Death of the Soul

by William Barrett

Traces the development of philosophical thought from the seventeenth century to today, and explores why questions of the soul figure so little in the minds of present-day technocratic intellectuals

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, History, Politics

173 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1986

About the author

Librarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.

William Christopher Barrett (1913 – 1992) was a professor of philosophy at New York University from 1950 to 1979. Precociously, he began post-secondary studies at the City College of New York when 15 years old. He received his PhD at Columbia University. He was an editor of Partisan Review and later the literary critic of The Atlantic Monthly magazine. He was well-known for writing philosophical works for nonexperts. Perhaps the best known among these were Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy and The Illusion of Technique , which remain in print.

Reviews

[Szplug · Rating 4 out of 5]

Metaphysical patchouli.

Much as in Irrational Man, William Barrett proves himself here to possess an immensely readable philosophical voice—reasonable, measured, sober while yet so with the timbre of an easy jocularity, and endowed with a rich passion and warmth that is both indicative of and provisioned by a deep and earnest humanity. I languidly make my way through his books with an unabated pleasure, drinking of the decanted detailing of a learned and lucid wise man. Barrett practices what he preaches, which is that philosophy—or at least the discussion of such—in our modern era should make itself accessible, and hence available, to the general public; an intention that, by no means, involves the dumbing down of the material and concepts being presented, but rather that they be analyzed from, used to explain, and offer means to redress, the core problems of a humanity that exists within the everyday world. The principal state of affairs that troubles the author is the increasingly atomized nature of our modern culture, a specialized technocratic materialism that tends towards dissolving or diluting, amongst other things, societal values and mores, whilst simultaneously engendering varieties of nihilism, with its attendant corrosive energy, within this archipelago of fragmentation. A regrettable victim of this dispersion is what the ancients termed psyche, the soul; the consciousness, the existential awareness of human beings which, up until the time and philosophical speculations of Descartes, was an assumed natural inhering component of mankind within a divinely ordered cosmos.

There is a key section in the middle part of Death of the Soul where the author points out a revealing mistake he has observed, on the part of his students, in the envisioning of the three areas of the mind that Kant detailed in the Critique of Pure Reason—Sensibility, our sense perception, Understanding, the conceptual or scientific intellect, and Reason, that which deals with transcendent ideas—as a series of enclosed and self-contained levels, stacked one upon the other in the order they are named above. Kant, as Barrett conceives of it, would rather they be envisioned as three concentric circles, the smaller inset within the larger, and crisscrossed by a series of diagonal and vertical lines to clarify the interpenetration and interconnectedness of the trinity. This commingled wholeness is the thematic subject of Barret's elegant little book: an investigation of how this perduring unity of our mind and its apperception of the sensory world, filtering of said inputs, and transcendent ideation, has been continuously, perhaps calamitously, sundered into various component parts by the strains of modern philosophy that have arisen out of the very intellectual environment erected and nurtured by the psyche they have displaced. The irony lies in that very fact: that this consciousness, the presence of mind, was thoroughly involved at all stages of the formation of the new science of matter, even as the burgeoning spread and opening vistas of the latter tended towards a cohering mechanical view of the universe that relegated that human mind to the status of an enervated, enfeebled ghost.

To develop his point, Barrett examines the philosophical systems of a progression of thinkers, beginning with Descartes. Again as with Irrational Man, I was impressed with the author's ability to produce an abundance of clarifying exegesis and reasoned interpretation of the philosophers under consideration within the space of a handful of pages. At all times he endeavors to place the thought they promoted and produced within the context of a concrete humanity whose mental processes are quite inseparable from the flesh in which it is contained and the temporal-spatial environment through which it operates. A recurring flaw that Barrett detects, and/or criticism that he offers, is the tendency on the part of the great philosophers of the modern era to abandon this reality in lieu of a greater abstraction the more detailed and developed their own personal thought structures become—examples being that the Empiricists failed to properly consider the unity of the mind's sensory processing, its relating of the continuous stream of impression and sensation to past remembrances and considerations or the projecting of such into the anticipations of an unknown future; that the early Rationalists erred in treating the body as a scientific construct, a piece of matter separate and distinct from the consciousness that observes it when our commonsensical experience is that the body is inextricably connected with the mind in our quotidian existence; and that the Analytics, in their focus upon a rigorous analysis and formal logic that parses our mental processes into systematic bits that can be encoded and programmed, fail to account for the ineluctable wholeness—a historical sense, emotional slingshots across the temporal spectrum, evolving understanding, instinctive and idiosyncratic responses to stimuli dependent upon the unique exclusivity of each individual psyche—that comprises a flesh-and-blood human being in all of its boundless mystery.

All of the above is, of course, my struggling attempt at achieving precision, within the space of a few paragraphs, of what Barrett has far more carefully and detailedly set about to bring before the reader. It is all quite fascinating, and, more than anything, a spur set to my procrastinating buttocks to get my shit together and undertake to read the works of these great and profound thinkers so that I can reach my own conclusions based upon my own understanding. Barret, in a brief dissertation upon the postwar development and prominence of Deconstructionism, offers up some stimulating food for thought; and one of the things I find the most inveigling about Barrett is the sense I have detected of a careful advancement of the omnipresence of God within the historical evolution of philosophical thought as something accessible to both religious- and secular-minded individuals—that some manner of godhead—even if drained of its divinity—is an antipodal requisite to the gravitational pull towards nihilism exerted by a splintered technocratic culture. Finally, I also believe—quite possibly incorrectly—that the philosophy Barrett tended to personally align with, to deem the most fruitful for our current situation, was Kant's critical philosophy applied with a phenomenology running the gamut from Kierkegaard to Heidegger—a concern with the existential status of humanity critiqued from a midpoint between empiricism and rationalism. I'm a tyro when it comes to such deeply-developed constructs, but it's what innately appeals to me, at least as I understand it. And the thing is, if this means that I end up hitching my wagon to the same propulsive mental horses that drove William B, that's just fine by me.

[Anne-Julia · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting read. I have a couple of favorite quotes: Re: Hume - "He stands outside the self and looks for it as some kind of sensory datum, forgetting that he himself has launched the search and is involved in it throughout." And, "What shall it profit a whole civilization, or culture, if it gains knowledge and power over the material world, but loses any adequate idea of the conscious mind, the human self, at the center of all that power?" Absolutely fascinating.

[Barak · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Death of the Soul, Barrett takes a brave excursion through the western intellectual history of mankind, via some of its prominent philosophers, in order to expose, examine, and explain the surprising chasm between the academic, over-intellectual and the common-sense, true to real-life perceptions of consciousness, the first one of suspicion and incredulity (giving birth to semi-philosophical debates like The Problem of Other Minds), the latter, one of obviousness and transparency.

This project is mainly achieved through the tracing of that development commencing in the seventeenth century that culminated in the novel creation of the scientific mind; ironically, it is this new mind that is now pulling the rug from under the consciousness that historically spawned it, by expounding reductionist theories of Materialism and Scientism countermanding its very requirement to exist.

I shall not be elaborating the philosophies and philosophers mentioned in the book but would instead discuss only briefly the dichotomies, ideas and themes Barrett demarcates at greater length:

Subject-Object: Barrett is discussing the rift between the tiny conscious subject and the vast uncaring universe, starting with Pascal and its quasi-existential broodings and moving on to Descartes and Leibnitz, the discussion of the latter's theory of monads, and in particular the idea of active, self-originating consciousness proving fascinating.

Empiricism: Barrett brings to light both its Materialism and Idealism manifestations through a cursory discussion of their proponents, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, sprinkling hints as to how these different perspectives may bear on questions of human-Freedom's and God's existence. He is criticising Hume's detached view of cause and effect, and that sense impressions can be logically and coherently discussed without referring to a perceiver or "I" having them. In mentioning Hume's construction of the ego as a heap of perceptions, Barrett laments the current state of affairs, writing (25 years ago): "We live in a world where the flow of sensations, copiously fed to us by all the devices of technology, can virtually turn the ordinary citizen into a heap of perceptions". I cannot but wonder what he would have written today, at the age of Internet and Twitter.

Kant: A significant part of the book is discussing Kant's answers to the above, and in a very positive manner. Kant is depicted as a pivot point between Rationalists and Empiricists on the one side of history, and Idealism, Positivism, Pragmatism and Existentialism on the other. The discussion is very long, but what I found especially of interest is Barrett's defense of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, turning what is normally considered to be Kant's weakness to one of salient strength. The crust of the exegesis is that science, software, and even mathematics, are in the final analysis original inventions of the human mind; Mathematics, he goes to discuss, cannot be founded on Logic despite Russell's and Whitehead's heroic efforts, as it is not merely a collection of tautologies. Many other topics are also discussed in the context of Kant's philosophy.

Dispersion: The third and last part of the book was the one I was most eager to read, and at the same time the one I felt after reading to be the most disappointing, being rushed in places and leaving a taste for more. Throwing in some of the concepts discussed in there, one will encounter Soul, Self Deconstruction, Being Desubstentialization and more, including short critical analyses of Heidegger, Sartre et al. The last chapter prior to the epilogue, dubbed Analytic Philosophy and the Computer I found, alas, (understandably I think) less erudite and well treated than the rest.

With that being said, the book as a whole is an excellent and original effort in philosophical salvaging of the human soul and a courageous and honest attack of contemporary schools of philosophy, some strands of intellectualism, and of the prevalent trends in modern society at large.

[Neal Tognazzini · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read an intro to existentialism by this author a few years ago and loved it, so I picked up this one at a used bookstore and just got around to reading it. It’s a very brief history of modern philosophy from the 17th century to the time it was written (1986), with a particular focus on the trajectory of philosophical thinking about the self or human consciousness. It was a bit uneven, I think - at times insightful and at times confusing even for someone with their PhD in philosophy, and at times grumpy in a “get off my lawn” sort of way. Still I’m glad I read it. I’m sympathetic with the overall view of the author that all too often scientism leads us to forget our own humanity.

[Tash]

had 2 buy this from ebay bc its out of print but once it arrives its over for u all!!!!!!!! i will b so smart

[Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a brief and light read; Barrett has the gift of being both highly intelligent and affable in his style.

The title, in my opinion, is a bit misleading. Throughout the book, Barrett states that the topic is the history of "the mind," then of "the soul," then of "the self," then of "consciousness." To be sure, there is much overlap between these various terms, to the point that we use them synonymously, seeing no distinction; however, as Barrett well knows, each of these terms has immense historical and traditional baggage, so that a hasty equivalence becomes careless. It would've been interesting for him to show how these terms went in and out of favor and how they developed in relation to each other; though then again, this would extend the book and make it rather technical, whereas most readers would willingly look past such a point.

As short as the book is, I think it also could've been shorter. A lot of time is spent giving a portrait of certain philosophers, which is helpful in humanizing and contextualizing them, but when he dedicates three whole chapters to Kant's influence, for example, Barrett's flair for literary criticism becomes indulgent. Many of the sections are only peripherally, if at all, about the soul/self/mind, particularly the Kant one. The real thrust of his thesis—that the advent of modern scientific materialism, combined with a distrust and deconstruction of the concept of "substance," led to today's "scattering" and "fragmentation" (113) of the self—really only comes in chapters 3, 8, and 9. Additionally, I was a little disappointed that he didn't take his criticism of Heidegger and the analytics all that far.

Lastly, as this work is largely a critical history, Barrett leaves little positive vision. He tells us, "Here's the story of how this thing we ought to value so much, the self, has been discredited and discarded; things are bad as a result of this error." He speaks of rescuing and retrieving "the concrete self" (13-14, 112), which he claims was only really recognized by Kierkegaard, but other than that, he gives scant clues as to what the self is. I think this kind of fair of him for two reasons: (1) as I said, this is a historical work, not a philosophical thesis meant to put forward some comprehensive defense of the self, which would be a separate work; (2) perhaps he assumes that an account of the self is unnecessary, that each of us knows it already on a firsthand basis.

Despite these shortcomings, this gives a pretty good succinct overview of the trends in the history of philosophy from 1600-1960; and I agree with him, first, that “there is something a little strange, even foolish, about [our] flight from consciousness” (xii), and second, that philosophy has done little-to-no justice to the concrete self.

[Simon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Barrett says he wanted to write a book describing how the development of scientific thought eventually resulted in a worldview in which the "self" was lost, being seen as either superfluous or just another cog in a worldly machine beyond its control. His method is to trace the philosophy of self and science from Descartes and Kant (who argued that the self was essential to the perception of reality) up to 20th-century philosophers as varied as Sartre, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, who in their different ways argued that the self was either contingent or totally unnecessary to the understanding of reality.

It's an interesting history, and as a non-expert I can't find any major fault with how he presents it. The curious thing is Barrett's unwillingness to draw any ethical or political implications from the argument he makes. Perhaps he's not the man for the job -- early on in the book, he derides the idea of "ideology" (without ever defining what he means by that), so it's puzzling why he would even bother writing a book that is nominally opposed to the idea of society and history as a mechanical system better left unsullied by the imperfections of human will. It's too bad really, because it's not hard to see the negative effects of such a way of thinking -- from the excesses of postmodernism and econometrics in the academy, to the politics of neoliberalism, race science, or even the cruder forms of Marxism, all of which seem to bear the imprint of the way of thinking he opposes.

As such, he's written an entertaining but ultimately unsatisfying book. I recommend it to people with an interest in the history of modern (Western) philosophy or scientific ethics -- but be prepared to do the heavy lifting on your own when it comes to applying the book meaningfully to real life.

[Toby Newton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Published almost a half century ago, in Death of the Soul, Barrett begins to get nervous about the claims made for mathematics, science, and, as a physical manifestation thereof, the computer.

"The dreamers of the computer insist," he writes, " that we shall someday be able to build a machine that can take over all the operations of the human mind, and so in effect replace the human person. After all, why not? There should be no "mystic" obstacle that should impede the progress of our technology. But in the course of these visions they forget the very plain fact of the human body and its presence in and through consciousness. If that eventual machine were ever to be realised, it would be a curiously disembodied kind of consciousness, for it would be without the sensitivity, intuitions, and pathos of our human flesh and blood. And, without those qualities, we are less than wise, certainly less than human."

Well, the dreamers of the computer either didn't read the book or didn't take the lesson seriously. In any case, the claims are still being made, now with more confidence, and Barrett's update of the familiar scriptural injunction, "What shall it profit a whole civilisation, or culture, if it gains knowledge and power over the material world, but loses any adequate idea of the conscious mind, the human self, at the centre of all that power?" goes unheeded.

What colossal insecurity lies at the heart of man's necrotic technophilia?

[feux d'artifice · Rating 1 out of 5]

yeahhhhh this will probably be the last time I read William Barrett.
the whole time I'm reading this, I can feel the author's agenda as he presents his vision of the history of modern western philosophy from 1700 to present. it makes me suspicious of everything the author has to say, and also I just straight up don't care for western philosophy in general.
and wow Barrett really doesn't like social history!! makes me want to dive back into social history texts, just to be contrary.
also was super annoyed by the prose that uses "he" as the universal singular pronoun, and sketchy descriptions of equating homosexuality and crime????
one good thing out of this read was that I discovered the existence of Jean Genet.... yeah, that's all I got.

[K · Rating 2 out of 5]

I didn't finish it! This book hasn't aged exceptionally well in terms of applying it's central premise to today's technologies etc., and it was also a bit hard to get through -- not because the concepts were too high-minded or difficult to understand, but rather the delivery was too opaque.

[Cole · Rating 4 out of 5]

Did not appreciate his treatment of Turing (unsurprisingly homophobic, and cruel compared to his generous /respectful tone with everyone else). the rest of the book is immensely readable, thoughtful and relevant, even if I didn’t agree with all his conclusions.

[Fianna · Rating 5 out of 5]

"What shall it profit a whole civilization, or culture, if it gains knowledge and power over the material world, but loses any adequate idea of the conscious mind, the human self, at the center of all that power."

Oh what I wouldn't give to hear Barrett's take on the current overuse of AI

[David Rush · Rating 3 out of 5]

Barrett covers a lot of philosophical territory with pithy conceptualization of many big name philosophers. He is not trying to give a survey or even highlights of these philosophical giants, rather he only focuses on how their views affect his main concern.

Here I boldly state what I think is his “deal”... Barrett wants to save the very idea of the individual self, which is really the very notion of the soul. For him most modern philosophy and scientism (NOT science itself, mind you) AND the ever encroaching influence of computers, all of these by virtue of their world views, want us to believe there is no such thing as a soul. And really the very idea of “self” is an antiquated concept.

He starts with Descartes at the introduction of the “New Science”, and while the enlightenment thinkers still accepted most religious fundamentals, they started a way of thinking that ultimately led to a Nihilistic framework.

But really at the core is his feeling that modern man,since the introduction of the “New Science”, and mostly because of it, man has an overwhelming sense of “cosmic alienation”

“Myth, magic, religion and philosophy seek to deal with this condition (cosmic alienation) in their differing ways” pg 9

I think the hero of his battle is really Kant, who, in spite of embracing the study of science, offers the point of view there a knowledge beyond reason. And it is the area outside of scientific analysis where the soul can be embraced.

“Kant introduces his distinction between ideas and concept. The idea of God is not meaningless because it can never become like a strict concept in science; it belongs to another order of mind and lays claim upon other positions of our being” pg 83

I am still a little unclear on why Kant doesn't completely fill the bill but for some reason he keeps on going. And we hear some more bits on philosophers from the existentialists to the positivist. But even though he wrote the book on existentialism he really doesn’t use them too much, other than to dump on Sartre.

Maybe ultimately his problem was with computers and he was just looking for a way to use philosophy to complain about them. Basically he thinks (I think) that this most modern world, of 1986, wants humanity to think of itself as nothing more than some sort of computer.

He goes on for a while mocking the notion that a computer could write a poem. But he uses Shakespeare as the poet a computer could never mimic. But what of the thousands of poems by human that are no better that a sonnet created by a commodore 64? After all how many humans can match Shakespeare? But that is just the way my analog brain works.

This is how he feels the computerization of mankind is being propagated...

“(the view)...that the nature of our human consciousness is essentially additive and atomistic:...and mind itself is but an aggregate of such data” pg 165

which, of course he feels is not an accurate reading of human consciousness.

Sooooo....what do I, the "man on the street", think?

Yeah, he has a point. But I don't see this relentless attack on the soul.

He was probably surrounded by a bunch of big headed atheist academics who were, I'm sure, insufferable. But I live in Texas where is seems everybody wears their God loving-ness on their sleeve (or at least on their bumper sticker).

Plus, as of now there is a presidential election going on, so you know God and the Soul is broadcast 24/7.

But on a more subtle note, I have to admit I suspect, like Barrett, there is something “beyond reason”, which by its very nature cannot be proved. So to the rationalist of today I'm am just delusional. And of course they may be right.

[Rick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Descartes did not create consciousness, but he certainly made us conscious of consciousness. And ever since Descartes we have tried to reduce its importance and vitality. Barrett says that the history of civilization since the 17th century has been an "effort to undermine in one way or another the spiritual status of the human person." (p. 157) How is this done? We have let our tools (machines, inventions, technology, computers) take over our soul(s). We have become tools of our tools, as Thoreau has pointed out.

[Roger Carter · Rating 4 out of 5]

A classic survey of modern philosophy from the Enlightenment and where it has led us.
This is my second reading after about 20 years. Highly recommended as an introduction to modern thought (and its discontents!)