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The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes
In this classic work, Adler explores how man differs from all other things in the universe, bringing to bear both philosophical insight and informed scientific hypotheses concerning the biological and behavioral characteristics of mainkind. Rapid advances in science and technology and the abstract concepts of that influence on man and human value systems are lucidly outlined by Adler, as he touches on the effect of industrialization, and the clash of cultures and value systems brought about by increased communication between previously isolated groups of people. Among the other problems this study addresses are the scientific achievements in biology and physics which have raised fundamental questions about humanity's essential nature, especially the discoveries in the bilogical relatedness of all living things. Thrown into high relief is humanity's struggle to determine its unique status in the natual world and its value in the world it has created.
Ultimately, Adler's work develops an approach to the separation between scientific and philosophical questions which stands as a model of thought on philosophical considerations of new scientific discoveries and its consequences for the human person.
Ultimately, Adler's work develops an approach to the separation between scientific and philosophical questions which stands as a model of thought on philosophical considerations of new scientific discoveries and its consequences for the human person.
395 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1960
2 people are currently reading
189 people want to read
About the author
Mortimer J. Adler
595 books1,063 followersNumerous published works of American educator and philosopher Mortimer Jerome Adler include
How to Read a Book
(1940) and
The Conditions of Philosophy
(1965).
This popular author worked with thought of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. He lived for the longest stretches in cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and San Mateo. He worked for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and own institute for philosophical research.
Born to Jewish immigrants, he dropped out school at 14 years of age in 1917 to a copy boy for the New York Sun with the ultimate aspiration to a journalist. Adler quickly returned to school to take writing classes at night and discovered the works of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and other men, whom he came to call heroes. He went to study at Columbia University and contributed to the student literary magazine, The Morningside, (a poem "Choice" in 1922 when Charles A. Wagner was editor-in-chief and Whittaker Chambers an associate editor). Though he failed to pass the required swimming test for a bachelor's degree (a matter that was rectified when Columbia gave him an honorary degree in 1983), he stayed at the university and eventually received an instructorship and finally a doctorate in psychology. While at Columbia University, Adler wrote his first book: Dialectic, published in 1927.
In 1930 Robert Hutchins, the newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, whom Adler had befriended some years earlier, arranged for Chicago’s law school to hire him as a professor of the philosophy of law; the philosophers at Chicago (who included James H. Tufts, E.A. Burtt, and George H. Mead) had "entertained grave doubts as to Mr. Adler's competence in the field [of philosophy]" and resisted Adler's appointment to the University's Department of Philosophy. Adler was the first "non-lawyer" to join the law school faculty. Adler also taught philosophy to business executives at the Aspen Institute.
Adler and Hutchins went on to found the Great Books of the Western World program and the Great Books Foundation. Adler founded and served as director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in 1952. He also served on the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica since its inception in 1949, and succeeded Hutchins as its chairman from 1974. As the director of editorial planning for the fifteenth edition of Britannica from 1965, he was instrumental in the major reorganization of knowledge embodied in that edition. He introduced the Paideia Proposal which resulted in his founding the Paideia Program, a grade-school curriculum centered around guided reading and discussion of difficult works (as judged for each grade). With Max Weismann, he founded The Center for the Study of The Great Ideas.
Adler long strove to bring philosophy to the masses, and some of his works (such as How to Read a Book) became popular bestsellers. He was also an advocate of economic democracy and wrote an influential preface to Louis Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto. Adler was often aided in his thinking and writing by Arthur Rubin, an old friend from his Columbia undergraduate days. In his own words:
Unlike many of my contemporaries, I never write books for my fellow professors to read. I have no interest in the academic audience at all. I'm interested in Joe Doakes. A general audience can read any book I write—and they do.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer...
This popular author worked with thought of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. He lived for the longest stretches in cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and San Mateo. He worked for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and own institute for philosophical research.
Born to Jewish immigrants, he dropped out school at 14 years of age in 1917 to a copy boy for the New York Sun with the ultimate aspiration to a journalist. Adler quickly returned to school to take writing classes at night and discovered the works of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and other men, whom he came to call heroes. He went to study at Columbia University and contributed to the student literary magazine, The Morningside, (a poem "Choice" in 1922 when Charles A. Wagner was editor-in-chief and Whittaker Chambers an associate editor). Though he failed to pass the required swimming test for a bachelor's degree (a matter that was rectified when Columbia gave him an honorary degree in 1983), he stayed at the university and eventually received an instructorship and finally a doctorate in psychology. While at Columbia University, Adler wrote his first book: Dialectic, published in 1927.
In 1930 Robert Hutchins, the newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, whom Adler had befriended some years earlier, arranged for Chicago’s law school to hire him as a professor of the philosophy of law; the philosophers at Chicago (who included James H. Tufts, E.A. Burtt, and George H. Mead) had "entertained grave doubts as to Mr. Adler's competence in the field [of philosophy]" and resisted Adler's appointment to the University's Department of Philosophy. Adler was the first "non-lawyer" to join the law school faculty. Adler also taught philosophy to business executives at the Aspen Institute.
Adler and Hutchins went on to found the Great Books of the Western World program and the Great Books Foundation. Adler founded and served as director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in 1952. He also served on the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica since its inception in 1949, and succeeded Hutchins as its chairman from 1974. As the director of editorial planning for the fifteenth edition of Britannica from 1965, he was instrumental in the major reorganization of knowledge embodied in that edition. He introduced the Paideia Proposal which resulted in his founding the Paideia Program, a grade-school curriculum centered around guided reading and discussion of difficult works (as judged for each grade). With Max Weismann, he founded The Center for the Study of The Great Ideas.
Adler long strove to bring philosophy to the masses, and some of his works (such as How to Read a Book) became popular bestsellers. He was also an advocate of economic democracy and wrote an influential preface to Louis Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto. Adler was often aided in his thinking and writing by Arthur Rubin, an old friend from his Columbia undergraduate days. In his own words:
Unlike many of my contemporaries, I never write books for my fellow professors to read. I have no interest in the academic audience at all. I'm interested in Joe Doakes. A general audience can read any book I write—and they do.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer...
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
August 2, 2014
This philosophical analysis of the problem of "human nature" casts a strong and rare light on one of the most important questions ever asked.
What is this thing called Man? In the first place he's an enigma, or, in the words of Jacob Needleman, "partly divine and partly an animal that reads." From ancient times man has been exalted as a being above all the other animals, holding mastery over the rest of creation by virtue of his intellectual power and his special relationship with God or, anyway, with ultimate reality. On the other hand, since the advent of modern science and particularly since the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, the species known as Homo sapiens has come to be seen as one organism among the many that make up the natural biological world, possessing unique and distinctive traits to be sure, but only in the sense that every other animal does as well. Man is the smartest land animal in the same way that the elephant is the heaviest and the cheetah the fastest.
This latter view is generally the view of the modern world and certainly that of modern science. But, as Mortimer J. Adler shows, we're not very consistent about this, and we certainly have not worked through the implications for our attitudes about society, law, and rights. He's convinced that if we wish to be governed by principles and by reason, it makes the biggest possible difference what our view of human nature is. For if man is really just one animal among many, then there can be no fundamental reason to justify treating humans and animals differently. We may not like what Hitler did to Jews, gypsies, and Jehovah's Witnesses, but our modern scientific view of human nature gives us no principled reason to criticize his regarding those humans as animals and treating them as such. True, Hitler was an animal too, but, he would say, a superior animal--and there lies the crux.
No one denies that man is an animal. The question is whether he is also anything more or other than that. Adler finds that the issue boils down to this: does man differ from all other animals in kind, or only in degree? He further examines the question of what it means to differ in kind, and finds that there are exactly two ways: a superficial way, which arises when a difference in degree passes a certain threshold that causes a jump in capability; or a radical way, which arises when a trait possessed by one creature is not possessed in any degree by another. In other words, if man is radically different in kind from other animals, then he possesses one or more traits that are not possessed at all by any other animal, and no amount of increasing other animals' existing traits will bring them any closer to humanity.
Adler takes his time developing his argument, and I found him sometimes repetitive in rephrasing and recapitulating his points, which made the book a bit longer than it needed to be. But I was very impressed with his rigor and his fearlessness in working through the issues in detail. I was also very impressed with his level of authority on this topic.
What do I mean by that? I mean that Adler, rather than being one arguer among many in this debate, brings a greater detachment, a much deeper education in the history of the topic, and perhaps most of all a keener insight into the consequences of its resolution for human society and the justice attainable within it. (That said, I think that Adler differs only in degree from his adversaries--not in kind!) As editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica and co-editor of the Britannica Great Books series, Adler brings a unique degree of background knowledge to the discussion. Indeed, his essay on "Man" in volume 3 of The Great Books makes an excellent warmup for reading this book.
Adler regards the question of human nature a "mixed" one--that is, a question that can be answered only by a combination of philosophical and scientific methods. He believes that psychologists, zoologists, and computer scientists have as much to contribute to the question as philosophers do, and expects (writing in 1967) a definite--or definite enough--answer to the question in the future. At the end of the book he sketches what he believes will be the implications of either answer to the question (the key difference turns out to be whether humans are or are not radically different in kind from other animals.)
In all I found Adler's treatment of the topic serious, cogent, and forceful. He really helped to make clear and definite many things that were fuzzy and confused in my mind. Possibly because my own spiritual and philosophical training, such as it is, has been Buddhist, I felt that the argument did not actually cover the whole terrain. Adler's viewpoint and background are unabashedly Western, and I felt that, despite his unswerving effort to be impartial and objective, he accepts certain ideas without question, or at least regards them as demonstrated beyond doubt. One of these is that perceptions, unlike conceptions, are a physical, material phenomenon. As far as I can tell, a "perception" is as much an intangible, mental phenomenon as a "conception" is, and if this is so, it has important, even decisive, implications for Adler's argument.
But even if that's the case, this book is extremely valuable and should be required reading for anyone who wants to participate in the discussion of human rights, animal rights, or the environment. In other words, so far from going out of date, Adler's book is becoming more timely with each passing day.
What is this thing called Man? In the first place he's an enigma, or, in the words of Jacob Needleman, "partly divine and partly an animal that reads." From ancient times man has been exalted as a being above all the other animals, holding mastery over the rest of creation by virtue of his intellectual power and his special relationship with God or, anyway, with ultimate reality. On the other hand, since the advent of modern science and particularly since the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man, the species known as Homo sapiens has come to be seen as one organism among the many that make up the natural biological world, possessing unique and distinctive traits to be sure, but only in the sense that every other animal does as well. Man is the smartest land animal in the same way that the elephant is the heaviest and the cheetah the fastest.
This latter view is generally the view of the modern world and certainly that of modern science. But, as Mortimer J. Adler shows, we're not very consistent about this, and we certainly have not worked through the implications for our attitudes about society, law, and rights. He's convinced that if we wish to be governed by principles and by reason, it makes the biggest possible difference what our view of human nature is. For if man is really just one animal among many, then there can be no fundamental reason to justify treating humans and animals differently. We may not like what Hitler did to Jews, gypsies, and Jehovah's Witnesses, but our modern scientific view of human nature gives us no principled reason to criticize his regarding those humans as animals and treating them as such. True, Hitler was an animal too, but, he would say, a superior animal--and there lies the crux.
No one denies that man is an animal. The question is whether he is also anything more or other than that. Adler finds that the issue boils down to this: does man differ from all other animals in kind, or only in degree? He further examines the question of what it means to differ in kind, and finds that there are exactly two ways: a superficial way, which arises when a difference in degree passes a certain threshold that causes a jump in capability; or a radical way, which arises when a trait possessed by one creature is not possessed in any degree by another. In other words, if man is radically different in kind from other animals, then he possesses one or more traits that are not possessed at all by any other animal, and no amount of increasing other animals' existing traits will bring them any closer to humanity.
Adler takes his time developing his argument, and I found him sometimes repetitive in rephrasing and recapitulating his points, which made the book a bit longer than it needed to be. But I was very impressed with his rigor and his fearlessness in working through the issues in detail. I was also very impressed with his level of authority on this topic.
What do I mean by that? I mean that Adler, rather than being one arguer among many in this debate, brings a greater detachment, a much deeper education in the history of the topic, and perhaps most of all a keener insight into the consequences of its resolution for human society and the justice attainable within it. (That said, I think that Adler differs only in degree from his adversaries--not in kind!) As editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica and co-editor of the Britannica Great Books series, Adler brings a unique degree of background knowledge to the discussion. Indeed, his essay on "Man" in volume 3 of The Great Books makes an excellent warmup for reading this book.
Adler regards the question of human nature a "mixed" one--that is, a question that can be answered only by a combination of philosophical and scientific methods. He believes that psychologists, zoologists, and computer scientists have as much to contribute to the question as philosophers do, and expects (writing in 1967) a definite--or definite enough--answer to the question in the future. At the end of the book he sketches what he believes will be the implications of either answer to the question (the key difference turns out to be whether humans are or are not radically different in kind from other animals.)
In all I found Adler's treatment of the topic serious, cogent, and forceful. He really helped to make clear and definite many things that were fuzzy and confused in my mind. Possibly because my own spiritual and philosophical training, such as it is, has been Buddhist, I felt that the argument did not actually cover the whole terrain. Adler's viewpoint and background are unabashedly Western, and I felt that, despite his unswerving effort to be impartial and objective, he accepts certain ideas without question, or at least regards them as demonstrated beyond doubt. One of these is that perceptions, unlike conceptions, are a physical, material phenomenon. As far as I can tell, a "perception" is as much an intangible, mental phenomenon as a "conception" is, and if this is so, it has important, even decisive, implications for Adler's argument.
But even if that's the case, this book is extremely valuable and should be required reading for anyone who wants to participate in the discussion of human rights, animal rights, or the environment. In other words, so far from going out of date, Adler's book is becoming more timely with each passing day.
December 29, 2018
Very thorough but somewhat leading
To be honest, Mortimer Adler does an admirable job presenting the various positions related to the continuity or discontinuity between animals and man (and hypothetical computers). He wrote the book as an agnostic and much like Fr Brown converting G.K. Chesterton to Catholicism, we can feel traces of Professor Adler's intellectual movement in his analysis though at the time of writing he is far from dogmatic.
Having previously read 'How to Read a Book', ghosts reappear here in Adler's writing. The Difference of Man is exceptionally systematic in its treatment of philosophical anthropology. Professor Adler begins by noting that the question is neither philosophic, nor scientific, but a combination. Then proceeds to ellucitade what qualifies as a 'difference', namely: differences in degree and differences in kind.
Of the differences in degree, he notes that there are two type: 1) Differences in degree ie. the quantity of a quality possessed by both X and Y and 2) Apparent differences in kind, due to a lack of intermediaries
Of the differences in kind, Adler notes likewise there are two types: 3) superficial differences in kind (where an underlying aspect differs only in degree) and 4) radical differences in kind
Adler points out that even though any number of scientists might openly state that they believe that man differs from animals only in degree, in reality, when it comes especially to language and conceptual thought (as opposed to perceptible thought) they nearly all believe that man differs from animals in kind (but only superficially in order to not break the ). He repeatedly points out a confusion or incosistency amongst some rather important scientists, evolutionary biologists, psychologist and lingusts on this point. But there is no assumption of malice where ignorance of the difference between apparent differences in degree and superficial differences in kind are concerned.
The two underlying aspects that make man's difference from animals only superficial are: psychological structures in man differ only in degree from those of animals and/or neurological structures differ only in degree from those of animals. Adler then examines these two and comes to the conclusion he has been leading the read to: the scientific and philosophic positions for the materialist position that the brain is the sufficient cause of man's conceptual ability and the immateralist position that the brain is only the necessary (but not sufficient) cause is...a draw.
This leads Professor Adler to the last ditch effort to resolve the situation: what he variously calls the Cartesian challenge or the Turing test. Adler notes that a successful Turing test would validate the argument that the difference in kind is merely superficial, however, no amount of failed tests will ever prove that the difference is radical, because a new and better robot could always be built. (He also mentions dolphins potentially having a conceptual language, but this area seems to have died out as no one has yet developed a dolphin-human dictionary).
Finally, Adler hypothesizes on what the implications would be for an affirmative answer to the question of whether the difference is only superficial as the boundaries between human and animal and person and thing are removed. He suggests that man will (re)turn to treating other (lesser) men as animals, whereas in reality we have seen the extension of rights down into the animal kingdom as vegetarianism and Peter Singer's Animal Liberation have gained in popularity.
Some areas that are in need of updating after 50 years are obviously the advances in neurology, psychology and genetics. Adler mentions Chomsky and linguistics but much of the book is still aimed as behaviouralism and could be updated in this regard (I admit to being rather ignorant myself of linguistics). Additionally, John Searle's China Room would be an interesting route to explore as it relates to the Turing test and artificial intelligence.
Overall, the book is excessively fair to those people with whom Adler disagrees. After 50 years it remains very current and foundational if somewhat in need of a good new appendix/post-script.
To be honest, Mortimer Adler does an admirable job presenting the various positions related to the continuity or discontinuity between animals and man (and hypothetical computers). He wrote the book as an agnostic and much like Fr Brown converting G.K. Chesterton to Catholicism, we can feel traces of Professor Adler's intellectual movement in his analysis though at the time of writing he is far from dogmatic.
Having previously read 'How to Read a Book', ghosts reappear here in Adler's writing. The Difference of Man is exceptionally systematic in its treatment of philosophical anthropology. Professor Adler begins by noting that the question is neither philosophic, nor scientific, but a combination. Then proceeds to ellucitade what qualifies as a 'difference', namely: differences in degree and differences in kind.
Of the differences in degree, he notes that there are two type: 1) Differences in degree ie. the quantity of a quality possessed by both X and Y and 2) Apparent differences in kind, due to a lack of intermediaries
Of the differences in kind, Adler notes likewise there are two types: 3) superficial differences in kind (where an underlying aspect differs only in degree) and 4) radical differences in kind
Adler points out that even though any number of scientists might openly state that they believe that man differs from animals only in degree, in reality, when it comes especially to language and conceptual thought (as opposed to perceptible thought) they nearly all believe that man differs from animals in kind (but only superficially in order to not break the ). He repeatedly points out a confusion or incosistency amongst some rather important scientists, evolutionary biologists, psychologist and lingusts on this point. But there is no assumption of malice where ignorance of the difference between apparent differences in degree and superficial differences in kind are concerned.
The two underlying aspects that make man's difference from animals only superficial are: psychological structures in man differ only in degree from those of animals and/or neurological structures differ only in degree from those of animals. Adler then examines these two and comes to the conclusion he has been leading the read to: the scientific and philosophic positions for the materialist position that the brain is the sufficient cause of man's conceptual ability and the immateralist position that the brain is only the necessary (but not sufficient) cause is...a draw.
The opposed philosophical arguments, as we have seen, are deadlocked in the sense that neither of the opponents has as yet been able to persuade the other, or is likely to in the near future. The scientific data at present available leave the philosophical issue unresolved; there is no neurological evidence that definitely favors one side or the other. In addition, we have seen why future neurological research cannot ever by itself be decisive on the question whether the brain is a necessary or sufficient condition of conceptual thought. (p. 249)
This leads Professor Adler to the last ditch effort to resolve the situation: what he variously calls the Cartesian challenge or the Turing test. Adler notes that a successful Turing test would validate the argument that the difference in kind is merely superficial, however, no amount of failed tests will ever prove that the difference is radical, because a new and better robot could always be built. (He also mentions dolphins potentially having a conceptual language, but this area seems to have died out as no one has yet developed a dolphin-human dictionary).
Finally, Adler hypothesizes on what the implications would be for an affirmative answer to the question of whether the difference is only superficial as the boundaries between human and animal and person and thing are removed. He suggests that man will (re)turn to treating other (lesser) men as animals, whereas in reality we have seen the extension of rights down into the animal kingdom as vegetarianism and Peter Singer's Animal Liberation have gained in popularity.
Some areas that are in need of updating after 50 years are obviously the advances in neurology, psychology and genetics. Adler mentions Chomsky and linguistics but much of the book is still aimed as behaviouralism and could be updated in this regard (I admit to being rather ignorant myself of linguistics). Additionally, John Searle's China Room would be an interesting route to explore as it relates to the Turing test and artificial intelligence.
Overall, the book is excessively fair to those people with whom Adler disagrees. After 50 years it remains very current and foundational if somewhat in need of a good new appendix/post-script.
Read
August 2, 2014The rigor and precision of Adler's thought is certainly to be admired. However his complete disavowal of the mental and emotional capacities of non-human animals leads one to wonder if he were bitten by a baby chick at age 4 and spent the rest of his days sequestered in a library out of fear of the hoot owl outside. Such isolation breeds hubris much as mildew collects on an old damp rag.
At the end of the day there are plants (and insects) with a greater awareness of what it means to be alive than ol' Mort.
At the end of the day there are plants (and insects) with a greater awareness of what it means to be alive than ol' Mort.
February 8, 2026
This book should be on your shortlist (Christian or not) who struggles with the idea of religion as nothing more than institutional dogma. Very meaty food for thought, especially in the age of AI which challenges the idea of the human as the only being of conceptual thought.
June 22, 2015
At first I really appreciated the very structured and thorough approach this book took. However, as it became clear that Adler was not going to really question any preconceptions or common beliefs he just came off as pretentious and sophomoric. My one star rating may be a bit harsh given how long ago it was written, but a lot of this book is out of date and even the pure philosophy parts aren't worth reading.
Read
June 21, 2014Excellent book, but written with careful attention to detail, with rigorous intellectual scrutiny, so not for the casual reader. Better if the reader knows something of the questions Adler addresses, and understands something about how philosophical questions are explored.
Want to read
December 14, 2009Recommended by James Schall in Another Sort of Learning, Bibliography.
February 1, 2023
Every part of this book was fascinating. And, while I did get bogged down in the lengthy (but ultimately necessary) descriptions of scientific investigations and conclusions, the consolidation by Adler was enlightening. I'm almost ashamed to admit that I did not really know that such a debate was ongoing: about whether man differs from other animals (and now, especially with the dawn of AI, machines) in degree, superficially in kind, or radically in kind.
This book, and the question it addresses, seems VERY important at this point in time, now that I see there are two machines/programs/technologies have passed the Turing test (the most recent being ChatGPT). I am curious to know what Adler or his successors would have to say about that result, and what bearing it has on Adler's big question.
This book, and the question it addresses, seems VERY important at this point in time, now that I see there are two machines/programs/technologies have passed the Turing test (the most recent being ChatGPT). I am curious to know what Adler or his successors would have to say about that result, and what bearing it has on Adler's big question.
July 8, 2019
This is a remarkable book for clarifying what it means to be human. It is unfortunate that men such as Roger Penrose (Shadows of the Mind) do not seem to have read it. What I got from this book was the meaning of AI (artificial intelligence) what if we can build AI and what if we find that we can not!
The current meaning of AI from an article if Forbes, is "activities commonly thought of as being done by humans." Pretty weak, but given all the sales hype for AI the last decade, it is accurate.
The current meaning of AI from an article if Forbes, is "activities commonly thought of as being done by humans." Pretty weak, but given all the sales hype for AI the last decade, it is accurate.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews