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Origins of Modern Wars
The Origins of the Second World War in Europe
In this famous book Philip Bell examines the European origins of the Second World War from three different angles: first, he sets out the various explanations which have been offered for the war, and discusses the historiographical debates to which they have given rise; he then analyses the major underlying forces - ideological, economic and strategic - that were at work in Europe during the 1930s; and in his final section he traces the course of events from 1932, when Europe was visibly at peace, via the initial oubreak of hostilities in 1939, right through to June 1941, when the German attack on the Soviet Union marked the climax of the acceleration into general conflict.
P.M.H.BELL is Senior Research Fellow at the University of Liverpool. Longman recently published his two-volume study of Franco-British relations in the twentieth century, as France and Britain 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement and France and Britain 1940-1994: The Long Separation.
P.M.H.BELL is Senior Research Fellow at the University of Liverpool. Longman recently published his two-volume study of Franco-British relations in the twentieth century, as France and Britain 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement and France and Britain 1940-1994: The Long Separation.
384 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1986
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About the author
P.M.H. Bell
7 books1 followerPhilip Michael Hett Bell was Reader in History at the University of Liverpool
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
May 26, 2019
Undergraduate textbook that was surprisingly readable with a good, if now dated, bibliography.
December 13, 2012
Learned a lot. Author inspired confidence.
June 12, 2017
An excellent overview of the competing theories of the origins of the war. Bell discusses the economic and political background, the thirty year war thesis, tackles Viktor Suvorov's claims in Icebreaker, and discusses each major nation's role in the build up to the war, concluding that war was inevitable once Hitler achieved power. A wealth of information, and an amazing resource.
July 23, 2025
I first encountered this book in Professor Bennett’s “Europe in the Twentieth Century” course many years ago. The book is concise: 300 pages, but long enough to give a student the most important details. There are notes and a list for further reading, which I am sure is quite out of date now. Nevertheless, P.M.H. Bell does a logical and creditable job of analyzing the debates surrounding the origins of World War Two in Europe.
Bell looks at the origins from three different angles. He starts with historiography; crucially, was the Second World War just the concluding phase of a Thirty Years’ War, or was is something distinctive in itself? Next, he looks at deeper structural forces: ideology, strategy, and the economy. Exactly how, when and to what extent did these forces contribute to the outbreak of the war. Lastly, he offers a narrative of developments from 1932 to June 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. He contends that only by following developments to that date rather than September 1939, as is usually done, can the true causes of the war be discovered.
In the end, Bell attributes the war to this. Britain and France were satisfied powers that were scarred by the experience of World War One. They desperately wanted to avoid a repeat and were prepared to allow for some amount of German and Italian revisionism. By the time they realized that the revisionist powers would not be satisfied with incremental adjustments to the balance of power but were both determined to dominate Europe by force, and that their word could not be trusted, only a general war could stop them. War was not inevitable if Hitler and Mussolini could be satisfied, but if they could not, then it was. The precise timing of the war, however, was contingent. Earlier resistance, for example, during the Rhineland reoccupation or the Czechoslovak crisis, might have sparked a different kind of war, but war, nonetheless.
So the war was a blend of an old-fashioned push for dominance in Europe in the west with an ideological thirst for Lebensraum in the east at the expense of the Jewish and Slavish people there. Had Hitler not invaded France or the Soviet Union, the war might now be remembered as the war for Polish dismemberment. But because of the scale and nature of the expansionist goals, especially in the minds of Hitler and Mussolini, the conflict became total. Understanding that mindset is crucial—but that, as Bell hints, may be the subject of another book.
Bell looks at the origins from three different angles. He starts with historiography; crucially, was the Second World War just the concluding phase of a Thirty Years’ War, or was is something distinctive in itself? Next, he looks at deeper structural forces: ideology, strategy, and the economy. Exactly how, when and to what extent did these forces contribute to the outbreak of the war. Lastly, he offers a narrative of developments from 1932 to June 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. He contends that only by following developments to that date rather than September 1939, as is usually done, can the true causes of the war be discovered.
In the end, Bell attributes the war to this. Britain and France were satisfied powers that were scarred by the experience of World War One. They desperately wanted to avoid a repeat and were prepared to allow for some amount of German and Italian revisionism. By the time they realized that the revisionist powers would not be satisfied with incremental adjustments to the balance of power but were both determined to dominate Europe by force, and that their word could not be trusted, only a general war could stop them. War was not inevitable if Hitler and Mussolini could be satisfied, but if they could not, then it was. The precise timing of the war, however, was contingent. Earlier resistance, for example, during the Rhineland reoccupation or the Czechoslovak crisis, might have sparked a different kind of war, but war, nonetheless.
So the war was a blend of an old-fashioned push for dominance in Europe in the west with an ideological thirst for Lebensraum in the east at the expense of the Jewish and Slavish people there. Had Hitler not invaded France or the Soviet Union, the war might now be remembered as the war for Polish dismemberment. But because of the scale and nature of the expansionist goals, especially in the minds of Hitler and Mussolini, the conflict became total. Understanding that mindset is crucial—but that, as Bell hints, may be the subject of another book.
February 23, 2023
Excellent overview of the WWI and postwar period, with thematic chapters and sections on ideology, effects of the Great Depression, strategy, and the buildup to war. Conclusions: Britain was more profoundly anti-Communist than anti-fascist, France's governmental turmoil (and culture of sacrifice from WWI) made war largely unfeasible before 1939, and Hitler's conquests were both pre-planned and opportunistic. Hitler did not anticipate Britain and France declaring war over Poland, and the long-term planning of the German war machine expected war in 1942.
March 6, 2023
This is good if you have an interest in World War 2. In this book you'll get detailed information on the buildup that led to WW2 breaking out. If you're curious, and if you're interested, you'll like this book.
December 18, 2022
A comprehensive but not overwhelming look at the decline or rise of various nations in the interwar period between WWI and WWII.
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July 23, 2023So boring. I could barely make it to chapter 5!
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews