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How Hitler Could Have Won World War II; The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat
From an acclaimed military historian, a fascinating account of just how close the Allies were to losing World War II.Most of us rally around the glory of the Allies' victory over the Nazis in World War II. The story is often told of how the good fight was won by an astonishing array of manpower and stunning tactics. However, what is often overlooked is how the intersection between Adolf Hitler's influential personality and his military strategy was critical in causing Germany to lose the war.With an acute eye for detail and his use of clear prose, Bevin Alexander goes beyond counterfactual "What if?" history and explores for the first time just how close the Allies were to losing the war. Using beautifully detailed, newly designed maps, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II exquisitely illustrates the important battles and how certain key movements and mistakes by Germany were crucial in determining the war's outcome. Alexander's harrowing study shows how only minor tactical changes in Hitler's military approach could have changed the world we live in today. Alexander probes deeply into the crucial intersection between Hitler's psyche and military strategy and how his paranoia fatally overwhelmed his acute political shrewdness to answer the most terrifying Just how close were the Nazis to victory?
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First published January 1, 2000
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About the author
Bevin Alexander
14 books35 followersBevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 65 reviews
December 5, 2018
I am on the fence about this book which purports to explain the mistakes made by Hitler that caused Nazi Germany to lose the war or, as the title states, how Hitler could have won the war if he avoided those mistakes. Those of us who read the history of that war are aware of the obvious errors and certain ridiculous assumptions made by Hitler, who brooked no argument from his military staff.......assumptions made by a self deluded dictator who had no idea how a war should be fought. Attacking Russia, by-passing Malta in favor of Crete, bombing London repeatedly rather than bombing British airfields, etc.
So far, so good but then the author goes off on a tangent regarding Greece, the Balkans, and Africa and it then becomes alternative "what if" history even though the author assures the reader that if the Nazis had done what he thinks they should have, they could have won the war and that there is no "what if" to it.
There is no doubt it is an interesting read, extremely detailed with great maps but it is only for the military buff. And even the military minded might have trouble with it since it starts to sound like those books by Harry Turtledove. I enjoyed it to a point but have some reservations about giving it a higher rating.
So far, so good but then the author goes off on a tangent regarding Greece, the Balkans, and Africa and it then becomes alternative "what if" history even though the author assures the reader that if the Nazis had done what he thinks they should have, they could have won the war and that there is no "what if" to it.
There is no doubt it is an interesting read, extremely detailed with great maps but it is only for the military buff. And even the military minded might have trouble with it since it starts to sound like those books by Harry Turtledove. I enjoyed it to a point but have some reservations about giving it a higher rating.
December 17, 2017
This book is not about alternative history of World War II nor an attempt to lessen the magnitude of Hitler’s crimes. it is about the mistakes Hitler made along the way in World War II. It details how the Nazis came scarily close to winning the war. The book is well researched from the politics to thearmy movements in every major battle in the war.
But contrary to the title, 'fatal errors' isn't actually the focus of the book itself. The book starts out decently - in the prologue he states how he believes Hitler could have won the war (by focusing on North Africa and the Middle East and not attacking Russia). The bulk of book is a survey of the war itself, from the invasion of France to Germany's surrender. Alexander takes a critical look at many of Hitler's military decisions, from the bypassing of Maginot line, to Operation Sea Lion to the fatal mistake of Operation Barbarossa & Battle of the Bulge. Although these fatal mistakes are mentioned, not much more is said about how Hitler could have won World War II. Critical missions like Battle of Kursk, Operation Neptune are hardly covered.
The focus of the book is mostly on the European theater & Africa,without giving the other fronts all the attention they deserve. The Pacific theater of the war is totally ignored. Also, given the nature of this book, it should have carried more maps detailing army movements, as it hard to visualise the army tactics deployed,forming the bulk of the book.
Personally, "How Hitler Could Have Won World War II" is a good read, but I felt it could have been much better. It felt more like a brief history of World War II, and there are many other books that do a much better job at that. If you are interested in World War II,this book is a good read but nothing outstanding.
But contrary to the title, 'fatal errors' isn't actually the focus of the book itself. The book starts out decently - in the prologue he states how he believes Hitler could have won the war (by focusing on North Africa and the Middle East and not attacking Russia). The bulk of book is a survey of the war itself, from the invasion of France to Germany's surrender. Alexander takes a critical look at many of Hitler's military decisions, from the bypassing of Maginot line, to Operation Sea Lion to the fatal mistake of Operation Barbarossa & Battle of the Bulge. Although these fatal mistakes are mentioned, not much more is said about how Hitler could have won World War II. Critical missions like Battle of Kursk, Operation Neptune are hardly covered.
The focus of the book is mostly on the European theater & Africa,without giving the other fronts all the attention they deserve. The Pacific theater of the war is totally ignored. Also, given the nature of this book, it should have carried more maps detailing army movements, as it hard to visualise the army tactics deployed,forming the bulk of the book.
Personally, "How Hitler Could Have Won World War II" is a good read, but I felt it could have been much better. It felt more like a brief history of World War II, and there are many other books that do a much better job at that. If you are interested in World War II,this book is a good read but nothing outstanding.
April 15, 2013
This book was very interesting and portrayed some of the events of WWII in a way I haven't experienced before. This book goes into clear detail of simple decisions that could have easily led to Hitler wining the war. These results of the actions Hitler should've taken are hypothetical of course, but I felt that they were very realistic. Two problems I had with the book. The first and the only major problem I had was how often the author would write paragraph after paragraph saying this unit went to this obscure town and this division drove towards this obscure town and you occasionally got a crappy map that didn't have most of the tiny towns on it. This made the small details hard to follow. My second problem, and a minor one, was how much Patton smacking around a few troops effected his opinion of Patton as a general.
February 18, 2023
A long time ago, I liked this book, but now after so much research, I feel like this book is bad, it feeds into the "Hitler myth" that he was entirely to blame for Germany's loss during World War Two. Not that I am a Hitler fan or anything, but the German generals clearly were just as much to blame for the war.
June 25, 2014
Overall, this wasn't a bad read, but it was titled incorrectly. Yes, Egypt was open for the taking in the early stages of 1942 and possibly 43, but with Hitler not committing enough troops to take Egypt, the Middle East would just be a pipe-dream. If Hitler would have thrown enough troops for Rommel to capture the oilfields of the Iran and Iraq, they would still have to hold them. To think England would wither and die without those countries is hardly feasible. The British Fleet would pull out and become a very formidable force in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans instead of being dispersed everywhere. In fact, that is one area Mr. Alexander keeps referring to through the book as the downfall of Hitler in spreading his forces thin.
Hitler was going to invade Russia no matter what other countries he conquered. That was his main goal the whole time. He never forgave the communists he battled in the streets of Germany for control of the country. To think he had any other aims is not to know "his" history and beliefs.
If Hitler would have made one concentrated strike at Moscow, Leningrad or the Ukraine, he would have still been required to consolidate the gains. That would prove impossible with his missions of destroying every living Russian. Seriously, the partisan bans that lived in the Pripet Marshes numbered over 100,000 and with the SS continuing with the policy of killing all "sub-humans" the populace would never succumb to Hitler or Nazi Germany. If a central thrust would have been set upon, the flanks would have been long and vulnerable to harrying attacks at any point.
One reviewer talked about factual errors. I concur. One that jumped out wi Tigers were not equipped with a machine gun which killed the northern pincer attack during the Battle of Kursk. It was the Ferdinand or as others called it the Elephant that was not equipped with a machine gun making it very vulnerable to infantry attacks. Many were knocked out by infantry and anti-tank guns as the monsters passed-by with no accompanying infantry support.
This would be a fair book to provide novice readers and be introduced to WWII in Europe.
Hitler was going to invade Russia no matter what other countries he conquered. That was his main goal the whole time. He never forgave the communists he battled in the streets of Germany for control of the country. To think he had any other aims is not to know "his" history and beliefs.
If Hitler would have made one concentrated strike at Moscow, Leningrad or the Ukraine, he would have still been required to consolidate the gains. That would prove impossible with his missions of destroying every living Russian. Seriously, the partisan bans that lived in the Pripet Marshes numbered over 100,000 and with the SS continuing with the policy of killing all "sub-humans" the populace would never succumb to Hitler or Nazi Germany. If a central thrust would have been set upon, the flanks would have been long and vulnerable to harrying attacks at any point.
One reviewer talked about factual errors. I concur. One that jumped out wi Tigers were not equipped with a machine gun which killed the northern pincer attack during the Battle of Kursk. It was the Ferdinand or as others called it the Elephant that was not equipped with a machine gun making it very vulnerable to infantry attacks. Many were knocked out by infantry and anti-tank guns as the monsters passed-by with no accompanying infantry support.
This would be a fair book to provide novice readers and be introduced to WWII in Europe.
February 27, 2016
This work of non-fiction is soooo much more interesting than Harry Turtledove's unbearable "War That Came Early" series.
This is a true history of World War II that outlines the facts yet also explores electrifying what-if questions -- Germany overruns the Persian Gulf, creates oil-rich superstate, Russia and America are humbled, Britain ceases to exist!
The chapters on the summer of 1940 and 1941 and the opportunities Hitler squandered in North Africa are electrifying. So are the blow by blow accounts of the catastrophic battles on the Eastern Front. Only one thing is missing from this amazing book. Nowhere does Bevin Alexander mention either the German rocket program, the V1 and V2 campaigns, or the jet fighters such as the Messerchmitt 262 that nearly turned the tide of the air war over Europe.
This is a true history of World War II that outlines the facts yet also explores electrifying what-if questions -- Germany overruns the Persian Gulf, creates oil-rich superstate, Russia and America are humbled, Britain ceases to exist!
The chapters on the summer of 1940 and 1941 and the opportunities Hitler squandered in North Africa are electrifying. So are the blow by blow accounts of the catastrophic battles on the Eastern Front. Only one thing is missing from this amazing book. Nowhere does Bevin Alexander mention either the German rocket program, the V1 and V2 campaigns, or the jet fighters such as the Messerchmitt 262 that nearly turned the tide of the air war over Europe.
October 9, 2017
Very insightful. Shows, not only for Germany, how one man can devastate his country by himself.
Also shows how much talented and prepared were the German officers and high staff and how they clearly saw the way to victory multiple times but all failed to sway Hitler every time.
This should be read also as a warning book. A lot of people think "The Nazis were evil and thus destined to lose and we fighting them destined to win" and such taken for granted views would be shaken with all the possibilities the Germans had.
One thing that really stood out was the major incompetence of the highest leadership of each country. France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, the US... none escaped. The same thing regarding generals, though Germany fared far better with these.
And finally, since it's a "what if" book, a lot of interesting scenarios are created, but common to this kind of book, they only take the "what if" to one side or situation and develop it assuming all the other sides or opposite situations will remain the same or what they could've done differently as well.
What if Rommel had gained reinforcements and conquered the whole Middle East, gained unlimited oil and cut off the British? What if Hitler listened to his generals? What if he didn't declare war on the US? What if he had coordinated an attack on the USSR with Japan? What if he first built up his resources through the Mediterranean and neutralized Britain to only tackle on the USSR much later? What if the Germans focused on one objective during Barbarossa instead of spreading thin?
All fair questions and scenarios, but also ignore the same things for the other side. What if the French had mounted proper defenses? What if Montgomery wasn't such a methodical and meticulous snail? What if Patton didn't slap those two soldiers and was in the command that was supposed to be his? What if Stalin had listened to all the warnings about Barbarossa?
But how Nazi Germany could win is of course, a more provoking and interesting theme than say, How Nazi Germany could've been stopped at 1939.
To be fair, the book does tell what Montgomery should have done, how Stalin could've defended and etc, but when going to the hypothetical German scenarios completely keeps the Reich's enemies as they were or in a impossible to win scenario.
Even if Germany seized Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, etc, they still would have to defend and keep them. Even if Germany had seized all that and still claimed Moscow, it would have a ridiculously large line to protect.
Maybe instead of Normandy the Allies might've needed to go disembark at Africa or the Middle East or the US even through eastern Russia. The war would be prolonged, certainly, but if the Middle East was vital, you also could attack there, or the Caucasus. There would be so much more things to defend that Germany, who won it's amazing victories with concentration of power, would be now spread too thin.
A "virtually untouched" German war machine was simply not possible. Even with just the USSR let alone against the Allies and defending three other continents when originally they couldn't even just in Europe.
Nevertheless, a great book for reflection and how everything boils down to good leadership. And how every side was plagued by bad, irrational and slow decisions.
If Nazi Germany made tons of mistakes that cost them the war, so did the Allies in the beginning of it that allowed Germany to grow. Luckily for us, Hitler started making craploads of mistakes later in the war to compensate for the craploads of everyone else in the beginning of it.
Also shows how much talented and prepared were the German officers and high staff and how they clearly saw the way to victory multiple times but all failed to sway Hitler every time.
This should be read also as a warning book. A lot of people think "The Nazis were evil and thus destined to lose and we fighting them destined to win" and such taken for granted views would be shaken with all the possibilities the Germans had.
One thing that really stood out was the major incompetence of the highest leadership of each country. France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, the US... none escaped. The same thing regarding generals, though Germany fared far better with these.
And finally, since it's a "what if" book, a lot of interesting scenarios are created, but common to this kind of book, they only take the "what if" to one side or situation and develop it assuming all the other sides or opposite situations will remain the same or what they could've done differently as well.
What if Rommel had gained reinforcements and conquered the whole Middle East, gained unlimited oil and cut off the British? What if Hitler listened to his generals? What if he didn't declare war on the US? What if he had coordinated an attack on the USSR with Japan? What if he first built up his resources through the Mediterranean and neutralized Britain to only tackle on the USSR much later? What if the Germans focused on one objective during Barbarossa instead of spreading thin?
All fair questions and scenarios, but also ignore the same things for the other side. What if the French had mounted proper defenses? What if Montgomery wasn't such a methodical and meticulous snail? What if Patton didn't slap those two soldiers and was in the command that was supposed to be his? What if Stalin had listened to all the warnings about Barbarossa?
But how Nazi Germany could win is of course, a more provoking and interesting theme than say, How Nazi Germany could've been stopped at 1939.
To be fair, the book does tell what Montgomery should have done, how Stalin could've defended and etc, but when going to the hypothetical German scenarios completely keeps the Reich's enemies as they were or in a impossible to win scenario.
Even if Germany seized Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, etc, they still would have to defend and keep them. Even if Germany had seized all that and still claimed Moscow, it would have a ridiculously large line to protect.
Maybe instead of Normandy the Allies might've needed to go disembark at Africa or the Middle East or the US even through eastern Russia. The war would be prolonged, certainly, but if the Middle East was vital, you also could attack there, or the Caucasus. There would be so much more things to defend that Germany, who won it's amazing victories with concentration of power, would be now spread too thin.
A "virtually untouched" German war machine was simply not possible. Even with just the USSR let alone against the Allies and defending three other continents when originally they couldn't even just in Europe.
Nevertheless, a great book for reflection and how everything boils down to good leadership. And how every side was plagued by bad, irrational and slow decisions.
If Nazi Germany made tons of mistakes that cost them the war, so did the Allies in the beginning of it that allowed Germany to grow. Luckily for us, Hitler started making craploads of mistakes later in the war to compensate for the craploads of everyone else in the beginning of it.
April 11, 2010
This book had me hooked from the begining. It gave a good look at what could have been if Hitler would not have interevened. If he would have left the war to his general the Third Reich would be in place today. If you plan on reading this book you should have a decent understanding of the events that took place through out the war, because the book does not go into detail on certain events. Overall a wonderful read of Hitler's blunders.
September 21, 2014
This book was a disappointment - it was basically an elementary overview of WWII along the way with some mistakes the Germans made which lost them the war - the author spent little time on the mistakes and why some were rational from the German point of view (ie there are a few reasons Hitler rejected the Mediterranean and N Africa approach), however, the author only discussed why it would have been good to focus more on the sector not the reasons why the Germans did not. If you want a basic understanding of WWII and are not well versed in the history this book might be a good read, but if you want a look at the pros and cons of using different strategies at different moments in the war, skip this book.
February 10, 2025
Published in 2000, Mr. Alexander has written an outstanding book about how Adolph Hitler could have won WW2.
Mr. Alexander argued that Hitler lost the war even before the USA entered the conflict after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Hitler was obsessed with defeating the USSR more than defeating United States or Great Britain.
Hitler's major mistake, according to Mr. Alexander, was Hitler's "refusal to concentrate on a single, decisive goal."
Another blunder of Hitler was his constant delays and vacillations.
Even General Erwin Rommel was frustrated with Hitler's indecisiveness over the Africa campaign.
By 1943 Hitler's incapacity as a leader was well know among his generals. Hitler, furthermore, distrusted his officers educated in "the old Germany army." They lacked "the glow of National Socialist conviction."
Hitler's "final divorce" came when Albert Speer, the Nazi armaments head, sent Hitler this memorandum: "The war is lost." From then on Hitler refused to entertain anyone who questioned his authority and absolute loyalty.
Towards the end of the war Hitler blamed the German people for his failures. And Hitler set out in destroying Germany. According to Mr. Alexander, Hitler's goal was to "produce a desert in the Allies' path."
Mr. Alexander argued that Hitler lost the war even before the USA entered the conflict after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Hitler was obsessed with defeating the USSR more than defeating United States or Great Britain.
Hitler's major mistake, according to Mr. Alexander, was Hitler's "refusal to concentrate on a single, decisive goal."
Another blunder of Hitler was his constant delays and vacillations.
Even General Erwin Rommel was frustrated with Hitler's indecisiveness over the Africa campaign.
By 1943 Hitler's incapacity as a leader was well know among his generals. Hitler, furthermore, distrusted his officers educated in "the old Germany army." They lacked "the glow of National Socialist conviction."
Hitler's "final divorce" came when Albert Speer, the Nazi armaments head, sent Hitler this memorandum: "The war is lost." From then on Hitler refused to entertain anyone who questioned his authority and absolute loyalty.
Towards the end of the war Hitler blamed the German people for his failures. And Hitler set out in destroying Germany. According to Mr. Alexander, Hitler's goal was to "produce a desert in the Allies' path."
January 2, 2021
For want of a nail the shoe was lost,” says the proverb, “for want of a shoe the horse was lost. for want of a horse the battle was lost, for the failure of battle the kingdom was lost— all for the want of a horse-shoe nail.” US military historian Bevin Alexander seems determined to prove this regarding Adolf Hitler’s battle logistics in the Second World War, and largely makes his case.
Hitler’s chief error, as Bevin explains continuously, was arrogance based on egoism and fanaticism, fed by that early string of victories. First, by his relatively easy climb to power over demoralized opponents in a demoralized country; then by picking soft and easy targets in a Europe desperate to avoid another war. This success seems to have turned Hitler’s head into thinking it would continue in his favor, which it could not. Not only did it feed his arrogance into believing he could blitzkrieg totally over all his enemies, even at once: the Jews, the Bolsheviks, the Americans. It also enabled the US and USSR to drop their neutrality and resign themselves to war. Once the classic two-front pincer was revived, German defeat was again in the cards, if far from quick. And yes – the “two-front theory” is far from that, as some revisionists would have it. Knocking out Russia in a blitzkrieg before the US could enter Europe was in fact counter-productive, which Hitler already knew by late ’41 in his lackadaisical declaration of war on the US following Pearl Harbor.
But this does raise a critique of Bevin’s Hitlercentric approach. Indeed, Hitler thought he knew better than his generals: they were “mere military men”, while he was the Fuhrer, directly plugged into the soul of Aryan divinity, and thus “knew” what they could never. From dividing his forces in two directions in Russia, by refusing to strangle the British in the Middle East, choosing the conquest of Russia for “lebensraum” over the early surrender of Britain: any one of these directions would have prevented or knocked out the second front combo from either side. Failure to do so gave his enemies the gift of rallying back and forging a practical unity against him. Thus it was not Hitler’s blindness alone, but the recreation of the Allied alliance of the First world war that made possible the victory of the Second.
Another criticism, although minor, is Bevin’s dragging in details unnecessary to his points, like Mussolini’s rescue by SS commandos or Patton’s career mishaps. As Bevin is a thorough historian, he seems at time to fall into the trap of seeing all details as necessary bits of the big picture; but editing one’s knowledge is sometimes more necessary to keep the message free of wool-gathering clutter. He also slights the titanic nature of the war despite Hitler’s military misjudgments: against their own better calculations, the Wehrmacht officer corps followed his orders. Their discipline and arms made World War II far from guaranteed for quite a while.
Although there’s nothing really new here – many of these same points have been long discussed and acknowledged – Bevin does present them in a single and unified narrative, displaying his masterful knowledge in concise and readable form. It is not exactly an “easy read” for the airport book-buyer. (My personal animosity shows through again – so be it.) One must have a certain background knowledge of the war and its issues before following him along on this high, direct flight. For those who do, it is a *rewarding* read.
Hitler’s chief error, as Bevin explains continuously, was arrogance based on egoism and fanaticism, fed by that early string of victories. First, by his relatively easy climb to power over demoralized opponents in a demoralized country; then by picking soft and easy targets in a Europe desperate to avoid another war. This success seems to have turned Hitler’s head into thinking it would continue in his favor, which it could not. Not only did it feed his arrogance into believing he could blitzkrieg totally over all his enemies, even at once: the Jews, the Bolsheviks, the Americans. It also enabled the US and USSR to drop their neutrality and resign themselves to war. Once the classic two-front pincer was revived, German defeat was again in the cards, if far from quick. And yes – the “two-front theory” is far from that, as some revisionists would have it. Knocking out Russia in a blitzkrieg before the US could enter Europe was in fact counter-productive, which Hitler already knew by late ’41 in his lackadaisical declaration of war on the US following Pearl Harbor.
But this does raise a critique of Bevin’s Hitlercentric approach. Indeed, Hitler thought he knew better than his generals: they were “mere military men”, while he was the Fuhrer, directly plugged into the soul of Aryan divinity, and thus “knew” what they could never. From dividing his forces in two directions in Russia, by refusing to strangle the British in the Middle East, choosing the conquest of Russia for “lebensraum” over the early surrender of Britain: any one of these directions would have prevented or knocked out the second front combo from either side. Failure to do so gave his enemies the gift of rallying back and forging a practical unity against him. Thus it was not Hitler’s blindness alone, but the recreation of the Allied alliance of the First world war that made possible the victory of the Second.
Another criticism, although minor, is Bevin’s dragging in details unnecessary to his points, like Mussolini’s rescue by SS commandos or Patton’s career mishaps. As Bevin is a thorough historian, he seems at time to fall into the trap of seeing all details as necessary bits of the big picture; but editing one’s knowledge is sometimes more necessary to keep the message free of wool-gathering clutter. He also slights the titanic nature of the war despite Hitler’s military misjudgments: against their own better calculations, the Wehrmacht officer corps followed his orders. Their discipline and arms made World War II far from guaranteed for quite a while.
Although there’s nothing really new here – many of these same points have been long discussed and acknowledged – Bevin does present them in a single and unified narrative, displaying his masterful knowledge in concise and readable form. It is not exactly an “easy read” for the airport book-buyer. (My personal animosity shows through again – so be it.) One must have a certain background knowledge of the war and its issues before following him along on this high, direct flight. For those who do, it is a *rewarding* read.
February 6, 2022
Di dalam buku mengenai sejarah Perang Dunia Kedua ini,penulisnya,Bevin Alexander,mengetengahkan sebuah topik perbincangan yang amat menarik sekali untuk diteliti. Yakni,bagaimanakah Adolf Hitler mampu memenangi perang tersebut dan sekaligus mengubah geopolitik dunia kita. Ya. Perkara ini tidak mustahil terjadi. Namun demikian,ianya tidak menjadi kenyataan kerana sikap Hitler sendiri terlalu egoistik dan tidak mahu mendengar pandangan dan nasihat subordinatnya yang lebih berpengalaman dan profesional di dalam strategi peperangan.
Tidak terhad mengkritik Hitler sahaja semata-mata,Alexander turut menyatakan kritikannya kepada Pihak Berikat yang seringkali mensia-siakan peluang yang terbuka untuk menamatkan Perang Dunia Kedua dengan lebih awal. Bukan sahaja peluang disia-siakan,terdapat juga kelemahan-kelemahan lain yang membawa bencana kepada Pihak Berikat terutamanya dari segi korban perang.
Saya berpandangan bahawa buku ini sebuah buku yang amat baik sekali dibaca oleh semua peminat sejarah Perang Dunia Kedua. Saya juga berpendapat bahawa penulis telah berjaya membentangkan study casenya dengan begitu baik,jelas dan mudah difahami. Tetapi,secara peribadi saya tidak suka Alexander menggunakan sistem endnotes di dalam penulisannya. Selain menyatakan sumber-sumber penulisan beliau,Alexander turut menggunakannya sebagai cara untuk menyampaikan maklumat tambahan yang tidak diletakkan di dalam teks. Saya lebih suka sekiranya maklumat tambahan ini dinyatakan melalui cara footnotes di bawah teks. Dengan itu,pembacaan saya akan lebih lancar tanpa perlu saya membelek pada muka surat endnotes.
Tidak terhad mengkritik Hitler sahaja semata-mata,Alexander turut menyatakan kritikannya kepada Pihak Berikat yang seringkali mensia-siakan peluang yang terbuka untuk menamatkan Perang Dunia Kedua dengan lebih awal. Bukan sahaja peluang disia-siakan,terdapat juga kelemahan-kelemahan lain yang membawa bencana kepada Pihak Berikat terutamanya dari segi korban perang.
Saya berpandangan bahawa buku ini sebuah buku yang amat baik sekali dibaca oleh semua peminat sejarah Perang Dunia Kedua. Saya juga berpendapat bahawa penulis telah berjaya membentangkan study casenya dengan begitu baik,jelas dan mudah difahami. Tetapi,secara peribadi saya tidak suka Alexander menggunakan sistem endnotes di dalam penulisannya. Selain menyatakan sumber-sumber penulisan beliau,Alexander turut menggunakannya sebagai cara untuk menyampaikan maklumat tambahan yang tidak diletakkan di dalam teks. Saya lebih suka sekiranya maklumat tambahan ini dinyatakan melalui cara footnotes di bawah teks. Dengan itu,pembacaan saya akan lebih lancar tanpa perlu saya membelek pada muka surat endnotes.
November 13, 2018
I learned a great deal I hadn't known about WWII in Europe, reading this book, and I was fascinated the entire time. Also chilled, because the author makes a powerful case for how close it really was.
Thoroughly supporting his theory, Alexander posits that the war in Europe was Hitler's to lose, and the delusional and otherwise troubled personality of the Fuhrer himself led him to make massive errors in judgement. Despite three brilliant generals, Germany managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
The Allied effort rarely appears heroic, or laudable (a surprise!). It wasn't Allied superiority that won the war; it was Hitler who lost it. The tragic takeaway is that in all the analyses of bad decisions on both sides, the massive waste is measured in lives - the lives of soldiers, wasted in hopeless, foolish actions.
Thoroughly supporting his theory, Alexander posits that the war in Europe was Hitler's to lose, and the delusional and otherwise troubled personality of the Fuhrer himself led him to make massive errors in judgement. Despite three brilliant generals, Germany managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
The Allied effort rarely appears heroic, or laudable (a surprise!). It wasn't Allied superiority that won the war; it was Hitler who lost it. The tragic takeaway is that in all the analyses of bad decisions on both sides, the massive waste is measured in lives - the lives of soldiers, wasted in hopeless, foolish actions.
May 25, 2008
Bevin Alexander is a bit of an unknown gem in the military history field. A professor from Longwoods College in Farmville, VA, Alexander also served in a "historical battalion" during the Korean War.
Besides this analysis of the military errors of the Third Reich, Lee's Civil War, How Great Generals Win and Korea the First War We Lost are worth the time if you enjoy being an armchair general.
Besides this analysis of the military errors of the Third Reich, Lee's Civil War, How Great Generals Win and Korea the First War We Lost are worth the time if you enjoy being an armchair general.
December 17, 2017
The title of this book is misleading; while the author does deal with how could Hitler could have won in the early part of WW2, it devolves into a general accounting of Hitler's actions during the second World War.
February 8, 2016
I felt that the book was extremely good. It used real situations and showed how close the Nazis were to winning WWII. Between history changing battles, WWII is told as it happened.
August 20, 2018
A fairly bad book. To be sure, the Nazis in general, including the autocrat himself, weren't the shrewdest political tacticians ever and there's no doubt about that. However this author takes this proposition to ridiculous extremes. The way to victory he says was to attack the USSR from the Mid-East and to cut off its supply of oil in Baku, obviously ignoring that
1. This would mean that the Germans would have to stretch their forces on a much longer supply line than simply attacking frontally and do so by carving a route across dozens of foreign countries with minimal infrastructure and populated entirely by alien nations.
2. The element of surprise would have been lost and therefore the Soviet Union would be spared the millions of men and the bulk of its airforce that it lost thanks to the frontal approach.
3. Germany's navy could still not compete effectively with the British for control of the Mediterranean which would have been essential for this plan.
4. Germany's infantry was not motorized and the country was not food secure. The further away it got from the German empire the more seriously fragile it got.
5. The Soviets had alternative sources of domestic fuel anyway.
Even if they got some oil in the Mid-East there was nothing really to do with it. How would they transport it without the protection of a reliable navy? Alternatives such as pipelines were unfeasible.
It was such rational reasons that dictated a wary approach in North Africa and the Mid-East. In fact the real error was bothering with North Africa in the first place. Other than that, Hitler should have discouraged Mussollini's senseless dreams and try to get the entirety of the Italian army in Russia and Eastern Europe, assimilate it along with other big, substantial nations into a monetary union with Germany and equipping it with decent weapons and decent leadership. He should have applied the same strategy with France, the Low Countries and the Balkans.
But such elaborate plans would take a lot of time and unfortunately time was not on Hitler's side. The Soviet Army was in a process of modernizing its equipment and doctrine. He couldn't wait to finish off Britain before commencing Barbarossa. He could have done it of course but didn't because of his (entirely justifiable) obsession with Romania's oilfields. They were very close to the Soviets and all they had to do was simply walk right in and seize them. This would seriously diminish the German war machine's capabilities and bring it to a point where it could quickly be brought to heel by Stalin. This is the fear that Hitler relayed to Finland's leader in the famous recorded exchange and nobody can blame him for this.
His decision to turn to Ukraine and ignore Moscow was entirely correct. Without it, the Soviets would have made off with hundreds of thousands of men, equipment and raw materials and his exhausted units might well still fail to take Moscow anyway.
Also, the repeated complaints that Hitler didn't make huge tactical retreats are naive, failing to take into account the political dimensions of every war. The decision to continue fighting on Soviet soil at all costs meant that the army and the German people couldn't support themselves and their foreign workers as well without constant plundering. So a crucial military advantage hinged on Germany's ability to occupy territory. Besides if the regime yielded ground it would have signaled to its people and the world that it was failing, very likely leading to a political crisis at home and an attempted takeover by Hitler's domestic enemies, which included many people in his military waiting for the right moment to topple the Nazi regime.
There's also the foolish assumption of thinking that if Hitler had treated the Russian populace "better", then he would be welcomed as a liberator. This brushes aside the simple fact that the Russians had never lived under benevolent governments. The life of the average Russian was not in fact worse than it had been under the Czars. No matter how "well" they had been treated, the ethnic Russians would still rally to the side of their own country. But what does "well" mean anyway? The German campaign couldn't be sustained without ruthless plundering and forced labor and the population couldn't be allowed to feel the occupier had a soft touch. This "hearts and minds" bullshit is intended more as a slogan to sell to the masses. It never reflects policy. Occupied populations are always treated bad. Just how bad depends on the situation.
Some of the literature is dated. The assertion that Hitler withdrew troops from Russia during Kursk and sent them to Sicily has been discredited.
Ultimately, while it enjoyed undisputed tactical superiority on the ground, Germany lost because of its comparative shortage of infantry and raw materials as well as its failure to deploy new technologies in time and not because Hitler forgot to apply some philosophical Sun-Tzu bullshit. Mismanagement of resources and tactical errors only served to speed up the inevitable. The tactical errors made by the Soviet leadership were in fact costlier in both absolute and relative terms and without them, the war could be over as early as 1943, and virtually all of Europe fallen to the Soviet Empire. Instead of being thankful for Hitler's errors we should rather praise God for Soviet ineptitude because that ineptitude had a far greater effect on the course of WWII and its aftermath than Nazi errors. Everything else is easy hindsight wisdom.
Finally, after a 70 years, at a time when some of the virtues of far-right thinking have been recognized and acknowledged, the whole western world should stop this childish fixation with morality and thank Adolf Hitler and the millions of Germans that fought and died in a war that ultimately benefited all of us immensely. For without the horrendous losses they inflicted on the Soviets, a good chunk of the world might have to suffer communist oppression for hundreds of years. This alone should make us forgive their crimes and prejudices.
1. This would mean that the Germans would have to stretch their forces on a much longer supply line than simply attacking frontally and do so by carving a route across dozens of foreign countries with minimal infrastructure and populated entirely by alien nations.
2. The element of surprise would have been lost and therefore the Soviet Union would be spared the millions of men and the bulk of its airforce that it lost thanks to the frontal approach.
3. Germany's navy could still not compete effectively with the British for control of the Mediterranean which would have been essential for this plan.
4. Germany's infantry was not motorized and the country was not food secure. The further away it got from the German empire the more seriously fragile it got.
5. The Soviets had alternative sources of domestic fuel anyway.
Even if they got some oil in the Mid-East there was nothing really to do with it. How would they transport it without the protection of a reliable navy? Alternatives such as pipelines were unfeasible.
It was such rational reasons that dictated a wary approach in North Africa and the Mid-East. In fact the real error was bothering with North Africa in the first place. Other than that, Hitler should have discouraged Mussollini's senseless dreams and try to get the entirety of the Italian army in Russia and Eastern Europe, assimilate it along with other big, substantial nations into a monetary union with Germany and equipping it with decent weapons and decent leadership. He should have applied the same strategy with France, the Low Countries and the Balkans.
But such elaborate plans would take a lot of time and unfortunately time was not on Hitler's side. The Soviet Army was in a process of modernizing its equipment and doctrine. He couldn't wait to finish off Britain before commencing Barbarossa. He could have done it of course but didn't because of his (entirely justifiable) obsession with Romania's oilfields. They were very close to the Soviets and all they had to do was simply walk right in and seize them. This would seriously diminish the German war machine's capabilities and bring it to a point where it could quickly be brought to heel by Stalin. This is the fear that Hitler relayed to Finland's leader in the famous recorded exchange and nobody can blame him for this.
His decision to turn to Ukraine and ignore Moscow was entirely correct. Without it, the Soviets would have made off with hundreds of thousands of men, equipment and raw materials and his exhausted units might well still fail to take Moscow anyway.
Also, the repeated complaints that Hitler didn't make huge tactical retreats are naive, failing to take into account the political dimensions of every war. The decision to continue fighting on Soviet soil at all costs meant that the army and the German people couldn't support themselves and their foreign workers as well without constant plundering. So a crucial military advantage hinged on Germany's ability to occupy territory. Besides if the regime yielded ground it would have signaled to its people and the world that it was failing, very likely leading to a political crisis at home and an attempted takeover by Hitler's domestic enemies, which included many people in his military waiting for the right moment to topple the Nazi regime.
There's also the foolish assumption of thinking that if Hitler had treated the Russian populace "better", then he would be welcomed as a liberator. This brushes aside the simple fact that the Russians had never lived under benevolent governments. The life of the average Russian was not in fact worse than it had been under the Czars. No matter how "well" they had been treated, the ethnic Russians would still rally to the side of their own country. But what does "well" mean anyway? The German campaign couldn't be sustained without ruthless plundering and forced labor and the population couldn't be allowed to feel the occupier had a soft touch. This "hearts and minds" bullshit is intended more as a slogan to sell to the masses. It never reflects policy. Occupied populations are always treated bad. Just how bad depends on the situation.
Some of the literature is dated. The assertion that Hitler withdrew troops from Russia during Kursk and sent them to Sicily has been discredited.
Ultimately, while it enjoyed undisputed tactical superiority on the ground, Germany lost because of its comparative shortage of infantry and raw materials as well as its failure to deploy new technologies in time and not because Hitler forgot to apply some philosophical Sun-Tzu bullshit. Mismanagement of resources and tactical errors only served to speed up the inevitable. The tactical errors made by the Soviet leadership were in fact costlier in both absolute and relative terms and without them, the war could be over as early as 1943, and virtually all of Europe fallen to the Soviet Empire. Instead of being thankful for Hitler's errors we should rather praise God for Soviet ineptitude because that ineptitude had a far greater effect on the course of WWII and its aftermath than Nazi errors. Everything else is easy hindsight wisdom.
Finally, after a 70 years, at a time when some of the virtues of far-right thinking have been recognized and acknowledged, the whole western world should stop this childish fixation with morality and thank Adolf Hitler and the millions of Germans that fought and died in a war that ultimately benefited all of us immensely. For without the horrendous losses they inflicted on the Soviets, a good chunk of the world might have to suffer communist oppression for hundreds of years. This alone should make us forgive their crimes and prejudices.
January 25, 2025
Ожидания от этой книги были большими.
Хотелось прочитать серьезный анализ ошибок Гитлера, с оценкой мотивов его действий, бездействий и отвергнутых альтернатив. Получилось прочитать в целом базовый обзор Второй мировой войны.
Впрочем, я всё равно благодарен автору как за некоторые включенные в книгу факты, которые современные историки часто обходят стороной, так и за хорошую проработку действий Великобритании и США на Западном фронте.
Хотелось прочитать серьезный анализ ошибок Гитлера, с оценкой мотивов его действий, бездействий и отвергнутых альтернатив. Получилось прочитать в целом базовый обзор Второй мировой войны.
Впрочем, я всё равно благодарен автору как за некоторые включенные в книгу факты, которые современные историки часто обходят стороной, так и за хорошую проработку действий Великобритании и США на Западном фронте.
February 25, 2013
I’m a great fan of alternate history both fictional and extrapolation. Bevin Alexander’s book How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors that led to Nazi Defeat is of the latter category. Extrapolating an alternate history is difficult to due to the fact that just because one alters a few key events does not necessarily mean that the future would have played out like the author predicts; however, it does make food for thought on how things could have been. This was the hope that I had when I started this book. How would Alexander play out the battles and campaigns that he had selected? How did he see the tide moving if General So-And –Such had done this not that?
Unfortunately, Alexander failed to follow through this the premise of his book. Basically, he took several key battles or campaigns in condensed versions mixed with a few “should have” sentences or paragraphs. This is very little in-depth analysis of how these pivotal battles could have altered history is something different had been done. It’s not like Alexander did not have material to work with as much of what he proposed were courses of action that the German generals wanted to do in the first place only be over ridden by Hitler. All Alexander had to do what play them out in a realistic, logical manner to support his thesis but he doesn’t. In reality the book is little more than a Cliff Note compilation of battles that are more extensively written about.
Not to be completely harsh on the book, Alexander does do an excellent job of covering these battles. This is a great book for someone who wants to read about these events without being bogged down by some of the weightier tomes out there. I just wish there was a little less “what did” and a little more “what if.”
Unfortunately, Alexander failed to follow through this the premise of his book. Basically, he took several key battles or campaigns in condensed versions mixed with a few “should have” sentences or paragraphs. This is very little in-depth analysis of how these pivotal battles could have altered history is something different had been done. It’s not like Alexander did not have material to work with as much of what he proposed were courses of action that the German generals wanted to do in the first place only be over ridden by Hitler. All Alexander had to do what play them out in a realistic, logical manner to support his thesis but he doesn’t. In reality the book is little more than a Cliff Note compilation of battles that are more extensively written about.
Not to be completely harsh on the book, Alexander does do an excellent job of covering these battles. This is a great book for someone who wants to read about these events without being bogged down by some of the weightier tomes out there. I just wish there was a little less “what did” and a little more “what if.”
Read
December 19, 2019While it pales in comparison with the likes of Beevor and Hastings, Bevin Alexander offers a compelling account of the (fortunately) missed opportunities for German victory. His discussion of how Germany’s only real chance of victory hinged on waging a successful campaign in the Mediterranean theatre, is superbly argued and convincing. Unfortunately the book does fail to consider German economic policies & possibilities of coordination with Japan. In hindsight Alexander should have restricted his approach to the Mediterranean, where he brilliantly argues for how a few tactical decisions altered the course, and possibly, outcome of the war.
July 23, 2012
A "What If?" history without "What If?" in the title. The early parts are more interesting because, by the author's own admission, after 1942 Hitler had lost the war. It was just a question of when. Much of the later chapters consider what the Allies could have done to have won more quickly. Alexander, like every other WWII historian I've read, doesn't like Montgomery. He doesn't like Bradley either but lover Patton(although he does criticize Patton for taking towns he should have bypassed.) None of his projections can be proven but it is a different way to approach the war.
March 16, 2021
I love that instead on focusing on alternate history and painting a world where the Axis power prevailed (I was half expecting this I don't know why), the author focuses on the actual mistakes that Hitler and those in high Nazi command did and did not do and how it helped turn the tide to the Allied forces. It's a good read specially if you're looking for more Desert Fox's material. There is less contemporary visuals on the Mediterranean front and there are tons of information in this book. The only not good part would be the maps and how confusing the markers are sometimes :p
December 4, 2018
I loved this book. It is not a piece of alternative history but a look at Hitler's decisions, the ones that worked and the majority that were just plain bad. Despite the title, the author also highlights bad decisions by the Allies as well. This book would be good for people who are not interested in military history but are interested in leadership. The author demonstrates the danger of leaders losing the vision and not listening to their team.
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December 17, 2010Interesting topic. What if Hitler had not come to Mussolini's rescue after his bumbled attempt at invasion of Greece? Swept through the Middle East (OIL) and forced Turkey to join in invasion of USSR form the south at a more opportune time? Thought provoking.
December 7, 2019
The book isn't what it says on the tin. It reads more like an operational history of the European theater of WWII, with occasional commentary on German tactical errors, than a book explaining how Hitler...could have won World War II. And the analysis on these errors and missed opportunities is hardly original: that Hitler should have destroyed the BEF in 1940 and not let it escape at Dunkirk or march on Moscow in summer 1941 instead of divert armored units to attack Leningrad and Kiev are documented errors in practically every noteworthy history of the war.
There's also curiously little discussion on arguably Hitler's gravest mistake of the war: the declaration of war on the US in December 1941 when Germany wasn't obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact and without having won the war in Russia. This gratuitous decision to wage war on the world's greatest industrial power is tucked into one paragraph while Alexander narrates the Battle of Moscow. Indeed, Alexander spends more time detailing German tactics in the Battle of the Bulge (when German defeat was long inevitable) than explicating the consequences of that decision.
Readers should prepare themselves for a blizzard of unit formations seizing obscure geographical landmarks. Even as a military history buff, my eyes can glaze over at overly wonky descriptions of battles that lose the forests for the trees. War isn't just a map exercise.
WWII junkies can safely skip over this book and dive into John Keegan's, Max Hastings', or Antony Beevor's one-volume accounts of the war if they want a full operational history (with superior narrative verve, to boot). Ian Kershaw's 10 Decisions also does a better job explaining the menu of options available to Hitler in 1940-41 and the counterfactuals that could have resulted from different decisions.
There's also curiously little discussion on arguably Hitler's gravest mistake of the war: the declaration of war on the US in December 1941 when Germany wasn't obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact and without having won the war in Russia. This gratuitous decision to wage war on the world's greatest industrial power is tucked into one paragraph while Alexander narrates the Battle of Moscow. Indeed, Alexander spends more time detailing German tactics in the Battle of the Bulge (when German defeat was long inevitable) than explicating the consequences of that decision.
Readers should prepare themselves for a blizzard of unit formations seizing obscure geographical landmarks. Even as a military history buff, my eyes can glaze over at overly wonky descriptions of battles that lose the forests for the trees. War isn't just a map exercise.
WWII junkies can safely skip over this book and dive into John Keegan's, Max Hastings', or Antony Beevor's one-volume accounts of the war if they want a full operational history (with superior narrative verve, to boot). Ian Kershaw's 10 Decisions also does a better job explaining the menu of options available to Hitler in 1940-41 and the counterfactuals that could have resulted from different decisions.
June 25, 2025
Pointed out some crucial moments when the battles could have turned the other way, for instance the first few hours of Rommel's Afrika Korps' arrival on the battlefield of El Alemain, or Guderian's panzer division's stop in front of Dunkirk. I think the book delved too much into the details of the campaign which is not relevant to the title of the book. However, given the random and chaotic nature of warfare, this book made me realize that the so called decisive moment is more random than you think. Even when you consider the Allies' superiority in resources, in some key battles the outcome of the battle is decided within several key decisions or key moments. You can easily imagine a scenario where Germany wins Stalingrad or conquers Malta, or pushes RAF to the brink of destruction in the Battle of Britain. However, I do believe the way the odds are in your favor are normally distributed. As much as German commanders are more experienced and resourceful than their Allies counterpart, such scenarios that I mentioned above are fat tail scenarios. I do believe that in the long term, Allies resources and manpower will win out regardless of Axis' short term success and luck. One of Hitler's best missed chance that is discussed in the book is Admiral Raeder's plan of a push through the Mediterranean to conquer North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, and eventually Mesopotamia, Iran, and the Caucasus. That would destroy the British access to Iranian oil and forced Turkey and the Balkans to submit to Hitler without shedding blood. That would have been scary.
December 7, 2024
Just finished "How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat" by Bevin Alexander. This book is hard to review since it's mostly about strategies the Germans were using that gave them great military successes early on during the war but eventually Hitler's inability to listen to others and paranoia caused catastrophic mistakes and led to the downfall of his regime pretty quickly. The author does state very clearly in his notes that his book is in no way an endorsement of what Germany did in that war, but does make it clear that the Nazis were a serious military power who had a real shot at achieving their goals. It wasn't purely the skill and might of the Allies that stopped them, much of their failure came down to Hitler's personality and incompetence. It seems weird to give this book a score, but I would recommend it for anyone interested in history and military strategy. It's not long but very dense and highly detailed so if you're looking for a quick, fun read this one isn't for you.
July 18, 2023
So this book is aimed at the casual reader of World War II, you've probably read some books on WWII and you have a good grasp of most of the timeline. This appeals to armchair general types, and this focuses on sweeping generalizations with very little precision in details and numbers.
It includes erroneous and glib errors like "most of the oil was produced in the Middle East" - utterly untrue at the time, Saudi Arabia produced like no oil, and Kuwait, Iraq and Iran were not the massive producers they became later. 6 b of the 7 b barrels of oil used by the Allies were from the USA, not the Middle East.
The bigger issue is that it gets bogged down in descriptions of battles that are hard to follow, and kind of unreadable to me.
There are some serious reliability and research errors in the book, which really make it difficult to recommend. Its fine if you read enough to take it all in balance, so this is kind of the "sugar cereal" in the "part of a complete breakfast", ie, light and you shouldn't rely on it.
It includes erroneous and glib errors like "most of the oil was produced in the Middle East" - utterly untrue at the time, Saudi Arabia produced like no oil, and Kuwait, Iraq and Iran were not the massive producers they became later. 6 b of the 7 b barrels of oil used by the Allies were from the USA, not the Middle East.
The bigger issue is that it gets bogged down in descriptions of battles that are hard to follow, and kind of unreadable to me.
There are some serious reliability and research errors in the book, which really make it difficult to recommend. Its fine if you read enough to take it all in balance, so this is kind of the "sugar cereal" in the "part of a complete breakfast", ie, light and you shouldn't rely on it.
March 29, 2022
I picked this title b/c I was searching for a new history of WWII and noticed I had missed this one.
This was the first time that I had read Alexander, and it's quite good. I think the nature of the book is really in the subtitle, as it gives a fairly standard recounting of how the war went overall.
Notably, the opening chapter mentions an alternate strategy Hitler might have tried that the author believes might have worked, attacking the Suez Canal before Britain could reinforce it. He asserts that this strategy seemed obvious and British war planners greatly feared it.
The remainder of the book shows, in case after case, how Hitler was a strategic nincompoop, generally choosing the most outlandish, illogical choice at nearly every possible opportunity, trusting only his intuition and never listening to the warfighters.
This was the first time that I had read Alexander, and it's quite good. I think the nature of the book is really in the subtitle, as it gives a fairly standard recounting of how the war went overall.
Notably, the opening chapter mentions an alternate strategy Hitler might have tried that the author believes might have worked, attacking the Suez Canal before Britain could reinforce it. He asserts that this strategy seemed obvious and British war planners greatly feared it.
The remainder of the book shows, in case after case, how Hitler was a strategic nincompoop, generally choosing the most outlandish, illogical choice at nearly every possible opportunity, trusting only his intuition and never listening to the warfighters.
October 13, 2022
A very interesting topic, but - probably inevitably - it was an extremely high level overview. A lot of nuance was lost as the author told the story in broad strokes. Additionally, the author peppered his writing with his own personal comments/opinions. It was very clear which generals he liked and which he didn't. He was not chary of throwing in rather unnecessarily biased adjectives and adverbs which didn't help this book feel like a delivery of the clinical analysis it could have been. Overall, a good attempt but it grossly oversimplified many things and was far from the detached analysis I was hoping for.
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