Beyond objectivism and relativism: Science, hermeneutics, and praxis

by Richard J. Bernstein

"A fascinating and timely treatment of the objectivism versus relativism debates occurring in philosophy of science, literary theory, the social sciences, political science, and elsewhere."--Choice

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Academic, Science, Reference

284 pages, Paperback

First published November 1, 1983

Reviews

[Martin Henson · Rating 3 out of 5]

PART ONE Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: An Overview
Richard Bernstein feels the need to begin with an interesting definition: a 'conversation' "... is an extended and open dialogue which presupposes a background of intersubjective agreements and a tacit sense of relevance" (p. 2). It is interesting and relevant that he should feel the need to describe something so familiar - but it is in the spirit of this book's theme, and the "uneasiness that has spread throughout intellectual and cultural life" (p. 1). He begins by identifying the fundamental Either/Or: that there are either ultimate foundations or we are led to some form of relativism. Part of philosophy's history has been devoted not so much to resolving this problem but settling on a proper method for doing so - a method that would yield episteme and not just a set of doxai. The felt urgency here is predicated on the observation that concerns in this area are not just confined to philosophy, but are felt throughout culture - in both social and hard sciences, and in practical morality (and, so, politics).

Philosophers like Michael Dummett have not been put off by centuries of failure and have been perfectly content to make new claims regarding philosophy's true method - in this case based on Frege's approach: that thought is the proper focus of philosophy's analysis and that that is to be pursued through the investigation of language. Dummett is well aware that he follows a long tradition of failure in making such grandiose claims - but happy to let time tell. In contrast, Rorty, following in certain senses, Wittgenstein, places the scandal elsewhere - it is not the constant lack of a project object for philosophy, but the Kantian illusion that philosophy can act as a foundational discipline at all. And that getting rid of this is a therapeutic approach (which, one has to suppose, is the proper role of philosophy, after all!). Dummett, then, is not so much a prophet as a reactionary.

Bernstein agrees with Rorty, up to a point. He thinks this is the end of something (the "Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian tradition" (p. 7). His contrast, then, is between Objectivism (and not Absolutism - which he thinks is dead as a result of fallibilism) and Relativism (and not Subjectivism - which is also dead, but for reasons I do not fully follow). The former claims that there is an "ahistorical matrix ... to which we can ultimately appeal" (p. 8) a position close to foundationalism. The latter claims that all relevant concepts (rationality, truth, reality, the good, ...) must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme.

It would not be new to note the self-referential inconsistency in the stark statement of relativism, which dates back to Plato and Protagoras. Gadamer refers to Heidegger (Note 18, p. 234) in this regard, asking what exactly this irrefutable argument achieves and claiming that all formal argument is made suspect in the process. Maybe. Reading Terry Eagleton's book Culture (Chapter 2, pp. 30-48) suggests to me that the many contradictions of post-modern relativism spring from the same source: the failure to address the basic inconsistency in stating strong relativism. For example, only missing this inconsistency would lead to the (equally absolutist) position that "... rather than condemning ... headhunters, we should seek to understand them, setting such practices in their cultural contexts." (Eagleton, p. 38; my emphasis). On the other hand, should we be sufficiently self-aware as to recognise the inconsistency in strong relativism, we should surely set our possible condemnation of headhunting in its cultural context (and understand it?!).

So the "uneasiness" that prompts this book is the dilemma of having two unacceptable positions: "the choice between a sophisticated form of fallibilistic objectivism and a non-subjective conception of relativism" (pp. 12-13) which is not a long way from Kant's own concern, an Either/Or: Either morality is universally grounded or it is meaningless.

In reviewing another book I referred to Descartes as marking philosophy's neurotic turn. Bernstein refers to this as "Cartesian Anxiety" (p. 16). Teachers of philosophy are won't to correct a novice referring to Descartes as a sceptic - because this was his method: he felt, of course, that he had secured the foundations with the Cogito and with God. Descartes was, however, motivated by an anxiety (or neurosis) which better captures the spirit of his work. His worry that he may be plaything of an evil demon is "set aside ... for [that] God is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that I am not deceived." (Descartes Rene, Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 198-9). His placing a firewall against scepticism around God must show something about the power of religion - even over one so anxiously dedicated to the sceptical method.

So, having traced the history of the current anxiety back to Plato, Descartes, and Kant (among others), Bernstein finishes his introduction by suggesting that the opposition itself is a manifestation of the Cartesian Anxiety - and that that needs exorcizing (p. 19). But what does that mean?

If one wanted convincing that this is a genuine dilemma for contemporary thought, consider the fallout from the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the area of natural science and The Idea of a Social Science: And Its Relation to Philosophy in the social sciences. The hysteria following the publication of both testifies - underlying the backlash to both is captured by Laudan's claim that Kuhn has "abandon[ed] the search for an adequate model of rationality as a lost cause, thereby accepting the thesis that science is, so far as we know, blatantly irrational." Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, p. 3. There is an irony, in fact, lurking between these two works. In arguing that social science is distinct from the natural science the methods and results of which the area has envied and tried to copy, Winch adopted the pre-Kuhnian tradition. Post-Kuhn, the distinction has disappeared, as Bernstein illustrates with long quotes from Mary Hesse (pp. 31-33, her book, In Defence of Objectivity is not on Goodreads).

Wittgenstein is lurking in the shadows here for both Kuhn and especially Winch. Despite what Grayling A. C. thinks, W was not a relativist. One thing he did do was identify what he called the Augustianian picture of language (APL). - in which meaning is referential and denotational. He didn't claim that it isn't (he didn't claim anything at all, in fact) but he offered other perspectives. What the APL shows is that what look like polar opposites are actually bed fellows. For example mathematical realism and mathematical formalism share this model of meaning, just whether there are denotations or not. In similar fashion, objectivism and relativism also share this underlying model - if concepts are not foundationally secured, they are left completely unhinged. It is the difference between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism (where the latter is left in the air because there is no ladder beneath - both F and anti-F require a ladder). It is not then a-foundationalism (however that might be cashed out).

Bernstein, however, does not follow the W-ian route here but turns to the continent and Gadamer. Interestingly, from this hermeneutic tradition we get to something like the same place - though it is not yet clear how successful this would be (I can see clearly how this can be done via W). Anyway, G thinks - in similar fashion - that Objectivism and Relativism are dialectical opposites but parasitic on one another (as realism and formalism in mathematics are). This is to be explored through new notions of knowledge and truth. For G, "reason is not a ... capacity that can free itself from its historical context and horizons ... This is not a limitation or deficiency of reason, but rather the essence of reason rooted in human finitude". From a W-ian perspective, we might turn to his notion of sublimation. Reason (and, indeed objectivity and relativity) are internal to the enterprises they appear to be meta-linguistic upon - to think otherwise is to sublime them.

«To be Continued»

[VII · Rating 2 out of 5]

Although I agree with the message, it is a terribly written book. Instead of actually trying to make his point, the author chose to almost exclusively present the ideas of others and ended up including an obscene amount of quotes that were extremely tiring to me. There is also too much repetition. The first chapter is something like an extended introduction that takes 25% of the book but makes points that are later repeated. The second chapter can also be skipped if you are familiar with mainstream philosophy of science. The third one, another 25% of the book is all about Gadamer. It was a great introduction to Gadamer, but it wasn't really what I signed up for. The fourth chapter is also something like a, somewhat less detailed, introduction to Habermas, Rorty and Arendt. Again, useful and interesting but somewhat out of place. The book also has, of course, a point that slowly unfolds but this happens way too slowly. So what's that?

He identifies as our major problem what he dubs "the Cartesian anxiety"; the classification of everything as either objective or relative, or, in other words, our anxiety about whether there is a permanent ahistorical matrix or metalanguage that we can compare our theories to or rather that everything depends on our historical situation and culture. Another way to put it is whether we can find ways to determine what is rational or scientific or if these words are just compliments that are given after we decide that this theory or practice is useful to us. We gradually moved towards the latter options, first by resisting that the objectivity of the natural sciences can be applied to the social sciences and then by wondering whether this objectivity is actually applicable to the natural sciences as well. Bernstein is trying to show that these developments and the point of the thinkers discussed here (Winch, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Geertz, Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, Arrendt) can be used to show that by denying this objectivism we don't automatically move to relativism. We change our conception of what is what we name "scientific" or "rational", but can still keep its privileged status. The point is that what we thought we had is not actually possible, but what we have is still valuable.

This middle road is very close to Gadamer's hermeneutics. For him, we are creatures whose every action involves understanding and this understanding is not based on rules, like pairing a particular situation to this or that category but is closer to Aristotle's phronesis. It is something much more subtle, more complicated and oriented towards praxis (action) and dialogue, not theory. As I understand it, it is some kind of negotiation between ourselves and the thing or the person we are engaging with, that, when done right, is carried not by ego but by the thing, ourselves and language (that always includes tradition) combined.

But we still operate within the bounds of rationality. Even Feyerabend or Rorty are creating a rational reconstruction of why this theory prevailed over another. It's just that it is usually done after the fact and not by obeying pre-constructed rules. Reason is also something that is presupposed in our encounters with others or at least it is when two people are engaging in an honest dialogue. All these thinkers stress the importance of freedom, dialogue and community, trusting that these ideals are able to guide us towards the creation of a better society. This will be done not with theory but with praxis, with engagement with one another and a constant re-arrangement of positions. And as Rorty writes, maybe the recognition that this society or the world in general is made, rather than found, might strengthen solidarity.

Of course this image would only be appreciated by the thinkers that are closer to relativism. I am sure the objectivists can't see this solution as anything other than relativism. If we can only see what's rational after it becomes ours, then we have to wonder whether we just "baptize" as rational what we adopt as our practice. How can an objectivist can ever accept this? And the parts about community and dialogue are also too hopeful, too optimistic or just plain naive. Honest dialogue between two people who hold wildly incompatible views is extremely rare. It is a good regulative ideal and perhaps the only one we can have, but it becomes more and more apparent that it is also too utopian.

[James Henderson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Richard Bernstein examines the works of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and Arendt. He focuses on some controversies to demonstrate changes in the discussion of human rationality. This goes beyond the traditional notions of reason, whether objective or not, expanding understanding and emphasizing its practical character. For example in discussing Gadamer Bernstein noted how he uses the concept of "play" to establish "an order" for the work of art. This is used in developing an ontology of art, i.e. what is their ontological status? How are works of art related to us and we to them? The work of art is not complete without the spectator (reader, listener, looker). This is perhaps easiest to imagine in the case of drama when the audience interacts, knowingly or not, with the actors in the process of the production of the work of art. For Gadamer "a work of art is seen as an event (or being). Understanding must be conceived as a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning."

[Captainsoftrock · Rating 3 out of 5]

Incredibly intertextual, should maybe have been split into three books dealing with practical implications of deconstruction on daily life, the threat of scientism dominating the social sphere, and a contrast on Habermas and Gadamer. It was very dry, but it had it's highpoints. I'd skip it, unless you want to invest a lot of time and attention with small rewards.

[Sumeyye Pa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Metnin kendisi kadar çevirinin güzelliği de kitabı okunur kılıyor.

[Wessel · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book primarily proves that scientists who try so hard to introduce a new paradigm and dedicate their whole book to the creation of this ''new'' paradigm usually fail in doing so. Also annoyed by his ''moving beyond'' while he obviously isn't.

[Mahsa · Rating 4 out of 5]

A perfect comprehensible melange of dialectics in philosophy of science with the main focus staying on hermeneutics.
Absolutely enjoyed reading it

[Marc · Rating 2 out of 5]

UoG Library copy;

I think the author tries to make all sorts of arguments about "science" yet his only experience seems to be in Social Studies. [the unit that is studying is also the studied-lost objectivity]

He simply does not understand how natural science actually works. He criticizes resistant paradigms, theories; he says they have no common agreement about counts as a decisive argument in favour of competing paradigms; Science works decisively via falsification not validation; The best work constructs falsification criteria. This is what is missing from most Social Studies [which is why I refuse to refer to it as "Science" Social Sagaxis perhaps]

[Exavidreader]

The author makes convincing arguments about the need to move away from absolute objectivism or absolute relativism. It presents an interesting perspective on how we should look at the world and how we shouldn't regard one view as superior to all else even if they have been 'proven' scientifically. Bernstein presents his arguments by bringing in arguments from many scientists and philosophers before putting forth his conclusion. This book does cause a 'paradigm shift' for me. I can't give more comments about the book or rate it however because it was my 'textbook' for a course that I didn't find interesting so I didn't finish beyond what was required.