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Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I
The common explanation for the outbreak of World War I depicts Europe as a minefield of nationalism, needing only the slightest pressure to set off an explosion of passion that would rip the continent apart. But in a crucial reexamination of the outbreak of violence, Michael Neiberg shows that ordinary Europeans, unlike their political and military leaders, neither wanted nor expected war during the fateful summer of 1914. By training his eye on the ways that people outside the halls of power reacted to the rapid onset and escalation of the fighting, Neiberg dispels the notion that Europeans were rabid nationalists intent on mass slaughter. He reveals instead a complex set of allegiances that cut across national boundaries.
Neiberg marshals letters, diaries, and memoirs of ordinary citizens across Europe to show that the onset of war was experienced as a sudden, unexpected event. As they watched a minor diplomatic crisis erupt into a continental bloodbath, they expressed shock, revulsion, and fear. But when bargains between belligerent governments began to crumble under the weight of conflict, public disillusionment soon followed. Yet it was only after the fighting acquired its own horrible momentum that national hatreds emerged under the pressure of mutually escalating threats, wartime atrocities, and intense government propaganda.
Dance of the Furies gives voice to a generation who found themselves compelled to participate in a ghastly, protracted orgy of violence they never imagined would come to pass.
Neiberg marshals letters, diaries, and memoirs of ordinary citizens across Europe to show that the onset of war was experienced as a sudden, unexpected event. As they watched a minor diplomatic crisis erupt into a continental bloodbath, they expressed shock, revulsion, and fear. But when bargains between belligerent governments began to crumble under the weight of conflict, public disillusionment soon followed. Yet it was only after the fighting acquired its own horrible momentum that national hatreds emerged under the pressure of mutually escalating threats, wartime atrocities, and intense government propaganda.
Dance of the Furies gives voice to a generation who found themselves compelled to participate in a ghastly, protracted orgy of violence they never imagined would come to pass.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published April 25, 2011
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337 people want to read
About the author
Michael S. Neiberg
36 books55 followersMichael S. Neiberg is the Stimson Chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He has also taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy and the University of Southern Mississippi.
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October 18, 2022
Michael S Neiberg - A dança das Fúrias. A Europa e a Eclosão da Primeira Guerra Mundial
Magnífico livro. Escrito numa prosa doce, clara, sem teatralidades, de cuja tentação fugiu, MS Neiberg apresenta-nos um precioso registo vivo da sociedade europeia no início do século XX. Muitíssimo bem documentado, com as referências colocadas em rodapé, vai ficar sem dúvida como um documento incontornável para quem quiser entender o contexto da eclosão e persistência, o grande quadro, do que para história ficou conhecido como a primeira guerra mundial.
Num dos primeiros livros de 2022 – A Grande Guerra de Marc Ferro, pela descrição do autor tinha ficado com a impressão que a IªGM tinha emergido de nacionalismos exacerbados, que a população europeia se tinha atirado para o abismo plenamente convencida que as sua suas razões se sobrepunham às “do outro” e que dos sentimentos nacionalistas emanavam deveres que se sobreporiam a um qualquer conceito de humanidade e civilidade.
Uma posição muito idêntica retirei do romance de George Orwell - História de um Homem Comum, onde pela descrição de uma Inglaterra antes do fatídico agosto de 1914, pairava no ar um entusiasmo que só depois, mas muito rapidamente, se revelou serôdio e maligno.
Como estava errado. Neste livro, Michael Neiberg mostra-nos “ao vivo” e de forma documentada a realidade da europa nos inícios do século XX. Era uma europa de uma nova era. Uma europa da modernidade, da civilidade, das instituições vaga e lentamente democráticas. Uma europa que presava os valores nacionais, tinha orgulho na sociedade e nos seus feitos, sociais, culturais, científicos e tecnológicos. Características estas que não eram apanágio de um qualquer império, mas cujos valores se encontravam embrionariamente difusos a ocidente dos montes Urais. Havia competição entre nações, havia orgulho nacional, mas daqui resultava um nacionalismo assente em ambas as formas de cultura, popular e “alta-cultura”, mas que convivia e coexistia sem ofuscar com os conceitos humanistas da época, o internacionalismo social e científico que então germinava. A europa era guiada por dois nortes, um minoritário sem dúvida ultrarradical, nacionalista e de direita e um outro predominante, e de pendor universalista, solidário e eclético.
Era, como nos bem documenta Neiberg uma europa nada era favorável à eclosão da 1ªGM. Claro que os imperialistas, ainda que minoritários e dispersos pelas quatro potencias de então forçavam sempre os seus governos, exércitos e populações para posições próximas do abismo – crise de Marrocos, Líbia e Balcãs, mas sempre houve o bom senso que pela mão amiga da diplomacia resolveu as contendas antes das “vias de facto” enveredarem por caminhos marciais, emergentes e irreversíveis. Esta era a europa antes da 1ªGM, a europa antes do verdadeiro século XX se ter iniciado.
Quando a guerra eclodiu, as populações continuavam crentes e esperançadas numa solução diplomática que entretanto nunca surgiu. E assim se foram arrastando para a contenda, sem euforia e com uma confiança inicial que rapidamente evoluiu para esperança e depois para súplica, que tudo poderia terminar com um volte-face pacífico. Acreditavam nas suas instituições e líderes. Mas enquanto o tempo tardava e o outono europeu se instalou, a guerra acabou perspectivada e aceite como defesa do território, passou a ser uma guerra defensiva. Uma guerra que defendia um nacionalismo cujo entusiasmo era intrínseco em alguns grupos e intervenientes (muito típico dos “… armemo-nos e ide para a frente de combate …”). Este entusiasmo inicial era minoritário e enquanto posição minoritária podia ser observado em qualquer potencia imperial. Populações citadinas, conservadoras, nacionalistas e de direita tendiam a um maior entusiasmo com a guerra que o observado em populações rurais, proletárias, de pendor socialista e adepta de um internacionalismo transfronteiriço. Mas mesmo nestes grupos mais minoritários, com as primeiras semanas de guerra o nacionalismo e entusiasmo chocou com a realidade é deu origem ao desânimo, descrença, desmotivação e depressão coletiva.
A mobilização para a guerra foi aceite de forma resignada e imbuída de sentimentos de inserção comunitária e reconhecimento pelos pares. “Uma guerra não é para ser saudade, é para ser suportada”; “Numa guerra não há heróis só há vítimas”, “O diabo ria-se da obra dos seus filhos” são expressões que retratam bem os sentimentos dos que se sentiam arrastados pelos acontecimentos.
Com a manutenção da guerra os soldados perderam qualquer resquício de humanidade ou civilidade. A brutalidade tornou-se uma segunda natureza. Se assim não fosse, se não fossem brutais não eram bons soldados. A guerra era então dominada com um misto de desilusão “… se fosse eu que mandasse este ano não havia Natal. Soldado 12/1914 …”, “o que de melhor podia acontecer a um soldado era ser feito prisioneiro”, mas também de omissão, desinformação, mentira e propaganda de que é exemplo a que indicava as condições do campo de batalha “trincheiras com aquecimento central”.
Mas os exércitos não foram as únicas vítimas desta guerra. Na sociedade civil as populações sofreram inicialmente com a desinformação, a mentira, a omissão, mas depois viram os mortos, os feridos, a fome, as migrações, as evacuações, o medo, e o pânico. A sociedade ficou dividida entre velhos, viúvas, órfãos e estropiados por um lado, e noutro por especuladores, oportunistas e parasitas da mais variada taxonomia. Para os que ficam acentuou-se o fosso entre os com posses para resistir ou para fugir e os que por falta de meios não têm como se proteger ou como subsistir.
Em ambos os lados a informação era manipulada. Só se informava conforme o efeito que se pretendia. Nunca era para apresentar a verdade. As más notícias podiam ser omitidas ou deturparas por motivos óbvios. As boas eram igualmente manipuladas para não induzirem euforia. Era o domínio absoluto da propaganda. Se para os mortos eram o fim da incerteza e do sofrimento, com os feridos, a realidade estava à frente de todos. A 12 de setembro mais de 200.000 feridos entraram em Paris após a “vitória” do Marne.
A primeira grande guerra foi uma guerra de gabinete de uma dúzia de homens que por ambição, incompetência ou ambas não souberam parar a tempo e levaram a Europa para um abismo onde morreram 20M e 20M ficaram feridos. Antes de agosto de 1914, não havia ódio entre as nações e conceitos como nacionalismo e chauvinismo eram essencialmente abstratos. Com o início da guerra e a descrição das atrocidades e violência (sempre do outro) instalaram um clima de ódio que incendiou e forneceu combustível para uma guerra de mais 4 anos. E é aqui que se dá uma mudança importante. Se antes se acreditava que o inimigo correspondia aos líderes e elites do inimigo, com o padrão dos horrores descritos por testemunhos e propaganda, e com a própria evolução da guerra, este estereótipo de ódio ao inimigo passou a ser atribuído genericamente a todos, a todo o inimigo, quando antes só era dirigido aos hiper-nacionalistas e classe dominante. O ódio passou a ser generalizado. Era preciso vencer. E a vitória só podia ser total. A guerra tinha de ir até ao fim. Se o ódio não causou a guerra, depressa se instalou e serviu de carburante num ciclo vicioso de um só objectivo, a vitória total! A guerra ganhou vida própria e entrou numa maligna dança de fúrias, título que o autor dá a este livro.
Magnífico livro. Escrito numa prosa doce, clara, sem teatralidades, de cuja tentação fugiu, MS Neiberg apresenta-nos um precioso registo vivo da sociedade europeia no início do século XX. Muitíssimo bem documentado, com as referências colocadas em rodapé, vai ficar sem dúvida como um documento incontornável para quem quiser entender o contexto da eclosão e persistência, o grande quadro, do que para história ficou conhecido como a primeira guerra mundial.
Num dos primeiros livros de 2022 – A Grande Guerra de Marc Ferro, pela descrição do autor tinha ficado com a impressão que a IªGM tinha emergido de nacionalismos exacerbados, que a população europeia se tinha atirado para o abismo plenamente convencida que as sua suas razões se sobrepunham às “do outro” e que dos sentimentos nacionalistas emanavam deveres que se sobreporiam a um qualquer conceito de humanidade e civilidade.
Uma posição muito idêntica retirei do romance de George Orwell - História de um Homem Comum, onde pela descrição de uma Inglaterra antes do fatídico agosto de 1914, pairava no ar um entusiasmo que só depois, mas muito rapidamente, se revelou serôdio e maligno.
Como estava errado. Neste livro, Michael Neiberg mostra-nos “ao vivo” e de forma documentada a realidade da europa nos inícios do século XX. Era uma europa de uma nova era. Uma europa da modernidade, da civilidade, das instituições vaga e lentamente democráticas. Uma europa que presava os valores nacionais, tinha orgulho na sociedade e nos seus feitos, sociais, culturais, científicos e tecnológicos. Características estas que não eram apanágio de um qualquer império, mas cujos valores se encontravam embrionariamente difusos a ocidente dos montes Urais. Havia competição entre nações, havia orgulho nacional, mas daqui resultava um nacionalismo assente em ambas as formas de cultura, popular e “alta-cultura”, mas que convivia e coexistia sem ofuscar com os conceitos humanistas da época, o internacionalismo social e científico que então germinava. A europa era guiada por dois nortes, um minoritário sem dúvida ultrarradical, nacionalista e de direita e um outro predominante, e de pendor universalista, solidário e eclético.
Era, como nos bem documenta Neiberg uma europa nada era favorável à eclosão da 1ªGM. Claro que os imperialistas, ainda que minoritários e dispersos pelas quatro potencias de então forçavam sempre os seus governos, exércitos e populações para posições próximas do abismo – crise de Marrocos, Líbia e Balcãs, mas sempre houve o bom senso que pela mão amiga da diplomacia resolveu as contendas antes das “vias de facto” enveredarem por caminhos marciais, emergentes e irreversíveis. Esta era a europa antes da 1ªGM, a europa antes do verdadeiro século XX se ter iniciado.
Quando a guerra eclodiu, as populações continuavam crentes e esperançadas numa solução diplomática que entretanto nunca surgiu. E assim se foram arrastando para a contenda, sem euforia e com uma confiança inicial que rapidamente evoluiu para esperança e depois para súplica, que tudo poderia terminar com um volte-face pacífico. Acreditavam nas suas instituições e líderes. Mas enquanto o tempo tardava e o outono europeu se instalou, a guerra acabou perspectivada e aceite como defesa do território, passou a ser uma guerra defensiva. Uma guerra que defendia um nacionalismo cujo entusiasmo era intrínseco em alguns grupos e intervenientes (muito típico dos “… armemo-nos e ide para a frente de combate …”). Este entusiasmo inicial era minoritário e enquanto posição minoritária podia ser observado em qualquer potencia imperial. Populações citadinas, conservadoras, nacionalistas e de direita tendiam a um maior entusiasmo com a guerra que o observado em populações rurais, proletárias, de pendor socialista e adepta de um internacionalismo transfronteiriço. Mas mesmo nestes grupos mais minoritários, com as primeiras semanas de guerra o nacionalismo e entusiasmo chocou com a realidade é deu origem ao desânimo, descrença, desmotivação e depressão coletiva.
A mobilização para a guerra foi aceite de forma resignada e imbuída de sentimentos de inserção comunitária e reconhecimento pelos pares. “Uma guerra não é para ser saudade, é para ser suportada”; “Numa guerra não há heróis só há vítimas”, “O diabo ria-se da obra dos seus filhos” são expressões que retratam bem os sentimentos dos que se sentiam arrastados pelos acontecimentos.
Com a manutenção da guerra os soldados perderam qualquer resquício de humanidade ou civilidade. A brutalidade tornou-se uma segunda natureza. Se assim não fosse, se não fossem brutais não eram bons soldados. A guerra era então dominada com um misto de desilusão “… se fosse eu que mandasse este ano não havia Natal. Soldado 12/1914 …”, “o que de melhor podia acontecer a um soldado era ser feito prisioneiro”, mas também de omissão, desinformação, mentira e propaganda de que é exemplo a que indicava as condições do campo de batalha “trincheiras com aquecimento central”.
Mas os exércitos não foram as únicas vítimas desta guerra. Na sociedade civil as populações sofreram inicialmente com a desinformação, a mentira, a omissão, mas depois viram os mortos, os feridos, a fome, as migrações, as evacuações, o medo, e o pânico. A sociedade ficou dividida entre velhos, viúvas, órfãos e estropiados por um lado, e noutro por especuladores, oportunistas e parasitas da mais variada taxonomia. Para os que ficam acentuou-se o fosso entre os com posses para resistir ou para fugir e os que por falta de meios não têm como se proteger ou como subsistir.
Em ambos os lados a informação era manipulada. Só se informava conforme o efeito que se pretendia. Nunca era para apresentar a verdade. As más notícias podiam ser omitidas ou deturparas por motivos óbvios. As boas eram igualmente manipuladas para não induzirem euforia. Era o domínio absoluto da propaganda. Se para os mortos eram o fim da incerteza e do sofrimento, com os feridos, a realidade estava à frente de todos. A 12 de setembro mais de 200.000 feridos entraram em Paris após a “vitória” do Marne.
A primeira grande guerra foi uma guerra de gabinete de uma dúzia de homens que por ambição, incompetência ou ambas não souberam parar a tempo e levaram a Europa para um abismo onde morreram 20M e 20M ficaram feridos. Antes de agosto de 1914, não havia ódio entre as nações e conceitos como nacionalismo e chauvinismo eram essencialmente abstratos. Com o início da guerra e a descrição das atrocidades e violência (sempre do outro) instalaram um clima de ódio que incendiou e forneceu combustível para uma guerra de mais 4 anos. E é aqui que se dá uma mudança importante. Se antes se acreditava que o inimigo correspondia aos líderes e elites do inimigo, com o padrão dos horrores descritos por testemunhos e propaganda, e com a própria evolução da guerra, este estereótipo de ódio ao inimigo passou a ser atribuído genericamente a todos, a todo o inimigo, quando antes só era dirigido aos hiper-nacionalistas e classe dominante. O ódio passou a ser generalizado. Era preciso vencer. E a vitória só podia ser total. A guerra tinha de ir até ao fim. Se o ódio não causou a guerra, depressa se instalou e serviu de carburante num ciclo vicioso de um só objectivo, a vitória total! A guerra ganhou vida própria e entrou numa maligna dança de fúrias, título que o autor dá a este livro.
April 19, 2013
I'm a little divided as to how to rate this book. It's theme is how people entered a war mentality at the beginning of the Great War, and it's thesis is that nationalistic hatred were a result of the war, but they did not exist prior to the war in sufficient strength to be a cause of the war.
This argument has, from what I can gather, a certain degree of merit. Ordinary people were certainly not universally demanding a war prior to hostilities. However, Neiberg pounds his contrarian points so hard that at times he seems to be pushing an equally unbelievable contrary point. Thus, for example, in his chapter on the initial mobilizations he is at pains to emphasize that not everyone welcomed war and quotes primary source after primary source to make this point. This is a good point, and one of the things that I liked very much about the book in general was the large number of high quality primary sources which it quoted. I added a lot of primary source accounts to my research reading list due to the this book and its copious citations. However, citing source after source on the fairly obvious point that "many people were horrified at the coming of war" he then briefly mentions as an aside: Yes, there were many people who cheering the coming of war and many demonstrations of strident nationalism as men marched off to war. Having the short backtrack after so many contrary examples left one wondering why he hadn't presented a more balanced spread of opinion rather that emphasizing one side all the way through and then mentioning the other in passing. In other words, I think the book would have been stronger if it had been a more general account of feeling at the outbreak of war (emphasizing how the reality differed from the stereotypes) rather than being a one-sided account in opposition to another one-sided account, with only brief references to the validity of the stereotypical view.
All that said, I think I flagged more notes for future reference in this book than in any other I've read on the war to date. I found the heavy use of primary sources very useful, and the notes and references are a treasure.
This argument has, from what I can gather, a certain degree of merit. Ordinary people were certainly not universally demanding a war prior to hostilities. However, Neiberg pounds his contrarian points so hard that at times he seems to be pushing an equally unbelievable contrary point. Thus, for example, in his chapter on the initial mobilizations he is at pains to emphasize that not everyone welcomed war and quotes primary source after primary source to make this point. This is a good point, and one of the things that I liked very much about the book in general was the large number of high quality primary sources which it quoted. I added a lot of primary source accounts to my research reading list due to the this book and its copious citations. However, citing source after source on the fairly obvious point that "many people were horrified at the coming of war" he then briefly mentions as an aside: Yes, there were many people who cheering the coming of war and many demonstrations of strident nationalism as men marched off to war. Having the short backtrack after so many contrary examples left one wondering why he hadn't presented a more balanced spread of opinion rather that emphasizing one side all the way through and then mentioning the other in passing. In other words, I think the book would have been stronger if it had been a more general account of feeling at the outbreak of war (emphasizing how the reality differed from the stereotypes) rather than being a one-sided account in opposition to another one-sided account, with only brief references to the validity of the stereotypical view.
All that said, I think I flagged more notes for future reference in this book than in any other I've read on the war to date. I found the heavy use of primary sources very useful, and the notes and references are a treasure.
October 26, 2024
4.25
Took me a while to get through this!! But it’s worth it. Neiberg excellently weaves personal correspondences, notes, letters, poems, and other primary sources to put together this compelling narrative of a (relatively) peaceful continent whose people were coerced and led into war and chaos. Sure, these people had nationalistic tendencies but their desire to live peacefully outweighed any nationalist pride that would have them kill enemy soldiers. Still, the governments of each power involved could have done more to stop the war but didn’t, instead choosing to play the blame game and point the finger at other powers. This way, governments could claim they were engaging in a defensive war and wipe their hands of any responsibility. Interesting how blame was put on Germany in the Versailles Treaty. They certainly aren’t inculpable, but they’re not the only ones.
Took me a while to get through this!! But it’s worth it. Neiberg excellently weaves personal correspondences, notes, letters, poems, and other primary sources to put together this compelling narrative of a (relatively) peaceful continent whose people were coerced and led into war and chaos. Sure, these people had nationalistic tendencies but their desire to live peacefully outweighed any nationalist pride that would have them kill enemy soldiers. Still, the governments of each power involved could have done more to stop the war but didn’t, instead choosing to play the blame game and point the finger at other powers. This way, governments could claim they were engaging in a defensive war and wipe their hands of any responsibility. Interesting how blame was put on Germany in the Versailles Treaty. They certainly aren’t inculpable, but they’re not the only ones.
August 13, 2012
Neiberg uses diaries, memoirs, and letters, belonging to both soldiers and civilians, to show that ordinary Europeans, at least in the summer and fall of 1914, didn't expect war and didn't want it, and didn't feel raging hatreds for the nations they were fighting. (Some of those hatreds would develop as the conflict went on, of course.) There were chunks of the book that were quite interesting, and chunks that were rather boring. As an example of how quoting from diaries and letters can be a less than scintillating way of constructing a book, take this passage, from the chapter "The Coming of a Great Storm":
These images of natural disaster were common throughout Europe. In Russia Sergei Sazonov invoked the image of a "terrible storm" disrupting the calm European skies, and Evelyn Blücher wrote of a "thunderstorm which has broken so suddenly." Vera Brittain also thought of the start of the war as a "quite unexpected" storm, and her fellow Briton James Lawson wrote about "a bolt from the blue." Similarly, Johan Wilhelm von Lowenell Brandenburg-Hohenzollern thought the news of war was "like a peal of thunder" and a "flash of lightning" that came with little warning. From the relative safety of neutral Holland Henry Van Dyke described a "tempest." [Etc. It goes on.]
But the text also has moments of luminosity, as when Neiberg describes the very rare truces that would sometimes happen on the front. One Christmas morning six Saxon officers yelled in English "Don't shoot! We don't want to fight today" and then rolled kegs of beer across the no man's land between the armies as a Christmas gift. At another spot on Christmas Eve, a French tenor sang a German hymn, and the German soldiers responded by singing La Marseillaise. More often, truces happened so the soldiers could briefly collect their dead; then the shooting began again.
One French soldier's little boy had asked him to get a Prussian helmet, resulting in this letter home:
My poor Maurice, you must reflect that the Prussians are like us. There are fathers who are at war and little boys like you who are home with their mothers. What if a Prussian boy like you wrote to his father asking for the same thing that you are asking for and wanted his father to bring his little boy a French kepi? And what if that kepi was your father's? Then what would you think? Keep this letter and read it when you are older. Then you will understand.
These images of natural disaster were common throughout Europe. In Russia Sergei Sazonov invoked the image of a "terrible storm" disrupting the calm European skies, and Evelyn Blücher wrote of a "thunderstorm which has broken so suddenly." Vera Brittain also thought of the start of the war as a "quite unexpected" storm, and her fellow Briton James Lawson wrote about "a bolt from the blue." Similarly, Johan Wilhelm von Lowenell Brandenburg-Hohenzollern thought the news of war was "like a peal of thunder" and a "flash of lightning" that came with little warning. From the relative safety of neutral Holland Henry Van Dyke described a "tempest." [Etc. It goes on.]
But the text also has moments of luminosity, as when Neiberg describes the very rare truces that would sometimes happen on the front. One Christmas morning six Saxon officers yelled in English "Don't shoot! We don't want to fight today" and then rolled kegs of beer across the no man's land between the armies as a Christmas gift. At another spot on Christmas Eve, a French tenor sang a German hymn, and the German soldiers responded by singing La Marseillaise. More often, truces happened so the soldiers could briefly collect their dead; then the shooting began again.
One French soldier's little boy had asked him to get a Prussian helmet, resulting in this letter home:
My poor Maurice, you must reflect that the Prussians are like us. There are fathers who are at war and little boys like you who are home with their mothers. What if a Prussian boy like you wrote to his father asking for the same thing that you are asking for and wanted his father to bring his little boy a French kepi? And what if that kepi was your father's? Then what would you think? Keep this letter and read it when you are older. Then you will understand.
February 10, 2020
I saw Professor Neiberg speak at the National World War I Museum and in Boston at a conference. His lectures are just as engaging as this book!
January 2, 2024
Maybe I'm being generous because it's my favourite time period but 5/5.
The book is mainly about the public's (across all the major European powers) views, attitudes, moods and beliefs before WWI and up to the end of 1914. The main argument through the book is that very few Europeans actually wanted war and very few actually expected to happen. People had faith in the diplomatic system that either stopped diplomatic crises becoming wars or managed to keep the wars contained in a particular area (like the Balkan Wars). Generally they only consented to war as the publics of each country (including Germany and Austria-Hungary) believed it to be a defensive war forced on them by others and that their own governments had done everything to keep peace.
Additionally the author also argues (convincingly in my opinion) that intensive nationalism and hatreds were more a product of the war than a cause. The nationalistic beliefs that existed prewar were not enough for the European public to accept a major war over. For example French people wanted Alsace-Lorraine back for sure but they weren't willing to die for it. Most of the time the people (French Right/Conservatives) who were talking about it were using it more as an excuse to whine about the Third Republic than genuinely demanding war to get it back. For Russians a lot of the peasants who made up the army barely knew what a Slav was or what Serbia was so the whole Pan-Slavism thing didn't matter to them at all in their view on the war, they just felt that Russia had been attacked over something that had nothing to do with them.
Later on the book covers disillusionment with the war, which the author says developed very rapidly and that the war enthusiasm was mostly gone by the end of 1914 and the role of atrocity stories in motivating people to keep on fighting.
It's a short book at under 250 pages not counting notes. The book is well written in my opinion with a good use of the diaries, newspapers and letters to back up what it is saying. I felt the sources used were chosen well and really gave a good insight into what people believed at the time.
I really enjoyed this book but it is mainly about public opinion in this period. I wouldn't recommend it if you want the history of the major political events leading to the outbreak of the war or a more political-diplomatic history as that isn't what the book is focused on.
The book is mainly about the public's (across all the major European powers) views, attitudes, moods and beliefs before WWI and up to the end of 1914. The main argument through the book is that very few Europeans actually wanted war and very few actually expected to happen. People had faith in the diplomatic system that either stopped diplomatic crises becoming wars or managed to keep the wars contained in a particular area (like the Balkan Wars). Generally they only consented to war as the publics of each country (including Germany and Austria-Hungary) believed it to be a defensive war forced on them by others and that their own governments had done everything to keep peace.
Additionally the author also argues (convincingly in my opinion) that intensive nationalism and hatreds were more a product of the war than a cause. The nationalistic beliefs that existed prewar were not enough for the European public to accept a major war over. For example French people wanted Alsace-Lorraine back for sure but they weren't willing to die for it. Most of the time the people (French Right/Conservatives) who were talking about it were using it more as an excuse to whine about the Third Republic than genuinely demanding war to get it back. For Russians a lot of the peasants who made up the army barely knew what a Slav was or what Serbia was so the whole Pan-Slavism thing didn't matter to them at all in their view on the war, they just felt that Russia had been attacked over something that had nothing to do with them.
Later on the book covers disillusionment with the war, which the author says developed very rapidly and that the war enthusiasm was mostly gone by the end of 1914 and the role of atrocity stories in motivating people to keep on fighting.
It's a short book at under 250 pages not counting notes. The book is well written in my opinion with a good use of the diaries, newspapers and letters to back up what it is saying. I felt the sources used were chosen well and really gave a good insight into what people believed at the time.
I really enjoyed this book but it is mainly about public opinion in this period. I wouldn't recommend it if you want the history of the major political events leading to the outbreak of the war or a more political-diplomatic history as that isn't what the book is focused on.
November 16, 2017
A very interesting book on the First World War.
"Dance of the Furies" is part of the "rediscovery of 1914," the realization that the first year of the war was the bloodiest and most lethal, despite the fact that the more famous battles happened later.
Neiberg looks at public opinion from the start of the July Crisis to the end of 1914. He finds not an enthusiasm for going to war but surprise that events moved so quickly and a grim resolve to defend one's country from invasion.
It takes a while to get into the book. The first chapter in particular is about a non-event, because hardly anyone in Britain and France had any idea who Franz Ferdinand was or why his assassination should affect them.
What interests me is that the public only became aware that war was imminent when Russia issued its mobilization. I have not seen a book that emphasizes this as a key step.
However, this points out a flaw in "Dance of the Furies." The book really focuses on the Western Front. What views we get of the Eastern Front are from British observers with the Russians, and we hardly get any impression of Austria-Hungary's disastrous double war against Russia and Serbia.
Still, this does not take away from Neiberg's achievement. He has issued a serious challenge to the conventional Western Civ textbook view of the outbreak of war. He does a fine job tracking how the Socialist parties responded to the outbreak of war and shows that in 1914 the assassination of Jean Jaures struck people as more important than the death of Franz Ferdinand. In short, he makes us reconsider what we thought we knew about 1914.
"Dance of the Furies" is part of the "rediscovery of 1914," the realization that the first year of the war was the bloodiest and most lethal, despite the fact that the more famous battles happened later.
Neiberg looks at public opinion from the start of the July Crisis to the end of 1914. He finds not an enthusiasm for going to war but surprise that events moved so quickly and a grim resolve to defend one's country from invasion.
It takes a while to get into the book. The first chapter in particular is about a non-event, because hardly anyone in Britain and France had any idea who Franz Ferdinand was or why his assassination should affect them.
What interests me is that the public only became aware that war was imminent when Russia issued its mobilization. I have not seen a book that emphasizes this as a key step.
However, this points out a flaw in "Dance of the Furies." The book really focuses on the Western Front. What views we get of the Eastern Front are from British observers with the Russians, and we hardly get any impression of Austria-Hungary's disastrous double war against Russia and Serbia.
Still, this does not take away from Neiberg's achievement. He has issued a serious challenge to the conventional Western Civ textbook view of the outbreak of war. He does a fine job tracking how the Socialist parties responded to the outbreak of war and shows that in 1914 the assassination of Jean Jaures struck people as more important than the death of Franz Ferdinand. In short, he makes us reconsider what we thought we knew about 1914.
September 17, 2024
Neiberg ganhou uma bolsa para investigar sobre a primeira guerra mundial.
Dedicou anos a ler diários, cartas, atas das conferências dos governantes, militares e pessoas com quem eles conviviam e que, de certa forma, influenciaram as suas opiniões e decisões.
Não é um livro de fácil leitura, uma vez que o autor optou por saltar frequentemente no tempo e no espaço em que ocorriam as ações, exigindo maior concentração do leitor. Para pessoas como eu, com dificuldade em memorizar nomes complicados, em particular alemães e russos, tive de folhear à frente e atrás para compreender melhor o texto.
O livro versa sobre a 1ª guerra mundial, a morte do arquiduque austro-húngaro foi o mote que acordou ódios escondidos na Rússia, Alemanha, Sérvia, França, Bélgica e Áustria.
O nacionalismo e o ultranacionalismo atingiram patamares completamente desumanos, acirrando ódios entre os povos, antes amigos, depois, os maiores inimigos.
Curioso que o autor fez uma análise à imprensa da altura, confrontando as publicações do mesmo dia, em vários países, sobre o mesmo assunto e concluiu que os governos mentiam descaradamente aos seus cidadãos.
A informação verdadeira era sonegada aos militares. A estes era dito que a guerra estava quase no fim e que o adversário tinha muitas baixas.
Ao povo era transmitido a constante vitória na linha da frente.
A verdade chegou no fim do conflito, quando muitos homens não regressaram e quando os factos se revelaram.
Dedicou anos a ler diários, cartas, atas das conferências dos governantes, militares e pessoas com quem eles conviviam e que, de certa forma, influenciaram as suas opiniões e decisões.
Não é um livro de fácil leitura, uma vez que o autor optou por saltar frequentemente no tempo e no espaço em que ocorriam as ações, exigindo maior concentração do leitor. Para pessoas como eu, com dificuldade em memorizar nomes complicados, em particular alemães e russos, tive de folhear à frente e atrás para compreender melhor o texto.
O livro versa sobre a 1ª guerra mundial, a morte do arquiduque austro-húngaro foi o mote que acordou ódios escondidos na Rússia, Alemanha, Sérvia, França, Bélgica e Áustria.
O nacionalismo e o ultranacionalismo atingiram patamares completamente desumanos, acirrando ódios entre os povos, antes amigos, depois, os maiores inimigos.
Curioso que o autor fez uma análise à imprensa da altura, confrontando as publicações do mesmo dia, em vários países, sobre o mesmo assunto e concluiu que os governos mentiam descaradamente aos seus cidadãos.
A informação verdadeira era sonegada aos militares. A estes era dito que a guerra estava quase no fim e que o adversário tinha muitas baixas.
Ao povo era transmitido a constante vitória na linha da frente.
A verdade chegou no fim do conflito, quando muitos homens não regressaram e quando os factos se revelaram.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 16, 2017
This well-written book describes and documents the views and opinions of common, everyday people all over Europe in the weeks and days leading up to the outbreak of World War I (no one expected war), the change in views when war began (we must fight to defend our countries!), citizens' inability to obtain good information on what was happening in the war due to government censorship and, finally, the deep depression and despair that overcame the civilian populations and the soldiers on the front lines when it became clear the war would not end quickly. I had the feeling there was too much repetition in the book’s early chapters but the author really hits his stride once the war begins and does a fine job of explaining how the public everywhere was kept in the dark about what was happening in the war and how the soldiers in the trenches quickly became disenchanted and weary of the war effort.
April 6, 2023
One of my favorite books that I have ever read. The book goes into detail about the political situation that sparked the beginning of World War I, then goes into much more detail about the general sentiment surrounding the war. The prevailing thoughts seem to be that there was no chance that war would take place.
There’s a lot that can be learned from this book in modern times in terms of just out quickly a civilization-shifting moment can happen through unexpected means.
Would 100% read this again.
There’s a lot that can be learned from this book in modern times in terms of just out quickly a civilization-shifting moment can happen through unexpected means.
Would 100% read this again.
September 2, 2021
Would almost consider this a must read for those interested in WW1. Gives a really good view of what the average person thought before and right at the start of the war and how their mindset shifted overtime.
March 31, 2023
Nice book on more everyday attitudes of mainly middle class folks in the various belligerent countries in 1914. Correct thesis that European populations didn't want a war and that the hatreds the war produced have been read backward as causes.
December 23, 2023
Excellent, well researched and written and thoughtful study of the start of WWI.
August 22, 2025
wonderful book. chilling and clear
December 25, 2019
An important, if flawed, book.
Michael S. Neiberg correctly shifts the focus away from just the halls of power. For students of the First World War the July Crisis and all the debate surrounding it are surely old hat. By shifting the focus towards the common people, Neiberg illuminates what Europeans thought in general about the war.
Sometimes I felt that his evidence was a bit too middle/upper class, and I felt that he moved fairly quickly between countries. Would have liked to see deeper analysis on some subjects.
That said, this is a must read.
Michael S. Neiberg correctly shifts the focus away from just the halls of power. For students of the First World War the July Crisis and all the debate surrounding it are surely old hat. By shifting the focus towards the common people, Neiberg illuminates what Europeans thought in general about the war.
Sometimes I felt that his evidence was a bit too middle/upper class, and I felt that he moved fairly quickly between countries. Would have liked to see deeper analysis on some subjects.
That said, this is a must read.
July 15, 2012
This is an example of a focused history. The target period is the time immediately prior to the outbreak of the first world war (Summer 1914) until the end of 1914. The intent of the book is to show how the outbreak of war was experienced by a population that almost uniformly did not see that war was coming, did not want war to come, did not view other nations as enemies or evil, and did not see the immediate cause of the war (the Sarajevo murders of the Archduke and his wife) was worthy of conflict. Once he has done that, the author shows how such initial feelings rapidly morphed into the hard drawn lines and unforgiving hatreds that characterized the rest of the war.
The point of all this is to show that events can and do take on a logic of their own, move out of the control of those initiating them, and end up destroying even those whose appear to win the war. This is hardly a new point but the author is very effective in making it.
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the book is the reliance of first person accounts of individuals involved in the war at all levels. This is akin to what Max Hastings did in his recent book - Inferno - and it is effective. The author is also skillful in not repeating all of the military and political details that have been covered in other works - most notably by Barbara Tuchman in "The Guns of August". The material here is complementary to what is found there and in other more conventional histories, such as John Keegan's.
The overall punchline here of a population stumbling into a catastrophic war by not paying attention to current events and allowing the government too much discretion is timeless - and certainly resonates in the context of the US in 2003. I have to wonder if this was on the author's mind in bringing the fine study to press. I ended up struggling about just how distinctive a message this was but I have to come down very positive on it. After reading it, I also thought about Kubrick's movie with Kirk Douglas - Paths to Glory.
The point of all this is to show that events can and do take on a logic of their own, move out of the control of those initiating them, and end up destroying even those whose appear to win the war. This is hardly a new point but the author is very effective in making it.
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the book is the reliance of first person accounts of individuals involved in the war at all levels. This is akin to what Max Hastings did in his recent book - Inferno - and it is effective. The author is also skillful in not repeating all of the military and political details that have been covered in other works - most notably by Barbara Tuchman in "The Guns of August". The material here is complementary to what is found there and in other more conventional histories, such as John Keegan's.
The overall punchline here of a population stumbling into a catastrophic war by not paying attention to current events and allowing the government too much discretion is timeless - and certainly resonates in the context of the US in 2003. I have to wonder if this was on the author's mind in bringing the fine study to press. I ended up struggling about just how distinctive a message this was but I have to come down very positive on it. After reading it, I also thought about Kubrick's movie with Kirk Douglas - Paths to Glory.
June 2, 2012
This book appears to be an extremely well researched look at world war one. The themes that stood out to me were:
1) The relatively minor underlying causes.
2) The lack of will or want to war on the part of the whole of the population.
3) The surprise and shock that war actually did break out.
4) How quickly the war turned nasty through manipulation of the masses by the leadership. The justification of war as being caused by the other side.
5) Various thematic descriptions of war in its different stages as weather, moods, philosophical and spiritual descriptions.
I found that I was fighting to finish the book. The author's dedication to research made parts of the book dense. Part of the text felt like he was over proving his point through research from diaries, correspondence, and newspapers were used.
Other sections though showed sections of brilliance and of beautiful writing shining through. The author's use of literary illustration provided insights into the horror and impact this war had on all nations in this senseless, unwanted battle started by an extremely small handful of men.
1) The relatively minor underlying causes.
2) The lack of will or want to war on the part of the whole of the population.
3) The surprise and shock that war actually did break out.
4) How quickly the war turned nasty through manipulation of the masses by the leadership. The justification of war as being caused by the other side.
5) Various thematic descriptions of war in its different stages as weather, moods, philosophical and spiritual descriptions.
I found that I was fighting to finish the book. The author's dedication to research made parts of the book dense. Part of the text felt like he was over proving his point through research from diaries, correspondence, and newspapers were used.
Other sections though showed sections of brilliance and of beautiful writing shining through. The author's use of literary illustration provided insights into the horror and impact this war had on all nations in this senseless, unwanted battle started by an extremely small handful of men.
March 9, 2014
Wasn't excited at all to read this, only for not wanting to look stupid at book club did I complete it. However, I did learn a lot about WWI and why it started, much more than I had learned before. It is truly amazing how war can seem to take on a life of its own, despite no one really wanting it to happen. I appreciated the author's heavy use of letters and examples of people, not just high ranking government officials. It gave the book more depth than an average history lesson. Well worth reading to further a person's understanding of how WWI ,and sometimes even war in general, could begin.
February 9, 2016
A clearly written account of the social, cultural and psychological factors supporting the start of WWI and emerging in its first year to create the brutal futility of the Great War. Neiberg is somewhat repetitive in making his point at times but his writing is relatively engaging and rich with first-hand accounts.
January 15, 2017
As some other reviewers said, the constant repetition of some points weakens this book.
I was especially struck, though, by his assertion (with copious evidence) that most Europeans did not welcome the start of the war — Martin Gilbert's history, for one, asserts the opposite.
I was especially struck, though, by his assertion (with copious evidence) that most Europeans did not welcome the start of the war — Martin Gilbert's history, for one, asserts the opposite.
May 23, 2014
This is a very good short (237 pages) introduction to the causes of WWI and how it got out of hand so quickly.
January 3, 2015
A stirring and vividly-written account of the tangle of forces that led to World War I. Here's my Open Letters Monthly review:
http://www.openlettersmonthly.com/boo...
http://www.openlettersmonthly.com/boo...
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