A selection of the Military Book “A solid operational analysis” from “an established scholar of the Scandinavian theater” (Publishers Weekly). This book describes the odd coalition between Germany and Finland in World War II and their joint military operations from 1941 to 1945. In stark contrast to the numerous books on the shorter and less bloody Winter War, which represented a gallant fight of a democratic “David” against a totalitarian “Goliath” and caught the imagination of the world, the story of Finland fighting alongside a Goliath of its own has not brought pride to that nation and was a period many Finns would rather forget. A prologue brings the reader up to speed by briefly examining the difficult history of Finland, from its separation from the Soviet Union in 1917 to its isolation after being bludgeoned in 1939–40. It then examines both Finnish and German motives for forming a coalition against the USSR, and how—as logical as a common enemy would seem—the lack of true planning and preparation would doom the alliance. In this book, Henrik Lunde, a former US Special Operations colonel and author of Hitler’s Pre-emptive The Battle for Norway, 1940, once again fills a profound gap in our understanding of World War II.
HENRIK O. LUNDE, was born in Norway, moved to America as a child and thence rose in the U.S. Army to become a Colonel in Special Forces. Highly decorated for bravery in Vietnam, he proceeded to gain advance degrees and assume strategic posts, his last being in the Plans and Policy Branch of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. After retirement from the Army he turned to writing, with a focus on his native North, and given his combination of personal tactical knowledge plus objective strategic grasp has authored several groundbreaking works. These include Hitler's Pre-Emptive War, about Norway 1940, Finland's War of Choice, and Hitler's Wave-Breaking Concept, which analyzes the controversial retreat of Germany's Army Group North from the Leningrad front in WWII. In A Warrior Dynasty he re-examines the potential of pure military skill in global affairs. His next, long-awaited work, will examine how America itself has fared in this regard during the last 50 years.
The Barbarossa Directive of 18 December 1940 already assigned the Fins their old territory around Lake Ladoga & Hanko to tie down the Russians while they pushed towards the Murmansk railroad. Suffice it to say Finland got back what it wanted by autumn '41, more or less poised along its 1939 borders and on a line between the Gulf and the White Sea, far enough from Leningrad not to piss off the Russians even more.
Consequently, the German commanders could lead a horse to water, but not a Finnish corps to Murmansk. A series of half-hearted attempts never managed to strangle their adversaries' supply line to the plentiful cargo of the Artic convoys. All was quiet on the Finnish front after spring '42, except light pushes to Leningrad.
These were not inevitable bed fellows. If the German occupation of Norway had been thwarted, Finland would probably not have allied itself to the invasion of the USSR; indeed a Scandinavian block might've formed to keep the region out of the war, freeing up resources for the Soviet defense further south. As things stood in reality, the Winter War had cost Finland 10% of its territory rich in both industry and agricultural resources and Germany appeared the only friend left.
Tempting proof for covert military operation exists in Lunde's opinion : I believe the Finnish General Staff, possibly with Mannerheim's blessing, did discuss contingency plans. It is otherwise difficult to explain why Army of Norway Chief Buschenhagen would travel to northern Finland in the company of the operations officer of the Finnish General Staff. He's reading between the lines of the Halder diary and Buschenhagen's testimony at Nuremberg, written in Soviet captivity. Naturally you can't start a coalition war without talking it over; otherwise it's such an akward situation on the first day of invasion! Ziemke already arrived at a definite YES based on such clear activities as increased reconnaissance and strengthening the supply network (which stretched across the Far North into Norway for German troop transfers). The only aspect that leaves no paper trail is whatever territorial ambitions they had entertained for the Continuation War beyond their 1939 border.
Operation Bagration shook Finland awake from entrenched slumber into a tightrope game: trick Germany into taking over the front, while opening peace talks with the USSR. The most incredible thing is Mannerheim pulled it off with an armistice on 19 September 1944. Germany knew it was too weak to retaliate against a defective ally, although Hungary misassumed as much the next year. Neither could it muster the manpower to plug the holes, as it had done after the overthrow of Mussolini. Would Finland ordain an orderly evacuation ? Would the Soviet Army respect the armistice treaty and stand to at the pre-war borders, or pursue any German units in reach like bloodhounds on a scent ? As it turned out, they got a taste of everything.
An amphibious attack on vital islands in the Finnish Gulf, where the Soviet Baltic fleet lay bottled up, was bloodily repulsed by Finnish troops. The retreat of the 20th Mountain Army in mid-september to mid-october '44 across the northern landbridge into Norway (on a scale of 200.000 men over 600km) was an astonishing feat of Artic warfare, with whole roads built from scratch. It also benefitted from a helping hand by the Finnish High Command and the country's northernmost railway lines. Conversely, scorched earth tactics and a general feeling of abandonment fueled mutual resentment between Finnish and German troops; minor armed clashes occured, but nothing that would earn the sobriquet "Finno-German war" Lunde employs. Norvegian soil would see a few thousand frontoviks buried before their commanding officers halted the pursuit. With the ranks of the Army of Norway swollen to 500.000, as many first-rate units as possible were shipped off across the Baltic to shore up the defence of the Reich to the bitter end, but about half remained behind to repulse a Northern Normandy that never came.
Two thirds in, I was bored to death with this book. The fight is as passive as the Western Front in the popular imagination and the tone is dry. I suspect Lunde's unfamiliarity with both Finnish and Russian is to blame after all. He puts a lot of Ziemke's German Northern Theater of Operations"and The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim into the blender, adding the : the Halder Diariesto shore up the quotes.
Nothing on the ground: no sneaking through 7 feet of snow to encircle a Russian outpost, no frosty bayonet charges. A recollection from one of those Finnish border trappers involved in anti-partisan hunts would read like The Most Dangerous Game. Or the recollection of a hapless Finnish veteran of WWI that witnessed the red storm of steel on the first day of operation Bagration.
I'll agree he demythologises a few Eastern Front stock images, such as on p. 156:
The condition of the 152nd Ural division may have played a role in the decision to end the offensive [against Mountain corps Norway in the Murmansk sector in May 1942] had not received it's winter equipment in time. Entire companies froze to death on the tundra on their way; of the 6000 troops only about 500 reached the front.
Usually it's comically wrapped Germans around say, operation Typhoon, but Russians can also freeze to death.
I don't often banish an expensive purchase, but I'm certainly not reading this again. Out it goes, with two stars. We need something else for this lesser-known part of WWII, pulled from original sources on both sides of the pine trees. High hopes for Hitler's Nordic Ally?: Finland and the Total War 1939 - 1945 !
"Finland would be swept from the map of history forever."
This review is from: Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II (Kindle Edition)
For all practical purposes Finland was already at war, but Finland did have choices. All bad. The wrong choices would lead to the destruction of Finland as a nation. Perhaps as a people (see Stalin's resettlement programs). Try looking at those choices through the eyes of the Finnish people and leaders in 1939,1940 and 1941. They were living a nightmare that Americans never faced and have difficulty understanding.
The Finns tried desperately to make defensive alliances with Sweden and other Scandinavian countries only to be rebuffed by all. Sweden's behavior before and during the war seems to have been governed first by a left leaning government which was in sympathy with the Soviets, then by a government which cooperated with Nazi Germany. Finland was alone.
After the Finnish government joined Germany as a cobelligerent, not an ally, Marshal Mannerheim explained to one of his confidants that he would not allow the Finns to participate in capturing Leningrad because the "Russians would never forgive us and Finland would be swept from the map of history forever"*. From his point of view he had to "win", but he couldn't win too big. For those like Lunde who would second guess the choices and decisions, there is one question. What possible, realistic ending position could the Finns have achieved that would have been better than the one they managed to reach? Particularly in view of the American abandonment of Eastern Europe after WW2 to the not so tender mercies of Stalin.
Other reviewers have already noted Lunde's dearth of Finnish sources, his heavy reliance on German material and his inability to read Finnish, Russian and, apparently, German. He seems to have relied on sources available in English.
Just for the record, Mannerheim was not just anti-Nazi, he wasn't exactly pro-German either. After all, before he again become a Finn, he was an Imperial Russian general. His goal was not German victory but the preservation of Finland. The author seems to believe that the goal was or should have been total victory. The accomplishment of which may have, in the long run, been worse for Finland than was Germany's total defeat.
I consider this book flawed at best- it is a real handicap to not be able to work with primary sources, yet Mr. Lunde starts the book by stating up front that he does not read Finnish with any fluency, strongly implies that he does not read Russian (he states his use of Russian sources is limited to those that have been translated into English), and then mentions later in the book that he does not read German. In other words, he is working with secondary sources at best, as he must rely on sources that have been translated into English.
Lunde's attitude toward Finland is judgmental throughout, as if they must be condemned and upbraided for getting in bed with the Nazis when they were making what appeared to be the best of bad choices regarding their own self-interest. Finland's primary goal was to retain their independence, which they ultimately succeeded in doing. Finland is aware, in retrospect and most probably also at the time, that Nazi Germany was hardly an ideal ally. But what would Lunde have done if he were caught between Hitler and Stalin? Hitler had already proven he did not respect neutrality, and the Finnish government can hardly be faulted for suspecting that Stalin would not either and hoped to deal with them in the same way he dealt with their neighbor across the way, Estonia (along with Latvia and Lithuania.)
Lunde apparently feels a defensive pact with Norway and Sweden would have been an effective alternative to the alliance with Germany, but this does not appear to be very realistic, in view of combined German and Russian opposition to the idea. Lunde does acknowledge in the prologue that it was a mistake by the Soviet Union to oppose such an alliance, but apparently does not consider with any seriousness that in the face of Soviet opposition, pursuing that alliance might have given Stalin the pretext for an invasion. He feels that the Soviets would not have punished Finland for pursuing this alliance because it would have upset the US and the UK- a laughable argument, given the fate of Poland. Moreover, his conjecture that 'Allied presence' in Scandinavia might have kept Finland from the German alliance is pie in the sky- where does he propose such a presence would have come from? The US was not party to the war at this early stage, and neither France nor England were in a position to offer Finland the protection they needed.
In short, while this might be informative to those who are unaware of Finland's role in World War II, it hardly breaks new ground, and shows a lack of understanding for the Finnish position- which might have been remedied had the author been able to make use of Finnish sources.
Henrik O. Lunde's book Finland's War of Choice primary purpose is to examine Finnish leadership's political and military decisions during the period 1940 – 1944. As expressed by COL Lunde Finland’s choices were limited as they strove to remain a free and independent Scandinavian nation during the war. COL Lunde delves into the political and economic landscapes of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe as it relates to Finnish developments, the choices with which Finland was faced, Finnish statecraft, and the political maneuvering of the Soviet and Nazi States and to a lesser extent Great Britain and the United States. He utilizes a number of resources to include published memoirs of Finnish and German political and military leaders along with fellow historians’ theories. I won’t state here whether COL Lunde believed the Finns made the correct choice by siding with Nazi Germany. You’ll need to read the book for yourself and decide if his arguments match with your thoughts on the matter.
An interesting choice by COL Lunde was to include a significant amount of military details regarding maneuvers and engagements between Finnish, German and Soviet forces in Finland and surrounding nations. There is so much of this information one could almost state that the book was a military history of what is called in Finland ‘The Continuation War’. COL Lunde provides detailed movements of Finnish and German units, the strategy behind the troop movements, challenges faced fighting and sustaining military units in arctic environments, and the eventual Soviet response to the Finnish / German threat. As an armchair general and amateur military historian I was pleasantly surprised by the inclusion and enjoyed reading about the military campaign of which I know little about. However, the conflict as told through detailed military maneuver and engagements really didn’t add to the book’s primary purpose of discussing Finland’s political choices.
I read the Kindle version of this book and as I have experienced in other volumes the conversion of military geographical charts and maps was very poor in many cases. So poor that place names could not be read and when zooming in the resolution of the chart or map was of such low quality that the names were nothing but a messy blur. Picture resolution quality aside, the quality of the map contents in comparison to the detailed military unit discussion in the text was not up to par. In many cases unit locations were not clearly identified, and in the case of Soviet units they weren’t even represented in the earlier maps. Having adequate maps to help the reader understand unit locations would have significantly aided in the understanding of unit strategic placement and decisions made for maneuver.
Overall I believe COL Lunde’s book is a valuable addition to the literary collection of Finnish and World War 2 military history. Finland is an oft overlooked country in World War 2 discussions and good historical research is always welcome. COL Lunde is criticized by some for his lack of first hand sources. If one believed this book was about the Finnish military campaign – after reading it I can see were one might believe that was the purpose of the book – I can see where one might have a point with regards to primary sources. However, when recalling the primary purpose of the books was to examine Finland’s choice to side with Nazi Germany the selected sources are the primary sources. I recommend this book to anyone interested specifically in Finnish military history and the Eastern Front of World War 2.
The author does a good job exploring the diplomatic and political aspects of the conflict, even if the Soviet and Swedish points of view are not explained in much depth.
His explanation of the consequences of the German-Finnish failure to cut the Murmansk railroad is a real eye-opener. Between 1941 and 1943, before their other supply connections to their allies were established, the Soviets were able to import a staggering amount of raw materials, supplies, and equipment through the Murmansk route. The lifeline enabled them to replace the enormous material losses that they suffered during the German 1941 and 1942 offensives. Without the Murmansk route, it is difficult to imagine how the Soviets could have rebounded nearly as quickly as they did.
The description of the near-miraculous withdrawal of the German 20th Mountain Army from northern Finland in late 1944, under heavy Soviet pressure in early winter, is one of the high points of the book.
Then the bad:
In the 21st century, researching and writing a book on the WWII Eastern Front without taking advantage of the Soviet archives is almost an act of historical malpractice. The author lacked language skills in German, Finnish, or Russian, and apparently he lacked research assistants with those skills. Therefore, he relied heavily on secondary sources and postwar memoirs, very few of which were written before the opening of the Soviet archives. In fact, the author's most important sources were published in the late 1940s and 1950s. Therefore, if you want to find out what role Ultra intelligence or the Lucy spy ring played in the allied military and diplomatic decisions, this book does not help.
The accounts of military operations are told from the 30,000-foot level, which makes these passages very dry. The lack of good maps aggravates this problem. The book desperately needs some first-person accounts from front-line soldiers or even civilians who lived through the conflict.
It's an informative book, but we're still waiting for the definitive English-language account of WWII in northern Europe .
“Finland's War Of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II” by Henrik O. Lunde tells the little know story of the strange partnership and joint military operations of Finland and Germany between 1941 and 1945. The coalition of these two is rarely included in English books. This is not the more well know “Winter War” of 1940 between the Soviet Union and Finland, but rather the story that has not brought pleasure to that Finns. It was a political decision and union the Finns would rather forget.
Henrik O. Lunde is an excellent writer. He gives us the necessary background of Finland’s history. He gives a necessary overview covering the country’s severance from the Soviet Union in 1917. He explains Finland’s seclusion after the Winter War in 1940. Finally he explains the decision making process and unbelievable lack of planning and coordination used by both the Germans and Finns in forming this unlikely coalition against the Soviet Union.
We see how bizarre it was for that the German Generals allowed their military machine to accept an unsteady and rickety alliance. We see how the normal planning processes just did not happen. We see the failure to plan their goals and objectives. We see inadequate command and control as well as no overall coordinated plan. We find the normally highly professional German General Staff not following normal procedures and protocol at every turn. We see how Leningrad jaded both the Germ and Finn’s planning and strategy.
We see how the Finns quickly fell into “Goose-Step” with the Germans as the willing followed their leadership without question. We learn that their best trained and most powerful army made almost no major contribution because of its misuse in central and northern Finland. German lack the troop strength in this harsh climate theater to achieve success without the Finns. The Finns were unwell in provide the necessary assistance.
The book concludes with the Finns battling the USSRs counterattack in 19944. We see how Finland lost all military gains. To the German’s dismay the Finns engaged in a separate peace agreement with the Soviets. This resolution gave the German’s no option due to their troop strength levels except to fight their way from the region. The casualties for this theater of operation were a staggering 1,000,000 plus. Compared to the Soviet losses of over 800,000 the Finland/German total of just fewer than 300,000 were meager.
Former US Army Colonel Henrik Lunde has produced a well written, well researched book. It should be part of any World War II students library and is must reading for any student of 20th century European history. It is well done.
Finland knew from the Winter War with the Soviets, that England and France were useless as allies. They suffered the loss of prime territory. It then made the calculation that Germany was it's only friend in standing against Russia. Poland, on the other hand, believed in the support of England and France, and so resisted the return of Danzig. It was over run by Germany, and eventually became a Soviet client state. Who was the bigger fool? A detailed study, unfortunately more so than I am interested in at this time.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
A detailed strategic exploration of Finland's challenging role during World War II, particularly focusing on the Continuation War (1941–1944) between Finland and Germany versus the Soviet Union. Excepting the author’s apparent inability to read Finnish, Russian, and maybe even German, the book is well researched, thought-provoking, and delves into Finland’s rock-and-a-hard-place decision to align with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union with focus on Finland’s political and military maneuvering for their very survival.
Admittedly, I chose to listen to the audio version of this book after multiple attempts to play a computer game called Hearts of Iron 4 as Finland and getting demolished by the Soviet Union. In part, my hope was to better understand how the Finns approached their situation and to explore alternatives in the video game. After listening to this book (usually while playing the video game), I did succeed in defending Finland (and even rewrote history by taking Finland further than their initially held territory) and must say that I wholly agree that siding with the Nazis was one done with my nose held.
In the real world, as the Germans advanced on the Eastern Front, Finland chose to collaborate with the Nazis to regain lost territory ceded to the Soviet Union during the Winter War and secure its independence from the same. The author frames this as a "war of choice" because it was not driven by ideological alignment with Nazi Germany, but by pragmatic considerations and survival tactics in the face of an aggressive Soviet Union. The author presents a very balanced narrative as they walk through the political, military, and social forces that shaped Finland’s decision and reiterates differences between the strategic and moral perspectives.
The non-strategic details in the book were exceptional as the author goes into depth about troop movements and commander’s thoughts and issues at the time. The non-strategic points that most stood out to me in the book were supply issues, winter weather, remoteness of the terrain, and special operations style tactics that emerged as the war continued. For instance, the author states that entire battalions of men froze to death on the tundra due to poor equipment or that military intelligence led commanders to believe roads existed in far regions where there were none (phone line confused with road from old maps)… both are horrifying thoughts as tens of thousands of men were fighting for their lives in that remote terrain and inhospitable landscape.
A saying comes to mind: “marality is secondary to survival.”
To me, this saying (which was not in the book) summarized the Finnish position at the time. They faced a terrific onslaught of a much larger foe and determined that, in order to maintain their national survival, certain morals and realities had to be put on hold for later review As of August 2023, Finland is part of NATO. No doubt their lessons learned in the Winter War and Continuation War as well as their lack of choices for alliance during that period have pushed Finland towards the bloc. Seeing as this alliance was made during a time of lesser crisis, I hope Finland will have more opportunity to drive towards their own national goals and general well being than in years past.
My one takeaway quote: “It is rather amazing that the Finns appeared not to have realized that their refusal to participate in operations against the Soviet Union after they had secured the lost territories at East Karelia that the achievement of their own goals was totally dependent on Germany achieving its goal of destroying the Soviet Union. Germany’s failure to do so, either because of a military defeat or because of a negotiated settlement would jeopardize Finland’s position. If Germany lost the war, the very existence of Finland came into question. It therefore made virtually no difference what the Finnish war aims were as they were intrinsically linked to those of Germany. It is nevertheless extraordinary that the Germans did not press the Finns for more definite answers regarding their participation in achieving the two main German objectives: operations against Leningrad, and the cutting of the Murmansk railroad. The failure to do so became a major bone of contention and should have been anticipated. Carl von Clausewitz wrote: ‘no war is begun, or at least no war should begin, if people acted wisely without first finding the answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war?’” -H. O. Lunde
Henrik O. Lunde provides an excellent look at the semi-alliance between Finland and Nazi Germany in World War II. It's not a story you typically hear much of, at least outside of Finland, but perhaps one of the most fascinatingly intricate and extensive from the war.
This book detail's Finland's and Germany's ties that go all the way back to World War I, when Germany sent troops to aid the Finnish White Army against the newly established Soviet Russia and Finns loyal to her. We then watch as this relationship spirals out of control, to the point where, with a war with Russia taking place, Finland feels like they have no choice but to continue soliciting help from Hitler.
The best history books are told with minimal or no bias, and Lunde does that well. He talks about how to this day the Finnish people don't see themselves as allies to Nazi Germany, but co-belligerents, and how they didn't fight in World War II, but some made up war called the Continuation War. But he also points out the facts - that Finland fought alongside Nazi Germany against Russia, and at one point had to defend themselves against British attacks as well. It's a fair, honest, and balanced look at why Finland entered the war at all, why they'd align themselves with Hitler, and why they ultimately switched sides.
But this book makes one grave error: it's boring. Finland's War of Choice was an absolute slog to read, as it's written not as a non-fiction novel but more like a textbook. It's incredibly dry, to the point where I started skipping sections that I was less interested in just to finish it. In fact, maybe as a textbook isn't accurate, it's more like an order of battle, or some kind of official document on the course of the war that isn't meant to be consumed by the public. It's very matter of fact, stating fact after fact without setting up much in the way of characterization or setting, throwing you into events without really caring about any of the people involved, or understanding the setting of where these events take place.
Because of this bland writing, an otherwise great book really suffers, and I can't recommend it to anyone but hardcore history buffs, or those with a high tolerance for this kind of bland writing style.
While some of this military history book goes into a lot of detail of what various divisions were trying to do, most of the book is about politics and strategy and about clearing up various excuses about Finland's role and goals. The analysis of this alliance is well done. The maps: well one map was just about illegible on my Kindle. If one drew a line through Scandinavia, Finland was on the Russian side with Sweden a far from entirely neutral center. After the Winter war with Russia (1939-1940) and Russian plans to annex Finland around the time France fell (May 1940), the Finns went for the best deal they could get considering they were unable to join a coalition of Finland, Norway, Sweden. After the war of course the politicians wrote the first "histories" with a fair amount of whitewashing. This was a very difficult and costly war in terms of lost lives and lost homes, lost territory, etc. The book doesn't address the criminal histories of the main military figures, but some of the later German generals who served in Finland were guilty of terrible crimes in the Balkans. Eduard Dietl, who was the first commander of the 20th German Mountain Army, the key unit in Finland and respected by the Finns, was a Hitler favorite who apparently described Finnish women as trash. (Wikipedia.) He managed to die during the war in a plane crash.
I think most students of WW2 history are fairly clear on the 1st Soviet-Finnish winter war of 1939-1940, with the post-purge Soviet Red Army trying to sledgehammer the better trained, higher morale, but ultimately overwhelmed Finns. The ski troops, the Mannerheim Line, the Soviet disaster at Suomussalmi are all fairly well known.
What is less well known is the focus of this book, what is known as the "Continuation War", where the Finns joined forces with Nazi Germany in an attempt to reclaim the losses of the Winter War. This book does an adequate, but not outstanding, job of describing the events of this conflict. Where this book shines is in attempting to show the lack of cohesion between the Finnish and German commands, apparently thrown together with very little attempt to form a joint command, or even really agree on objectives. Where it does somewhat less well is in describing the actual conflicts, which quickly bog down into a somewhat dry recitation of divisions and dates.
Overall, I'd recommend it to someone trying to bridge a gap in their general knowledge of the Eastern Front in the north during WW2. Useful but not ground-breaking.
Finland occupies an unique place within history of World War II, for the Finns were the only democratic power who fought on Axis’ side alongside Germany. Unlike the more David-vs-Goliath-ish Winter War in which the little Finns were pitted against the gargantuan, yet still clumsy Soviet juggernaut, German-Finnish coalition in so-called Continuation War was more complex. Finns desire for revenge, coupled with Hitler’s paranoid obsession to keep Norway safe at all cost, became the main factors for this unholy alliance, in my opinion. This book tried to present the whole events through two lenses: military lens and international relation lens. For me, the Finns’ position already interesting in itself, and how they managed to avoid the wraths of both Germans and Soviets also interesting to know. The Finns were very skillfully walking on the tightrope of realpolitik, avoiding the fates experienced by other Axis’ collaborating nations such as Hungary and Romania. I find that reading this book is a fine experience for me, except that the map of military operations being unreadable to me, most annoying.
This is my first extensive reading on the "Continuation War" so I reserve the right to later modify my rating. I liked the book. Being that I have no other knowledge, other than general, about this theater I have to start with the premise there are no factual mistakes. I'm also hesitant to differ with the author's opinions and conclusions. His positions seem well laid out and reasonably argued. I wasn't aware that the United States never declared war on Finland but it issued warnings to not conduct any additional offensive operations against the Soviet Union beyond the recovery of the territory lost during the Winter War of 1939-1940. The author writes well but it seems the book could have used a combination of more anecdotes, detailed campaign/battle narratives and more research, specifically from Soviet sources. The maps aren't particularly detailed and helped somewhat to follow the narrative. I feel the book could have been fleshed out a bit more. All in all, I consider this a competently written title.
A flawed book however provides definite insight and information about a little known part of WWII. As others have noted, it is often dry and can provide a blizzard of unit designations without much colour. The author acknowledges he doesn't read or read well, Finnish, German or Russian. So his use of sources is secondary. However he considers Finnish motivations and their justifications and provides some cogent analysis. This book will give you an overview of what occurred and why. Which for a little known (outside of Scandinavia)part of WWII does it make it interesting. However it lacks depth or colour. But sufficient detail is provided that keeps you sufficiently engaged to keep reading. If you're a military history buff and a curious soul this is worth the investment. But if you like your Military History as written by Beevor or Hastings then this might not be your cup of tea.
About the continuation war, where Finland somewhat reluctantly fought on the German side against the Soviets, to win back the Finnish territories lost in the Winter War.
The book describes the general narrative of the various campaigns and why they, after initial success, ultimately failed, and it took quite a bit of diplomatic acrobatics to let Finland survive all of this is an independent state.
The Germans didn't follow some of the Clausewitzian principles (like having clear war goals, clear chain of command etc.) esp. with respect to the cooperation with the Finns (dealing with democracies is hard!). And the Finns weren't to clear on their exact goals, and tried to do a bit of whitewashing after everything was over.
This book traces Finland's role in World War 2. Finland was caught between the rock and a hard place, between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. It is easy to say in hindsight what Finland could have done. It entered the War more or less willingly with Germany, but at the end of the war, there was no equivalent of a Nuremberg Trial, the leadership remaining the same, and never occupied.
Lunde comes up short in some of the analysis and on the whole the book is dry. However it is still a good book covering the basic history and decision made.
I have read more than 3 dozen books on WW II. Nearing the end of my interest, I was intrigued to learn why Finland had fought on the German side. The author obviously spent an incredible amount of time researching. His details of every event and troop movement forces the reader to slog on because , occasionally, his interpretation of the events is clear and concise. If your are curious why Finland fought with Germany, simply read the epilog and save a lot of time.
Well done military history of the Finnish collaboration with the Germans, post-Winter War, during World War II. Like many books of this type, the maps and locations were inadequate to fully cover the military operations. This is heightened in the kindle version, but in any case the reader needs to identify supplemental maps unless he is very knowledgeable of the geography of Russia and Finland in the 1940s. Good explanations and sources make this a valuable resource to cover this lesser known theater of operations. Recommended.
A thorough and comprehensive report of Finland's weird alliance with Nazi Germany to retake the territories they lost after the Winter War.
I label this a report because that's what it often felt like. This book goes into the minute details of negotiations, plans, troop movements, battles, and the intentions of the upper brass. This made it sometime feel like a slog to push through, but, overall, (and with some skipping of paragraphs or pages here and there), it did provide a rather enjoyable experience of World War 2 in the arctic north.
Not a very good book; but the topic really interests me. Following the remarkable “Winter War'' against the Russian invasion, Finland – as the only democracy to do so – chose to ally with the Nazis against the Russians in order to take back as much as possible of their lost territories. As a small country, keeping their independence between such great powers was a great feat for the Finns; and they mainly did it through their bravery, skills, and determination in their wars.
Having not read much on this area of the war, especially the continuation war as opposed to the winter war, it contains a decent breakdown of what happened. I come away reading it much more well informed on this section of the war I believe. As others have stated the author says up front at the beginning of the book that he only uses limited sources for his book so that is a problem. If you have little to no knowledge of WW2 in Finland I would say this isn’t a bad book to start with.
This is essentially an operations overview with politics mixed in.
The Author openly admits in the preface upon his lack of Finnish skills and thus the limiting of Finnish sources in his work. This is a big mistake for anyone writing about Finland and its involvement in the Second World War.
Mr Lunde (as pointed out by another reviewer) leans extremely heavily on Ziemke's German Northern Theater of Operations, with sprinklings of Mannerheim's memoirs and the Halder Diaries. This really makes the books pretty much dry in numerous aspects.
The author promises to explore the relationship between the Finnish Military and Government and the Nazi Military and Government but it rarely touches upon this. Often it forces or sandwiches in little tidbits of the relationship between large slabs of text that is akin to a units war diary.
He skims over Finland's reasoning for getting involved with the Third Reich, or why it took the course of action that it did but seems to point finger that Finland is completely incorrect in its actions.
The book has its pluses in the point of it being a campaign driven book, and we can read about the movements of troops, but it does suffer from lack of maps to help the reader see those movements.
Overall the book is dry, a drag, boring but full of information for those who are very much interested in troop movements. It lacks greatly in research and sources and is eclipsed by more modern books written in this area. It fails to achieve its stated purpose of exploring Finland's reasoning behind joining with the Third Reich.
The Book should be more appropriately titled 'Germany's War in Finland: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II'
Terribly dry. There was a lot of this regiment was positioned to the left of that regiment and they were opposed by this corps and that corps to their right and etc... The portions dealing with the political aspects were somewhat more interesting, but in general, I would caution you not to read prior to operating heavy machinery.
I liked the book. My references to theater of operations weren't many so it was a good introduction. It could have had more information from both a political and military perspective, but even so, it is worth recommending for anyone who wants to begin to understand a sector of operations neglected by historians.
Well written, greatly researched, heavily footnoted,, logical in presentation, and insightful in a very complex political, military, national objective of survival of a small Democratic nation in a risky geopolitical situation.
This part of the war is often neglected, it provides information that I was not fully aware of in my previous readings on World War II. My problem with the book was that at times it was hard to follow....and sadly, boring. That said I am glad to learn more about these events.
Another lesson in "read the book blurb carefully before buying". I thought this book was about the Winter War, but it was a book about the German offensive in the Arctic and what role the Finns played. A WWII buff may find it vastly more interesting than I did.
Thorough and thoughtful. Lunde describes vividly the battles, logistics and strategies that marked this often overlooked theater. Well written and engaging.