In a book of around 500 pages, using testimony from the letters, diaries, and memoirs of participants, Peter Hart successfully supports the bold assertion made in the opening to his Preface: "Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that could never have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking." But in this history of the campaign there is no muddled thinking, instead a clear sighted and well argued case for explaining the disaster of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign as a product of serious strategic error, poor tactical leadership, and insurmountable logistic difficulties, particularly due to a insufficiency of artillery and high explosive munitions.
The defeat at Gallipoli of the British imperial and French forces, despite the tremendous courage and ingenuity of the often woefully unprepared men sent to fight it, was ultimately due to a complete failure of a political and military high command that embarked on a campaign with poor preparation and insufficient material in pursuit of a nonsensical strategic objective whose achievement, even if attained, would not have been sufficient, despite its high cost, to bring about victory against the Central Powers. The author, although primarily an historian of the eastern campaigns, is quite rightly a Westerner at heart, believing that the outcome of the Great War could only have been determined on the Western Front, and that all military objectives should have been focused on that object. Gallipoli was not just a sideshow, but by drawing resources from the Western Front it also weakened the British strategic position there and did so without degrading the capability of the enemy.
The thinking behind Gallipoli was deceptively simple. By forcing the Dardanelles, a naval force could approach Constantinople and through bombardment knock Turkey out of the war, thus relieving pressure on the Russians, so freeing up forces to attack Germany in the East, thereby forcing her to divert precious resources from the West where the British and French armies were increasing in size in preparation for coordinated attacks. It being the case, as shown at the end of 1914, that naval forces alone could not force the Dardanelles, it would be necessary to deploy land forces to overcome the Turkish land defences and deny them the capability of harassing the naval task force as it entered the narrows on its approach to Constantinople. Therefore, originally, the Gallipoli campaign was conceived in terms of military support for a naval operation, with the Gallipoli peninsula chosen as the site of land operations over the Asiatic coast for tactical and operational reasons.
However, before its very inception the primary strategic justification for the campaign had been removed after the Russians had comprehensively defeated Turkish armies to their south and secured the Caucuses, neutralising the Turkish threat to Russia. And yet, the landings on 25 April 1915 still went ahead. Why? The short answer is the imagination and determination of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, an Easterner to his bones, who with most of British naval forces tied up in the North Sea watching for a German High Seas breakout, saw an opportunity to deploy British Mediterranean naval assets, and the men of the newly formed Royal Naval Division, in a coup de main operation which would attack the Central Powers in their supposedly weaker rear and provide a short cut around the stalemate on the Western Front and the stand off in the North Sea. Unfortunately, while this was superficially attractive, it was strategic nonsense, a product of public school romanticism, and operationally impracticable.
But, Churchill did not act alone. That what was originally designed as a primarily naval campaign metastasised into a large scale military campaign with half a million men in the Allied armies was due to the failures of the politicians and military leaders to question Churchill's optimistic assumptions and to undertake the proper intelligence gathering and planning necessary, which would have revealed that operations on the Gallipoli peninsula to have any chance of success would require the allocation of resources greater than could be supplied if the position on the Western Front was to be maintained. And that is even without considering whether a forcing of the Dardanelles would bring about a Turkish surrender or whether a naval force at the top of the channel would be vulnerable to counter attack and being cut off. In this, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the normally clear sighted First Sea Lord, and Lord Kitchener, the War Secretary, were particularly deficient in allowing themselves to be diverted by Churchill from their primary objectives, respectively the bringing to battle and defeat of the German High Seas Fleet and the building up of the British Expeditionary Force in preparation for large scale offensive actions. These men should have stopped Gallipoli at its conception, rather than acquiescing in a campaign in which they had little faith and which was a diversion from their main focus, but both, along with their colleagues in the war committees, succumbed to Churchill's ebullient optimism and embarked upon a gamble whose weak premise and sketchy planning should have alerted them to its dangers.
And so, with poor planning and overly optimistic aims, Gallipoli went ahead under the leadership of Sir Ian Hamilton, whose plans for multiple landings and diversions were overly complicated and who commanded a force insufficient for the task, which included too many divisional, brigade, and staff officers who were not up to the job. Hamilton cannot be blamed for the decision to attack Gallipoli, and whatever the flaws in his plans it is unlikely any landings, even if locally successful, would have delivered the quick victory against stronger than expected and determined Turkish troops, but he is grossly at fault for continuing with his plans once it became quickly apparent that neither the British at Hellas nor the Australians and New Zealanders at Anzac would be able to achieve their initial objectives, would remain hemmed in in front of their beachheads, and would not be able to advance so as to meet up and take control of the peninsula, the ultimate tactical aim of operations. Gallipoli was bound to fail strategically, but because of its inadequate forces, poor planning and logistical weakness, the initial operations of 25 to 27 April proved that it would also be a tactical failure, and at this point Hamilton should have reassessed and withdrawn. Early on, as field officers, particularly at Anzac, reported that their initial objectives were beyond reach, Hamilton was presented with the choice as to whether to re-embark his forces before the Turks could reinforce their defences or to continue and reinforce the landings in the hope that local breakthroughs could be achieved sufficient to change the tactical balance in the British favour. Sadly, he chose the latter, more politically acceptable option, and Gallipoli descended into a gruelling stalemate where the original grand tactical objectives of securing the peninsula gave way to meaningless small scale operations which at heavy cost to both sides had no tangible effect upon the military situation.
Twice Hamilton tried through the application of additional forces, firstly in the south at Hellas in multiple offensives, and then in August at Anzac and through the new landings at Suvla to bring about breakthroughs, but, again, as in the original landings in April, through ridiculous optimism, poor staff work and incompetent local commanders little was achieved and through a lack of initiative in general officers local victories were not exploited, as cautious officers went too soon on the defensive against defences whose strength they overestimated. All Hamilton achieved was to throw more men into the slaughter and to draw more resources into theatre that could be better employed in Flanders, as he reinforced defeat in battles even less successful than the original invasion. To the last, Hamilton remained convinced that victory was possible, and yet his successor within a few days of arrival had concluded that it was not and had recommended evacuation, which was then superbly executed, as Hart excellently tells. The tragedy is that the withdrawal when it came in December was eight months too late.
Gallipoli was an unnecessary disaster. It was a strategic error and a badly executed operation that had no chance of success, and even if tactical objectives had been attained it is unlikely it would have altered the strategic situation. Turkey was not the key to unlocking the door to victory, but to romantic minds educated in a classical tradition, notions of campaigns in plains and hills not far from Troy provided an illusion attractive to politicians and military planners brought up in the nineteenth century and imbued with a spirit of gentleman amateurism that was yet through harsh experience to give way to the professionalism which would bring victory in November 1918. The meaningless of the tragedy of Gallipoli is revealed by the British defeat producing no effect upon the outcome of the War, so that in spite of their determined victory in 1915 the Turks still succumbed to total defeat in 1918, as much as anything because of the outcome on the Western Front where the Great War was actually won and lost.
In this splendid, well written popular history Peter Hart provides a fine telling of the horrors of the Gallipoli campaign and in so doing serves up a strong indictment of the old men in Whitehall who sent thousands of young men to die for little reason in pursuit of unobtainable objectives and for no practicable strategic advantage. Gallipoli, indeed, was lunacy.