in the world itself. A mathematician can discover relationships between disparate data and draw them together into an equation, which the person without such resources cannot. This is not a question of cognitive superiority, then, but of resources.
"...who includes and who is included, who localizes and who is localized, is not a cognitive or a cultural difference, but the result of a constant fight."
Here we are again in the human realm of conflict.
What technoscience does do, for those who center it around themselves, is extend their power over vast distances:
"Nothing is unfamiliar, infinite, gigantic or far away in these centers that cumulate traces; quite the opposite, they cumulate so many traces so that everything can become familiar, finite, nearby and handy."
How powerful are these networks? Only as strong as the weak link.
Fourth: "When the out-thereness is really encountered, when things out there are seen for the first time, this is the end of science, since the essential cause of scientific superiority has vanished."
Lets back up a minute. Why engage in technoscience at all?
"Hard facts are, by all means of assessing them, rare and costly occurrences that are only met in the few cases when someone tries to make others move out of their normal course and still wants them to participate faithfully in the enterprise."
It is a question then of forcing others to follow us, not against their will, but by over-powering them with 'reality'. What is this reality?
"Reality, that is what resists all efforts at modification."
And how is reality built? Painstakingly, inside of our network. But what happens when the network breaks down, when something unpredictable happens, when we encounter the 'outside' of our network? What happens when we attempt to extend our network, and encounter the outside for the first time? We may successfully extend our network, or our ship may sink to the bottom of the sea, never to be heard of again. This is the adventure of science, the unknown. The attempt to make everything known, predictable, manageable, who is motivated by this?
What if we do not want to make a world for facts and machines, but for people?
Who are these people doing science and engineering, and what are their motivations? That is the question we must ask.
First: "No one has ever observed a fact, a theory, or a machine that could survive outside of the networks that gave birth to them."
Throughout, Latour builds a case for viewing technoscience as a network. When we follow scientists doing 'science', we find they are embedded in complex human relations. As Latour states earlier in the book: "Understanding what facts and machines are is the same task as understanding who the people are." Facts and machines do not arrive from nowhere, they come from somewhere, and someone.
Putting this into a concrete example:
"...we tend to think that a poorly funded workshop is more tied to outside interests than a well-funded one, whereas it is poor because it is less tied; conversely, when we visit a gigantic cyclotron we tend to think that it is more remote from anyone's direct interest, whereas it is remote only because of its tight links with millions of people."
The cyclotron cannot come from nowhere and no-one, it comes from many places and many people. It's existence is contingent on a million other happenings, while the small workshop only relies on a few.
Second: "...when everything works according to plan it means that you do not move an inch out of well-kept and carefully sealed networks."
How useful is a map without road signs, or a clock without another clock to check it by, or a car out of fuel? Once we are outside the network, chaos ensues.
Third: "Metrology is the name of this gigantic enterprise to make of the outside a world inside which facts and machines can survive."
Metrology is the scientific study of measurement. Metrology is concerned with making the world measurable. It attempts to represent the world in a paper world. Latour says: "Many things can be done with this paper world that cannot be done with the world." Yes, this is true. A king can divide his kingdom on a map, while he cannot (without great difficulty) in practice in the world itself. A mathematician can discover relationships between disparate data and draw them together into an equation, which the person without such resources cannot. This is not a question of cognitive superiority, then, but of resources.
"...who includes and who is included, who localizes and who is localized, is not a cognitive or a cultural difference, but the result of a constant fight."
Here we are again in the human realm of conflict.
What technoscience does do, for those who center it around themselves, is extend their power over vast distances:
"Nothing is unfamiliar, infinite, gigantic or far away in these centers that cumulate traces; quite the opposite, they cumulate so many traces so that everything can become familiar, finite, nearby and handy."
How powerful are these networks? Only as strong as the weak link.
Fourth: "When the out-thereness is really encountered, when things out there are seen for the first time, this is the end of science, since the essential cause of scientific superiority has vanished."
Lets back up a minute. Why engage in technoscience at all?
"Hard facts are, by all means of assessing them, rare and costly occurrences that are only met in the few cases when someone tries to make others move out of their normal course and still wants them to participate faithfully in the enterprise."
It is a question then of forcing others to follow us, not against their will, but by over-powering them with 'reality'. What is this reality?
"Reality, that is what resists all efforts at modification."
And how is reality built? Painstakingly, inside of our network. But what happens when the network breaks down, when something unpredictable happens, when we encounter the 'outside' of our network? What happens when we attempt to extend our network, and encounter the outside for the first time? We may successfully extend our network, or our ship may sink to the bottom of the sea, never to be heard of again. This is the adventure of science, the unknown. The attempt to make everything known, predictable, manageable, who is motivated by this?
What if we do not want to make a world for facts and machines, but for people?
Who are these people doing science and engineering, and what are their motivations? That is the question we must ask.
Read
November 14, 2024M he descargado una versión pirata y en lugar de las imágenes tenía descripciones en sueco de las imágenes.
El lirbo guay, Latour sabe cositas
El lirbo guay, Latour sabe cositas
June 3, 2007
An intriguing concept that for some people is tantamount to sacrilege: the social construction of science. Latour's take on the sociology of science is a topic that is controversial to even teach in some universities due to the unpopular idea that science is no more above social influence than anything else. Latour challenges the Baconian method of teaching science, asserting that nothing in science, even the "black boxes," are as pure and clear cut as we are led to believe. Latour uses many examples from history to illustrate his ideas, including the development of the transistor and Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA.
As someone currently pursing a career in scientific research I am thankful my Sociology teacher introduced this book to me as an undergraduate and would recommend it to anyone who is interested or working in research.
As someone currently pursing a career in scientific research I am thankful my Sociology teacher introduced this book to me as an undergraduate and would recommend it to anyone who is interested or working in research.
June 17, 2012
Science in Action is one of the most influential books in STS, and for good reason. Actor Network Theory as laid out here is a powerful description of how scientists make claims about reality, using technical rhetoric to shift claims between 'true' facts and 'falsified' artefacts. Latour moves smoothly from the level of the scientific paper, to researchers, labs, disciplines, and the immense network of technoscience that girdles and organizes the world. Rarely is a theory so useful at every scale.
For high theory, this is a relatively accessible book (relative being a relative term). I'd recommend it to everybody, if I thought they had the stomach for it, and if I thought they wouldn't use post-modern theory for evil.
For high theory, this is a relatively accessible book (relative being a relative term). I'd recommend it to everybody, if I thought they had the stomach for it, and if I thought they wouldn't use post-modern theory for evil.
April 20, 2023
Painful but at least there were fun anecdotes!
July 21, 2024
Would highly recommend the introduction of this book – it even has fun diagrams! The first chapter is also pretty solid in terms of giving amusing criticisms of academic writing. For the rest of the book………I was mostly in a state of idle speculation about what Bruno Latour would say to his dentist or mechanic given his super philosophical thoughts about science.
(I may have digested it better if I spread out reading it across more than two days :P)
(I may have digested it better if I spread out reading it across more than two days :P)
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February 20, 2025I did not finish this book - I was fifty pages from the end. But selfishly, this book was so hard to read, and I worked so hard to finish before I left, that I want this to count towards my Goodreads goal! 🥲 i will have to finish it before the year is out.
Crazy read!
Crazy read!
May 14, 2015
Книга Бруно Латура не є звичайною працею з соціології науки. Та й до соціології науки її цілком не зарахувати. Чимось вона нагадує Społeczne tworzenie rzeczywistości: Traktat z socjologii wiedzy П.Бергера та Т.Лукмана: наче й про соціологію знання, але більше - про соціальну реальність як таку. Так само і праця Б.Латура.
1. Чому ця праця не є звичайною роботою з соціології знання чи науки. Як не дивно, але більше про це Б.Латур пише в своїй книзі Nigdy nie byliśmy nowocześni. Studium z antropologii symetrycznej. Він зазначає, що його дослідженням завжди роблять три закиди (такі собі три спрощення). Перший: він просто пише, як вчені відкривають таємниці природи. Ні, каже Латур, природа з*являється завдяки науковим дослідженням. Поза межами науки - повний хаос, а тому науковці його впорядковують. І називають впорядковану частину природою. Звідси випливає другий закид: тоді він пише про владу! Науковці нав*язують влад�� іншим людям: влада/знання - як за М.Фуко. Та ні, відповідає Б.Латур, науковці вивчають природу, бо їм це цікаво. І ніяковї влади вони так не реалізовують. Навіть більше, вони залежать від влади інших: інс��итут ліквідують, фінансування обмежать, тему не затвердять - і дослідження припиняться. Отже, і це третій закид, йдеться про теорію дискурсів: вчені творять дискурсивну картину світу. От, вже починає злоститися Б.Латур, які дискурси можуть бути у вивченні мікробів: якщо всі теорії проходять перевірку практикою. Власне, Л.Пастер став авторитетом в медицині, коли продемонстрував на одній фермі, що щеплені від сибірської виразки вівці виживуть, а не щеплені - протягом місяця помруть. Як тут могли вчинити свій вплив дискурси? На кого? На овець? На мікробів?
Б.Латур відкидає всі звичні формати соціології науки - від Е.Дюркгайма та К.Мангайма починаючи. Згідно зі старими форматами є об*єктивне знання, яке соціально спотворюється - під впливом соціальних сил. Але воно не тільки сповторюється! Тоді Б.Латур стає радикальним релятивістом? Все знання - це соціальний конструкт? І так, і ні. Проблема в хибному розумінні соціального. Так, знання твориться завдяки соціальному - всі наукові факти створюються в колективній праці: не лише один вчений має побачити і показати факт, але тисячі інших вчених мають його підтвердити або спростувати. І не лише вчені, але й "прості споживачі". Тому факти творяться соціально, але на самі відносини науковця та природи суспільство тиску не чинить так, як це бачили К.Маркс чи К.Мангайм. Так, вчений залежить від фінансування, визнання колег, але і від морських свинок та бактерій. Якщо останні відмовляться "працювати на нього", то проект також провалиться. От вже ж, вигукне читач, але морські свинки не є соціальними акторами! Чому? Якщо ви аналізуєте залози внутрішньої секреції свинок, то умови, в яких ці свинки виростали, також мають вплив. Якщо їх вирощували десь на фермі і годували хімічною їжею, то і метаболізм в них інший, і тому результат експерименту буде зовсім не такий, як сподівався вчений. Отже, соціальні мережі включають в себе не лише людей.
2. І ось тут криється новизна праці Б. Латура - він пропонує нове бачення соціальної реальності. Насправді, як зазначив Howard S. Becker в одному інтерв*ю: аналогічні до Латурівських висловював ще в 1920-х рр. George Herbert Mead. Але ці вже ретроспективні пошуки є дуже кумедними (як іронічно про схожі ситуації відгукувався сам Б.Латур). Втім, не це зараз цікаво: Б.Латур зараховує до соціального і ті об*єкти, які не вважалися раніше соціальними. Чи це виправдано? А чому б і ні? Адже людина в соціальному житті не проводить розрізнення між засобами-людьми та засобами-речима. Навпаки, часто вони перемішані так, що їх не розділиш: для написання роботи мені потрібна програма SPSS, але вона коштує шалених грошей, а тому я маю отримати ґрант на те, щоб купити ліцензійну версію. Якщо цього не буде, то робота виконана не буде. І ось питання: в цьому випадку я залежу від людей чи від речей? І так, і так...
Як зазначав автор передмови Олег Хархордін, згадана праця Б.Латура є найбільш емпіричною: в ній він наводить більшість своїх емпіричних прикладів, які згодом фігуруватимуть в інших працях Б.Латура. Тому її можна читати і просто як трактат з соціології науки, і як вступ до ANT (actor-network theory) Б.Латура.
1. Чому ця праця не є звичайною роботою з соціології знання чи науки. Як не дивно, але більше про це Б.Латур пише в своїй книзі Nigdy nie byliśmy nowocześni. Studium z antropologii symetrycznej. Він зазначає, що його дослідженням завжди роблять три закиди (такі собі три спрощення). Перший: він просто пише, як вчені відкривають таємниці природи. Ні, каже Латур, природа з*являється завдяки науковим дослідженням. Поза межами науки - повний хаос, а тому науковці його впорядковують. І називають впорядковану частину природою. Звідси випливає другий закид: тоді він пише про владу! Науковці нав*язують влад�� іншим людям: влада/знання - як за М.Фуко. Та ні, відповідає Б.Латур, науковці вивчають природу, бо їм це цікаво. І ніяковї влади вони так не реалізовують. Навіть більше, вони залежать від влади інших: інс��итут ліквідують, фінансування обмежать, тему не затвердять - і дослідження припиняться. Отже, і це третій закид, йдеться про теорію дискурсів: вчені творять дискурсивну картину світу. От, вже починає злоститися Б.Латур, які дискурси можуть бути у вивченні мікробів: якщо всі теорії проходять перевірку практикою. Власне, Л.Пастер став авторитетом в медицині, коли продемонстрував на одній фермі, що щеплені від сибірської виразки вівці виживуть, а не щеплені - протягом місяця помруть. Як тут могли вчинити свій вплив дискурси? На кого? На овець? На мікробів?
Б.Латур відкидає всі звичні формати соціології науки - від Е.Дюркгайма та К.Мангайма починаючи. Згідно зі старими форматами є об*єктивне знання, яке соціально спотворюється - під впливом соціальних сил. Але воно не тільки сповторюється! Тоді Б.Латур стає радикальним релятивістом? Все знання - це соціальний конструкт? І так, і ні. Проблема в хибному розумінні соціального. Так, знання твориться завдяки соціальному - всі наукові факти створюються в колективній праці: не лише один вчений має побачити і показати факт, але тисячі інших вчених мають його підтвердити або спростувати. І не лише вчені, але й "прості споживачі". Тому факти творяться соціально, але на самі відносини науковця та природи суспільство тиску не чинить так, як це бачили К.Маркс чи К.Мангайм. Так, вчений залежить від фінансування, визнання колег, але і від морських свинок та бактерій. Якщо останні відмовляться "працювати на нього", то проект також провалиться. От вже ж, вигукне читач, але морські свинки не є соціальними акторами! Чому? Якщо ви аналізуєте залози внутрішньої секреції свинок, то умови, в яких ці свинки виростали, також мають вплив. Якщо їх вирощували десь на фермі і годували хімічною їжею, то і метаболізм в них інший, і тому результат експерименту буде зовсім не такий, як сподівався вчений. Отже, соціальні мережі включають в себе не лише людей.
2. І ось тут криється новизна праці Б. Латура - він пропонує нове бачення соціальної реальності. Насправді, як зазначив Howard S. Becker в одному інтерв*ю: аналогічні до Латурівських висловював ще в 1920-х рр. George Herbert Mead. Але ці вже ретроспективні пошуки є дуже кумедними (як іронічно про схожі ситуації відгукувався сам Б.Латур). Втім, не це зараз цікаво: Б.Латур зараховує до соціального і ті об*єкти, які не вважалися раніше соціальними. Чи це виправдано? А чому б і ні? Адже людина в соціальному житті не проводить розрізнення між засобами-людьми та засобами-речима. Навпаки, часто вони перемішані так, що їх не розділиш: для написання роботи мені потрібна програма SPSS, але вона коштує шалених грошей, а тому я маю отримати ґрант на те, щоб купити ліцензійну версію. Якщо цього не буде, то робота виконана не буде. І ось питання: в цьому випадку я залежу від людей чи від речей? І так, і так...
Як зазначав автор передмови Олег Хархордін, згадана праця Б.Латура є найбільш емпіричною: в ній він наводить більшість своїх емпіричних прикладів, які згодом фігуруватимуть в інших працях Б.Латура. Тому її можна читати і просто як трактат з соціології науки, і як вступ до ANT (actor-network theory) Б.Латура.
March 10, 2008
A seminal work on the way in which scientists construct facts. Latour develops an account of a complex process that entangles the personal and political investments of the scientist, interactions among other (often competing) scientists, the influence of funding agencies and other institutions, the intellectual convictions of the scientist, and the technical dance between the scientist and the apparatus from which scientific findings must emerge.
This last interaction is the focus of Latour's theory. He offers a compelling argument that we should not understand laboratory (or other technical) apparatus as a completely neutral, inanimate machine which produces results that reflect unequivocally the secrets of Nature, nor should we understand scientific apparatus as an implement over which the scientist has complete control to extract whatever result is desired.
Instead, Latour describes a continuous and conflicted process in which the scientist must design and implement an apparatus (understood broadly) to perform a certain study and produce a certain set of data. In doing so, there is necessarily an expectation of what one is looking for and how one will know if one has obtained the "correct" result. Yet the scientist must also be able to claim that results are "objective" reflections of Nature, that the experiments are unbiased and carefully controlled, and that it was impossible to obtain any other result. Rarely will the apparatus produce the expected result immediately, and so a cycle begins in which the scientist alternately tunes the apparatus, imposing some expectation of the successful result, and interprets the newest result of the apparatus, divining what aspects of the result are True and what are artifacts of interference, errors, or poor design.
Having become deeply skeptical of the way in which scientific knowledge is produced and used politically, culturally, and ethically, I found this book immensely helpful in giving me a vocabulary with which to articulate this type of critique. On the other hand, this is some fairly esoteric, geeky material, and it's probably not for everyone.
This last interaction is the focus of Latour's theory. He offers a compelling argument that we should not understand laboratory (or other technical) apparatus as a completely neutral, inanimate machine which produces results that reflect unequivocally the secrets of Nature, nor should we understand scientific apparatus as an implement over which the scientist has complete control to extract whatever result is desired.
Instead, Latour describes a continuous and conflicted process in which the scientist must design and implement an apparatus (understood broadly) to perform a certain study and produce a certain set of data. In doing so, there is necessarily an expectation of what one is looking for and how one will know if one has obtained the "correct" result. Yet the scientist must also be able to claim that results are "objective" reflections of Nature, that the experiments are unbiased and carefully controlled, and that it was impossible to obtain any other result. Rarely will the apparatus produce the expected result immediately, and so a cycle begins in which the scientist alternately tunes the apparatus, imposing some expectation of the successful result, and interprets the newest result of the apparatus, divining what aspects of the result are True and what are artifacts of interference, errors, or poor design.
Having become deeply skeptical of the way in which scientific knowledge is produced and used politically, culturally, and ethically, I found this book immensely helpful in giving me a vocabulary with which to articulate this type of critique. On the other hand, this is some fairly esoteric, geeky material, and it's probably not for everyone.
December 24, 2024
In large part, this book is about black boxes. You see, all science becomes a black box once it is more or less settled. There is a long discussion in this on the history of the Deisel engine. The problem was that such an engine was remarkably difficult to design, despite many scientists actively seeking a way to achieve precisely such a device. But once it had been achieved, it could be used without the person using it understanding this history or the problems associated with its creation. It became a black box – something you could assume would just work according to the specifications written on the box. This is also shown to be true of just about every problem in science. The artifacts of science are a series of black boxes that we trust will work – but that trust is always provisional, since, if the black box doesn’t work as intended, we may need to go back into it to understand its workings to see why, in this particular case, it is no longer doing what we intended it to do.
This is a book of sociology – but a particular form of sociology – one that avoids the large sociological categories we generally assume will form the foundation of the social science. Society being one of those categories, but also capitalism, race, gender and so on. These only are mentioned if they are observed directly as having an impact on what is being studied – science and technology – and if those directly engaged in such work – scientists and technologists – appear interested in these categories or make some use of them while they are engaged in their work. And this is shown to be virtually never the case. Instead, they are shown to be interested in their place in what I guess could be called the canon of science and technology. They want to be acknowledged as having contributed to the sum of human knowledge – but this is a difficult exercise. Not least because it is so competitive. And the basis of this competition is the desire to shape our understanding of the world. This isn’t quite the same as seeking to uncover the truth of nature – but like Khun’s paradigms, truth in this sense is seen as historically bound and socially conditioned.
One of the problems is that scientific research is built upon endless black boxes. This is what a laboratory is. It is almost meaningless to talk about a single inventor any longer. You know, a kind of Elon Musk reshaping the world in his image. This is because every laboratory is in essence a collaboration with everything that has come before. Just as a research paper without references to the work of others would never be published, so also a laboratory that did not contain various black boxes the technicians and scientists working in that laboratory did not know how they were built or how they work is also unimaginable. For example, if you are trying to redesign an engine, you are likely to need to use a computer, but you are unlikely to have more than an overview knowledge of how the computer works – even of the computer programs running on the computer hardware that your results are likely to depend upon. Your work is inevitably social – you will depend upon this social nature of your work if you are to move your research forward at all.
We like to think that if a scientist presents a theory that we do not agree with, we can simply challenge the assumptions they have made and test it according to the underlying logic of science – or of nature itself. The problem is that this is a bit like saying that if we don’t like the news, we can easily set up our own newspaper, or news website, and exercise our democratic rights. Which is true enough, if you are a billionaire, but less true for the rest of us. The same goes with science. Not only is the entry cost having the appropriate qualifications, but also in having the laboratory space with its multiple and very expensive black boxes. Criticism is not cheap.
This means that you might come up with something incredibly interesting about the nature of the universe, but if no one ends up using your idea as part of a black box, your idea is virtually meaningless. This is a bit like the fate of the Avogadro number, which is now so important to chemistry, but was initially ignored for 50 years until after his death. If people don’t know about your black box, they can’t use it, and it is only in its use that it becomes ‘true’. And if it is only in other people using your ideas that your ideas become worthwhile, finding ways to promote your ideas becomes a central task of science. And this becomes the central concern of scientists and their endless fascination with being published and being cited. To be cited is to be confirmed, even if the citation is a refutation – for someone to bother to refute your work shows its impact. The social nature of science goes all the way down. Muscling your way into this crowded space becomes central to having a productive scientific career.
There is an interesting discussion on the economics of science here – in the sense that the cost of copper was a factor in the electrification of the US. The point was to reduce the amount of copper used in the network. But this had further consequences, not least the need to have a high resistance filament in lightbulbs. High resistance filaments had not been discovered, and posed remarkable technological challenges – but the cost of copper was felt to be even more insurmountable if electric lights were to outcompete gas ones. And so the race was on for a high resistance filament that would persist. Society imposes restrictions, in much the same way that nature does, addressing those restrictions and redefining them is the work of scientists as they turn technological problems into settled science and from there to back boxes that can be used to address the issues of new restrictions and problems that need to be addressed.
This is quite a different way of understanding the workings of science. Rather than science being about addressing nature directly, it always is mediated by the social, the networks of scientists in an ongoing dialogue with each other over the immediate problems of the day. Rather than scientists being the great revolutionaries of our day, they are often highly conservative, relying on the endless black boxes created by the science of the past. These black boxes are often little understood, but they create an assemblage that has its own momentum, something it becomes increasingly difficult to redirect or overturn. Something that is inherently social with its own hierarchies, structures, power relations and demands. ‘Truth’ is presented as always being ‘enough’ in the mythology of science to overturn prejudice, but this is increasingly impossible unless your truth can be backed up by the money needed to engage in research – something that is highly competitive and therefore skewed towards those more in line with the paradigm of the day. I think this is an interesting take on the sociology of science, and I would probably recommend it above Latour’s other book I have read and not reviewed, Laboratory Life.
This is a book of sociology – but a particular form of sociology – one that avoids the large sociological categories we generally assume will form the foundation of the social science. Society being one of those categories, but also capitalism, race, gender and so on. These only are mentioned if they are observed directly as having an impact on what is being studied – science and technology – and if those directly engaged in such work – scientists and technologists – appear interested in these categories or make some use of them while they are engaged in their work. And this is shown to be virtually never the case. Instead, they are shown to be interested in their place in what I guess could be called the canon of science and technology. They want to be acknowledged as having contributed to the sum of human knowledge – but this is a difficult exercise. Not least because it is so competitive. And the basis of this competition is the desire to shape our understanding of the world. This isn’t quite the same as seeking to uncover the truth of nature – but like Khun’s paradigms, truth in this sense is seen as historically bound and socially conditioned.
One of the problems is that scientific research is built upon endless black boxes. This is what a laboratory is. It is almost meaningless to talk about a single inventor any longer. You know, a kind of Elon Musk reshaping the world in his image. This is because every laboratory is in essence a collaboration with everything that has come before. Just as a research paper without references to the work of others would never be published, so also a laboratory that did not contain various black boxes the technicians and scientists working in that laboratory did not know how they were built or how they work is also unimaginable. For example, if you are trying to redesign an engine, you are likely to need to use a computer, but you are unlikely to have more than an overview knowledge of how the computer works – even of the computer programs running on the computer hardware that your results are likely to depend upon. Your work is inevitably social – you will depend upon this social nature of your work if you are to move your research forward at all.
We like to think that if a scientist presents a theory that we do not agree with, we can simply challenge the assumptions they have made and test it according to the underlying logic of science – or of nature itself. The problem is that this is a bit like saying that if we don’t like the news, we can easily set up our own newspaper, or news website, and exercise our democratic rights. Which is true enough, if you are a billionaire, but less true for the rest of us. The same goes with science. Not only is the entry cost having the appropriate qualifications, but also in having the laboratory space with its multiple and very expensive black boxes. Criticism is not cheap.
This means that you might come up with something incredibly interesting about the nature of the universe, but if no one ends up using your idea as part of a black box, your idea is virtually meaningless. This is a bit like the fate of the Avogadro number, which is now so important to chemistry, but was initially ignored for 50 years until after his death. If people don’t know about your black box, they can’t use it, and it is only in its use that it becomes ‘true’. And if it is only in other people using your ideas that your ideas become worthwhile, finding ways to promote your ideas becomes a central task of science. And this becomes the central concern of scientists and their endless fascination with being published and being cited. To be cited is to be confirmed, even if the citation is a refutation – for someone to bother to refute your work shows its impact. The social nature of science goes all the way down. Muscling your way into this crowded space becomes central to having a productive scientific career.
There is an interesting discussion on the economics of science here – in the sense that the cost of copper was a factor in the electrification of the US. The point was to reduce the amount of copper used in the network. But this had further consequences, not least the need to have a high resistance filament in lightbulbs. High resistance filaments had not been discovered, and posed remarkable technological challenges – but the cost of copper was felt to be even more insurmountable if electric lights were to outcompete gas ones. And so the race was on for a high resistance filament that would persist. Society imposes restrictions, in much the same way that nature does, addressing those restrictions and redefining them is the work of scientists as they turn technological problems into settled science and from there to back boxes that can be used to address the issues of new restrictions and problems that need to be addressed.
This is quite a different way of understanding the workings of science. Rather than science being about addressing nature directly, it always is mediated by the social, the networks of scientists in an ongoing dialogue with each other over the immediate problems of the day. Rather than scientists being the great revolutionaries of our day, they are often highly conservative, relying on the endless black boxes created by the science of the past. These black boxes are often little understood, but they create an assemblage that has its own momentum, something it becomes increasingly difficult to redirect or overturn. Something that is inherently social with its own hierarchies, structures, power relations and demands. ‘Truth’ is presented as always being ‘enough’ in the mythology of science to overturn prejudice, but this is increasingly impossible unless your truth can be backed up by the money needed to engage in research – something that is highly competitive and therefore skewed towards those more in line with the paradigm of the day. I think this is an interesting take on the sociology of science, and I would probably recommend it above Latour’s other book I have read and not reviewed, Laboratory Life.
February 28, 2017
First off, this book is written very well in a creative sense, a skill that is often lacking in academic texts. Latour writes with wit and poses interesting anecdotes, keeping the reader very engaged while retaining a rigid structure guided by the methods and principles of Science in Action.
Latour shows that truth and Nature are not absolute, as they need a representant in our social world. This representation is science and fact, for which Latour through the multiple social processes that construct our society. It relativates the absoluteness of science. Each chapter adds an extra viewpoint for this: from academic texts, to laboratoria, to the management of scientific institutes and even the fabric of society itself. I found each chapter added new information, as behind the main idea of science as social activity, there are multiple different processes and principles at work.
"Science in Action" is allegedly culpable to the same relativity of representation as science is in relation to nature. "Science in Action" is as such a mere representation of science and not a true description of science. I believe however that self-reflection on science is a necessary precondition for any possibility of progress in science. Together with other ideas from the Philosophy of Science, the Social Scientific approach of science proves to be extremely valuable as a reflective methodology for any science.
Latour shows that truth and Nature are not absolute, as they need a representant in our social world. This representation is science and fact, for which Latour through the multiple social processes that construct our society. It relativates the absoluteness of science. Each chapter adds an extra viewpoint for this: from academic texts, to laboratoria, to the management of scientific institutes and even the fabric of society itself. I found each chapter added new information, as behind the main idea of science as social activity, there are multiple different processes and principles at work.
"Science in Action" is allegedly culpable to the same relativity of representation as science is in relation to nature. "Science in Action" is as such a mere representation of science and not a true description of science. I believe however that self-reflection on science is a necessary precondition for any possibility of progress in science. Together with other ideas from the Philosophy of Science, the Social Scientific approach of science proves to be extremely valuable as a reflective methodology for any science.
May 29, 2014
Latour's book is a full research program in its own style. His chain of thoughts is so well developed that you don't feel lost at any point of an absolutely magnificent journey. It can be a little dense, though, specially for people who are not familiarised with the "hard sciences" vocabulary. A modern classic which every reader interested in science and the manufacture of knowledge should read.
October 8, 2014
A comprehensive analysis of science and technology as they are practiced and a guide for further research. Latour's thesis, well-defended, is that science consists of evolving networks of marshalled resources including not only publications and laboratory research, but also whole societies, cultures, and bureaucracies.
Read
August 5, 2011In many ways the successor to Thomas Kuhn's work, Latour demonstrates how science actually works and how scientific facts are largely a community contruction, challenging the notion of a detached, value free science.
August 26, 2011
Análise da Ciência no seu processo de construção dos fatos científicos a partir de experimentos, erroneamente considerado como a-realista, na verdade a perspectiva de Latour é realista E "construtivista".
December 7, 2007
In my brief foray into the culture of science, this was the least obtuse book on this subject. (and i enjoyed it, too)
December 2, 2008
Really excellent illustrations- seriously, and an engaging use of examples/stories to outline Latour's methods for studying science before it is blackboxed.
June 1, 2022
Thought-provoking on the development and spread of of science, with a lingering argument that science can hardly be seen as objective.
February 20, 2023
Science in Action is about the theoretical production of scientific knowledge. Challenging the analysis of science, Latour describes the role of social context and technical content in understanding scientific activity. Influenced by Kuhn and Foucault, Latour was a challenging read I found largely unintelligible without discourse with peers.
Latour sees science, technology, and society as inextricably linked. And as a realist and social constructivist, he blends a realist idea of science as rhetorical combat over a particular argument with the constructivist and relativist notion that a claim must be socially accepted to become fact. The former influences the latter. Furthermore, Latour makes no distinction between things and their representations. Things are what we collectively represent them to be. He believes that knowledge (what we think or believe) is the byproduct of social agreement and, thus, a construct. The qualities of facts and technology are social belief’s consequence, not the cause. All science is where facts are the result of, not the cause of, collective action.
Things and facts become truths when controversies are closed and people no longer question the facts. Latour uses several essential concepts to help the layperson understand the creation of knowledge.
The black box is a metaphor for a piece of accepted knowledge. In a Kuhnian sense, this is normal science and generally unquestioned. An example is a CPU. Few understand its inner workings; we only know the inputs and outputs. The CPU is a black box – it is too complicated for most to understand, so we take it for granted. The black box represents a statement of uncontested scientific fact. To open the box, which could happen at any time, is to challenge scientific fact and create an anomaly.
The second idea is that of positive and negative modalities. Positive modalities are those sentences that support an assertion, while negative modalities are those that weaken an assertion. The best positive modalities are stories because they capture the imagination.
The third idea is that modalities support inscriptions, which are visual displays of scientific text. To layer multiple inscriptions are to use them to sustain or weaken a scientific assertion. This moves an assertion towards or away from societal acceptance.
The final idea is that networks of people, organizations, and things are needed to advance a scientific assertion. Latour writes about how networks influence power and control of knowledge. Science, therefore, is a set of networks; it is not some objective truth that involves nature, facts, and reality. Instead, it is a socially agreed-upon set of principles. Latour assesses that some scientists achieve while others fail due to their network. It is the confluence of the people, things, and stories that convince the scientific community of a set of knowledge.
Of note, this social constructivist approach is amoral. If we collectively believe a particular race is inferior, then it is. It is up to negative modalities to change the collective belief. This is not right or correct; the word truth is defined as what is accepted, not an objective reality.
An example is Louis Pasteur. Pasteur needed alliances for his research to continue and gain acceptance. He required the scientific community on his side but was also helped by inanimate objects, such as the anthrax outbreak. The disease itself was part of the network, as were the chickens. Without the biological crisis, he would not have been able to turn the chicken farm into a laboratory. Thus, his science advanced because of social pressure, not fact or reality.
How does this influence the study of history? The historian collects inscriptions in the form of diaries, photographs, and maps found in archives. These immutable mobiles, as Latour would call them, supply modalities to support a given assertion. The historian then creates abstractions from these primary sources that influence a given historical idea within society. Sometimes, a historian opens a black box of assumed knowledge and revisits it with a new theory. The inscriptions found in the historian’s abstraction, usually, a book or presentation, add something to the body of accepted knowledge. Over time, this new knowledge potentially gains societal acceptance, creating new knowledge.
Latour sees science, technology, and society as inextricably linked. And as a realist and social constructivist, he blends a realist idea of science as rhetorical combat over a particular argument with the constructivist and relativist notion that a claim must be socially accepted to become fact. The former influences the latter. Furthermore, Latour makes no distinction between things and their representations. Things are what we collectively represent them to be. He believes that knowledge (what we think or believe) is the byproduct of social agreement and, thus, a construct. The qualities of facts and technology are social belief’s consequence, not the cause. All science is where facts are the result of, not the cause of, collective action.
Things and facts become truths when controversies are closed and people no longer question the facts. Latour uses several essential concepts to help the layperson understand the creation of knowledge.
The black box is a metaphor for a piece of accepted knowledge. In a Kuhnian sense, this is normal science and generally unquestioned. An example is a CPU. Few understand its inner workings; we only know the inputs and outputs. The CPU is a black box – it is too complicated for most to understand, so we take it for granted. The black box represents a statement of uncontested scientific fact. To open the box, which could happen at any time, is to challenge scientific fact and create an anomaly.
The second idea is that of positive and negative modalities. Positive modalities are those sentences that support an assertion, while negative modalities are those that weaken an assertion. The best positive modalities are stories because they capture the imagination.
The third idea is that modalities support inscriptions, which are visual displays of scientific text. To layer multiple inscriptions are to use them to sustain or weaken a scientific assertion. This moves an assertion towards or away from societal acceptance.
The final idea is that networks of people, organizations, and things are needed to advance a scientific assertion. Latour writes about how networks influence power and control of knowledge. Science, therefore, is a set of networks; it is not some objective truth that involves nature, facts, and reality. Instead, it is a socially agreed-upon set of principles. Latour assesses that some scientists achieve while others fail due to their network. It is the confluence of the people, things, and stories that convince the scientific community of a set of knowledge.
Of note, this social constructivist approach is amoral. If we collectively believe a particular race is inferior, then it is. It is up to negative modalities to change the collective belief. This is not right or correct; the word truth is defined as what is accepted, not an objective reality.
An example is Louis Pasteur. Pasteur needed alliances for his research to continue and gain acceptance. He required the scientific community on his side but was also helped by inanimate objects, such as the anthrax outbreak. The disease itself was part of the network, as were the chickens. Without the biological crisis, he would not have been able to turn the chicken farm into a laboratory. Thus, his science advanced because of social pressure, not fact or reality.
How does this influence the study of history? The historian collects inscriptions in the form of diaries, photographs, and maps found in archives. These immutable mobiles, as Latour would call them, supply modalities to support a given assertion. The historian then creates abstractions from these primary sources that influence a given historical idea within society. Sometimes, a historian opens a black box of assumed knowledge and revisits it with a new theory. The inscriptions found in the historian’s abstraction, usually, a book or presentation, add something to the body of accepted knowledge. Over time, this new knowledge potentially gains societal acceptance, creating new knowledge.
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October 19, 2019Following from the foundations laid down in Laboratory Life, Latour expounds on 'technoscience,' a collapse of traditional boundaries of science, technology and society into a network of actants who(/which) strengthen or weaken the claims to the validity of knowledge and facts. Latour contends we cannot think of (scientific) knowledge as 'Nature' or independent of its presentation by scientists (even as they claim it to be objective truth). The principles and rules of method offer a succint summary of Latour's outlook that can easily be understood and applied to understand the development of human knowledge through 'technoscience'.
There are obvious rejoinders to the claims made in this book, as Latour relegates cognitive ability as an almost invisibly rare explanation of scientific fact being constructed and (as post modernists are wont to do) employs some clever - though at times it would seem belaboured - linguistic tricks to support his approaches, but the hypothesis would seem to survive most attacks (almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as this book has a strong influence on STS academics).
There are obvious rejoinders to the claims made in this book, as Latour relegates cognitive ability as an almost invisibly rare explanation of scientific fact being constructed and (as post modernists are wont to do) employs some clever - though at times it would seem belaboured - linguistic tricks to support his approaches, but the hypothesis would seem to survive most attacks (almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as this book has a strong influence on STS academics).
February 17, 2024
The best introduction to the vast and bewildering works and philosophy of Bruno Latour. It is extremely difficult to process at the beginning, but as the gist and principles are understood, it's clearer. For Latour, scientific facts are a set of controversies and uncertainties that are settled. They cannot be taken for granted because to understand how facts are generated, we have to follow the scientists (and other actors) that meet, align, and work collectively. Facts and artefacts are the product of heterogeneous elements that are displaced, moved, tried, tested. They're the consequences —not the cause—of actions.
July 20, 2021
Книга предлагает несколько неожиданных (для человека без социологического образования, вероятно) точек зрения на то, что такое technoscience (автор эксплицитно избегает разделения науки, инжениринга, экономики и всего остального), как она развивается и как ее можно изучать.
После вбитого в голову инженерным образованием разделения на "науку" и "общество" с долгими разговорами о том, как одно влияет на другое, читается очень освежающе.
Стиль учебника с многократным повторением одних и тех же тезисов местами утомляет, разве что.
После вбитого в голову инженерным образованием разделения на "науку" и "общество" с долгими разговорами о том, как одно влияет на другое, читается очень освежающе.
Стиль учебника с многократным повторением одних и тех же тезисов местами утомляет, разве что.
October 2, 2021
incredibly lucid (by latourian standards) description of science in action. specifically explores how so-called black boxes of complex scientific principles come to be, and argues for science as a cumulative back-and-forth process of strengthening and weakening claims. doesn’t take a social approach in the usual sense but rather takes science in itself as the object of study, looks at the actions happening to it in its creation/bolstering.
October 6, 2021
read for class. definitely bears re-reading to get more out of it given the somewhat opaque discursive style. i find myself in agreement with many of latour's principles, but also find the "everything is in a network with heterogeneous nodes and edges" not to be particularly deep (is actor-network theory the free energy principle of the 90s??). i found the more descriptive sociological work more useful and interesting
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January 21, 2025El Furro Latour no deja títere con cabeza en este certero análisis de las ciencias.
Su premisa es sencilla: estudiar lo que la ciencia hace y no lo que la ciencia dice que hace. A partir de ahí la ciencia se desmitifica, pero se vuelve mucho más terrenal y por lo tanto interesante. Lo que tenemos son prácticas que ensamblan seres de todo tipo en redes amplias y complejas que marcan nuestras sociedades. No es poca cosa.
Su premisa es sencilla: estudiar lo que la ciencia hace y no lo que la ciencia dice que hace. A partir de ahí la ciencia se desmitifica, pero se vuelve mucho más terrenal y por lo tanto interesante. Lo que tenemos son prácticas que ensamblan seres de todo tipo en redes amplias y complejas que marcan nuestras sociedades. No es poca cosa.
July 30, 2025
This book is seriously so brilliant, I would rate it five stars but I sometimes found Latour's flowery (although lovely) prose sometimes took away from the seriousness of his arguments and the points he makes. It's probably a useful book if you're an up and coming scientist and are looking to make it big: this is basically a how-to for scientific practice.
January 18, 2019
Really delightful way that presented an extremely unique and useful way to think about science/the production of knowledge. But getting *that* constructivist with things does kind of make my head hurt.
April 9, 2019
Along with David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery, this is an excellent, non-technical resource to help demystify the common conception of science.
November 8, 2021
Belle analyse de ce qui distingue la science du reste. J'ai beaucoup aimé le concept des "black boxes". Bien écrit également; ça rend la lecture facile. Certaines des conclusions ou des prémisses m'ont toutefois moins accrochée (ex. vision de la dichotomie rationalité/irrationalité).
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