What do you think?
Rate this book
Victims of Yalta: The Secret Betrayal of the Allies: 1944-1947
At the end of the Second World War, a secret Moscow agreement that was confirmed at the 1945 Yalta conference ordered the forcible repatriation of millions of Soviet citizens that had fallen into German hands, including prisoners of war, refugees and forced laborers. For many, the order was a death sentence, as citizens returned to find themselves executed or placed back in forced-labor camps. Tolstoy condemns the complicity of the British, who "ardently followed" the repatriation orders.
608 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1977
55 people are currently reading
354 people want to read
About the author
Nikolai Tolstoy
33 books34 followersCount Nikolai Dmitrievich Tolstoy-Miloslavsky (Russian: Николай Дмитриевич Толстой-Милославский; born 23 June 1935) is an Anglo-Russian author who writes under the name Nikolai Tolstoy. A member of the Tolstoy family, he is a former parliamentary candidate of the UK Independence Party.
Source: Wikipedia
The photograph by Justin K Prim.
Source: Wikipedia
The photograph by Justin K Prim.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
July 20, 2021
Horrifying and sad book about the fate of so many Russian POW's, refugees and anti-Bolsheviks that were handed over to the Soviet Union by the Western Allies after World War 2. Stalin and his cronies were just as evil as Hitler and his followers, and this book is just another example of how the Western Allies had to make a deal with the devil to defeat another evil. Especially sad is the fate of the Cossacks, where they were almost exterminated by the Soviets and few survived the Gulags, and how the Soviets settled personal scores with the émigré White Russians who opposed them during the Russian Civil War. This is a must read for the youth of today to see what happens when communism takes over a nation.
March 16, 2023
The Nikolai Tolstoy is a White Russian and lives in the UK.
Here, he writes of the horror that faced two-million Russians forcibly repatriated as a result of an agreement made between Churchill, FDR and Stalin at a meeting in Yalta, Crimea, during February 1945.
Many were assassinated upon return, vast numbers perished in gulag labour camps.
I read of Yalta many years ago; my grandmother was a White Russian who lived from an early age in the UK.
Here, the author provides, I feel, the much needed detail of this betrayal, and I valued reading of the author’s take. My take from this work is that again, as was true of Chamberlain when meeting with Hitler in 1938, is that the West gave in, in the hope of appeasement.
By 1945, the West was in no position to embark upon another conflict, but nor were Russia. Was this tragedy the result of Stalin being the better poker player?
There is suspicion of the hotel rooms occupied by Churchill, FDR and respective entourages being fitted with listening devices.
I’m not a poker player. How easy is it to win at poker when you know the cards held by your opponent?
This is a hard lesson that I feel British politicians are yet to learn.
Here, he writes of the horror that faced two-million Russians forcibly repatriated as a result of an agreement made between Churchill, FDR and Stalin at a meeting in Yalta, Crimea, during February 1945.
Many were assassinated upon return, vast numbers perished in gulag labour camps.
I read of Yalta many years ago; my grandmother was a White Russian who lived from an early age in the UK.
Here, the author provides, I feel, the much needed detail of this betrayal, and I valued reading of the author’s take. My take from this work is that again, as was true of Chamberlain when meeting with Hitler in 1938, is that the West gave in, in the hope of appeasement.
By 1945, the West was in no position to embark upon another conflict, but nor were Russia. Was this tragedy the result of Stalin being the better poker player?
There is suspicion of the hotel rooms occupied by Churchill, FDR and respective entourages being fitted with listening devices.
I’m not a poker player. How easy is it to win at poker when you know the cards held by your opponent?
This is a hard lesson that I feel British politicians are yet to learn.
November 25, 2020
Nikolai Tolstoy's book covers the forceful repatriation of over two million Russians to the Soviet Union in the years 1944-47.
In 1944, the Soviet official attitude still appeared to be that there were no Russians "worth speaking of" serving with the German Army or captured therefrom. Yet, reveals Tolstoy, the facts pointed the other way: of all the nations in Europe, the USSR was the only one to witness nearly a million of its subjects enlisting in the enemy army. ("A protracted campaign to raise a similar force from among British prisoners resulted in the recruitment of thirty drunken misfits.")
Despite Soviet denials that there weren't any Russians in the Wehrmacht, the British Foreign Office soon felt obliged to raise the matter with the Soviet Government: something had to be done soon, in view of the
arge number of Russian POWs in the country.
On 17 July 1944 the War Cabinet met to consider the matter. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, spoke in favour of handing the POWs back to the Soviets, while Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested that the Soviet authorities be notified of the presence of the Russians. Their "ambivalent position" as former allies of the Germans should be shown in the most extenuating light, argued he, and if possible their return should be delayed.
According to Tolstoy, the feeling of the Cabinet was clearly uneasy as to the reception the prisoners might experience on their return. Eden proposed a proviso: "In order not to discourage surrender on the part of others impressed by the Germans to fight against us, we should ask that no steps should be taken to deal with these Russians until the end of hostilities."
As the inevitability of the Nazi downfall increased, however, the view of the British Foreign Office on the repatriation question passed through what Tolstoy calls "a succession of logical stages". Firstly, the British refused to send back any prisoners whom it was feared the Soviets might punish before the cessation of hostilities. The next step was to send all back, at the same time requiring an undertaking by the Soviet authorities that no public punishment of repatriates should occur until the collapse of Germany. Yet, such an undertaking was not forthcoming, and finally the weak hope of obtaining it was completely abandoned and the policy of repatriating all, regardless of their wishes, came fully into being.
As Tolstoy explains, this gradual progression in policy took place over the summer months of 1944, and it was events themselves that in large part shaped policy decision-making: firstly, the Soviets, for reasons of their own, remained "commendably discreet" over the fate of their returned citizens; secondly, the Germans also showed no desire to "take up the cudgels" on this question because, indeed, every month that the war progressed saw the power of the Third Reich dwindle. Thus, by June 1944 the Foreign Office was determined that all the Russians should be returned eventually, whatever the fate in store for them.
Antony Eden's argument in favor of forcible repatriation was that (allegedly) "a large proportion of the prisoners, whatever their reasons, are willing and even anxious to return to Russia". He was relying on a report of 1 July, containing information based on interrogations of Russian prisoners held at Devizes. After noting that virtually all had been forced to join German units, and had thenceforward been treated abominably, the report went on to claim that most of the Russians, though fearing punishment on their return, wished to go back to the USSR.
But what about those who didn't agree to be send back? (And they, by the way, were in the majority.) What about those who were sure that they "are due for liquidation on their return"?
It is important to note that the British Foreign Office was fully aware of the Soviet Government’s callous abandonment of all its citizens who fell into German hands. In February 1942, the International Committee of the Red Cross telegraphed Molotov that the United Kingdom had given permission for the USSR to buy food for the prisoners in her African colonies, the Canadian Red Cross was offering a gift of five hundred vials of vitamins, and Germany had agreed to collective consignments of foodstuffs for POWs. "All these offers and communications from the ICRC to the Soviet authorities remained unanswered, either directly or indirectly," states the report of the Red Cross. This was an obvious sign that that were strong motives of policy behind the Soviet attitude since Stalin was not opposed to Red Cross aid in general – he readily provided British and Dutch soldiers fighting the Japanese with such; it was only Russian prisoners that he wished to deny any aid and comfort. What then did he plan to do with those men once were sent back to him?
Eden, however, was a practical man and didn't ask himself such questions. He simply wasn't at all enthusiastic about diverting already overstretched Allied resources to assist Russian prisoners, men whom in any case he regarded as traitors. In addition, to refuse the Soviet Government’s request for the return of their own men would lead to serious trouble with them, reasoned he. They would know that "we were treating them differently from the other Allied Governments on this question and this would arouse their gravest suspicions." Finally, he and the rest of the Foreign Office feared that any act which might seriously endanger the alliance between Britain and the Soviets would prove risky at such a critical juncture of the war. "The Foreign Office was convinced of the dangers of not falling in wholly with Soviet wishes, and then, as all too often occurs, tried to persuade itself and everyone else that such a policy was not only politically expedient, but also morally justified," writes Tolstoy.
The delicate part, reveals he, was to convince large sections of the British public not to revolt against the application of brutal measures to compel the return of unwilling Russians, particularly women and children. When, after finding out about their imminent repatriation, a number of terrified Russians held in camps in Britain committed suicide, Patrick Dean of the Office noted that, if the news got out, it might "possibly cause political trouble," urging "that the Foreign Office should speak to the News Department with a view to doing all that is possible to avoid publicity," "which might be embarrassing." Another official, John Galsworthy, admitted: "I think that any publicity given to the Soviet demand ... is a good thing. An enlightened public opinion can only strengthen our position in refusing to transfer these luckless folk to the Russians."
But, asserts Tolstoy, such alleged candour was for a purpose. In fact, the actual operations, with their irregular procedure, cheating people into accepting repatriation to the USSR etc., were carefully concealed from the British public. Instead, to lull the people's suspicions, the Office claimed that retainment of Russians unwilling to return would have "imperiled the return of British prisoners liberated by the Red Army."
Would Stalin have actually considered holding such liberated British and American prisoners hostage for the return of the millions of Soviet citizens held in Western Europe? This questions is explained in detail in Victims of Yalta. As Tolstoy argues, there exists no evidence that Antony Eden or anyone else in the Foreign Office at the time feared such a possibility. Although Stalin might not have been very co-operative at the time, the worst the Foreign Office envisaged was "that Britons in Red Army hands might continue for a few weeks to return home by sea from Odessa instead of overland through Germany." Neither Eden, nor any of his advisors, believed Stalin contemplated retaining them. Also, if the return of the British prisoners was the issue at stake, why was the policy continued for nearly two years after the last prisoners had come home? In fact, points out Tolstoy, by implementing forcible repatriation of Russians in Wehrmacht uniform, the same British prisoners for whom the supporters of forcible repatriation profess such overriding concern were exposed to a very real risk of Nazi reprisals whilst they were still in German hands. This was a far more terrible danger, one which the Foreign Office somehow deemed acceptable at the time.
Interesting to read is how different the United States policy on the matter was. The State Department delayed acceptance of the principle of forced repatriation for months after the British had conceded it. It then reluctantly gave in, but became so revolted at the relatively minor scenes of bloodshed that ensued that it temporarily abandoned the policy. Eventually, under strong British pressure, a few hundred Russians who had served in the German Army were sent back to the Soviets. This attitude on the part of the Americans did not result even in a one-day delay for any soldier returning from Russia, nor did the Soviets ever threaten the reprisals which the British Foreign Office officials claimed to have feared; the British Government was fully informed of the American stance and of Soviet failure to react harshly. "It was not necessary to speculate on the merits of an alternative policy; it was there to be seen," concludes Tolstoy.
The episode of the Cossack repatriation and the tragic fate of the Cossack occupants of the camp Lienz are also explored quite effectively, (although I personally recommend General V.G. Naumenko's "Great Betrayal" as a particularly potent, shocking first hand account of the event.)
Victims of Yalta is a very long book, which deals with its subject in meticulous detail. To establish his arguments, Nikolai Tolstoy draws upon an impressive number of first hand sources and key documents. This is a brilliantly written, and highly important, historical account of appalling injustice and horrible suffering.
In 1944, the Soviet official attitude still appeared to be that there were no Russians "worth speaking of" serving with the German Army or captured therefrom. Yet, reveals Tolstoy, the facts pointed the other way: of all the nations in Europe, the USSR was the only one to witness nearly a million of its subjects enlisting in the enemy army. ("A protracted campaign to raise a similar force from among British prisoners resulted in the recruitment of thirty drunken misfits.")
Despite Soviet denials that there weren't any Russians in the Wehrmacht, the British Foreign Office soon felt obliged to raise the matter with the Soviet Government: something had to be done soon, in view of the
arge number of Russian POWs in the country.
On 17 July 1944 the War Cabinet met to consider the matter. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, spoke in favour of handing the POWs back to the Soviets, while Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested that the Soviet authorities be notified of the presence of the Russians. Their "ambivalent position" as former allies of the Germans should be shown in the most extenuating light, argued he, and if possible their return should be delayed.
According to Tolstoy, the feeling of the Cabinet was clearly uneasy as to the reception the prisoners might experience on their return. Eden proposed a proviso: "In order not to discourage surrender on the part of others impressed by the Germans to fight against us, we should ask that no steps should be taken to deal with these Russians until the end of hostilities."
As the inevitability of the Nazi downfall increased, however, the view of the British Foreign Office on the repatriation question passed through what Tolstoy calls "a succession of logical stages". Firstly, the British refused to send back any prisoners whom it was feared the Soviets might punish before the cessation of hostilities. The next step was to send all back, at the same time requiring an undertaking by the Soviet authorities that no public punishment of repatriates should occur until the collapse of Germany. Yet, such an undertaking was not forthcoming, and finally the weak hope of obtaining it was completely abandoned and the policy of repatriating all, regardless of their wishes, came fully into being.
As Tolstoy explains, this gradual progression in policy took place over the summer months of 1944, and it was events themselves that in large part shaped policy decision-making: firstly, the Soviets, for reasons of their own, remained "commendably discreet" over the fate of their returned citizens; secondly, the Germans also showed no desire to "take up the cudgels" on this question because, indeed, every month that the war progressed saw the power of the Third Reich dwindle. Thus, by June 1944 the Foreign Office was determined that all the Russians should be returned eventually, whatever the fate in store for them.
Antony Eden's argument in favor of forcible repatriation was that (allegedly) "a large proportion of the prisoners, whatever their reasons, are willing and even anxious to return to Russia". He was relying on a report of 1 July, containing information based on interrogations of Russian prisoners held at Devizes. After noting that virtually all had been forced to join German units, and had thenceforward been treated abominably, the report went on to claim that most of the Russians, though fearing punishment on their return, wished to go back to the USSR.
But what about those who didn't agree to be send back? (And they, by the way, were in the majority.) What about those who were sure that they "are due for liquidation on their return"?
It is important to note that the British Foreign Office was fully aware of the Soviet Government’s callous abandonment of all its citizens who fell into German hands. In February 1942, the International Committee of the Red Cross telegraphed Molotov that the United Kingdom had given permission for the USSR to buy food for the prisoners in her African colonies, the Canadian Red Cross was offering a gift of five hundred vials of vitamins, and Germany had agreed to collective consignments of foodstuffs for POWs. "All these offers and communications from the ICRC to the Soviet authorities remained unanswered, either directly or indirectly," states the report of the Red Cross. This was an obvious sign that that were strong motives of policy behind the Soviet attitude since Stalin was not opposed to Red Cross aid in general – he readily provided British and Dutch soldiers fighting the Japanese with such; it was only Russian prisoners that he wished to deny any aid and comfort. What then did he plan to do with those men once were sent back to him?
Eden, however, was a practical man and didn't ask himself such questions. He simply wasn't at all enthusiastic about diverting already overstretched Allied resources to assist Russian prisoners, men whom in any case he regarded as traitors. In addition, to refuse the Soviet Government’s request for the return of their own men would lead to serious trouble with them, reasoned he. They would know that "we were treating them differently from the other Allied Governments on this question and this would arouse their gravest suspicions." Finally, he and the rest of the Foreign Office feared that any act which might seriously endanger the alliance between Britain and the Soviets would prove risky at such a critical juncture of the war. "The Foreign Office was convinced of the dangers of not falling in wholly with Soviet wishes, and then, as all too often occurs, tried to persuade itself and everyone else that such a policy was not only politically expedient, but also morally justified," writes Tolstoy.
The delicate part, reveals he, was to convince large sections of the British public not to revolt against the application of brutal measures to compel the return of unwilling Russians, particularly women and children. When, after finding out about their imminent repatriation, a number of terrified Russians held in camps in Britain committed suicide, Patrick Dean of the Office noted that, if the news got out, it might "possibly cause political trouble," urging "that the Foreign Office should speak to the News Department with a view to doing all that is possible to avoid publicity," "which might be embarrassing." Another official, John Galsworthy, admitted: "I think that any publicity given to the Soviet demand ... is a good thing. An enlightened public opinion can only strengthen our position in refusing to transfer these luckless folk to the Russians."
But, asserts Tolstoy, such alleged candour was for a purpose. In fact, the actual operations, with their irregular procedure, cheating people into accepting repatriation to the USSR etc., were carefully concealed from the British public. Instead, to lull the people's suspicions, the Office claimed that retainment of Russians unwilling to return would have "imperiled the return of British prisoners liberated by the Red Army."
Would Stalin have actually considered holding such liberated British and American prisoners hostage for the return of the millions of Soviet citizens held in Western Europe? This questions is explained in detail in Victims of Yalta. As Tolstoy argues, there exists no evidence that Antony Eden or anyone else in the Foreign Office at the time feared such a possibility. Although Stalin might not have been very co-operative at the time, the worst the Foreign Office envisaged was "that Britons in Red Army hands might continue for a few weeks to return home by sea from Odessa instead of overland through Germany." Neither Eden, nor any of his advisors, believed Stalin contemplated retaining them. Also, if the return of the British prisoners was the issue at stake, why was the policy continued for nearly two years after the last prisoners had come home? In fact, points out Tolstoy, by implementing forcible repatriation of Russians in Wehrmacht uniform, the same British prisoners for whom the supporters of forcible repatriation profess such overriding concern were exposed to a very real risk of Nazi reprisals whilst they were still in German hands. This was a far more terrible danger, one which the Foreign Office somehow deemed acceptable at the time.
Interesting to read is how different the United States policy on the matter was. The State Department delayed acceptance of the principle of forced repatriation for months after the British had conceded it. It then reluctantly gave in, but became so revolted at the relatively minor scenes of bloodshed that ensued that it temporarily abandoned the policy. Eventually, under strong British pressure, a few hundred Russians who had served in the German Army were sent back to the Soviets. This attitude on the part of the Americans did not result even in a one-day delay for any soldier returning from Russia, nor did the Soviets ever threaten the reprisals which the British Foreign Office officials claimed to have feared; the British Government was fully informed of the American stance and of Soviet failure to react harshly. "It was not necessary to speculate on the merits of an alternative policy; it was there to be seen," concludes Tolstoy.
The episode of the Cossack repatriation and the tragic fate of the Cossack occupants of the camp Lienz are also explored quite effectively, (although I personally recommend General V.G. Naumenko's "Great Betrayal" as a particularly potent, shocking first hand account of the event.)
Victims of Yalta is a very long book, which deals with its subject in meticulous detail. To establish his arguments, Nikolai Tolstoy draws upon an impressive number of first hand sources and key documents. This is a brilliantly written, and highly important, historical account of appalling injustice and horrible suffering.
January 17, 2014
Tolstoy is an accomplished historian and a quite a good writer. The story he tells here is heart-breaking and infuriating. He manages to provide extensive historical background and information without letting the reader lose sight of the immense horror and sadness of the forced repatriation of so many Russians at the hands of the British. It is so easy to think that the Allies were the "good guys" in WWII, but history is never that simple and, as Tolstoy so clearly knows, by ignoring the evil done by our own nations, we make it easier for future evils to arise. Any student of modern history should read this book. Anyone with an interest in present-day politics should read this book--these are our roots; this is part of how we got to where we are now. I first read this book about 25 years ago. I've never forgotten it and have gone out of my way to obtain a copy for my library.
June 22, 2022
By early 1945 the Eastern Front was already west of Poland and with its feet on Eastern German ground; and within a stone throw of many of the camps occupied by Allied prisoners.
The Yalta conference was held over eight days, February 4–11, 1945, which some saw as a betrayal of more than two-million people. I can see the argument, a small number (and it was only a small number) did work for the Allies, but betrayal might be too strong a word. I've not settled on either side of the fence, but I am opening a debate.
The author titles the book 'The Victims ..."
Who has the author defined as victims? Is it just the Russians that suffered Soviet reprisal or does he include the negotiators who were undoubtedly boxed into a corner, with no way out?
One of my questions is: why was Churchill so able to entertain appeasement at Yalto, when he was such a staunch advocate of non-appeasement when faced with Hitler? Churchill was most aware of their shared view on the value each placed on the life of those they governed.
Throughout this book I kept in mind that we, the British, had formed a war committee, way back in 1940, charged with discussing and formulating plans for the rebuilding of Europe once the Allies had WON the war: as Britain was convinced, even at that early stage, that the Allies would eventually win.
One of the questions I found myself asking is; was Stalin's desire to win the race for Berlin based purely on territory he would gain or did he also want the control of as many western PoW's as was possible?
Operation Market Garden (A Bridge Too Far) was all the proof Stalin needed when it came to the value the Allies placed on human life. If 'Market Garden' had of been a success, then of course Yalta would have been bargained by the Allies from a far stronger position. Why did the Allies not throw more and more troops into the fray, cross the Rhine and take Berlin before Stalin had woken for breakfast? I agree, it would have cost thousands more lives, but look at the millions of lives it would have saved. I accept that's hindsight for the man on the street, but I find it hard to believe the advisors to the powerbrokers didn't see that as a possible consequence of Stalin winning the race.
What nobody knew (apart from Stalin of course) was the existence of 'The Cambridge Spies', in particular those (Philby is the first that comes to mind) who had infiltrated the Foreign Office. At Yalta, Stalin knew exactly what cards we were holding close to our chests and just how far we were prepared to go.
I've just read 'Cossack' by Ronald Mcqueen. In that, I read what I see as the closest I will ever get to the first-hand emotions and despair faced by those forcibly returned by the British. I found the book humbling and it did leave me with a cold emptiness.
But 'betrayed' I find difficult to agree with. They were victims of a man who cared nothing for the life of his fellow countrymen.
This I believe to be a detailed and accurate account and shows clearly that Stalin held all the cards and the Allies had their hands tied behind their back before they stepped off the plane.
It is a valuable read.
The Yalta conference was held over eight days, February 4–11, 1945, which some saw as a betrayal of more than two-million people. I can see the argument, a small number (and it was only a small number) did work for the Allies, but betrayal might be too strong a word. I've not settled on either side of the fence, but I am opening a debate.
The author titles the book 'The Victims ..."
Who has the author defined as victims? Is it just the Russians that suffered Soviet reprisal or does he include the negotiators who were undoubtedly boxed into a corner, with no way out?
One of my questions is: why was Churchill so able to entertain appeasement at Yalto, when he was such a staunch advocate of non-appeasement when faced with Hitler? Churchill was most aware of their shared view on the value each placed on the life of those they governed.
Throughout this book I kept in mind that we, the British, had formed a war committee, way back in 1940, charged with discussing and formulating plans for the rebuilding of Europe once the Allies had WON the war: as Britain was convinced, even at that early stage, that the Allies would eventually win.
One of the questions I found myself asking is; was Stalin's desire to win the race for Berlin based purely on territory he would gain or did he also want the control of as many western PoW's as was possible?
Operation Market Garden (A Bridge Too Far) was all the proof Stalin needed when it came to the value the Allies placed on human life. If 'Market Garden' had of been a success, then of course Yalta would have been bargained by the Allies from a far stronger position. Why did the Allies not throw more and more troops into the fray, cross the Rhine and take Berlin before Stalin had woken for breakfast? I agree, it would have cost thousands more lives, but look at the millions of lives it would have saved. I accept that's hindsight for the man on the street, but I find it hard to believe the advisors to the powerbrokers didn't see that as a possible consequence of Stalin winning the race.
What nobody knew (apart from Stalin of course) was the existence of 'The Cambridge Spies', in particular those (Philby is the first that comes to mind) who had infiltrated the Foreign Office. At Yalta, Stalin knew exactly what cards we were holding close to our chests and just how far we were prepared to go.
I've just read 'Cossack' by Ronald Mcqueen. In that, I read what I see as the closest I will ever get to the first-hand emotions and despair faced by those forcibly returned by the British. I found the book humbling and it did leave me with a cold emptiness.
But 'betrayed' I find difficult to agree with. They were victims of a man who cared nothing for the life of his fellow countrymen.
This I believe to be a detailed and accurate account and shows clearly that Stalin held all the cards and the Allies had their hands tied behind their back before they stepped off the plane.
It is a valuable read.
October 4, 2015
This was a excellent, sobering, provocative book describing a little known facet of World War II, how the return of Soviet soldiers and laborers who had been captured on the battlefield or as territory was overrun by initial German advances, was in reality a return for torture, death, or a prison sentence in the Soviet Gulag (network of labor camps in Siberia).
For substance, the book is a comprehensive and documented treatise, encyclopedic in nature, one for the courtroom. The author, a "white russian," probably intended it to be a watertight case being made. And for that reason, it was not written with a strong narrative as in a historical fiction novel. So 5 stars for content, three for accessibility.
To the Soviet leadership (aka Stalin and his minions), true Russian soldiers would not be taken prisoner, they would die fighting, so all returning POW's were suspect and in need of close monitoring and re-education. Likewise civilians who had been trapped by early German advances into Russian territory, and who had ended up in either slave labor factories or concentration camps were considered as having been tainted with Western ideas, therefore also a potential threat to the paradise being built under communism.
The book details the initial reluctance and acceptance of returning unwilling Russian citizens by the allies, as they wanted no reasons why their own soldiers who had been liberated by Russian advances should become hostages to larger geopolitical forces. Still, the author spares no one who acquiesced in the formulation of the policies of forced repatriation.
An ugly, sobering chapter of this war that resulted in over 2 million soviet citizens returned, the vast majority unwillingly, to the unloving hands of the Soviet system.
For substance, the book is a comprehensive and documented treatise, encyclopedic in nature, one for the courtroom. The author, a "white russian," probably intended it to be a watertight case being made. And for that reason, it was not written with a strong narrative as in a historical fiction novel. So 5 stars for content, three for accessibility.
To the Soviet leadership (aka Stalin and his minions), true Russian soldiers would not be taken prisoner, they would die fighting, so all returning POW's were suspect and in need of close monitoring and re-education. Likewise civilians who had been trapped by early German advances into Russian territory, and who had ended up in either slave labor factories or concentration camps were considered as having been tainted with Western ideas, therefore also a potential threat to the paradise being built under communism.
The book details the initial reluctance and acceptance of returning unwilling Russian citizens by the allies, as they wanted no reasons why their own soldiers who had been liberated by Russian advances should become hostages to larger geopolitical forces. Still, the author spares no one who acquiesced in the formulation of the policies of forced repatriation.
An ugly, sobering chapter of this war that resulted in over 2 million soviet citizens returned, the vast majority unwillingly, to the unloving hands of the Soviet system.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Read
September 4, 2016An excellent book for bringing the reader inside the minds, and sharing the perspectives, of many World War II decision-makers, who were repeatedly faced with difficult decisions that they had to make, and the legal, moral, political, military societal, and other implications of such decisions, as to if and to what extent to use their power and authority to force repatriation to the Soviet Union on large numbers of captured and displaced people, with a diversity of individual backgrounds and experiences, knowing, or suspecting, what the life-and-death consequences would be for those individuals.
A careful and thoughtful reading of the book brings to mind not only the many questions raised directly and explicitly by the book, but also many important related difficult, but important, questions that have broad societal implications, such as, for example, the following:
1. Consideration of morality of both alliance & repatriation – If it was morally wrong for Britain/US to repatriate Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II based upon the contention that the Soviet Union was something of an "evil empire" that did not validly represent the Soviet people and that was inhumane in its treatment of the Soviet people, then was it also morally wrong for Britain/US (X) to have entered into the World War II military, economic, and political alliance with the Soviet Union to use the Soviet Union and its people to the military, economic, and political advantage of Britain/US, and (Y) to provide the Soviet Union with military, economic, and political resources to protect and strengthen the Soviet Union?
2. Repatriation hypocrisy – What do we anticipate would likely be the position of the US if, on the other hand, the Soviet Union had possession of US citizens who came into the Soviet Union’s possession during the war and the Soviet Union refused to honor the request of the US that the Soviet Union return such citizens to the US where (X) the US citizens did not want to be repatriated to the US, and (Y) the Soviet Union believed that the US would not treat the forcibly repatriated Americans in a manner that the Soviet Union believed to be appropriate, such as by, for example, the US punishing the return Americans for such reasons and in such manner that the Soviet’s considered to be inappropriate?
3. Rationale for refusing to accept repatriated individuals – Are there any circumstances where the continued existence of a country, the Soviet Union, is so threatened by the invasion of another country, Germany, that the threatened country may determine that in order to survive that it's soldiers (X) must be required to fight to the death, and (Y) must not have the option of surrendering under any circumstances, because to provide the soldiers with the right to surrender or otherwise be captured and then later repatriated would so detract from the intensity of the soldiers commitment to fight to protect the homeland that homeland would be most likely lost to the enemy?
4. Deceiving while criticizing other deceivers – Did the British and the US officials deceive their own citizens by concealing such officials’ decisions and efforts to turn people over to Stalin, because the British/US officials believed that such deceit of their own citizens was in the best interest of their own nations? All the while such officials were themselves criticizing and condemning Stalin for deceiving Soviet citizens when Stalin believed that such deceit was in the best interest of the Soviet Union?
5. Determining if and when the "ends" justify the "means" – What criteria should be used to determine if the "ends" sought to be accomplished by a political leader, such as Stalin, in a particular situation would justify the "means" that would need to be used to accomplish such objectives?
The answers to these and other questions have an importance and relevance far beyond a historical consideration of the events of World War II.
A careful and thoughtful reading of the book brings to mind not only the many questions raised directly and explicitly by the book, but also many important related difficult, but important, questions that have broad societal implications, such as, for example, the following:
1. Consideration of morality of both alliance & repatriation – If it was morally wrong for Britain/US to repatriate Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II based upon the contention that the Soviet Union was something of an "evil empire" that did not validly represent the Soviet people and that was inhumane in its treatment of the Soviet people, then was it also morally wrong for Britain/US (X) to have entered into the World War II military, economic, and political alliance with the Soviet Union to use the Soviet Union and its people to the military, economic, and political advantage of Britain/US, and (Y) to provide the Soviet Union with military, economic, and political resources to protect and strengthen the Soviet Union?
2. Repatriation hypocrisy – What do we anticipate would likely be the position of the US if, on the other hand, the Soviet Union had possession of US citizens who came into the Soviet Union’s possession during the war and the Soviet Union refused to honor the request of the US that the Soviet Union return such citizens to the US where (X) the US citizens did not want to be repatriated to the US, and (Y) the Soviet Union believed that the US would not treat the forcibly repatriated Americans in a manner that the Soviet Union believed to be appropriate, such as by, for example, the US punishing the return Americans for such reasons and in such manner that the Soviet’s considered to be inappropriate?
3. Rationale for refusing to accept repatriated individuals – Are there any circumstances where the continued existence of a country, the Soviet Union, is so threatened by the invasion of another country, Germany, that the threatened country may determine that in order to survive that it's soldiers (X) must be required to fight to the death, and (Y) must not have the option of surrendering under any circumstances, because to provide the soldiers with the right to surrender or otherwise be captured and then later repatriated would so detract from the intensity of the soldiers commitment to fight to protect the homeland that homeland would be most likely lost to the enemy?
4. Deceiving while criticizing other deceivers – Did the British and the US officials deceive their own citizens by concealing such officials’ decisions and efforts to turn people over to Stalin, because the British/US officials believed that such deceit of their own citizens was in the best interest of their own nations? All the while such officials were themselves criticizing and condemning Stalin for deceiving Soviet citizens when Stalin believed that such deceit was in the best interest of the Soviet Union?
5. Determining if and when the "ends" justify the "means" – What criteria should be used to determine if the "ends" sought to be accomplished by a political leader, such as Stalin, in a particular situation would justify the "means" that would need to be used to accomplish such objectives?
The answers to these and other questions have an importance and relevance far beyond a historical consideration of the events of World War II.
April 11, 2021
A fine read and a great window into WWII and Post-WWII political actions. From 1943 into 1947, millions of Soviet POWs and refugees were forced to return to the Soviet Union, regardless of their personal desires. We have all seen the facts and figures for decade after decade: "In a secret agreement, Communist Leader Joseph Stalin, USA's Democrat Party President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill Were Guilty of The Mass Murder of Millions of Allied POWs!" These two American and British leaders forced repatriation of Soviet POWs to maintain good relations with Stalin's Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was not a party to 'The Hague Conventions’ and was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929. All Russians absent from the control of the Soviet Union, even for a moment, were considered traitors. "There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community." Those POWs who died from hunger could have been saved had Stalin not called them traitors.
All atrocities, as seen through the rose-colored glasses of today's world view, eliminating all of those who have betrayed you and your country, may have done so, or could have by association, etc., is a fairly normal post-war process embraces throughout history.
Excerpts:
“The incident was shocking. There is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the American officers and men that they are being required by the American Government to repatriate these Russians…”
"All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear-gas and some force to drive them out. Tear-gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut and stabbed themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are still in the hospital from self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were set off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route."
Another's reflection:
"With the rise of extremist ideologies in Europe, and the fear that they inspired, liberalism’s association with socialism became increasingly seen as a liability, if not a danger. FDR-style liberalism and the New Deal, and embarking on 'collectivist experiments' would put countries on the slippery slope to fascism. The 'social liberalism' toward which Britain and America were heading would invariably lead to 'totalitarianism'.” ― Friedrich Hayek’s 'The Road to Serfdom'
- Works that may also be of interest to you:
Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II -Peter Williams & David Wallace
The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich Hayek
The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War - Ladislas Farago
History of the Russian Revolution
The Origins of Totalitarianism 1949 Hannah Arendt
Burn After Reading: The Espionage History of World War II
The Gathering Storm by Winston S Churchill
The Gulag Archipelago (Vol 1,2,3) by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present, Julius Epstein
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7, Nicholas Bethell
Teaching Atrocities: The Holocaust and Unit 731 in the Secondary School Curriculum -Rachel Pawlowicz and Walter E. Grunden, Bowling Green State University
The Game of the Foxes
The Murderers among us. The Simon Wiesenthal memoirs.
The East Came West, Peter Huxley-Blythe
The Soviet Union was not a party to 'The Hague Conventions’ and was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929. All Russians absent from the control of the Soviet Union, even for a moment, were considered traitors. "There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community." Those POWs who died from hunger could have been saved had Stalin not called them traitors.
All atrocities, as seen through the rose-colored glasses of today's world view, eliminating all of those who have betrayed you and your country, may have done so, or could have by association, etc., is a fairly normal post-war process embraces throughout history.
Excerpts:
“The incident was shocking. There is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the American officers and men that they are being required by the American Government to repatriate these Russians…”
"All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear-gas and some force to drive them out. Tear-gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut and stabbed themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are still in the hospital from self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were set off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route."
Another's reflection:
"With the rise of extremist ideologies in Europe, and the fear that they inspired, liberalism’s association with socialism became increasingly seen as a liability, if not a danger. FDR-style liberalism and the New Deal, and embarking on 'collectivist experiments' would put countries on the slippery slope to fascism. The 'social liberalism' toward which Britain and America were heading would invariably lead to 'totalitarianism'.” ― Friedrich Hayek’s 'The Road to Serfdom'
- Works that may also be of interest to you:
Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II -Peter Williams & David Wallace
The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich Hayek
The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War - Ladislas Farago
History of the Russian Revolution
The Origins of Totalitarianism 1949 Hannah Arendt
Burn After Reading: The Espionage History of World War II
The Gathering Storm by Winston S Churchill
The Gulag Archipelago (Vol 1,2,3) by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present, Julius Epstein
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7, Nicholas Bethell
Teaching Atrocities: The Holocaust and Unit 731 in the Secondary School Curriculum -Rachel Pawlowicz and Walter E. Grunden, Bowling Green State University
The Game of the Foxes
The Murderers among us. The Simon Wiesenthal memoirs.
The East Came West, Peter Huxley-Blythe
April 11, 2021
A fine read and a great window into WWII and Post-WWII political actions. From 1943 into 1947, millions of Soviet POWs and refugees were forced to return to the Soviet Union, regardless of their personal desires. We have all seen the facts and figures for decade after decade: "In a secret agreement, Communist Leader Joseph Stalin, USA's Democratic Party President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill Were Guilty of The Mass Murder of Millions of Allied POWs!" These two American and British leaders forced repatriation of Soviet POWs to maintain good relations with Stalin's Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was not a party to 'The Hague Conventions’ and was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929. All Russians absent from the control of the Soviet Union, even for a moment, were considered traitors. "There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community." Those POWs who died from hunger could have been saved had Stalin not called them traitors.
All atrocities, as seen through the rose-colored glasses of today's world view, eliminating all of those who have betrayed you and your country, may have done so, or could have by association, etc., is a fairly normal post-war process embraces throughout history.
Excerpts:
“The incident was shocking. There is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the American officers and men that they are being required by the American Government to repatriate these Russians…”
"All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear-gas and some force to drive them out. Tear-gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut and stabbed themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are still in the hospital from self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were set off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route."
Another's reflection:
"With the rise of extremist ideologies in Europe, and the fear that they inspired, liberalism’s association with socialism became increasingly seen as a liability, if not a danger. FDR-style liberalism and the New Deal, and embarking on 'collectivist experiments' would put countries on the slippery slope to fascism. The 'social liberalism' toward which Britain and America were heading would invariably lead to 'totalitarianism'.” ― Friedrich Hayek’s 'The Road to Serfdom'
- Works that may also be of interest to you:
Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II -Peter Williams & David Wallace
The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich Hayek
The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War - Ladislas Farago
History of the Russian Revolution
The Origins of Totalitarianism 1949 Hannah Arendt
Burn After Reading: The Espionage History of World War II
The Gathering Storm by Winston S Churchill
The Gulag Archipelago (Vol 1,2,3) by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present, Julius Epstein
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7, Nicholas Bethell
Teaching Atrocities: The Holocaust and Unit 731 in the Secondary School Curriculum -Rachel Pawlowicz and Walter E. Grunden, Bowling Green State University
The Game of the Foxes
The Murderers among us. The Simon Wiesenthal memoirs.
The East Came West, Peter Huxley-Blythe
The Soviet Union was not a party to 'The Hague Conventions’ and was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929. All Russians absent from the control of the Soviet Union, even for a moment, were considered traitors. "There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community." Those POWs who died from hunger could have been saved had Stalin not called them traitors.
All atrocities, as seen through the rose-colored glasses of today's world view, eliminating all of those who have betrayed you and your country, may have done so, or could have by association, etc., is a fairly normal post-war process embraces throughout history.
Excerpts:
“The incident was shocking. There is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the American officers and men that they are being required by the American Government to repatriate these Russians…”
"All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear-gas and some force to drive them out. Tear-gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut and stabbed themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are still in the hospital from self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were set off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route."
Another's reflection:
"With the rise of extremist ideologies in Europe, and the fear that they inspired, liberalism’s association with socialism became increasingly seen as a liability, if not a danger. FDR-style liberalism and the New Deal, and embarking on 'collectivist experiments' would put countries on the slippery slope to fascism. The 'social liberalism' toward which Britain and America were heading would invariably lead to 'totalitarianism'.” ― Friedrich Hayek’s 'The Road to Serfdom'
- Works that may also be of interest to you:
Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II -Peter Williams & David Wallace
The Road to Serfdom by Friedrich Hayek
The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War - Ladislas Farago
History of the Russian Revolution
The Origins of Totalitarianism 1949 Hannah Arendt
Burn After Reading: The Espionage History of World War II
The Gathering Storm by Winston S Churchill
The Gulag Archipelago (Vol 1,2,3) by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present, Julius Epstein
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7, Nicholas Bethell
Teaching Atrocities: The Holocaust and Unit 731 in the Secondary School Curriculum -Rachel Pawlowicz and Walter E. Grunden, Bowling Green State University
The Game of the Foxes
The Murderers among us. The Simon Wiesenthal memoirs.
The East Came West, Peter Huxley-Blythe
August 12, 2019
Between 1943 and 1947 the Western Democracies had returned to the USSR a recorded 2,272,000 Soviet citizens.’ Tolstoy’s gripping narrative shines the spotlight on this period of history, highlighting the moral compromises the British entered into in the name of real politik, and the devastating consequences for those repatriated to the Soviet Union.
In September 1939 the British went to war ostensibly against the repressive regime of Nazi Germany to defend Poland. By November 1939 they were contemplating going to war with the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union to defend Finland. But by June 1941, following the defeat of France, the British entered into a life-saving alliance with the murderous regime of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Germans after the Germans declared war on the Soviet Union. This alliance started the British down a slippery moral slope.
In order to avoid the uncomfortable truth of the nature of the Soviet regime the British were complicit in forced repatriations of people in conditions reminiscent of those used by Nazi Germany, and with the same outcome – state sanctioned murder.
During the war the Germans captured 5.7 million Soviet prisoners of war and transported a further 2.8 million Soviet citizens for use as forced labourers. A large number of these died as a result of deliberate maltreatment by the Germans. At the end of the war the Allies liberated about 3 million Soviets - 1.15 million Soviets POWs and about 2 million Soviet forced labourers. In addition there were between 0.8 and 1.0 million Soviet POWs and citizens who had become ‘volunteers’ ("Hilfswillige" or "Hiwi") in the Wehrmacht. (pp 3, 40, 415)
Some Hiwi’s joined the Wehrmacht as the alternative was death. Others joined because they wanted to help defeat the Soviet Union. In the 1920’s the British and French had assisted the ‘White Russians’ in their unsuccessful war against the emerging totalitarian regime of the Bolsheviks. After the Germans invaded the Soviet Union the Cossacks compromised to partner with the murderous regime of the Germans in order to defeat the Soviet Union – as Tolstoy notes it was “the only practical possibility of armed struggle against the Stalinist clique” and mirrored the Allies compromise in partnering with the murderous regime of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Germans.
But in 1943, at meetings in Moscow and Yalta Eden agreed to Stalin’s demand for all Russians to be returned to the Soviet Union – PoWs, forced labourers as well as the Hiwi fighting for the Germans – regardless of their wishes. The Allies also agreed to forcible repatriate a large number of ‘White Russians’ émigrés who were non-combatants.
Tolstoy highlights how most of those who were returned to the Soviet Union were brutally treated and in many cases murdered.
Tolstoy also catalogues how as a result of these fateful pledges, the British adopted a series of policies and practices which were eerily reminiscent of those so recently adopted by Nazi Germany.
The British ‘used lies to lure helpless prisoners to their deaths’ (p178). A band in the camp was retained to entertain further batches of Cossack PoWs as they were trucked or railed to the Soviets. (p236)
Cossack men, were shipped by the British to the Soviets in cattle trucks, bolted closed; women and children were also sent, with the baggage. A mother and child were crushed to death (p210)
Although Eden was aware that women who were returned and imprisoned in the Soviet gulags were being raped, he dismissed this with the comment “We cannot afford to be sentimental”.
The US State Department ‘had given its consent to the use of bayonets to return people to slavery, torture and death.’ (p337)
Some ‘White Russians’, the sole surviving units from the Russian Imperial Army had found refuge in Yugoslavia in the 1920s. Even those these émigrés had not lived in the Soviet Union for over two decades and were not captured POWs, they were still shipped back to the Soviets – and to their death – by the British.
Soviets captured in German uniform should have been treated in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention as should have German officers who had lead the Cossack formations. Instead they were handed over to the Soviets - in breach of the Geneva convention – where they were sentenced to death without trial (p234, 419) On no recorded occasion was Article 26 and 84 adhered to by the British. The British also lied to the Red Cross stating that “Soviet citizens who have fallen into our hands while wearing German uniforms have insisted that they had been conscripted into the German forces against their will, and they are therefore being treated as liberated Soviet citizens…” (p421)
As Tolstoy notes, the refusal to allow captured Russians the protection of the Geneva Convention was in opposition to previous and subsequent British interpretation.’ (p417)
The British Foreign Office ‘had always held, in every instance but that of the Russians in the Wehrmacht, “that from the point of view of international law the status of such persons depends not upon their nationality. But upon their membership of the … forces.” The Germans honoured this aspect of the Geneva Convention: it was fortunate for many Czechs, Poles, Norwegians and other Continental nationals in British uniform that they did so.’ (p421)
Tolstoy shows that the Foreign Office knew that their actions were illegal. Thomas Brimelow of the Foreign Office stated that they hoped “that the arrangement [repatriation of Russians fighting in the Wehrmacht] would never be subjected to scrutiny in a court of law.’ (p110)
But, Tolstoy highlights, ‘this enormous operation [the forced repatriation of Russians fighting in the Wehrmacht], involving as it did kidnappings, suicides and widespread infractions of British law on a scale involving thousands, was known only to a very few.’ (p149)
These crimes by the British were never publicised or investigated. Many British officers adopted what was later known as the ‘Nuremberg defence’ - “we…are obeying the orders of our superiors.”
When Field Marshal Alexander had queried his orders, ‘neither the Foreign Office, the War Office nor the Combined Chiefs of Staff had sent Alexander any ruling.’ If none of these groups were willing to officially endorse the policy, ‘there remained only the Prime Minister’ – Churchill. In light of the emerging and uncertain post-war world Churchill had scrawled impatiently, “We ought to get rid of them all as soon as possible…”.’ (p276)
In his memoirs Alexander noted that “we made up our minds long ago that we could not try to save Russians from their Government, however much we might wish to do so on purely humanitarian grounds”. (p345)
One of the Cossack officers, Major Ostrovsky berated the British ‘national hypocrisy which prated so much of democracy, honour and decency-and yet crawled to offer up human sacrifice to the Marxist Moloch.’ (p243)
This policy started with the hubris of Churchill and Eden who were beguiled by Stalin – a ruthless dictator but also their ally. Eden, as did Churchill, ‘felt for Stalin strong affection and admiration.’ Foreign Office officials convinced themselves that Stalin’s intentions towards the West were beneficent, and that to work in co-operation with him was not only possible but also essential to British interests.’ (p430) However even when a report by the Foreign Office stated “that the Soviet authorities entirely failed to give effect to several of the most important provisions of the Yalta Agreement” the British still continued to hand Soviet citizens over to be tortured and killed, and knowing this would occur. . (p426)
The Foreign Office ‘felt it to be a necessary sacrifice for the furtherance of vital diplomatic needs. … when the war was over, close co-operation with Soviet Union seemed the only way to establish a new international order on the ruins of the old.’ (p428)
Despite all that has been written about World War 2 Tolstoy’s disturbing but gripping account highlights an overlooked and under-researched part of history and shines a spotlight on the forgotten ‘Victims of Yalta’. It also reinforces Churchill’s cynical maxim that ‘History is written by the victors”.
Tolstoy’s Yalta also represents a timely reminder of how political expediency can trump human decency that is just as relevant today.
In September 1939 the British went to war ostensibly against the repressive regime of Nazi Germany to defend Poland. By November 1939 they were contemplating going to war with the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union to defend Finland. But by June 1941, following the defeat of France, the British entered into a life-saving alliance with the murderous regime of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Germans after the Germans declared war on the Soviet Union. This alliance started the British down a slippery moral slope.
In order to avoid the uncomfortable truth of the nature of the Soviet regime the British were complicit in forced repatriations of people in conditions reminiscent of those used by Nazi Germany, and with the same outcome – state sanctioned murder.
During the war the Germans captured 5.7 million Soviet prisoners of war and transported a further 2.8 million Soviet citizens for use as forced labourers. A large number of these died as a result of deliberate maltreatment by the Germans. At the end of the war the Allies liberated about 3 million Soviets - 1.15 million Soviets POWs and about 2 million Soviet forced labourers. In addition there were between 0.8 and 1.0 million Soviet POWs and citizens who had become ‘volunteers’ ("Hilfswillige" or "Hiwi") in the Wehrmacht. (pp 3, 40, 415)
Some Hiwi’s joined the Wehrmacht as the alternative was death. Others joined because they wanted to help defeat the Soviet Union. In the 1920’s the British and French had assisted the ‘White Russians’ in their unsuccessful war against the emerging totalitarian regime of the Bolsheviks. After the Germans invaded the Soviet Union the Cossacks compromised to partner with the murderous regime of the Germans in order to defeat the Soviet Union – as Tolstoy notes it was “the only practical possibility of armed struggle against the Stalinist clique” and mirrored the Allies compromise in partnering with the murderous regime of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Germans.
But in 1943, at meetings in Moscow and Yalta Eden agreed to Stalin’s demand for all Russians to be returned to the Soviet Union – PoWs, forced labourers as well as the Hiwi fighting for the Germans – regardless of their wishes. The Allies also agreed to forcible repatriate a large number of ‘White Russians’ émigrés who were non-combatants.
Tolstoy highlights how most of those who were returned to the Soviet Union were brutally treated and in many cases murdered.
Tolstoy also catalogues how as a result of these fateful pledges, the British adopted a series of policies and practices which were eerily reminiscent of those so recently adopted by Nazi Germany.
The British ‘used lies to lure helpless prisoners to their deaths’ (p178). A band in the camp was retained to entertain further batches of Cossack PoWs as they were trucked or railed to the Soviets. (p236)
Cossack men, were shipped by the British to the Soviets in cattle trucks, bolted closed; women and children were also sent, with the baggage. A mother and child were crushed to death (p210)
Although Eden was aware that women who were returned and imprisoned in the Soviet gulags were being raped, he dismissed this with the comment “We cannot afford to be sentimental”.
The US State Department ‘had given its consent to the use of bayonets to return people to slavery, torture and death.’ (p337)
Some ‘White Russians’, the sole surviving units from the Russian Imperial Army had found refuge in Yugoslavia in the 1920s. Even those these émigrés had not lived in the Soviet Union for over two decades and were not captured POWs, they were still shipped back to the Soviets – and to their death – by the British.
Soviets captured in German uniform should have been treated in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention as should have German officers who had lead the Cossack formations. Instead they were handed over to the Soviets - in breach of the Geneva convention – where they were sentenced to death without trial (p234, 419) On no recorded occasion was Article 26 and 84 adhered to by the British. The British also lied to the Red Cross stating that “Soviet citizens who have fallen into our hands while wearing German uniforms have insisted that they had been conscripted into the German forces against their will, and they are therefore being treated as liberated Soviet citizens…” (p421)
As Tolstoy notes, the refusal to allow captured Russians the protection of the Geneva Convention was in opposition to previous and subsequent British interpretation.’ (p417)
The British Foreign Office ‘had always held, in every instance but that of the Russians in the Wehrmacht, “that from the point of view of international law the status of such persons depends not upon their nationality. But upon their membership of the … forces.” The Germans honoured this aspect of the Geneva Convention: it was fortunate for many Czechs, Poles, Norwegians and other Continental nationals in British uniform that they did so.’ (p421)
Tolstoy shows that the Foreign Office knew that their actions were illegal. Thomas Brimelow of the Foreign Office stated that they hoped “that the arrangement [repatriation of Russians fighting in the Wehrmacht] would never be subjected to scrutiny in a court of law.’ (p110)
But, Tolstoy highlights, ‘this enormous operation [the forced repatriation of Russians fighting in the Wehrmacht], involving as it did kidnappings, suicides and widespread infractions of British law on a scale involving thousands, was known only to a very few.’ (p149)
These crimes by the British were never publicised or investigated. Many British officers adopted what was later known as the ‘Nuremberg defence’ - “we…are obeying the orders of our superiors.”
When Field Marshal Alexander had queried his orders, ‘neither the Foreign Office, the War Office nor the Combined Chiefs of Staff had sent Alexander any ruling.’ If none of these groups were willing to officially endorse the policy, ‘there remained only the Prime Minister’ – Churchill. In light of the emerging and uncertain post-war world Churchill had scrawled impatiently, “We ought to get rid of them all as soon as possible…”.’ (p276)
In his memoirs Alexander noted that “we made up our minds long ago that we could not try to save Russians from their Government, however much we might wish to do so on purely humanitarian grounds”. (p345)
One of the Cossack officers, Major Ostrovsky berated the British ‘national hypocrisy which prated so much of democracy, honour and decency-and yet crawled to offer up human sacrifice to the Marxist Moloch.’ (p243)
This policy started with the hubris of Churchill and Eden who were beguiled by Stalin – a ruthless dictator but also their ally. Eden, as did Churchill, ‘felt for Stalin strong affection and admiration.’ Foreign Office officials convinced themselves that Stalin’s intentions towards the West were beneficent, and that to work in co-operation with him was not only possible but also essential to British interests.’ (p430) However even when a report by the Foreign Office stated “that the Soviet authorities entirely failed to give effect to several of the most important provisions of the Yalta Agreement” the British still continued to hand Soviet citizens over to be tortured and killed, and knowing this would occur. . (p426)
The Foreign Office ‘felt it to be a necessary sacrifice for the furtherance of vital diplomatic needs. … when the war was over, close co-operation with Soviet Union seemed the only way to establish a new international order on the ruins of the old.’ (p428)
Despite all that has been written about World War 2 Tolstoy’s disturbing but gripping account highlights an overlooked and under-researched part of history and shines a spotlight on the forgotten ‘Victims of Yalta’. It also reinforces Churchill’s cynical maxim that ‘History is written by the victors”.
Tolstoy’s Yalta also represents a timely reminder of how political expediency can trump human decency that is just as relevant today.
January 18, 2024
As Allied forces began rolling eastward over the Nazi Army in the campaign to liberate Europe, a vexing question arose of how to dispense with Soviet prisoners who had been captured by German forces. The Victims of Yalta, a 1978 book authored by British historian Nikolai Tolstoy, mournfully answers that question. With original reporting, Tolstoy describes in novelistic fashion how Britain and the U.S. agreed under the 1945 Yalta Agreement to repatriate, forcibly in many cases, over two million Soviet nationals back to the USSR from 1944 to 1947. Tolstoy tells of countless stories where British and American military personnel forcibly collected Soviet war prisoners, many of which had inadvertently fallen into German hands at the chaotic onset of the German invasion of Russia, onto trucks to be sent eastward. Many prisoners attempted suicide or escape, fearing treatment under a Soviet regime which had denied all rights of citizenship to prisoners who had fallen into German hands. Death or long-term imprisonment were the most likely fates upon return.
This book is not only a scrupulous investigation into the questionably motivated treatment of prisoners of war during World War II; it is also a searing indictment of Western governments who Tolstoy argues knew better. Tolstoy especially indicts the British Foreign Office as being captive to Soviet entreaties by seeking to return prisoners without delay – even though many high-ranking officials denied the legality of forced repatriations. Tolstoy writes of Allied officers who, after witnessing women and children begging for mercy not to be returned, became horrified by instances of total despair. He labels this treatment as a “war crime of the first magnitude,” on par to the Nazi treatment of the Jews. The Victims of Yalta is an important reminder that no side during the war was free from misconduct – both violated human rights in various degrees, some more visible than others.
This book is not only a scrupulous investigation into the questionably motivated treatment of prisoners of war during World War II; it is also a searing indictment of Western governments who Tolstoy argues knew better. Tolstoy especially indicts the British Foreign Office as being captive to Soviet entreaties by seeking to return prisoners without delay – even though many high-ranking officials denied the legality of forced repatriations. Tolstoy writes of Allied officers who, after witnessing women and children begging for mercy not to be returned, became horrified by instances of total despair. He labels this treatment as a “war crime of the first magnitude,” on par to the Nazi treatment of the Jews. The Victims of Yalta is an important reminder that no side during the war was free from misconduct – both violated human rights in various degrees, some more visible than others.
December 8, 2024
“Victims of Yalta” by Nikolai Tolstoy is a crucial read for young generations, offering a profound insight into the complexities of political decisions and their human consequences, particularly at the end of World War II. This book unveils the tragic story of the Cossacks and other anti-communist nationals who were forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union, despite their anti-communist stances and contributions to the Allied war effort. Through Tolstoy’s detailed research, which includes personal narratives, official documents, and eyewitness testimonies, readers are presented with a narrative that is often omitted from mainstream historical accounts.
The significance of “Victims of Yalta” lies in its ability to challenge our understanding of justice and moral responsibility in the realm of international politics. It prompts critical thinking about the outcomes of war and the peace that follows, encouraging young people to question the ethical implications of political agreements made on the global stage. This book is not just about history; it’s about understanding the impact of history on human lives and learning from past mistakes to foster a more informed and conscientious approach to contemporary global issues.
For young readers, “Victims of Yalta” offers more than historical knowledge—it’s a call to be vigilant and active participants in shaping a just world. It’s an invitation to explore the often painful truths of our past, ensuring that the voices of the silenced are heard and remembered. Reading this book is an important step toward developing a deeper, more empathetic understanding of the world and the forces that shape our collective destiny
The significance of “Victims of Yalta” lies in its ability to challenge our understanding of justice and moral responsibility in the realm of international politics. It prompts critical thinking about the outcomes of war and the peace that follows, encouraging young people to question the ethical implications of political agreements made on the global stage. This book is not just about history; it’s about understanding the impact of history on human lives and learning from past mistakes to foster a more informed and conscientious approach to contemporary global issues.
For young readers, “Victims of Yalta” offers more than historical knowledge—it’s a call to be vigilant and active participants in shaping a just world. It’s an invitation to explore the often painful truths of our past, ensuring that the voices of the silenced are heard and remembered. Reading this book is an important step toward developing a deeper, more empathetic understanding of the world and the forces that shape our collective destiny
May 25, 2021
A great read. Remember forced repatriations throughout history... including the Big Three's decisions of the World War II "Yalta Conference" - February 4–11, 1945.
--The cast of Allied leaders:
1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt - United States
2. Premier Joseph Stalin - Soviet Union
3. Prime Minister Winston Churchill - Great Britain
Yalta confirmed the Tolstoy Conference (October 9-19, 1944) and led to the forced repatriation of all Soviet Union citizens resulting in the execution, or death through forced labor, of all non-Communists. Many being buried in mass graves.
-Without a vote or say by USA & Great Britain citizens and, of course, without the choice of those Soviets being repatriated.
--From BBC: A massacre revealed 30 years later
"In 1976 the BBC reported that a decision taken at Yalta was to be promulgated by the British government in compliance with the 30-year rule. It revealed that elements of the British 8th Army were involved in rounding up some 50,000 Russian deserters, both men and women, and handing them over to the Russian troops. The Russian army herded the men and women on to trucks and drove five miles north of Judenberg. There they shot and killed them before burying their bodies in mass graves."
--Historic related Books:
The East Came West ( Peter Huxley-Blythe)
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7 (Nicholas Bethell)
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present (Julius Epstein)
- Deportation... Repatriation - two sides of the same old coin?
Besides CBT & FATCA... could more happen???
--The cast of Allied leaders:
1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt - United States
2. Premier Joseph Stalin - Soviet Union
3. Prime Minister Winston Churchill - Great Britain
Yalta confirmed the Tolstoy Conference (October 9-19, 1944) and led to the forced repatriation of all Soviet Union citizens resulting in the execution, or death through forced labor, of all non-Communists. Many being buried in mass graves.
-Without a vote or say by USA & Great Britain citizens and, of course, without the choice of those Soviets being repatriated.
--From BBC: A massacre revealed 30 years later
"In 1976 the BBC reported that a decision taken at Yalta was to be promulgated by the British government in compliance with the 30-year rule. It revealed that elements of the British 8th Army were involved in rounding up some 50,000 Russian deserters, both men and women, and handing them over to the Russian troops. The Russian army herded the men and women on to trucks and drove five miles north of Judenberg. There they shot and killed them before burying their bodies in mass graves."
--Historic related Books:
The East Came West ( Peter Huxley-Blythe)
The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7 (Nicholas Bethell)
Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present (Julius Epstein)
- Deportation... Repatriation - two sides of the same old coin?
Besides CBT & FATCA... could more happen???
May 12, 2023
Excellent account of the forced return of Soviet POWs and civilians, along with anti-Bolshevik emigres who had never been citizens of the Communist regime, to Russia in the immediate aftermath of World War II. In chapter 11, “Interlude: An Unsolved Mystery”, Tolstoy speculates on who was responsible for the forced return of Cossack emigres. His further investigation would result in his controversial book, THE MINISTER AND THE MASSACRES, which resulted in a libel action.
June 2, 2019
How England and the United Stated sent millions of prisoners of war to their death or imprisonment in the Soviet Union, including thousands of refuges that should have been excluded from forced repatriation.
November 17, 2024
A tragic story and a lesson the world should never forget. I was aware of the fate of many Russians post WW2; this puts the stark reality and the depth of evil these victims faced.
I would say this should be mandatory reading at A Level.
I would say this should be mandatory reading at A Level.
October 4, 2015
The edition I read was simply called "The Secret Betrayal 1944-1947" and was 483 pages long.
Written in 1977, this is an account of the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens who had been Nazi slave laborers, prisoners of war, or even pre-WW II emigres to Western Europe. The British were the most guilty, but the U.S. also participated to some extent. Almost all those returned were executed or sent to the Gulag for many years.
Written in 1977, this is an account of the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens who had been Nazi slave laborers, prisoners of war, or even pre-WW II emigres to Western Europe. The British were the most guilty, but the U.S. also participated to some extent. Almost all those returned were executed or sent to the Gulag for many years.
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews