While I struggled with this way of looking at the world, I have to give it 4 stars for the nice curation of articles across the world. Interestingly, I use to are a lot about this topic of revolutions and how it manifests itself. However, I now see them in a very different light, and in that regard, this book was so painful.
The challenge for me is that in order for this book to make sense, you have to see Revolution as a unique phenomenon that is drive by something. Both parts must exist, the "Unique Phenomenon" and the "driven by something." I use to view such points in history in this way, but more than 20 years and physically visiting more than 50 countries, more than 1/2 of which are considered developing, I just feel differently. I do not see them as Unique events, but rather the result of a continuous march of change that sweeps across the globe. I do not see them as driven by something, but driven by many someones. And as a result, I cannot care about the subsequent conversation that come from unique and something, i.e. is it right, wrong, better, or worse. It just is.
So to be specific, then, the front few chapters discuss the need for modernization and how that is causal of revolutionary forces. In other words, without modernization there is no impetus to revolt. Well, kind of. But it's a bit backwards in framework. It's less that modernization causes revolution and more that modernization is going to happen. When the society has ways of handling it then no revolution. If it doesn't AND there is a leader who happens to feel strongly about it, then revolution will happen. But the stress is on the forward momentum of progress, not on the revolution, which is simply IMO the result of bad systems (socio, economic, political).
The articles come close, but their thrust is political and revolution as a point in time, versus the history of humanity as a continuous flow. So, for example, P. 38 talks about how the problem is that political liberalization is lagged relative to other modernization. Not exactly. I mean look at China in recent times. Modernization (Socio, political, and economic) first, political liberalization VERY slow behind it. That a very non-liberal state was able to choose precise parts of the socio, political, and economic to advance without doing it wholesale is far more the result of having learned a really tough lesson in '89 than anything else. A reverse conceptualization can only use revolution as the datapoint. However, this conceptualization that sees revolution as the outlyer can use all points in time as a datapoint. (sorry if that doesn't make sense).
Again, on pg 52 and 53, the end of the article on the Debate on Modernization is wonderful in the sense that it acknowledges that "states are warmakers and wars are state-makers. But then we end with the argument that Modernizations effects on revolution are indirect. You can see how this is just completely weird in my framework. The point is modernization or some forward trajectory of society. That different state compositions must result and that revolutions happen are more a sign of a failure of the systems in place to support broadly a movement forward.
Hence, we miss the more important questions of "What is this movement forward." This is so relevant as it does a better job of helping to understand why revolutions might happen. You can see the challenge of failing to do it by this framework in the chapter on "Outcomes of Revolutions." Here we talk about the impact to the peasants and whether they are better off. But the various hypothesis put forth on page 94 and spoken about in advance all have some underlying presumption that the rational was somehow based in the peasant class fighting for itself. Very few revolutions found their initial leader, financing and ultimate ends among the peasants. So, it's just crazy to formulate this way.
Modernization under any terms with revolution as secondary implies the opposite. Pretty much any class can want to raise the bottom up for reasons that socio, political, or economic (i.e. building a stronger more educated working class, a better class of voters, etc...).
The back half of the book goes through the modern world of revolutions from 1700 forward. It's great, but I really would rather read more deeply about each one rather than a short essay, personally. Still, if you're using this book and supplementing it could be great.
I did really enjoy the argument of the American Revolution being something that made no sense as relates to the idea that it must be the proletariate under duress and subjugation that revolts. However, it ends in some drivel that - even as a staunch US patriot - I can barely stomach. This idea that the founding forefathers were purely idealistic with a quick gloss over of slavery. But again, if instead we cast the American Revolution in the context of modernization you get a bit more insight.
Why does it matter? Well, if you're a nation or a policy maker that is trying to think about what to do to manage through a large amount of change, then it's quite relevant. Revolution is a check on stupid modernization choices. Sadly - as I disagree with the parts of the book that suggest otherwise - some other power will exploit (not save) the masses to over-through stupid policy regimes if other systems are not in place to stop that from happening.
But 4 stars, b/c without such a well curated collection, it would not be easy to think through which argument or approach you want to take in framing your world.