Do Islam and Islamic law constitute real obstacles to human rights? In this revised and updated edition, the author offers critical assessments of recent Islamic human rights schemes that dilute or eliminate the human rights protections afforded by international law and compares these both with the Islamic legal heritage and with international human rights law. Contesting stereotypes about a supposedly monolithic Islam inherently incompatible with human rights, Mayer dissects the political motives behind the selective use of elements of the Islamic tradition by conservative groups opposed to democracy and human rights. The third edition considers recent developments in human rights law and policy.
An in depth critical examination of how Muslim nations have tried to subvert the language of human rights making resultant laws subservient to the vagaries of Sharia. Mayer examines controversial documents such as the UIDHR (Universal Islamic Declarations of Human Rights), Egypt's al Azhar Draft Constitution, The Cairo Declaration, Saudi Basic Law and constitutions from Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq and illustrates how they apply to the treatment of woman and minorities in Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Syria and Sudan.
The main approach is to co-opt the language of human rights but then corrupt it. The countries Mayer examines often adopt the general form of the UN's UDHR, but the clauses are often modified making them subject to Sharia thereby diluting them.
A second tactic is to say one thing in English for international consumption, but have a completely different connotation in Arabic. The English version of the UIHDR is explicit in stating that each right is subject to "the law", but the authoritative Arabic version clarifies - law translates to Sharia or religious law, as opposed to qanun (legislation). The Egyptian constitution passed yesterday makes this clear in English as well: Article 2: The principles of Islamic law are the chief source of legislation, but further clauses merely refer to "the law".
A third technique is to simply omit a group as deserving of rights, for example mentioning equality of men, but not women, or leaving out sexual orientation. Or, as in the Cairo Declaration, stating that all human beings "are equal in terms of basic human dignity" w/o regard to race, color, language or sex, which Mayer argues that dignity is not equivalent having rights, and that being equal does not in itself protect one from abuse, all individuals being equally denied a right. Saudi Basic Law omits any discussion of rights at all!
Last, we find a cases where Muslims or Muslim men can be privileged. Article 1(b) of the Cairo Declaration says: persons most loved by God are those who are most useful to the rest of his subject and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of (Muslim) piety and good deeds - so that an individual who prays 5 times a day has greater value under the law. Another problem relates to the rules of inheritance - men and are entitled to ½ and women are entitled to ¼ of the estate. The position of women is eroded further as Islam allows multiple wives (not husbands) and the wives ¼ share to be split evenly between each wife.
It's not all bad news. The fact that some Muslim jurists use the UHDR formulations as a template is encouraging, as is the effort to retroactively claim that the Quran anticipated and implemented modern human rights. An obvious route to promote human rights in practice would be to show that such rights are not incompatible with the Sunna of Mohammed and his Companions. On the other hand you one can also find push-back against the UN's UDHR as un-Islamic. Mayer cites the current Ayatollah Khameini, who said in 1984 when he was Iran's President: "When we want to find out what is right and what is wrong, we do not go to the United Nations; we go to the Holy Koran. For us the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is nothing but a collection of mumbo-jumbo by disciples of Satan."
Mayer also notes that generally there seems to be push back against forced or arranged marriage as the UIHDR requires the consent of both parties, though both Iran and Saudi Arabia have lowered the age of marriage to an unacceptably low 9 years, to the detriment of their ability to become independent and to receive an education, not to mention failing to protect the rights of children.
The legal and political landscape of the Middle East are currently in flux. Nevertheless the analysis presented is invaluable in assessing the implications of proposed and actual legislation.