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Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II
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240 pages, Hardcover
First published April 15, 2012
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About the author
Stuart D. Goldman
2 books4 followersStuart D. Goldman is a scholar in residence at the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research in Washington, D.C. From 1979-2009, he was the senior specialist in Russian and Eurasian political and military affairs at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. A resident of Rockville, MD, he holds a PhD from Georgetown University.
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September 29, 2014
To most, WW2 started on 1 September 1939 with Germany's invasion of Poland. However Japan's involvement in WW2 is considered to only start on 7 December 1941 after they attacked Pearl Harbor. Yet the Japanese had been fighting for years in a more regional war in China because of their annexation of Manchuria. It wasn't only the Chinese they were fighting though, because of the unclear boundaries between what was then Manchukuo and Mongolia, the Japanese ended up also fighting a 'limited' war with the Russians. A serious one occured just before WW2 started in Europe, between May and August 1939 in a place known as Nomonhan to the Japanese, or Khalkhin Gol to the Russians.
This book by Prof. Stuart D. Goldman describes this relatively unknown incident called the Nomonhan Incident (or the Battle of Khalkhin Gol). But more than just describing the incident, the author put forth an important thesis: this battle, while relative small compared to others yet to come, and confined to a tiny, obscure area in the plains of faraway Mongolia, had a profound impact on how WW2 eventually developed. In particular it was because of this battle that Japan became convinced that they should avoid another conflict with Soviet Union, giving more force to those who argued that they should go down south for the resources that they need. And to prevent the US from intervening, they had to destroy the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, the rest, we all know.
The author developed his argument by taking the reader down two tracks. The first being the history associated with the Kwantung Army leading to the border disputes with the Russians. The second is the global context, setting out what was happening in other parts of the world (especially in Europe) and situating this incident within that larger context. With these in place, the author then explained first why the conflict took place and then how it led to subsequent developments in WW2.
Following the first track, besides the history related to the formation of the Kwantung Army, which was informative in itself, the author took pains to explain the concept of Gekokujo (下克上, literally "lower level overcoming upper level") which has been associated with the Japanese Army (less the Navy) and most frequently with the Kwantung Army. This is a strange concept that, as far as I know, is only present in the Japanese Army where mid-ranking officers either manipulated or openly defied their senior officers' commands to do what they wanted. The further away they were from the central command in Tokyo, the worse the transgressions. The author showed with many examples how this manifested itself in the Kwantung Army.
Further to their tendency to exhibit Gekokujo, they also had a sense of invulnerability which was heightened by their perception that the Russians were weak. And at one point indeed they appeared to be (pg 17). This together with the ineffective commands from Tokyo that the Kwantung Army commanders were determined to ignore, and the purposely vague border protection policies issued by the Kwantung Army commanders (pg 89) made for an inevitable showdown with the Russians - the question is what would the Russians do?
By way of introducing the Changkufeng Incident a year before the Nomonhan Incident, the author explained to the readers that the Russians probably felt that the time had come to put their foot down in their dealings with the Japanese, especially with the Kwantung Army. When the Japanese acted against the Mongolians (the allies of the Russians) in Nomonhan in 1939, the Russians decided that they had to teach the Japanese a lesson. The story then went on to describe in good details about the campaigns that took place in that period of four months, at an exciting pace for a scholarly work. More importantly, throughout the description, the author kept an eye on Stalin's responses and decisions, which in contrast to the Japanese's perspective, was wide in its geopolitical considerations. And who can blame him, for the Soviet Union spanned both Europe and Asia and could find herself potentially fighting a two-front war which Stalin was determined to avoid.
The Japanese had no such worries, although they should. While arguably in the same theatre, 1939 was also when Japan was beginning to be caught in the quagmire in China. So while the Tokyo wanted to play down the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army would have none of it. But in an almost ridiculous fashion, the Kwantung Army could be so compelling that even Tokyo went along with them despite an Imperial Order.
And so the slaughter on both sides started.
The author paid a reasonable attention to the Russian forces as well, never hiding the fact that their loses were equally appalling and that the incident, while celebrated for the bloody nose it gave to the Japanese, did not come at a small price for the Russians. Particularly enjoyable was to read about Marshall Zhukov who was given the first significant command of his career, coming in the wake of Stalin's purge of his more experienced commanders.
For a book that is no more than 180 pages, persuading readers about his thesis is an ambitious feat for the author. But he succeeded admirably. This is not to say that other scholars could not find reasons to disagree with him as he himself admitted in the Preface but at least in terms of academic rigor and logic, his case was compelling. Although many pieces of his evidence were circumstantial, the use of the dates to show the sequence of events on the side of the Russians seemed to suggest that Russian reactions to the geopolitical scenario in relation to Germany, Japan and subsequently to Poland hinged much on the Nomonhan Incident and its conclusion.
On the Japanese side according to Colonel Hayashi Saburo, one of the General Staff officers, there was general recognition that they should leave Russia alone and from then on, should only make their move south (into Southeast Asia). This compares well with what was said by Japanese Scholar Kazutoshi Handō (半藤一利) in Showa Shi (昭和史), where both Masanobu Tsuji and Takushiro Hattori were said to have decided that "in future, go south." And going south meant going after Pearl Harbor too.
This book is surely a good place to start for those of us wanting to get an introduction to the Nomonhan Incident. But to say that it is but an introductory book is unfair because it comes with a huge amount of information, all organised logically, and presented persuasively.
This book by Prof. Stuart D. Goldman describes this relatively unknown incident called the Nomonhan Incident (or the Battle of Khalkhin Gol). But more than just describing the incident, the author put forth an important thesis: this battle, while relative small compared to others yet to come, and confined to a tiny, obscure area in the plains of faraway Mongolia, had a profound impact on how WW2 eventually developed. In particular it was because of this battle that Japan became convinced that they should avoid another conflict with Soviet Union, giving more force to those who argued that they should go down south for the resources that they need. And to prevent the US from intervening, they had to destroy the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, the rest, we all know.
The author developed his argument by taking the reader down two tracks. The first being the history associated with the Kwantung Army leading to the border disputes with the Russians. The second is the global context, setting out what was happening in other parts of the world (especially in Europe) and situating this incident within that larger context. With these in place, the author then explained first why the conflict took place and then how it led to subsequent developments in WW2.
Following the first track, besides the history related to the formation of the Kwantung Army, which was informative in itself, the author took pains to explain the concept of Gekokujo (下克上, literally "lower level overcoming upper level") which has been associated with the Japanese Army (less the Navy) and most frequently with the Kwantung Army. This is a strange concept that, as far as I know, is only present in the Japanese Army where mid-ranking officers either manipulated or openly defied their senior officers' commands to do what they wanted. The further away they were from the central command in Tokyo, the worse the transgressions. The author showed with many examples how this manifested itself in the Kwantung Army.
Further to their tendency to exhibit Gekokujo, they also had a sense of invulnerability which was heightened by their perception that the Russians were weak. And at one point indeed they appeared to be (pg 17). This together with the ineffective commands from Tokyo that the Kwantung Army commanders were determined to ignore, and the purposely vague border protection policies issued by the Kwantung Army commanders (pg 89) made for an inevitable showdown with the Russians - the question is what would the Russians do?
By way of introducing the Changkufeng Incident a year before the Nomonhan Incident, the author explained to the readers that the Russians probably felt that the time had come to put their foot down in their dealings with the Japanese, especially with the Kwantung Army. When the Japanese acted against the Mongolians (the allies of the Russians) in Nomonhan in 1939, the Russians decided that they had to teach the Japanese a lesson. The story then went on to describe in good details about the campaigns that took place in that period of four months, at an exciting pace for a scholarly work. More importantly, throughout the description, the author kept an eye on Stalin's responses and decisions, which in contrast to the Japanese's perspective, was wide in its geopolitical considerations. And who can blame him, for the Soviet Union spanned both Europe and Asia and could find herself potentially fighting a two-front war which Stalin was determined to avoid.
The Japanese had no such worries, although they should. While arguably in the same theatre, 1939 was also when Japan was beginning to be caught in the quagmire in China. So while the Tokyo wanted to play down the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army would have none of it. But in an almost ridiculous fashion, the Kwantung Army could be so compelling that even Tokyo went along with them despite an Imperial Order.
General Nakajima, deputy chief of AGS (Army General Staff), flew to Hsinking with Imperial Order 343, commanding Kwantung Army to hold its position near the disputed frontier with "minimal strength" to ensure a quick end to hostilities and a prompt diplomatic settlement. But in meeting with Nakajima, the KwAHQ (Kwantung Army HQ) Staff, led by the Operations Sections, clung passionately to its convictions. Incredibly, Nakajima was won over by the staff's fervent spirit and gave verbal approval for Kwantung Army's general offensive to begin on September 10 (pg 150).
And so the slaughter on both sides started.
The author paid a reasonable attention to the Russian forces as well, never hiding the fact that their loses were equally appalling and that the incident, while celebrated for the bloody nose it gave to the Japanese, did not come at a small price for the Russians. Particularly enjoyable was to read about Marshall Zhukov who was given the first significant command of his career, coming in the wake of Stalin's purge of his more experienced commanders.
For a book that is no more than 180 pages, persuading readers about his thesis is an ambitious feat for the author. But he succeeded admirably. This is not to say that other scholars could not find reasons to disagree with him as he himself admitted in the Preface but at least in terms of academic rigor and logic, his case was compelling. Although many pieces of his evidence were circumstantial, the use of the dates to show the sequence of events on the side of the Russians seemed to suggest that Russian reactions to the geopolitical scenario in relation to Germany, Japan and subsequently to Poland hinged much on the Nomonhan Incident and its conclusion.
On the Japanese side according to Colonel Hayashi Saburo, one of the General Staff officers, there was general recognition that they should leave Russia alone and from then on, should only make their move south (into Southeast Asia). This compares well with what was said by Japanese Scholar Kazutoshi Handō (半藤一利) in Showa Shi (昭和史), where both Masanobu Tsuji and Takushiro Hattori were said to have decided that "in future, go south." And going south meant going after Pearl Harbor too.
This book is surely a good place to start for those of us wanting to get an introduction to the Nomonhan Incident. But to say that it is but an introductory book is unfair because it comes with a huge amount of information, all organised logically, and presented persuasively.
December 2, 2023
War in a small space with very wide results
Unfortunately, Stuart D. Goldman’s Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II, is going to appeal to a very small audience. It is a niche read withing a niche subject. Unfortunately, because it carries a number of lessons that are worth the time of a much broader audience. In a brief 120 odd pages the author describes how Japan, already deep into what will become WWII, engaged in several border incidents with Stalin’s Russia and having been embarrassed, had to adjust its strategic thinking.
A major theory in 1930‘s American thinking about how Japan would continue its military aggression, was based on guessing Japan’s intention to peruse a Northern strategy, focused on China, Korea and Russia, or a Southern strategy focused on The Dutch East Indies and other resource rich south and southeast Asian countries. Please to note that neither theory contained any notion that a direct attack on any part of the US might be a choice. All clear-thinking American policy makers held that tiny Japan could not win against huge USA. Being a rational people, Japan would avoid direct conflict. Given not a thought were Japanese beliefs in spirit over materialism and in the honor of fighting the unwinnable fight.
Even the French back in WWI had gotten over Elan as a war winning belief in the face of war as an expression of industrial might. We may still romance about the Don Quixote, fighting the unbeatable foe, but that is a romance hardly the bases for foreign policy. Right?
Add to that mix of planning based on ego rather than studied deliberation, the Japanese army had if not adopted, tolerated a philosophy of gekokujō, the notion of someone, from a junior position using particularly military power to overturn, or even kill, people we might consider their legal superiors. The Japanese military had applied this notion to the deliberate assassination of civil and military authorities not sufficiently committed to the military or even too Army officers insistent on a military limited to what was materially possible. Gekokujō is part of how Japan’s Kwantung Army felt sufficiently empowered to act aggressively in the invasion of Korea and to fake the incident that helped to initiate the invasion of China.
At far away, remote, almost useless Nomohan, this same Kwantung Army would under estimate the material power of Stalin’s Army, ignore all direction from higher, and critically better-informed authority; add in too much about fighting to honor the dead, and to regain face. In other words, over weaning pride aka hubris. Russia, for all its self-inflicted military limits, got the full benefit of that hubris.
Japan would decide that further war with Russia was a bad idea, and turn its attention to the oil and rubber to be taken from the south
In passing Russia would find its major WWII general Zhukov, , he would learn his first lessons about armored combat, and Russia would avoid a two front war.
Important to us, today: These two countries managed to fight what we now call limited war. Something modern flag wavers will deny as a choice. The on-scene commanders were so obsessed with avoiding humiliation, honoring the fallen and the rest of policy by pride, that they ignored their larger issues, like what might be better for the nation. National policy on both sides was being made in the light of global events. Hitler was on the ascendance, with each new move bringing many nations towards war. Who and how many nations were likely to be aligned for and against either Russia or Japan was far more important that the few miles of plains and rivers being contested near Nomonhan. Once again, the nationalistic would decide too many like decisions as if there never is a need for balance or a global analysis.
Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II is and appropriately so, a short book. It is worth the read as much for the analysis as for the actual events so remote as they were in time and space.
Unfortunately, Stuart D. Goldman’s Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II, is going to appeal to a very small audience. It is a niche read withing a niche subject. Unfortunately, because it carries a number of lessons that are worth the time of a much broader audience. In a brief 120 odd pages the author describes how Japan, already deep into what will become WWII, engaged in several border incidents with Stalin’s Russia and having been embarrassed, had to adjust its strategic thinking.
A major theory in 1930‘s American thinking about how Japan would continue its military aggression, was based on guessing Japan’s intention to peruse a Northern strategy, focused on China, Korea and Russia, or a Southern strategy focused on The Dutch East Indies and other resource rich south and southeast Asian countries. Please to note that neither theory contained any notion that a direct attack on any part of the US might be a choice. All clear-thinking American policy makers held that tiny Japan could not win against huge USA. Being a rational people, Japan would avoid direct conflict. Given not a thought were Japanese beliefs in spirit over materialism and in the honor of fighting the unwinnable fight.
Even the French back in WWI had gotten over Elan as a war winning belief in the face of war as an expression of industrial might. We may still romance about the Don Quixote, fighting the unbeatable foe, but that is a romance hardly the bases for foreign policy. Right?
Add to that mix of planning based on ego rather than studied deliberation, the Japanese army had if not adopted, tolerated a philosophy of gekokujō, the notion of someone, from a junior position using particularly military power to overturn, or even kill, people we might consider their legal superiors. The Japanese military had applied this notion to the deliberate assassination of civil and military authorities not sufficiently committed to the military or even too Army officers insistent on a military limited to what was materially possible. Gekokujō is part of how Japan’s Kwantung Army felt sufficiently empowered to act aggressively in the invasion of Korea and to fake the incident that helped to initiate the invasion of China.
At far away, remote, almost useless Nomohan, this same Kwantung Army would under estimate the material power of Stalin’s Army, ignore all direction from higher, and critically better-informed authority; add in too much about fighting to honor the dead, and to regain face. In other words, over weaning pride aka hubris. Russia, for all its self-inflicted military limits, got the full benefit of that hubris.
Japan would decide that further war with Russia was a bad idea, and turn its attention to the oil and rubber to be taken from the south
In passing Russia would find its major WWII general Zhukov, , he would learn his first lessons about armored combat, and Russia would avoid a two front war.
Important to us, today: These two countries managed to fight what we now call limited war. Something modern flag wavers will deny as a choice. The on-scene commanders were so obsessed with avoiding humiliation, honoring the fallen and the rest of policy by pride, that they ignored their larger issues, like what might be better for the nation. National policy on both sides was being made in the light of global events. Hitler was on the ascendance, with each new move bringing many nations towards war. Who and how many nations were likely to be aligned for and against either Russia or Japan was far more important that the few miles of plains and rivers being contested near Nomonhan. Once again, the nationalistic would decide too many like decisions as if there never is a need for balance or a global analysis.
Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II is and appropriately so, a short book. It is worth the read as much for the analysis as for the actual events so remote as they were in time and space.
July 24, 2012
"Nomonhan 1939: The Red Army Victory That Shaped World War II" is a very interesting read, and for a military-political history it is easy to dive into and follow along with. Having a basic understanding of the events leading up to World War II is useful, but not necessary. In fact, the basic concept of the book is to add some information to our understanding of the events leading up to WWII.
Specifically, the author states the limited war between the USSR and Japan in 1939 Manchuria contributed to the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany that gave Hitler a green light to invade Poland and start the European side of WWII.
Goldman's thesis is bolstered by recently released diplomatic records. Stalin maneuvered USSR foreign policy like a maestro conducting an orchestra, always, always, with the idea that war between the democracies, or war between the democracies and the fascist states — war between any of the USSR's rivals in Europe — was a good thing.
At the same time, Japan and the USSR had a very rough relationship in the Far East. Japan surprised and humiliated the Tsar's military in 1905, and the island nation sent 70,000 troops — the largest contingent of any nation — into Russian territory to intervene against the Bolsheviks during the Russia Civil War. The military cabal running Japan through the 1930s looked with distaste at the Bolsheviks and they thought little of the Soviet military, especially after Stalin purged most of his experienced leaders.
When Japan took Manchuria from China in 1931, they created the puppet state of Manchukuo that shared a 3,000 mile border with the USSR and its vassal state of Mongolia. This set the stage for a series of border incidents that created tension between the USSR and Japan, something Stalin did not want or need while the prospect of the Soviets going to war in Europe was in play.
But at the same time, Stalin did not want the generals and admirals in Tokyo to get the impression the Soviets would not defend themselves. By playing the democracies and fascists against each other, Stalin got what he wanted while at the same time dealing Japan a crushing defeat at Nomonhan. One clear future benefit of his policy was sending Georgy Zhukov — who would later deal Hitler's army its first major defeat and lead the Red Army to Berlin — to oversee the Far East battle.
Much of what Zhukov learned at Nomonhan in 1939, logistics, combined arms operations, use of armor and artillery, would be of direct value in his later offensives against the Germans.
I've read quite a bit about World War II, but profess my preference is the European Theater of Operations (ETO). I know the basics about the war in the Pacific, but not much about the early stages. I had not heard of Nomonhan before, or any of the clashes between the Soviets and Japan that preceded it. For me, then, Nomonhan 1939 was a great introduction, presented in a highly readable style. Goldman divides the book between the actual battles and border clashes — which are presented in a clear and forthright manner — and the diplomatic and political maneuverings in Tokyo, Berlin, London and Moscow.
I enjoyed this book very much, and would recommend it to anyone like me, who may not have known about the limited war in Manchuria and who enjoys learning something new.
Specifically, the author states the limited war between the USSR and Japan in 1939 Manchuria contributed to the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany that gave Hitler a green light to invade Poland and start the European side of WWII.
Goldman's thesis is bolstered by recently released diplomatic records. Stalin maneuvered USSR foreign policy like a maestro conducting an orchestra, always, always, with the idea that war between the democracies, or war between the democracies and the fascist states — war between any of the USSR's rivals in Europe — was a good thing.
At the same time, Japan and the USSR had a very rough relationship in the Far East. Japan surprised and humiliated the Tsar's military in 1905, and the island nation sent 70,000 troops — the largest contingent of any nation — into Russian territory to intervene against the Bolsheviks during the Russia Civil War. The military cabal running Japan through the 1930s looked with distaste at the Bolsheviks and they thought little of the Soviet military, especially after Stalin purged most of his experienced leaders.
When Japan took Manchuria from China in 1931, they created the puppet state of Manchukuo that shared a 3,000 mile border with the USSR and its vassal state of Mongolia. This set the stage for a series of border incidents that created tension between the USSR and Japan, something Stalin did not want or need while the prospect of the Soviets going to war in Europe was in play.
But at the same time, Stalin did not want the generals and admirals in Tokyo to get the impression the Soviets would not defend themselves. By playing the democracies and fascists against each other, Stalin got what he wanted while at the same time dealing Japan a crushing defeat at Nomonhan. One clear future benefit of his policy was sending Georgy Zhukov — who would later deal Hitler's army its first major defeat and lead the Red Army to Berlin — to oversee the Far East battle.
Much of what Zhukov learned at Nomonhan in 1939, logistics, combined arms operations, use of armor and artillery, would be of direct value in his later offensives against the Germans.
I've read quite a bit about World War II, but profess my preference is the European Theater of Operations (ETO). I know the basics about the war in the Pacific, but not much about the early stages. I had not heard of Nomonhan before, or any of the clashes between the Soviets and Japan that preceded it. For me, then, Nomonhan 1939 was a great introduction, presented in a highly readable style. Goldman divides the book between the actual battles and border clashes — which are presented in a clear and forthright manner — and the diplomatic and political maneuverings in Tokyo, Berlin, London and Moscow.
I enjoyed this book very much, and would recommend it to anyone like me, who may not have known about the limited war in Manchuria and who enjoys learning something new.
June 16, 2013
Dry and ponderous at times but still very interesting. I'd never heard of this battle but its effect on strategic alignments was rather startling. Basically a limited war was fought along the Chinese Soviet border as both Japan and the USSR tried to forestall each other as they negotiated alliances with Germany, France, and Britain. The biggest surprise in this book was finding about the contempt for authority and arrogance displayed by military officers in the Japanese Army in Manchuria who openly defied orders from higher headquarters-there's even a Japanese term for the philosophy behind it=gekokujo-rule from below. They even disobeyed an order from the Emperor. This battle was also the launching pad for Field Marshall Zhukov. The Japanese had no tactical intelligence and open contempt for their foe and the Soviets continually surprised them with not only their resources in materiel but also their fighting zeal and prowess. The Kwantung Army (the Japanese Army in Manchuria) would never back down from a fight and would escalate the slightest incident. Ultimately, their excessive audacity worked against them and their country. Goldman thinks that the Japanese could have attacked the Russians after the Germans started towards Moscow except for their experience at Nomonhan. They'd rather go south and fight the Americans than go north after getting bloodied by the Red Army. The Germans could have used the help. If the Soviets had had a two front war they would have lost-we'd all be speaking German maybe. You can see the opportunity for a great alternate history series with this battle as the first book. Also it was surprising to learn of the Japanese insistence on tank crews and artillery crews to not abandon their weapons. Tanks would receive a mobility kill but for the crew to escape and take on infantry role to continue the attack was not allowed. The Japanese martial ardor reminded me a lot of the Southern elan in the American Civil War. It couldn't defeat quantitative advantages in material nor could it defeat better tactics. Stalin comes out the big winner as he played the game masterfully-not ending up fighting a two front war.
February 20, 2018
I was reminded of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (i.e. Nomonhan) when reading Haruki Murakami's novel The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, where it features prominently, and then a few weeks later saw this book listed in the U.S. Naval Institute catalog. I'm happy I picked it up, because it does an excellent job of laying out the context and background for that battle and the two preceding Soviet-Japanese clashes: the Amur River Incident of 1937, and the Changkufeng Incident of 1938.
This is a scholarly work, with 22 pages of footnotes, and 7 pages of bibliography. It is not written in a dense academic style, however, but in a straightforward narrative style. The focus is on the command levels and diplomatic level of the story, and it does not delve into the experiences of soldiers in the field. The focus is more on the preparations for battle than on the battles themselves, and the general flow of events in the battles, rather than setting scenes.
This is the battle that made Zhukov important, and led to Stalin turning over the defense of Moscow to him.
It is difficult for a Westerner to understand the bizarre activities of the Kwantung Army in the years of the Manchukuo occupation, but Goldman does a good job of trying to explain gekokujo (where junior officers feel free to disobey orders and declare war on their own) and to illustrate the repeated instances of it in the Kwantung Army. The higher echelons often compounded mistakes by trying to issue orders as "suggestions" (since calling the junior officers to account too clearly might force them to commit suicide, or ruin morale), which the Kwantung Army then proceeded to ignore.
One reads all sorts of descriptions of bushido, but I particularly admired his clear explanation that "Surrender was so unspeakably dishonorable that the Japanese Army Field Manual was silent on the subject of proper conduct if captured. For officers, death was not merely preferable to surrender, it was expected, and in some cases, required. According to the army's penal code (promulgated in 1908 and not revised until 1942), it was dereliction of duty for a commander to surrender, whether or not he "did his best" to resist."
It is despicable how many Japanese officers were pressured to commit suicide after the Japanese finally admitted that they had lost at Nomonhan. Officers who managed to escape from encirclement with the last remnant of their force? Suicide. Pilots shot down behind enemy lines and repatriated? Suicide. Unauthorized retreat, or capture of your artillery? Suicide. But the guys who planned the stupid attacks without proper intelligence? They got promoted to the General Staff, and did it all over again later.
I found only one typo, I think (an east-west substitution on line 12 of p. 94) in this very well-edited volume.
This is a scholarly work, with 22 pages of footnotes, and 7 pages of bibliography. It is not written in a dense academic style, however, but in a straightforward narrative style. The focus is on the command levels and diplomatic level of the story, and it does not delve into the experiences of soldiers in the field. The focus is more on the preparations for battle than on the battles themselves, and the general flow of events in the battles, rather than setting scenes.
This is the battle that made Zhukov important, and led to Stalin turning over the defense of Moscow to him.
It is difficult for a Westerner to understand the bizarre activities of the Kwantung Army in the years of the Manchukuo occupation, but Goldman does a good job of trying to explain gekokujo (where junior officers feel free to disobey orders and declare war on their own) and to illustrate the repeated instances of it in the Kwantung Army. The higher echelons often compounded mistakes by trying to issue orders as "suggestions" (since calling the junior officers to account too clearly might force them to commit suicide, or ruin morale), which the Kwantung Army then proceeded to ignore.
One reads all sorts of descriptions of bushido, but I particularly admired his clear explanation that "Surrender was so unspeakably dishonorable that the Japanese Army Field Manual was silent on the subject of proper conduct if captured. For officers, death was not merely preferable to surrender, it was expected, and in some cases, required. According to the army's penal code (promulgated in 1908 and not revised until 1942), it was dereliction of duty for a commander to surrender, whether or not he "did his best" to resist."
It is despicable how many Japanese officers were pressured to commit suicide after the Japanese finally admitted that they had lost at Nomonhan. Officers who managed to escape from encirclement with the last remnant of their force? Suicide. Pilots shot down behind enemy lines and repatriated? Suicide. Unauthorized retreat, or capture of your artillery? Suicide. But the guys who planned the stupid attacks without proper intelligence? They got promoted to the General Staff, and did it all over again later.
I found only one typo, I think (an east-west substitution on line 12 of p. 94) in this very well-edited volume.
March 29, 2020
Another largely convincing entry in the annals of "Soviet foreign policy as realpolitik" literature. This diplomatic/military history is an expansion of the author's dissertation, which posited a causal relationship between Soviet insecurity in East Asia in the latter 1930s and the decision by Stalin and Molotov to make their unholy compact with Ribbentrop. This decision, of course, had momentous implications for the course of the war that broke out days later. The author brings to light quite a bit of interesting information concerning the culture of the Kwantung Army, the individuals who misguidedly pushed for war first against the USSR and then the United States, internal deliberations and the push and pull between authorities in Tokyo and local commanders in thrall to the warrior code of Bushido and driven by an overriding sense of honor and shame. The author spares no detail in his description of the conduct of military operations. It should be clear, to anyone searching for those elusive origins of the Second World War, that Nomonhan played an important role in the Soviet decision to spurn Anglo-French entreaties (insincere as they may have been) and neutralize the possibility of war on two fronts, thereby providing Hitler with his carte blanche to invade Poland.
January 26, 2021
This is an excellent, concise book about a little-known and complex geopolitical conflict that took place just before what most people consider the beginning of World War II, certainly that war’s European theater.
The book shows that the Soviet Union’s Red Army was far better prepared to fight in 1939 than German, y Japan, and perhaps the Soviet Union realized, and that Japan’s Imperial Army overestimated its own readiness. Given the ultimate size of the conflict, based on the number of troops involved and killed, and equipment deployed and destroyed, neither side seems to have had a specific goal except to prevent the other from violating an obscure border between territory each was occupying. Japan was not attempting to invade Mongolia; the Red Army was not trying to drive Japan out of northeastern China. As a border clash, it was terribly bloody and costly.
Goldman does an excellent job of providing sufficient but not excessive context of the machinations of all of the powers involved — not just Japan and the Soviet Union, but also Britain, France, and Germany — to understand how important the outcome at Nomonhan is to the outcome and understanding of the entire war. The resolution of Nomonhan also led to a lack of aggression between Japan and the Soviet Union until the war’s very end, allowing the Red Army to focus on fighting Germany, and Japan turning its attention to the United States and the rest of Asia. Marshal Georgy Zhukov plays a bit too much of a minor role in Goldman’s telling, although Nomonhan was where he cut his teeth and learned how to fight larger battles.
John FitzGibbon’s narration of the audiobook is slightly strange. His accent changes from chapter to chapter, which is distracting but does not ultimately detract from the text. Recommended.
The book shows that the Soviet Union’s Red Army was far better prepared to fight in 1939 than German, y Japan, and perhaps the Soviet Union realized, and that Japan’s Imperial Army overestimated its own readiness. Given the ultimate size of the conflict, based on the number of troops involved and killed, and equipment deployed and destroyed, neither side seems to have had a specific goal except to prevent the other from violating an obscure border between territory each was occupying. Japan was not attempting to invade Mongolia; the Red Army was not trying to drive Japan out of northeastern China. As a border clash, it was terribly bloody and costly.
Goldman does an excellent job of providing sufficient but not excessive context of the machinations of all of the powers involved — not just Japan and the Soviet Union, but also Britain, France, and Germany — to understand how important the outcome at Nomonhan is to the outcome and understanding of the entire war. The resolution of Nomonhan also led to a lack of aggression between Japan and the Soviet Union until the war’s very end, allowing the Red Army to focus on fighting Germany, and Japan turning its attention to the United States and the rest of Asia. Marshal Georgy Zhukov plays a bit too much of a minor role in Goldman’s telling, although Nomonhan was where he cut his teeth and learned how to fight larger battles.
John FitzGibbon’s narration of the audiobook is slightly strange. His accent changes from chapter to chapter, which is distracting but does not ultimately detract from the text. Recommended.
July 5, 2021
Concise, original and well-composed account of Zhukov's first battle,that argues well for a larger significance of this distant conflict, than traditionally adopted in Western accounts.
September 5, 2020
Extensively researched and written with great authority "Nomonhan, 1939" offers a fascinating view into one of the lesser known military conflicts of the 20th century.
Detailed accounts, extensive footnotes and superior writing makes this book more engaging than the typical fare. The author has an evident passion for the topic and really writes in a compelling fashion.
What I found most interesting was the scope of this book encompassed much more than just an account of mechanized battle. The ramifications of this battle, the long term effects and "what if" scenarios are fascinating to read and consider.
Not a light read, but a rewarding one.
Detailed accounts, extensive footnotes and superior writing makes this book more engaging than the typical fare. The author has an evident passion for the topic and really writes in a compelling fashion.
What I found most interesting was the scope of this book encompassed much more than just an account of mechanized battle. The ramifications of this battle, the long term effects and "what if" scenarios are fascinating to read and consider.
Not a light read, but a rewarding one.
February 8, 2016
Interesting history about a little-known border clash on the eve of WWII between the Soviet Union and Japan. The author makes the case that the resulting Soviet victory (more like destruction of the Japanese forces involved) influenced the course of WWII, specifically the Japanese decision to attack the US and strike South (Dutch East Indies, Singapore, etc) instead of North against the Soviet Union. This decision, reported to Stalin by the Soviet spy Richard Sorge, also enabled him to release forces from the far east to participate in the Battle of Moscow.
Well researched.
Well researched.
July 14, 2016
Very informative book on a little known battle on the Manchuria/Mongolian border that may have influenced some of the major decisions in WWII. What I liked about this book was the introductory chapters which gave a pretty good overview of the global situation prior to WWII
August 18, 2021
I was fascinated by Stuart Goldman’s exposition and analysis of the Nomonhan battles in 1939 between the Soviet Union and Japan, and its implication for the alignments and confrontations that evolved in World War II. Particularly enlightening, for me, was the author’s examination of Nomonhan as an example of limited war which pitted a politically oriented decision maker with limited but flexible strategic goals (Stalin) and military oriented decision makers (Kwantung Army) narrowly focused on total victory. In this book, the author shows Stalin to have been a master manipulator of people and events by positioning itself as a potential ally to both Germany and the western democracies, while at the same time creating a wedge between Germany and its ally Japan in order to escape the trap of facing enemies on two fronts.
Certainly the limited war between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1939 was different in many ways from limited wars in which the United States later became involved. In the case of the Soviet Union, Stalin was able to carry out his strategy, because he had purged the military leadership and internal opposition was nonexistent. His decisions proved prophetic, but it could have proved fatal to his regime had Japan not elected to attack the United States, or if Hitler had not made some strategic blunders. In the case of Japan, at the time of the Nomonhan battles, the military had not yet gained total ascendancy over the civilian side of government, and following their defeats at Nomonhan, the military turned its attention to the South. By the time Japan made the decision to attack the United States, military men occupied major civilian seats of government and political concerns gave way to military objectives aimed at the U.S. and ultimately brought total defeat. As for Germany, Hitler, like Stalin, controlled both the political and military elements of the nation, but he became obsessed with a military solution, and ignored political considerations. Like Napoleon, he overextended his military, and was crushed.
I can’t help but compare the Nomonhan limited war with the wars the United States has been involved with since 1950. They’ve all been termed limited wars—the Korean War, Vietnam War, 1990 Gulf War, War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq. In each case, American presidents have been faced with competing domestic pressures from political parties, news media, interest groups, the military establishment, and the public at large as to proper courses of action with regard to international conflicts—pressures Stalin wasn’t confronted with since he killed anyone who could potentially oppose him. In each of the above cases, the U.S. president made a decision to go to war with limited objectives, but once in, faced tremendous pressure to expand the limited objectives or continue the war if the objectives could not be achieved as originally intended. George H. W. Bush was probably most successful in achieving his limited war objectives in the 1990 Gulf War, but he was still under pressure to invade Iraq and eliminate Saddam Hussein. He resisted that pressure, but he failed to win reelection. Harry Truman resisted pressure to extend the limited war in Korea, facing pressure from Douglas MacArthur and others. Truman held his position to end the war with a negotiated armistice, but he also gave up a chance to run for another term of office. The Vietnam War affected the political lives of three presidents. Lyndon Johnson decided not to run for a second full term because of the pressures of the war. Richard Nixon promised in 1968 that he had a plan to end the war, but the war went on, and when he resigned under threat of impeachment in 1974, the war was still going on. It was left for Gerald Ford to oversee the end of America’s military involvement in Vietnam, and Ford failed to win election 1978. George H. Bush involved the U.S. in two limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. He survived two terms in office, but has been castigated for involving the U.S. in unending conflicts and leaving them to subsequent presidents to deal with. Now, after twenty years of limited warfare in Afghanistan, both Presidents Trump and Biden stated their intent to end the Afghanistan war. Trump made an agreement with Taliban to withdraw and now Biden has effected the withdrawal. There are recriminations and complaints that it is against military recommendations to continue the war efforts longer—for what purpose is unclear. Nevertheless, the U.S. military, as it has in the past and in accordance with its constitutional role, has accepted the political decision that it’s time to end it. It’s important to note that since World War II, the world has avoided a new world war because the major military powers, United States, Soviet Union/Russia, and China have, been governed by political decision makers who valued political considerations of systemic survival over total military victory. For that reason, the world has avoided, so far, World War III. Perhaps the limited war lessons of Nomonhan 1939 have been heeded, after all.
Certainly the limited war between the Soviet Union and Japan in 1939 was different in many ways from limited wars in which the United States later became involved. In the case of the Soviet Union, Stalin was able to carry out his strategy, because he had purged the military leadership and internal opposition was nonexistent. His decisions proved prophetic, but it could have proved fatal to his regime had Japan not elected to attack the United States, or if Hitler had not made some strategic blunders. In the case of Japan, at the time of the Nomonhan battles, the military had not yet gained total ascendancy over the civilian side of government, and following their defeats at Nomonhan, the military turned its attention to the South. By the time Japan made the decision to attack the United States, military men occupied major civilian seats of government and political concerns gave way to military objectives aimed at the U.S. and ultimately brought total defeat. As for Germany, Hitler, like Stalin, controlled both the political and military elements of the nation, but he became obsessed with a military solution, and ignored political considerations. Like Napoleon, he overextended his military, and was crushed.
I can’t help but compare the Nomonhan limited war with the wars the United States has been involved with since 1950. They’ve all been termed limited wars—the Korean War, Vietnam War, 1990 Gulf War, War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq. In each case, American presidents have been faced with competing domestic pressures from political parties, news media, interest groups, the military establishment, and the public at large as to proper courses of action with regard to international conflicts—pressures Stalin wasn’t confronted with since he killed anyone who could potentially oppose him. In each of the above cases, the U.S. president made a decision to go to war with limited objectives, but once in, faced tremendous pressure to expand the limited objectives or continue the war if the objectives could not be achieved as originally intended. George H. W. Bush was probably most successful in achieving his limited war objectives in the 1990 Gulf War, but he was still under pressure to invade Iraq and eliminate Saddam Hussein. He resisted that pressure, but he failed to win reelection. Harry Truman resisted pressure to extend the limited war in Korea, facing pressure from Douglas MacArthur and others. Truman held his position to end the war with a negotiated armistice, but he also gave up a chance to run for another term of office. The Vietnam War affected the political lives of three presidents. Lyndon Johnson decided not to run for a second full term because of the pressures of the war. Richard Nixon promised in 1968 that he had a plan to end the war, but the war went on, and when he resigned under threat of impeachment in 1974, the war was still going on. It was left for Gerald Ford to oversee the end of America’s military involvement in Vietnam, and Ford failed to win election 1978. George H. Bush involved the U.S. in two limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. He survived two terms in office, but has been castigated for involving the U.S. in unending conflicts and leaving them to subsequent presidents to deal with. Now, after twenty years of limited warfare in Afghanistan, both Presidents Trump and Biden stated their intent to end the Afghanistan war. Trump made an agreement with Taliban to withdraw and now Biden has effected the withdrawal. There are recriminations and complaints that it is against military recommendations to continue the war efforts longer—for what purpose is unclear. Nevertheless, the U.S. military, as it has in the past and in accordance with its constitutional role, has accepted the political decision that it’s time to end it. It’s important to note that since World War II, the world has avoided a new world war because the major military powers, United States, Soviet Union/Russia, and China have, been governed by political decision makers who valued political considerations of systemic survival over total military victory. For that reason, the world has avoided, so far, World War III. Perhaps the limited war lessons of Nomonhan 1939 have been heeded, after all.
January 29, 2018
4.25. A great description and analysis of the political and military implications of the Soviet- Japanese relationships and conflicts over the 1936-1939 period. A mostly unknown area of the Second World War, the early Asian conflicts are important not just in their own right but in how they meshed with the Western countries and their European ambitions. Some of his final conclusions are stretched but he admits that he is wandering into the realm of what-if. There are few people that won't learn something new from reading this.
February 15, 2020
Provocative history of the "limited war" between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1939 that uses new documents to show how, far from being a sideshow, was a meaningful factor in strategic calculations in Moscow, Berlin, and to a lesser extent London and Paris on the eve of the European war. In the second and penultimate chapters in particular he deftly walks through these diplomatic maneuvers. Other chapters focus on the operational history of the conflict, which can be a bit technical and dull for the non-specialist but still worth reading.
December 13, 2017
Good, straight forward, narrative account of the Nomonhan (and other Manchurian) battle in 1939. Makes pretty persuasive case that Japan chose to "turn south" (to Indochina) and eventual war with US/British over "turning north" to war with Soviets due to the mauling Japan received at Nomonhan. Also makes case about Soviet delayed entry into Poland due to waiting for final resolution of Nomonhan situation. Well reasoned, convincing.
October 22, 2019
He's interested in both telling the story of the battle and describing it's larger consequence. I think he does a fine job telling the story of the battle, although this is not a small unit narrative. There's is a lot of blow by blow in the book. I think he does an important service in discussing the larger import, as the timing was critical for events in Europe. The book is overall, well written. It was a fast read.
December 1, 2025
Goldman delivers a book that although short, is well researched and puts forth a great hypothesis that while many over look Nomonhan as being little more than a territorial dispute the Japanese and Soviets in a remote corner of Mongolia, the results would have even more far reaching consequences for WWII as a whole.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 2, 2018
An exhaustive analysis of a little-known border clash between Japan and Russia just before WW2 began. Puts the struggle in it's geopolitical context and helps the reader to understand how WW2 broke out and the shape it took. Throws some light on the Japanese rationale for attacking Pearl Harbor.
June 6, 2022
An excellent account of the Soviet/Japanese conflict at Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol). Goldman paints the portrait of a conflict most have never heard of but had a significant impact on the direction of World War 2. The author gives us much to consider here.
August 4, 2020
Informative!
A great and well researched book that highlights the border clashes between the Soviet Union and Japanese Empire in the late 1930s.
A great and well researched book that highlights the border clashes between the Soviet Union and Japanese Empire in the late 1930s.
December 29, 2020
A succinct and well researched account of the Battle of Nomonhan.
Goldman makes a compelling argument for the importance of the Soviet and Asian theatre in the years leading up to World War II.
Goldman makes a compelling argument for the importance of the Soviet and Asian theatre in the years leading up to World War II.
March 30, 2015
The book provides very detail account of the Russian-Japanese “local conflicts” fought in 1938-1939 at Changkufeng and Nomonhan(battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in Russian Historiography). Author argues that clear and decisive Soviet victories, especially at Nomonhan, had a significant effect on the decision of the Japanize government to attack United States in 1941, rather than join Germany in the war against the Soviet Union. That, in turn, did allow Stalin to move significant forces from Far East to the defense of Moscow in 1941, and win the battle and perhaps the war. What I find absolutely fascinating, and Mr. Goldman makes it abundantly clear, that the Japanize decisions to attack Soviet forces on both occasions, were not the decisions of the Japanize Government, but rather the local decisions of the Kwantung Army, made independently from the General Staff and the Government in Tokyo, and against the overall political policy of the Japanize government. On more than one occasion, Kwantung Army commanders did mislead the Tokyo and acted against the orders from the superiors. They even decided to ignore the “suggestion” from the emperor himself, who supposed to be “divine”. That, in turn, finally explains to me the Stalin’s paranoia about “German provocations”, that he exhibited the last few months leading to the German invasion: If the Japanize generals can act independently from the government, and almost succeed in provoking full scale Soviet-Japanize war, why can’t the German Generals, acted out of hatred of bolshevism, and against the Hitler’s wishes, do the same?
October 2, 2015
"Nomonhan, 1939" is an excellent study of a little known conflict. In 1939 Russia attacked and decimated Japanese troops at a place called Nomonhan. In the book the author, Stuart Goldman, set out to show that the fighting there on the Manchurian-Mongolian border had a direct effect on bringing about WWII. He succeeded admirably in this endeavor. Joseph Stalin, Soviet dictator, was afraid of becoming involved in a two front war with the Japanese in the east and the Germans in the west. His fear of the Japanese led him to sign the non-aggression pact with Hitler which split Poland and started the war between Germany and France and Britain. Also, the defeat of Japan in the mini-war at Nomonhan caused the Japanese to redirect their attention south into the Dutch East Indies which triggered the U.S. oil embargo and subsequent attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. Goldman uses Soviet archival records and those of all the other countries to reconstruct the actual events making for an interesting telling of this important though short conflict.
May 6, 2013
I've read references to this conflict with allusions to the effect it may have had on the course of WWII. The author, steeped in the subject, convincingly illustrates the significant impact that it had on the course of WWII. From the elevation of General Grigory Zhukov to become the architect of Soviet victory and an allaying of Stalin's fears of a Japanese second front...to a non-aggression pact with the Nazis. It is a compelling read thus far. As if that wasn't enough. Add to this the effect on Japan to choose a "Southern Strategy" instead of a "Northern" one into the Soviet Far East and thus to attack the U.S. at Pearl Harbor.
An interesting look at the conflict. The narrative can be rough reading, but he offers a lot of food for thought. It is interesting to see new assessments of WWII like this that continue to come out using the wealth of archival information available since the end of the Soviet Union.
An interesting look at the conflict. The narrative can be rough reading, but he offers a lot of food for thought. It is interesting to see new assessments of WWII like this that continue to come out using the wealth of archival information available since the end of the Soviet Union.
October 3, 2014
Usually, World War II maps show the Pacific and European theaters separately. This makes sense in most respects, but disguises the importance of both to the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the USSR was the only major combatant that did not fight a two-front war, and Soviet survival and victory depended on that fact. Goldman does a terrific job of explaining the tactics and operations involved in the Soviet-Japanese border clashes around Changkufeng and Nomonhan (aka Khalkin Gol), the political forces behind those clashes in both Japan and the USSR, and the impact of the "incidents" on Japanese and Soviet strategies. While the Japanese defeat at Nomonhan has long been understood to have driven the Japanese to choose to move south, ensuring war with the US, the role of Nohmonhan in the Soviet negotiations with the British and French, and the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, has been neglected.
July 22, 2015
I am not sure I can really recommend this book as it targets a very specialist audience who already know what they expect to find from it. As a history it is interesting, quite deeply researched (a little asymmetrically in favour of Japan but that's ok). It is also a PhD thesis which influences the narrative style, but that's also ok. Finally, and also ok, I don't think the facts support the author's conclusion that events at Nomonhan significantly influenced political decision making. if the Red Army had lost that would be a different story. Most interesting was insight into insubordination amongst the Imperial Kwangtung Army - and the inability of the Japanese military administration to deal with it.
May 6, 2015
I saw the author speak on cable at the Pritzker library, and I was impressed by his insights.
I loved the book, and I learned a great deal about how the events at Nomonhan, and in that part of China, affected strategic thinking.
I would wish for this story to be made into a work of fiction, but only because I find more of interest in fiction, in speculating on the mind-set of the persons involved.
But Goldman knows enough to tell it as a story. He's a good story teller.
I loved the book, and I learned a great deal about how the events at Nomonhan, and in that part of China, affected strategic thinking.
I would wish for this story to be made into a work of fiction, but only because I find more of interest in fiction, in speculating on the mind-set of the persons involved.
But Goldman knows enough to tell it as a story. He's a good story teller.
January 14, 2013
I loved this book! It tells the story of a limited war between the USSR and Japan just prior to World War II and how that conflict affected both countries' was planning. Decades in preparation, the author was for many years a Congressional Research Service expert. A professional historian, he writes clear prose with great selection of substance to tell a story.
October 13, 2012
A great work on an event of far greater importance than its fame in history suggests. Well written (rare for these more obscure topics) and tactically, strategically, and politically comprehensive as well.
December 9, 2012
When the arrow turns green go right. That's all we do. How did this happen? Imperial Japan had no design on attacking the U.S. but in 1939 things changed. This book is not the first to tell the story, but it does a good job.
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