The Command of the Air

by Giulio Douhet

This is the oft quoted, seldom seen classic work of Giulio Douhet, long out of print in English. "In the pantheon of air power theorists, Giulio Douhet holds center stage." - Richard P. Hallion, The Air Force Historian. "Douhet reigns as one of the twentieth century's foremost strategic air power theorists. Along with William "Billy" Mitchell, Douhet understood that the technological advances in weaponry made during World War I were not fully utilized by Allied commanders. Douhet thus spent the decade after the war constructing a theory that would facilitate the strategic use of what he conceived to be the biggest technological breakthrough of all, the airplane. [...] Over time, [his] theories became institutionalized to the point that they were rarely questioned. Their influence was subsequently evident in strategic Air Force operations." - Air University Review, 1986

Genres: Military Fiction, History, War, Military History, Aviation, Nonfiction, Philosophy

408 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1983

Reviews

[Nate Huston · Rating 2 out of 5]

Giulio had some crazy ideas, but hey, it was right after WWI! Bottom
line is that he said that there was no real way to stop airpower (both
pursuit aircraft and ground-based anti-aircraft guns were largely
ineffective) and therefore, the only way to win a war was to control
the air. In order to control the air, you needed to have an
independent air force. The independent air force ought to consist of
just enough "combat aircraft" (counter-air) to overwhelm whatever
aircraft the enemy put up in defense and the balance ought to be
bombers. The more bombers, the more stuff you could bomb. In his
second edition, he added a "Part II" that essentially "blew the lid
off" his view regarding auxiliary (ground and naval support) air
forces and confessed that he had only begrudgingly supported them in
the first edition due to political pressure. In this edition, he
completely dismisses auxiliary forces as "worthless, superfluous, and
harmful."

His logic train is impressive - there was no defense against air power
therefore control of the air was necessary and if you're going to have
control of the air, the best way to get it was by going straight for
the enemy's air forces before he had a chance to launch them.
Searching for them would be fruitless as they could avoid you (and
likely would) and you'd end up flying around looking while they
destroyed you. If air control was the name of the game, then any
auxiliary forces were unnecessary - they couldn't do their job without
control of the air! If the ground and naval forces needed support,
the independent air forces could be dispatched to help out once they
had gained control. Most likely, however, the independent force, if
invested in properly, after having gained control would devastate the
enemy to such an extent as to make the ground and naval forces
completely unopposed. Douhet ultimately based his views on the flawed
(at least today) premise that there was no defense against air power.
While today this is obviously untrue, his insights are nonetheless
valuable if for no other reason than they held such sway over the
early stages of American and continental air forces. Today's airmen
would do well to understand his arguments in order to understand their
flaws, lest they correctly advocate for an independent force while
basing their arguments on flawed premises.

[Jeff Greason · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dated in some ways, timeless in others, this is one of the foundational works on the theory of air power. Douhet was as much the pioneer of what today we might call 'strategic' air power as Billy Mitchell was for 'tactical' air power. Douhet foresaw the intrinsic tug-of-war between those objectives and that control of the air was the essential first duty of aviation, in that 'tactical' air support could not function without that control. He also grossly overstated the power of aviation to effectively control and strike rear areas, a misconception which clouded the reality of many others in many other nations. Ironically, the development of precision guided munitions in the present day may have brought strategic aviation closer to some of Douhet's vision. So while the work itself has its weaknesses, it is hard to gain an appreciation of both the development of air power theory, and some of it's long-standing and well-cherished errors, without reading his work.

[Daniel M Cousineau · Rating 3 out of 5]

For those who wish to learn of the history of the inter war military thinking

This illustrates where the idea that the bomber will always get through that guided Baldwin
The author was correct on several points
He over estimated the actual destructive power of bombing
Malta London and all those German cities took a pounding and kept on going
He lived and wrote before Radar was invented or effective radios in fighters were developed
So he couldn't know that nations would have advanced warning of the coming, size and altitude of a bomber attack which would make a fighter defense much more effective than he could imagine
He argues that once a fighter squadron begins its attack it ceases to be a unit
This was true in WW 1 when planes had no radios. But radios in fighters allows them to continue to keep cohesion as a unit

This book allows to understand the thinking both correct and incorrect that guided the development of the air forces in 1930's

[Jonathan Z. · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am shocked to see how much he got right about airpower in the interwar years. He also starts advocating for chemical and biological weapons on civilians within the first 20 pages, so there is a lot he gets wrong too.

[Dave's · Rating 5 out of 5]

A necessary read for those interested in the history of airpower.

[Roger Burk · Rating 3 out of 5]

My edition was a 1942 wartime publication containing four separate works:

The Command of the Air, Douhet's original 1921 air power manifesto that made him famous, plus a 1926 addendum in which he says he did not go far enough;

The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future, more of the same, from 1928;

Recapitulation, a polemic on the same subject from 1929, in which he replies to his critics; and

The War of 19--, a 1930 account of an imagined war of Germany vs. France and Belgium, decided in one day (solely by air power, of course).

The first work is of great interest to military historians because it was a great and famous inspiration for air power theorists around the world in the 1920s and 30s, It drove the imagination of many early military aviators. However, it did not convince large numbers of others.

The fourth work, much less known, is of interest because it is a prediction of the progress of a war between Germany and France, written about ten years before such a war broke out. Pundits are always trying to predict how a future war will go, so it should be illuminating to see how a past pundit fared in his prediction.

Other than correctly predicting that Germany would win, he was totally, laughably wrong. In Douhet's account, France sues for peace after two days of air bombardment. The Germans bombers come in seven great waves, paying no attention to losses and pressing on to their targets. The first two waves are entirely destroyed, but after them the French defenses are too exhausted and disorganized to offer significant resistance. German bombers level couple of cities to convince the French of their helplessness, and they quickly surrender.

Why did Douhet get it so wrong? I think he had a fixed idea about the unstopability of air power that lacked supporting evidence. He greatly exaggerated the damage that could be done by one air strike (he takes the ability of a squadron to destroy its assigned target as a near mathematical certainty). He makes no allowance for the friction of war (except on the defending side). He dismisses the ability of air defenses to keep operating after initial engagements. He does not explain who will be found to fly those first two sacrificial waves. He takes no account of how much easier it is to hit a target with a fighter's forward-firing machine guns than with the pivot-mounted defensive guns on a bomber. He neglects the ability of a defensive counter-air patrol to defend a large area. He assumes bombing will destroy civilian will to resist (WWII showed that on the contrary it tends to stiffen resistance, unless catastrophic defeat on the ground is imminent and inevitable). Perhaps Douhet was correct in thinking that defenses could not absolutely prevent bombing, but he missed the fact that they could make bombing difficult and dangerous.

It's only fair to mention things that Douhet perhaps could not have foreseen. Douhet assumes Germany goes all-in on his theories, which did not happen (the Luftwaffe was exclusively a tactical force.) Radar gave a big boost to the ability of defenders to see coming attacks and concentrate defenses on them. Douhet assumes all bombing will include poison gas. And he does not anticipate the advent of armored warfare, which greatly speeds up the advance of invading armies. But still considering all this, he clearly wildly exaggerated the effect of the air arm on warfare. That effect was very great, but not as overwhelming as Douhet predicted.

So what today is being over-hyped for its effect on future war?

[Rich · Rating 2 out of 5]

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:

One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.

Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available.

[Rich · Rating 2 out of 5]

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:

One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.

Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available.

[Rich · Rating 2 out of 5]

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:

One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.

Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available.

[Frankie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Giulio sei un po’ un pazzo sgravato ma grazie mille per il 30 e lode all’esame di studi strategici

[Luis Sánchez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un interesante estudio sobre la importancia y el futuro (se escribió en 1921) de la aviación como elemento vital para ganar una guerra. El autor da muestras de una clarividencia sorprendente, al acertar en su escrito sobre los avances que se verían en el arma de la aviación.