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Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
For more than a century, from 1900 to 2006, campaigns of nonviolent resistance were more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts in achieving their stated goals. By attracting impressive support from citizens, whose activism takes the form of protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and other forms of nonviolent noncooperation, these efforts help separate regimes from their main sources of power and produce remarkable results, even in Iran, Burma, the Philippines, and the Palestinian Territories.
Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the factors enabling such campaigns to succeed and, sometimes, causing them to fail. They find that nonviolent resistance presents fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and that higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' erstwhile supporters, including members of the military establishment.
Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.
Combining statistical analysis with case studies of specific countries and territories, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan detail the factors enabling such campaigns to succeed and, sometimes, causing them to fail. They find that nonviolent resistance presents fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and that higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' erstwhile supporters, including members of the military establishment.
Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published July 8, 2011
315 people are currently reading
5260 people want to read
About the author
Erica Chenoweth
12 books109 followersErica Chenoweth, Ph.D. is Professor & Associate Dean for Research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.
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July 12, 2021
§1. I saw this empirical and rigorous study praised, criticized and used in social movements, all for the wrong reasons.
§2. The main statement of the study is that nonviolent movements have been more successful than violent movements to achieve success or partial success in regime change, territorial independence or secession campaign in the last century.
This statement looks bold, but it isn't.
I read the book with the explicit intention of being dissuaded from my prior opinions on strategy. And I found something much less controversial, and much less relevant.
§3. By violent campaigns, they mean "nonstate armed opposition campaigns", like insurgencies, guerrilla warfare and civil wars. By nonviolent campaigns, they mean "nonstate unarmed opposition campaigns".
According to this definition, street blockades, throwing stones, burning garbage containers in the cities etc. are all nonviolent campaigns. In fact, even if there is a guerilla group of thousands of members, the movement is considered nonviolent if the urban nonviolent counterpart is the dominant element of the movement (in defining its strategy, its narrative and its objectives). The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 is considered a nonviolent campaign in the book.
This is the first common misunderstanding about the book: the authors are not having an ethical nonviolence debate, particularly because their examples include, by all standards, violent components.
This misunderstanding is about content.
§4. The main argument of the study is that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent campaigns, and that mass participation is positively correlated with success. I agree with this argument. What I mean is: they show data to prove this argument, but I agreed with this theory of change even before reading the study.
That who leads the masses leads the campaign, and that who uses tactics that can mobilize millions will probably lead the masses.
§5. The authors check the causality for a number of variables, to make sure they avoid "common cause" fallacies. Namely, they demonstrate that nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns, independent of existence of international sanctions, support by other states, regime crackdown, location of the campaign, date of the campaign, the level of oppressiveness of the regime, etc. Since they have 300+ cases in hand, the authors can just the statistics and see if any of these parameters could be a better explanation. I am really amazed by how they stick to the empirical approach throughout the book.
§6. The authors are working in the liberal democratic framework. Class struggle is just another campaign for them, and so are the neoliberal transitions in former socialist countries. Accordingly, the Iranian revolution of 1977-1979 that toppled the shah regime and replaced it with sharia is a success story.
Since they start with "mass support" as their initial condition, their conclusion is that any systemic change that goes beyond the hegemonic ideology is less prone to success as it attracts less people. No one doubts that there would be statistical evidence to prove that system change is not the hegemonic ideology in any system - in fact that's more or less the definition of hegemonic.
But this has a side effect in the argument: if we want mass movement and if we should therefore reduce our demands so that they are compatible with the Catholic Church or "the international community" (by which they mean the UN Security Council), then obviously we are aiming at changing less. So, we are reducing our success criteria, politically.
This is not a problem for the authors as their interest is in regime change and "democratization" in the liberal, capitalist sense of the word; their interest is not in the benefits of the working class. This is to say that the study is perfectly fine and clean in its argument; but I think many social movement organizers are not reading it properly.
This is the second misconception about the book. This is the misconception of framework.
§7. There is, however, a bigger misunderstanding. Not about content or framing, but about context.
This book was published in the series "Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare". Here is the editor's note in the beginning of the book:
"This series seeks to fill a conspicuous gap in the burgeoning literature on terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. The series adheres to the highest standards of scholarship and discourse and publishes books that elucidate the strategy, operations, means, motivations, and effects posed by terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations and movements."
Other books in the series are: "The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism", "Jewish Terrorism in Israel", and "The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West".
One could say that there is probably no better academic series for the book and justify its inclusion here. But then CHAPTER 1 of the book ends with a section called WIDER IMPLICATIONS. Here is what the authors say, please read carefully:
"Beyond scholarly contributions, this research possesses a number of important implications for public policy. Research regarding the successes and failures of nonviolent campaigns can provide insight into the most effective ways for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—to aid such movements. From the perspective of an outside state, providing support to nonviolent campaigns can sometimes aid the movements but also introduces a new set of dilemmas, including the free-rider problem and the potential loss of local legitimacy. This study strongly supports the view that sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns work best when they are coordinated with the support of local opposition groups; but they are never substitutes."
This is a carefully-written, rigorous, empirically-supported conclusion for imperialist policies. And this is not just a side note or an isolated paragraph. The argument is further developed in CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION.
For context, then, my intuition is: This book was not written for social movements. This book is about social movements but was written for imperialist policy-makers, diplomats, intelligence services, and army officials. The study is not talking to us.
This perspective shift was revealing but also confusing. There is a TED Talk on this, after all. To check, I re-read the peer-reviewed article (published in International Security) after finishing the book. I had read the article right before reading the book, but I was more confused by the article (I couldn't follow the tables and the data) and that was why I read the book.
Reading the article again but this time not as something written for me but as something written to an intelligence agent (yet still /about/ me), everything made sense.
§8. To conclude, I found the empirical approach quite informative and the presentation very rigorous. I also learned about some historical social movements in the case studies (PART 2 of the book). However, if you are reading it or if you are using its conclusions when building your strategy, bear in mind:
- The book is extremely likely *not* talking about the same "violence" you have in mind.
- The book is probably *not* talking about the same "movement" and "movement success" that you have in mind.
- The book is not written for you. You are ear-dropping to a conversation taking place within the status quo. See what you can learn from it, but don't treat it as a lecture directed at you.
§2. The main statement of the study is that nonviolent movements have been more successful than violent movements to achieve success or partial success in regime change, territorial independence or secession campaign in the last century.
This statement looks bold, but it isn't.
I read the book with the explicit intention of being dissuaded from my prior opinions on strategy. And I found something much less controversial, and much less relevant.
§3. By violent campaigns, they mean "nonstate armed opposition campaigns", like insurgencies, guerrilla warfare and civil wars. By nonviolent campaigns, they mean "nonstate unarmed opposition campaigns".
According to this definition, street blockades, throwing stones, burning garbage containers in the cities etc. are all nonviolent campaigns. In fact, even if there is a guerilla group of thousands of members, the movement is considered nonviolent if the urban nonviolent counterpart is the dominant element of the movement (in defining its strategy, its narrative and its objectives). The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 is considered a nonviolent campaign in the book.
This is the first common misunderstanding about the book: the authors are not having an ethical nonviolence debate, particularly because their examples include, by all standards, violent components.
This misunderstanding is about content.
§4. The main argument of the study is that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent campaigns, and that mass participation is positively correlated with success. I agree with this argument. What I mean is: they show data to prove this argument, but I agreed with this theory of change even before reading the study.
That who leads the masses leads the campaign, and that who uses tactics that can mobilize millions will probably lead the masses.
§5. The authors check the causality for a number of variables, to make sure they avoid "common cause" fallacies. Namely, they demonstrate that nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns, independent of existence of international sanctions, support by other states, regime crackdown, location of the campaign, date of the campaign, the level of oppressiveness of the regime, etc. Since they have 300+ cases in hand, the authors can just the statistics and see if any of these parameters could be a better explanation. I am really amazed by how they stick to the empirical approach throughout the book.
§6. The authors are working in the liberal democratic framework. Class struggle is just another campaign for them, and so are the neoliberal transitions in former socialist countries. Accordingly, the Iranian revolution of 1977-1979 that toppled the shah regime and replaced it with sharia is a success story.
Since they start with "mass support" as their initial condition, their conclusion is that any systemic change that goes beyond the hegemonic ideology is less prone to success as it attracts less people. No one doubts that there would be statistical evidence to prove that system change is not the hegemonic ideology in any system - in fact that's more or less the definition of hegemonic.
But this has a side effect in the argument: if we want mass movement and if we should therefore reduce our demands so that they are compatible with the Catholic Church or "the international community" (by which they mean the UN Security Council), then obviously we are aiming at changing less. So, we are reducing our success criteria, politically.
This is not a problem for the authors as their interest is in regime change and "democratization" in the liberal, capitalist sense of the word; their interest is not in the benefits of the working class. This is to say that the study is perfectly fine and clean in its argument; but I think many social movement organizers are not reading it properly.
This is the second misconception about the book. This is the misconception of framework.
§7. There is, however, a bigger misunderstanding. Not about content or framing, but about context.
This book was published in the series "Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare". Here is the editor's note in the beginning of the book:
"This series seeks to fill a conspicuous gap in the burgeoning literature on terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. The series adheres to the highest standards of scholarship and discourse and publishes books that elucidate the strategy, operations, means, motivations, and effects posed by terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations and movements."
Other books in the series are: "The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism", "Jewish Terrorism in Israel", and "The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West".
One could say that there is probably no better academic series for the book and justify its inclusion here. But then CHAPTER 1 of the book ends with a section called WIDER IMPLICATIONS. Here is what the authors say, please read carefully:
"Beyond scholarly contributions, this research possesses a number of important implications for public policy. Research regarding the successes and failures of nonviolent campaigns can provide insight into the most effective ways for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—to aid such movements. From the perspective of an outside state, providing support to nonviolent campaigns can sometimes aid the movements but also introduces a new set of dilemmas, including the free-rider problem and the potential loss of local legitimacy. This study strongly supports the view that sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns work best when they are coordinated with the support of local opposition groups; but they are never substitutes."
This is a carefully-written, rigorous, empirically-supported conclusion for imperialist policies. And this is not just a side note or an isolated paragraph. The argument is further developed in CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION.
For context, then, my intuition is: This book was not written for social movements. This book is about social movements but was written for imperialist policy-makers, diplomats, intelligence services, and army officials. The study is not talking to us.
This perspective shift was revealing but also confusing. There is a TED Talk on this, after all. To check, I re-read the peer-reviewed article (published in International Security) after finishing the book. I had read the article right before reading the book, but I was more confused by the article (I couldn't follow the tables and the data) and that was why I read the book.
Reading the article again but this time not as something written for me but as something written to an intelligence agent (yet still /about/ me), everything made sense.
§8. To conclude, I found the empirical approach quite informative and the presentation very rigorous. I also learned about some historical social movements in the case studies (PART 2 of the book). However, if you are reading it or if you are using its conclusions when building your strategy, bear in mind:
- The book is extremely likely *not* talking about the same "violence" you have in mind.
- The book is probably *not* talking about the same "movement" and "movement success" that you have in mind.
- The book is not written for you. You are ear-dropping to a conversation taking place within the status quo. See what you can learn from it, but don't treat it as a lecture directed at you.
February 6, 2025
Nonviolent resistance works better than violent resistance.
This is a book written with a specific goal: to convince the reader that non-violent resistance is superior to violent resistance. The authors delicately and succinctly lay out their argument in a scholarly way while providing their methodology. They looked at both violent and non-violent resistance movements all over the world from 1900 to 2006 and found clear statistical evidence that non-violent resistance is more successful at regime change than violent resistance.
One of the main advantages and characteristics of a non-violent movement is a low barrier for mass public participation. Violent resistance almost always relies on a smaller group of people, fragile networks, and unreliable external assistance. The low barrier of non-violent resistance opens the doors for a larger cohort of the public across racial, class and ideological lines that provides the impetus for the movement and insidiously chips away at the power and influence of the regime who is in control. It is way, way easier for a regime to crack down on a violent group who uses terrorism and/or guerrilla warfare in their resistance. The regime is provided with the social and political justification and ammunition to apply force and violence to destroy the violent opposition groups. Non-violent resistance is more like trying to nail Jello to the wall because it is more broadly spread among the populace and instills self-reflection in the regime members and often ultimate defection and collapse of the regime.
It is worth stating the violent resistance can and has succeeded in regime change but they most certainly succeed at much lower rates than non-violent movements, the authors provide ample evidence of this. Additionally, once a violent movement succeeds, they are way more likely to have much harsher civil rights abuses and oppressive instruments in place that are just as bad as the outgoing regime or even worse. Many examples of this abound.
The authors provide numerous case studies including the fall of the Sha in the Iranian revolution in the 1970s, the fall of Marcos in the Philippines, the Palestinian Intifadas and others. What many of these examples have in common is mass non-cooperation with the state, boycotts, strikes and protests.The authors are very careful with how they present these examples. They fully recognize that just because a nonviolent movement helped displace an authoritarian regime, it doesn’t mean the good times roll. This is especially true in the post-Sha theocratic rule in Iran and the de facto apartheid occuring in Israel after the well organized and transiently effective Intifadas. But here is what the authors argue quite effectively in my opinion with robust evidence: nonviolent campaigns are not only more likely to succeed in regime change but they more often have a liberal democracy afterwards and less likely to relapse into civil war. Violent coups more likely have rebranded authoritarian rule and more often have subsequent civil wars.
Many argue that non-violent resistance and violent resistance have a symbiotic relationship and that any success of a non-violent resistance is also owed to violence, but the authors did not find this to be true. Most of the evidence is that violent resistance actually has the opposite effect: the non-violent movements get lumped into the violent movement and together they are treated with justified violence from the regime.
I'm deeply troubled right now in 2024 about the extremism happening on both sides of the political spectrum. I lean left and so the threat from right wing extremism is very clear to me. There is a clear global neo fascist movement that is taking over the political world. That is unassailable. However, it would be very unwise to assume that there is not a loud minority of leftists that also seeks change and believe that violence is not only the only means of achieving change but is in fact virtuous.The marxist vanguard revolution ideology is very troubling to me and is a tactic that I condemn. We have abundant historical evidence that violent vanguardism has resulted in rebranded authoritarianism and human rights violations perhaps to the same degree as right wing fascist neoliberal and neocolonialism. Violent extremism, regardless of its ideology, is immoral, unethical, ineffective and should be widely condemned.
This is a book written with a specific goal: to convince the reader that non-violent resistance is superior to violent resistance. The authors delicately and succinctly lay out their argument in a scholarly way while providing their methodology. They looked at both violent and non-violent resistance movements all over the world from 1900 to 2006 and found clear statistical evidence that non-violent resistance is more successful at regime change than violent resistance.
One of the main advantages and characteristics of a non-violent movement is a low barrier for mass public participation. Violent resistance almost always relies on a smaller group of people, fragile networks, and unreliable external assistance. The low barrier of non-violent resistance opens the doors for a larger cohort of the public across racial, class and ideological lines that provides the impetus for the movement and insidiously chips away at the power and influence of the regime who is in control. It is way, way easier for a regime to crack down on a violent group who uses terrorism and/or guerrilla warfare in their resistance. The regime is provided with the social and political justification and ammunition to apply force and violence to destroy the violent opposition groups. Non-violent resistance is more like trying to nail Jello to the wall because it is more broadly spread among the populace and instills self-reflection in the regime members and often ultimate defection and collapse of the regime.
It is worth stating the violent resistance can and has succeeded in regime change but they most certainly succeed at much lower rates than non-violent movements, the authors provide ample evidence of this. Additionally, once a violent movement succeeds, they are way more likely to have much harsher civil rights abuses and oppressive instruments in place that are just as bad as the outgoing regime or even worse. Many examples of this abound.
The authors provide numerous case studies including the fall of the Sha in the Iranian revolution in the 1970s, the fall of Marcos in the Philippines, the Palestinian Intifadas and others. What many of these examples have in common is mass non-cooperation with the state, boycotts, strikes and protests.The authors are very careful with how they present these examples. They fully recognize that just because a nonviolent movement helped displace an authoritarian regime, it doesn’t mean the good times roll. This is especially true in the post-Sha theocratic rule in Iran and the de facto apartheid occuring in Israel after the well organized and transiently effective Intifadas. But here is what the authors argue quite effectively in my opinion with robust evidence: nonviolent campaigns are not only more likely to succeed in regime change but they more often have a liberal democracy afterwards and less likely to relapse into civil war. Violent coups more likely have rebranded authoritarian rule and more often have subsequent civil wars.
Many argue that non-violent resistance and violent resistance have a symbiotic relationship and that any success of a non-violent resistance is also owed to violence, but the authors did not find this to be true. Most of the evidence is that violent resistance actually has the opposite effect: the non-violent movements get lumped into the violent movement and together they are treated with justified violence from the regime.
I'm deeply troubled right now in 2024 about the extremism happening on both sides of the political spectrum. I lean left and so the threat from right wing extremism is very clear to me. There is a clear global neo fascist movement that is taking over the political world. That is unassailable. However, it would be very unwise to assume that there is not a loud minority of leftists that also seeks change and believe that violence is not only the only means of achieving change but is in fact virtuous.The marxist vanguard revolution ideology is very troubling to me and is a tactic that I condemn. We have abundant historical evidence that violent vanguardism has resulted in rebranded authoritarianism and human rights violations perhaps to the same degree as right wing fascist neoliberal and neocolonialism. Violent extremism, regardless of its ideology, is immoral, unethical, ineffective and should be widely condemned.
May 5, 2016
Excellent book! Chenoweth and Stephan do a superb job of showing the reader how and why nonviolent movements are superior vis-a-vis violent movements. It's clear that they painstakingly went through years of resistance movements and their idiosyncrasies and tried to figure out if they were successful in achieving their goals and why this was so. The book is filed with data, analysis, examples and case studies. Perfect read for folks wanting to understand WHY nonviolence works and why is often a better path when groups want social or political change.
December 14, 2020
I cannot believe that I finished it... And I needed one year and a half (or so) :) IT WAS HARDCORE.
Ok, a long story short: authors analyze what kind of violent or non-violent actions are more successful in asymmetrical fights (people/citizens VS regimes). Surprise surprise - non-violent fighting (i.e. peaceful mobilization for protests, stay-ins, a refusal to collaborate with a particular regime) is more effective. Even more important: long-term consequences are much better. Successful violent insurgencies may (and mostly do) lead nations to another non-democratic regime or a civil war. Not the best award for a victory...
After reading the book, the results of the research seem intuitive but I have to admit that it was not the case beforehand. So I want to share some ideas which looked important:
x (According to the book) I was surprised how rarely (a lot of statistics in the book) violent insurgencies are successful in comparison with non-violent o.O
x Furthermore, even many scholars argue that a "violent wing" or other military organizations complement a peaceful fight, very often they worsen everything. Firstly, public opinion, potential alliances and prevent loyalty shifts (what is extremely important - especially, regarding military and such)
x Secession-related fights are the only type (discussed in the book), which is //more or less// always unsuccessful
x Very often paramilitary (or even civic) organizations, which are striving to change a particular regime, try to find external sponsors but that may be a crucial mistake! It may reduce their legitimacy in the eyes of local populations (that is logical but for me, this tactic being bad was a surprise - probably if I wanted to organize a revolution, seeking external international help (financial one too) would be one of my first steps)
x Of course, sanctions and pressure to repressive regimes of important players may be very important - for example, when the USA decided not to support a dictator Marcos in the Philippines (yes, they did that for a long time because he was acting to be an enemy of the communism), the regime got a really strong blow. Summa summarum - if you need strong and resilient support of your population (or positive opinion of the international community) legitimacy in their eyes is crucial.
x a successful campaign may not be a success in the long term: violent actions - most of the cases - establish another authoritarian regime or leads to further fights in a country. Yet again, sometimes the old bad regime is still better than a new -previously widely supported - regime.
x even unsuccessful non-violent campaigns may lead to a democracy/ more democratic regimes in coming years because people have more necessary skills of the state-building/ often are more engaged and not so easy manipulated, plus, activists/ leaders know each other, have established networks, may share information or execute a greater pressure to regimes
x it is harder to reach a regime change if it is very repressive but the research showed that non-violent campaigns have a similar probability of success in very different conditions, repressive regimes are not excluded. Nevertheless, discipline, commitments to non-violence, unity are very important. Aaaaand it is crucial to dismantle the main pillars of power. Every regime has weaknesses: it may be workers strikes that paralyze essential industries and/ or causing loyalty shifts in militaries and other main - strongest - supporters.
x a broad and diverse base of people is important - yet again, it gives the legitimacy and proves that a concrete campaign represents not the narrow interests of one X group but "covers" many different groups
x oh, and violent campaigns cause too much traumas (and wishes for revenge), that negatively impacts countries for many years
x even the most perfect campaigns have no guarantees of success...
I hope Belarus will get rid of its idiotic dictator soon! According to this book, the protesters are doing everything well.
Ok, a long story short: authors analyze what kind of violent or non-violent actions are more successful in asymmetrical fights (people/citizens VS regimes). Surprise surprise - non-violent fighting (i.e. peaceful mobilization for protests, stay-ins, a refusal to collaborate with a particular regime) is more effective. Even more important: long-term consequences are much better. Successful violent insurgencies may (and mostly do) lead nations to another non-democratic regime or a civil war. Not the best award for a victory...
After reading the book, the results of the research seem intuitive but I have to admit that it was not the case beforehand. So I want to share some ideas which looked important:
x (According to the book) I was surprised how rarely (a lot of statistics in the book) violent insurgencies are successful in comparison with non-violent o.O
x Furthermore, even many scholars argue that a "violent wing" or other military organizations complement a peaceful fight, very often they worsen everything. Firstly, public opinion, potential alliances and prevent loyalty shifts (what is extremely important - especially, regarding military and such)
x Secession-related fights are the only type (discussed in the book), which is //more or less// always unsuccessful
x Very often paramilitary (or even civic) organizations, which are striving to change a particular regime, try to find external sponsors but that may be a crucial mistake! It may reduce their legitimacy in the eyes of local populations (that is logical but for me, this tactic being bad was a surprise - probably if I wanted to organize a revolution, seeking external international help (financial one too) would be one of my first steps)
x Of course, sanctions and pressure to repressive regimes of important players may be very important - for example, when the USA decided not to support a dictator Marcos in the Philippines (yes, they did that for a long time because he was acting to be an enemy of the communism), the regime got a really strong blow. Summa summarum - if you need strong and resilient support of your population (or positive opinion of the international community) legitimacy in their eyes is crucial.
x a successful campaign may not be a success in the long term: violent actions - most of the cases - establish another authoritarian regime or leads to further fights in a country. Yet again, sometimes the old bad regime is still better than a new -previously widely supported - regime.
x even unsuccessful non-violent campaigns may lead to a democracy/ more democratic regimes in coming years because people have more necessary skills of the state-building/ often are more engaged and not so easy manipulated, plus, activists/ leaders know each other, have established networks, may share information or execute a greater pressure to regimes
x it is harder to reach a regime change if it is very repressive but the research showed that non-violent campaigns have a similar probability of success in very different conditions, repressive regimes are not excluded. Nevertheless, discipline, commitments to non-violence, unity are very important. Aaaaand it is crucial to dismantle the main pillars of power. Every regime has weaknesses: it may be workers strikes that paralyze essential industries and/ or causing loyalty shifts in militaries and other main - strongest - supporters.
x a broad and diverse base of people is important - yet again, it gives the legitimacy and proves that a concrete campaign represents not the narrow interests of one X group but "covers" many different groups
x oh, and violent campaigns cause too much traumas (and wishes for revenge), that negatively impacts countries for many years
x even the most perfect campaigns have no guarantees of success...
I hope Belarus will get rid of its idiotic dictator soon! According to this book, the protesters are doing everything well.
December 23, 2021
A seemingly well researched book that unfortunately cherry picks their evidence in attempting to make a case for civil resistance and nonviolent campaigns
This is underlined by Maria Stephan composing her portion of the book in the US embassy in Kabul in which she was a lead officer in the US state department's mission to anticipate, prevent and respond to conflict that undermines US national interests. A clear link can be made towards this book arguing that pacifistic protest is effective and that pacifism and non-violence is what would give the US empire the easiest time. This could be extended further to claim that the authors are being disingenuous in their analysis and committing academic fraud to support their employers' and funders' interests.
In fact it was difficult to ignore the arrogance bred from within the ivory and concrete towers of the empire from which this book was written, when the authors chide Palestinans for using rocks and petrol bombs in the first intifada, implying that if they had only managed to stay peaceful, they would have won the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, rather than the more historically accurate analogue of total genocide and elimination
On the surface, their quantitative analysis ruled out confounding factors and issues of endogeneity (that is if nonviolent resistance proved to be a symptom of a high probability of campaign success rather than the cause of success, or that the conditions that motivate the choice to use violent resistance are the same conditions that predict campaign failure). However upon closer inspection their analysis rests on selective use of data and picking observations that would fit their message
I also found myself wanting further analysis beyond, what I found was, a rather strict dichotomy between violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, and greater focus on the complex interactions and intersections between the two would have added to the nuance of the issue
Qualitative case studies, which covered a mix of violent and nonviolent campaigns, attempt to capture these nuances better. However the researchers base their analysis on inaccurate comparisons of apples and oranges, invoking a sleight of hand in true Gandhian spirit, such as democracy in Slovenia and occupied Palestine, and arguing non-violence against Hitler was more successful than violent resistance.
For those interested in resistance and conflict, I would recommend "How to Blow up a Pipeline" by Andreas Malm that offers an antidote against status-quo funded research that obscures facts and figures for their own purposes, which I believe Chenoweth and Stephan have done
This is underlined by Maria Stephan composing her portion of the book in the US embassy in Kabul in which she was a lead officer in the US state department's mission to anticipate, prevent and respond to conflict that undermines US national interests. A clear link can be made towards this book arguing that pacifistic protest is effective and that pacifism and non-violence is what would give the US empire the easiest time. This could be extended further to claim that the authors are being disingenuous in their analysis and committing academic fraud to support their employers' and funders' interests.
In fact it was difficult to ignore the arrogance bred from within the ivory and concrete towers of the empire from which this book was written, when the authors chide Palestinans for using rocks and petrol bombs in the first intifada, implying that if they had only managed to stay peaceful, they would have won the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, rather than the more historically accurate analogue of total genocide and elimination
On the surface, their quantitative analysis ruled out confounding factors and issues of endogeneity (that is if nonviolent resistance proved to be a symptom of a high probability of campaign success rather than the cause of success, or that the conditions that motivate the choice to use violent resistance are the same conditions that predict campaign failure). However upon closer inspection their analysis rests on selective use of data and picking observations that would fit their message
I also found myself wanting further analysis beyond, what I found was, a rather strict dichotomy between violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, and greater focus on the complex interactions and intersections between the two would have added to the nuance of the issue
Qualitative case studies, which covered a mix of violent and nonviolent campaigns, attempt to capture these nuances better. However the researchers base their analysis on inaccurate comparisons of apples and oranges, invoking a sleight of hand in true Gandhian spirit, such as democracy in Slovenia and occupied Palestine, and arguing non-violence against Hitler was more successful than violent resistance.
For those interested in resistance and conflict, I would recommend "How to Blow up a Pipeline" by Andreas Malm that offers an antidote against status-quo funded research that obscures facts and figures for their own purposes, which I believe Chenoweth and Stephan have done
May 17, 2024
حقیقتا خود من رو کاملا متقاعد کرد در راه مبارزه با حکومت های توتالیتاریست، روشی که احتمال موفقیت بالاتری داره مبارزات خشونت پرهیزه و از راه های خشن دستاوردی حاصل نخواهد شد.
October 18, 2012
I tried to like this book. I tried to READ this book. I didn't finish it, I didn't even get through the third chapter. I am a huge fan of civil resistance and nonviolence and thus really wanted to like this book. But I just couldn't. It reads like a college essay. The whole first chapter is the authors quipping about how their research is better than any other research on the subject. And what I did read appeared to be them saying the same things over and over again while simply rearranging the words. I'm not disagreeing with the research itself, simply the manner in which it was presented. I feel like all the information they gave could have been presented in less than fifty pages, but they tried to stretch it out and that, to me, gave it an air of being mostly filler content.
June 16, 2019
Interesting insight into effectivness of nonviolent strategies and tactics. The book covers more than a century of social conflict and provides a scientific analysis of violent and nonviolent campaigns, while providing explanation of the key success/failure factors at play, while ilustrating them in a couple of case studies. In the end, the book provides a set of characteristics your movement should definitely have in order to raise it's chances of winning and delivering social change even under the most dire circumstances. However, note that the writing is more on the academic side.
August 19, 2015
Great book. A little dry, but I liked some of the stories, especially about mass protesters in the Philippines who surrounded soldiers, offering them flowers and chocolate and inviting the soldiers to join them. Oh also the "confetti demonstrations" in the business district of Manila where 100,000 office workers marched in the streets as protesters threw down yellow pieces of shredded phone books from the skyscrapers. That's awesome.
Basic take-away from the book: Nonviolent campaigns usually work better than violent ones, because:
- They are able to mobilize greater numbers of people (because the physical and moral barriers to participation are lower).
- They are able to mobilize more diverse segments of society (e.g. students, workers, families, clerics...).
- A nonviolent mobilization has more potential to create loyalty shifts on the part of the regime in power (e.g. military or other forces refusing to obey orders) because participants are not using violence against them. Also since it is large and diverse, protesters are more likely to have connections to those in the military which can help lead to loyalty shifts.
- Regime repression against large, nonviolent campaigns is more likely to backfire which can lead to greater mobilization, loyalty shifts in the regime, and international pressure.
- Large nonviolent campaigns are more likely to get international support
- Large nonviolent campaigns are usually better at "evading and remaining resilient in the face of regime repression" and develop more tactical, adaptive innovations than small campaigns
Basic take-away from the book: Nonviolent campaigns usually work better than violent ones, because:
- They are able to mobilize greater numbers of people (because the physical and moral barriers to participation are lower).
- They are able to mobilize more diverse segments of society (e.g. students, workers, families, clerics...).
- A nonviolent mobilization has more potential to create loyalty shifts on the part of the regime in power (e.g. military or other forces refusing to obey orders) because participants are not using violence against them. Also since it is large and diverse, protesters are more likely to have connections to those in the military which can help lead to loyalty shifts.
- Regime repression against large, nonviolent campaigns is more likely to backfire which can lead to greater mobilization, loyalty shifts in the regime, and international pressure.
- Large nonviolent campaigns are more likely to get international support
- Large nonviolent campaigns are usually better at "evading and remaining resilient in the face of regime repression" and develop more tactical, adaptive innovations than small campaigns
January 7, 2022
4.5 stars? Really interesting ideas, but also a slog to read - lots of data and confusing statistical models, and pretty repetitive.
The cool parts: they convincingly show that non-violent civil resistance is more effective (no matter the circumstances) at overturning governments than violent resistance.
Non-violent resistance is more effective because it involves more people, is harder to stop, employs more creative tactics that outflank regimes, often causes violent repression to backfire, and wins the sympathy of outside groups/nations.
So they also debunk the idea that insurgents turn to violence as a last resort: in fact although many groups imagine their resistance this way, violence is often a first (weaker) tactic.
A chunk of the book is case-studies where they show their theories in action, and I learned a lot from the history/re-telling of resistance movements (Iran, Philippines, Burma, Palestine). Side note: the US doesn’t have a great track record of protecting human rights in these situations… we tended to be a little more concerned with stopping communism :/
Really interesting stuff that I’ll be thinking about for a long time
The cool parts: they convincingly show that non-violent civil resistance is more effective (no matter the circumstances) at overturning governments than violent resistance.
Non-violent resistance is more effective because it involves more people, is harder to stop, employs more creative tactics that outflank regimes, often causes violent repression to backfire, and wins the sympathy of outside groups/nations.
So they also debunk the idea that insurgents turn to violence as a last resort: in fact although many groups imagine their resistance this way, violence is often a first (weaker) tactic.
A chunk of the book is case-studies where they show their theories in action, and I learned a lot from the history/re-telling of resistance movements (Iran, Philippines, Burma, Palestine). Side note: the US doesn’t have a great track record of protecting human rights in these situations… we tended to be a little more concerned with stopping communism :/
Really interesting stuff that I’ll be thinking about for a long time
June 22, 2025
Very academic and repetitive. The premise, that nonviolent protest is more effective than violent because of higher levels of participation, is sound and well-supported by the data but the writing is a veritable snooze fest.
November 10, 2014
Very good examination of why nonviolence succeeds, by multiple indicators, over violence.
It is a text book and written for scholars and students but is still worth adding to your library.
It is a text book and written for scholars and students but is still worth adding to your library.
February 3, 2025
"power actually depends on the consent of the civilian
population, consent that can be withdrawn and
reassigned to more legitimate or more compelling
parties." (p. 38)
June 24, 2025
Good and worth the read. They may have started to convert me. I think there are still some exceptions but they made some excellent points and I really enjoyed the case studies that were used. Highly recommend this one. 4.3 stars
April 24, 2012
On the nonviolent/civil disobedience side we have Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Aung San Suu Kyi, Desmond Tutu and Vaclav Havel; lining up with the armed struggle/revolutionary violence folks are George Washington, Ho Chi Minh, Emiliano Zapata, Simon Bolivar and Michael Collins. Whether one picks up the gun or sits-in at the presidential palace will depend on moral, intellectual and emotional judgments informed by religious training and convictions, social class and political ambition. Plus a survival instinct—whether you have a better chance of remaining alive with the rebels in the jungle or the protesters in the streets. Chenoweth and Stephan look at a broad range of civil conflict, both violent and nonviolent, and come up with a non-intuitive but very well argued reason for choosing the road that leads to the Oslo City Hall on December 10.
Put very simply, nonviolence works better. They identify a number of reasons: lower barriers to active participation in nonviolent resistance by the population in general (easier to convince someone the carry a picket sign than throw a bomb), the disruptive effects of mass nonviolent noncooperation and the greater likelihood of shifting loyalties among regime loyalists and security forces. Additionally there are significantly fewer moral issues in civil resistance to a repressive regime than using weapons and killing to overthrow it.
“Why Civil Resistance Works” seems to be a model of social science investigation of political phenomena. “Seems” because, since I am neither a scientist nor particularly social, I can’t judge their methodology. My only criticism is their sometimes artificial decision of when a campaign against an authoritarian government ends and therefore which of them succeeded and which failed. Myanmar/Burma is an example. The Saffron Revolution ended in repression and bloodshed in late 1997; monks and civilians were in the streets again in 2007; free elections which swept the inept, brutal generals from power happened this year. Chenoweth and Stephan call the 1997 events a failed nonviolent campaign and taken in isolation it was, as were the 2007 demonstrations. In order to gather data, measure it and draw conclusions investigators look at events as separate and isolated from their environment—if one is comparing two disparate things in this case violent and nonviolent resistance then it is necessary to strip away everything that isn’t comparable. Or at least one must attempt to.
Another way of looking at the last 20 years in Myanmar, though, is as a continuum with opposition to the generals going underground, possibly gaining strength from the growing international condemnation of their dictatorial rule (although the authors do a good job of showing that outside assistance isn’t of much help) and strengthening their resolve.
“Why Civil Resistance Works” has been praised by political scientists for its analytical rigor; I don’t have the quantitative or technical knowledge to know if they are right but will assume they are. However whether Chenoweth and Stephan prove their case isn’t as important as is their very lucid and polished style. Their deep immersion in the sources, critical reading and broad knowledge of the social, military and political causes and results of nonviolent resistance shows through.
Put very simply, nonviolence works better. They identify a number of reasons: lower barriers to active participation in nonviolent resistance by the population in general (easier to convince someone the carry a picket sign than throw a bomb), the disruptive effects of mass nonviolent noncooperation and the greater likelihood of shifting loyalties among regime loyalists and security forces. Additionally there are significantly fewer moral issues in civil resistance to a repressive regime than using weapons and killing to overthrow it.
“Why Civil Resistance Works” seems to be a model of social science investigation of political phenomena. “Seems” because, since I am neither a scientist nor particularly social, I can’t judge their methodology. My only criticism is their sometimes artificial decision of when a campaign against an authoritarian government ends and therefore which of them succeeded and which failed. Myanmar/Burma is an example. The Saffron Revolution ended in repression and bloodshed in late 1997; monks and civilians were in the streets again in 2007; free elections which swept the inept, brutal generals from power happened this year. Chenoweth and Stephan call the 1997 events a failed nonviolent campaign and taken in isolation it was, as were the 2007 demonstrations. In order to gather data, measure it and draw conclusions investigators look at events as separate and isolated from their environment—if one is comparing two disparate things in this case violent and nonviolent resistance then it is necessary to strip away everything that isn’t comparable. Or at least one must attempt to.
Another way of looking at the last 20 years in Myanmar, though, is as a continuum with opposition to the generals going underground, possibly gaining strength from the growing international condemnation of their dictatorial rule (although the authors do a good job of showing that outside assistance isn’t of much help) and strengthening their resolve.
“Why Civil Resistance Works” has been praised by political scientists for its analytical rigor; I don’t have the quantitative or technical knowledge to know if they are right but will assume they are. However whether Chenoweth and Stephan prove their case isn’t as important as is their very lucid and polished style. Their deep immersion in the sources, critical reading and broad knowledge of the social, military and political causes and results of nonviolent resistance shows through.
March 6, 2018
What a fascinating book. A short confession: I am against political violence. The rating I've given might be in part due to the book agreeing with my views.
Now that I've said that, the book is wonderful. It presents the idea that non-violent mass movements are the most effective way to topple repressive governments or acquire concessions from them. The researches have a data set of two hundred and some insurgencies, which they analyze from multiple angles. The first part of the book covers the theory, the second part goes through four case studies to illustrate the points.
The biggest lesson for me was how non-violent campaigns produce more stable outcomes than violent campaigns. Failed violent campaigns reduce the probability of a country remaining a democratic country five years after the campaign ends. In short, live by the sword, die by the sword.
The book, as are any books that deal with tyrannies, a good antidote against first-world problems. Things could be so much worse, and still are, in many places around the world.
Now that I've said that, the book is wonderful. It presents the idea that non-violent mass movements are the most effective way to topple repressive governments or acquire concessions from them. The researches have a data set of two hundred and some insurgencies, which they analyze from multiple angles. The first part of the book covers the theory, the second part goes through four case studies to illustrate the points.
The biggest lesson for me was how non-violent campaigns produce more stable outcomes than violent campaigns. Failed violent campaigns reduce the probability of a country remaining a democratic country five years after the campaign ends. In short, live by the sword, die by the sword.
Insurgents who claim that violent resistance is necessary are probably always wrong. In fact, we conjecture that many of the groups that claim violence as a last resort may have never attempted strategic non-violent action, judging it to be too difficult at the outset.
The book, as are any books that deal with tyrannies, a good antidote against first-world problems. Things could be so much worse, and still are, in many places around the world.
February 15, 2022
Her ne kadar akademik bir dile sahip olsa da sıkılmadan okunabilecek bir eser var karşımızda. Meseleyi ele alışını açık, net ve anlaşılır bir dille ifade eden, savlarını çok sayıda kanıtla destekleyen ve örneklemelerini kusursuz yapan bir eser. Kusursuzluğunu sağlayan şey sistematik metodolojisi değil, 3 önemli örneklemesini çok detaylı ve akıcı bir şekilde anlatıyor olması. Kitabın ortalarına denk gelen bu kısım gerçekten çok etkileyici. İran devrimi hakkında çok şey bildiğimi iddia ederdim (en az 3 kitap okumuştum konuyla alakalı) ancak burada verilen detaylara daha önce başka yerde rastlamadım. Bu kısımlar bolca bilimsel referanslarla desteklendiği için, müthiş detaylı, nesnel ve çok akıcı olmuş. Keza Filistin örneğinde İntifada hakkında bilgilerimin ne kadar eksik olduğunu fark ettim. Son örnek Filipinler örneği ise en az bildiğim bir hadise idi.
Yazarın iddialarını destekleyecek söyleme Noam Chomsky'nin yer aldığı Requiem for the American Dream (2015) belgeselde denk gelmiştim. Belgeselin en sonunda Chomsky'nin söyledikleri ile bu kitabın savları birebir örtüşüyor.
Yazarın iddialarını destekleyecek söyleme Noam Chomsky'nin yer aldığı Requiem for the American Dream (2015) belgeselde denk gelmiştim. Belgeselin en sonunda Chomsky'nin söyledikleri ile bu kitabın savları birebir örtüşüyor.
September 2, 2013
This was a little more academic than I expected it to be but still very accessible. Its message is very important, too - the data is in and violent insurgency is not a rational last-resort tactic that will succeed when all else fails. It's all statistical, of course, but the truth is that nonviolent civil resistance is more likely to succeed, more likely to result in peaceful democracy (as opposed to the insurgents taking over and being just as bad as the last lot), and safer to participate in. Oh, and violence is not generally chosen as a rational last-resort option, it's chosen because of anger and violent impulses, and because of the presumed futility of nonviolence, as much as anything else.
This book is essential reading for any serious activist or foreign policy wonk, but if you can't be bothered with the whole thing, this lecture gives you a good oversight.
This book is essential reading for any serious activist or foreign policy wonk, but if you can't be bothered with the whole thing, this lecture gives you a good oversight.
September 29, 2019
An interesting book that has several major flaws, particularly when considering the question of state power. But the book is much more nuanced than many of the crude summaries of this work that are common within some social movements today. My full review: https://resolutereader.blogspot.com/2...
November 1, 2025
This is a book length secutities studies paper that presents a nearly irrefutable argument on why civil resistance works, not from a moral stance (the authors note that there is ample literature on that subject) but from a practical results based position. If you want to be able to make concrete, evidence based arguments on the practicality of non-violent direct action, read this book. If you want to understand the dynamics of nonviolent resistance, read this book. Read this book with a friend or two, though. I read Why Civil Resistance Works with my partner Ida Grace and it took us months. This work is as dense and technical as you can imagine it could be. If highly technical isn't accessible to you, I recommend Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know, also by Erica Chenoweth.
December 5, 2025
This was very repetitive, is that just how academic books are?
This book argues that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance. I appreciated learning about the mechanisms behind its effectiveness using historical examples of civil resistance (even though the historical accounts weren't provided fully/were biased)
This book argues that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violent resistance. I appreciated learning about the mechanisms behind its effectiveness using historical examples of civil resistance (even though the historical accounts weren't provided fully/were biased)
February 15, 2026
As much as I wanted to like this book, I just can't recommend it as anything other than an aside in a college course. Of all prime examples to choose - the Iranian revolution and Palestinian Intafada? This book summarizes extensive research, but I do feel that the cases were twisted to fit the end findings. Hopefully civil resistance works better than violent resistance, but after reading this book, I can't tell you any more about how to go about it.
January 27, 2026
Very academic but it made me feel better. Non-violent civil resistance is important and more effective than violent protest. Non-violent protest does work.
Read
November 11, 2025Many people have at least heard of the "3.5% rule" of resistance. Broadly speaking, it says, "Nonviolent protests are twice as likely to succeed as armed conflicts – and those engaging a threshold of 3.5% of the population have never failed to bring about change."
I would like to believe this. Believing it has encouraged many, many people to engage in mass demonstrations in the U.S. against the would-be dictator in the White House, including something like 7 million people on No Kings Day, 10/18/25. But it's clear to me that the simple version of the rule is leaving a lot out. So, using my political science training for good, I decided to read the original statement in this book, and lay it out in non-technical terms for my own readers.
Authors Erica Chenoweth (Author)Maria J. Stephan (Author) state the question they are investigating this way: "...why nonviolent resistance often succeeds relative to violent resistance, and under what conditions nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails."
Their short answer: "...between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success...." The campaigns they rated as successful or partly successful included campaigns against repressive regimes, or against occupation, or for national self-determination, as well as the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa. (Movements for secession rarely ever succeeded, and never nonviolently.)
Why? I was surprised to learn that their answer--because nonviolent resistance attracts a much larger number of participants--was not most political scientists' answer when they published the book. Most thought it was either political opportunity (the time was right for resistance because the regime was already crumbling) or "resource mobilization" (the structure of the movement and the assets it could bring to the struggle). This book's answer makes success depend more on people's decisions. To oversimplify: when we fight, nonviolently, we most likely win!
In their theory, the reasons that having huge numbers of participants matters so much include:
This all sounds plausible. When I look closely at the evidence, however, I am worried that the authors may have seen what they wanted to see. The definitions of success and failure are a bit subjective. Even more so, the definitions of violent and nonviolent, because when does a mass movement occurring after or at the same time as a guerrilla campaign against the government get to be called nonviolent? These questions make me doubt that you can derive a rule from them.
Better to turn it into a narrative: if you are trying to resist an authoritarian regime, here's what to think about. Unfortunately, when the authors do turn to narrative, in case studies, it makes their "strategic logic" seem even more fuzzy. One of their arguments about successful violent revolution is that it often leads to repression after the revolution succeeds; yet, the example of Iran shows that a nonviolent revolution can lead to the same result. Was Ayatollah Khomeini worth struggling for?
The example of the First Intifadah in the Occupied Territories seems especially poignant now, after the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas that killed about 1,200 people in Israel and after the Israeli war on Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of people and devastated the landscape for years to come. Today, it is hard to see the Intifadah as a partial success, as the authors did in 2011.
Yes, the First Intifadah helped to change international opinion of the Israeli government and led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Under different circumstances, that could have moved toward a negotiated two-state solution. But as the authors point out, the First Intifadah did not affect the perception of Israelis that Palestinians did not want peace. They quote Adam Keller, an Israeli peace activist: "Most Israelis do not consider stone throwing to be nonviolent, and that is mostly all they ever saw." (p. 143) Plus, the Palestinian resistance continued to be highly divided, and violence continued to be the preferred method of some parts of it. Hamas' violent attacks therefore led to the consequences the authors would have predicted: a crackdown that (at least initially) neither the world nor most Israeli citizens condemned. That part of their theory holds.
The Burmese example seems to make my point: that it's more than just the violence or nonviolence variable that leads to failure or success. In particular, the ability of the opposition to unify is crucial.
In the conclusion, the authors themselves state:
I would disagree that this ability inevitably increases as the numbers of participants do. It is "obvious to anyone who has studied" social movements that structures, resources, and especially training all matter in an ongoing struggle. So, if you have read this long review so far and are still interested in thinking about what will help us resist fascism in the U.S., here are some other books I would recommend:
This Is An Uprising, by Mark and Paul Engler
Waging a Good War: A Military History of The Civil Rights Movement, by Thomas Ricks
We Do This 'Til We Free Us, by Mariame Kaba
I would like to believe this. Believing it has encouraged many, many people to engage in mass demonstrations in the U.S. against the would-be dictator in the White House, including something like 7 million people on No Kings Day, 10/18/25. But it's clear to me that the simple version of the rule is leaving a lot out. So, using my political science training for good, I decided to read the original statement in this book, and lay it out in non-technical terms for my own readers.
Authors Erica Chenoweth (Author)Maria J. Stephan (Author) state the question they are investigating this way: "...why nonviolent resistance often succeeds relative to violent resistance, and under what conditions nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails."
Their short answer: "...between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success...." The campaigns they rated as successful or partly successful included campaigns against repressive regimes, or against occupation, or for national self-determination, as well as the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa. (Movements for secession rarely ever succeeded, and never nonviolently.)
Why? I was surprised to learn that their answer--because nonviolent resistance attracts a much larger number of participants--was not most political scientists' answer when they published the book. Most thought it was either political opportunity (the time was right for resistance because the regime was already crumbling) or "resource mobilization" (the structure of the movement and the assets it could bring to the struggle). This book's answer makes success depend more on people's decisions. To oversimplify: when we fight, nonviolently, we most likely win!
In their theory, the reasons that having huge numbers of participants matters so much include:
1. Large, peaceful resistance raises the costs of repression.
2. When the regime does use force to repress a popular nonviolent movement, it shifts the loyalties of people in key institutions.
3. Violent resistance may backfire. It tends to rally business, bureaucrats, churches, the media, and especially the military to support the existing regime. Nonviolent resistance can lead to defections, and having police and troops who won't obey the regime's orders is crucial for change. "In fact, such defections increase the likelihood of success by nearly 60 percent." (p. 58)
4. Large, peaceful resistance encourages other nations and international organizations to punish the regime with economic sanctions.
5. The larger the peaceful nonviolent movement, the more different and sometimes innovative tactics it can use.
This all sounds plausible. When I look closely at the evidence, however, I am worried that the authors may have seen what they wanted to see. The definitions of success and failure are a bit subjective. Even more so, the definitions of violent and nonviolent, because when does a mass movement occurring after or at the same time as a guerrilla campaign against the government get to be called nonviolent? These questions make me doubt that you can derive a rule from them.
Better to turn it into a narrative: if you are trying to resist an authoritarian regime, here's what to think about. Unfortunately, when the authors do turn to narrative, in case studies, it makes their "strategic logic" seem even more fuzzy. One of their arguments about successful violent revolution is that it often leads to repression after the revolution succeeds; yet, the example of Iran shows that a nonviolent revolution can lead to the same result. Was Ayatollah Khomeini worth struggling for?
The example of the First Intifadah in the Occupied Territories seems especially poignant now, after the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas that killed about 1,200 people in Israel and after the Israeli war on Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of people and devastated the landscape for years to come. Today, it is hard to see the Intifadah as a partial success, as the authors did in 2011.
Yes, the First Intifadah helped to change international opinion of the Israeli government and led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Under different circumstances, that could have moved toward a negotiated two-state solution. But as the authors point out, the First Intifadah did not affect the perception of Israelis that Palestinians did not want peace. They quote Adam Keller, an Israeli peace activist: "Most Israelis do not consider stone throwing to be nonviolent, and that is mostly all they ever saw." (p. 143) Plus, the Palestinian resistance continued to be highly divided, and violence continued to be the preferred method of some parts of it. Hamas' violent attacks therefore led to the consequences the authors would have predicted: a crackdown that (at least initially) neither the world nor most Israeli citizens condemned. That part of their theory holds.
The Burmese example seems to make my point: that it's more than just the violence or nonviolence variable that leads to failure or success. In particular, the ability of the opposition to unify is crucial.
In the conclusion, the authors themselves state:
Campaigns do not succeed simply because they have won the moral high ground, as some may suggest. Rather, the ability of the campaign to make strategic adjustments to changing conditions is crucial to its success, whether it is nonviolent or violent...the ability to outthink and outmaneuver one's adversary is obvious to anyone who has studied conflict. (p.221)
I would disagree that this ability inevitably increases as the numbers of participants do. It is "obvious to anyone who has studied" social movements that structures, resources, and especially training all matter in an ongoing struggle. So, if you have read this long review so far and are still interested in thinking about what will help us resist fascism in the U.S., here are some other books I would recommend:
This Is An Uprising, by Mark and Paul Engler
Waging a Good War: A Military History of The Civil Rights Movement, by Thomas Ricks
We Do This 'Til We Free Us, by Mariame Kaba
September 3, 2017
Review first published on My Blog.
An in-depth study and analysis of how successful nonviolent and violent campaigns are historically. The thesis is that non-violent campaigns are more successful at achieving their results long-term and since they were looking mostly at regime changes, ending up in a more democratic government as well. They reviewed campaigns going back to 1900 and wrote about 4 specific case studies in the book to illustrate specific points (Iran, Philippines, Burma, and Israel/Palestine). Their conclusion is that non-violent campaigns are more successful for a variety of reasons (which they do go into fairly deeply) than violent ones and have a better outcome over 5-10 years after.
I read this for book club but admit to this being something I'm interested in for a variety of reasons. Most of which have to do with learning more history about other countries around the world and how different types of governments work and don't work and how the people react to them when they don't work for the people. That being said, this is definitely a text book and reads like I would imagine a doctoral thesis paper would, especially the first several chapters. It was dry and very difficult for a layperson like myself to get through. Once we got to the case studies, it was much more approachable and I really enjoyed seeing how these events unfolded especially since they either happened before I was born or when I was young enough to not really be paying attention to the world outside my neighborhood. I vaguely remember something happening in the Philippines and the talk about Imelda Marcos's shoes but that's really it. I know a little about what is going on in Israel and Palestine and I have a very basic understanding of the root issues and while this didn't go much into all that, it was interesting to see some of what has happened there over the years.
An in-depth study and analysis of how successful nonviolent and violent campaigns are historically. The thesis is that non-violent campaigns are more successful at achieving their results long-term and since they were looking mostly at regime changes, ending up in a more democratic government as well. They reviewed campaigns going back to 1900 and wrote about 4 specific case studies in the book to illustrate specific points (Iran, Philippines, Burma, and Israel/Palestine). Their conclusion is that non-violent campaigns are more successful for a variety of reasons (which they do go into fairly deeply) than violent ones and have a better outcome over 5-10 years after.
I read this for book club but admit to this being something I'm interested in for a variety of reasons. Most of which have to do with learning more history about other countries around the world and how different types of governments work and don't work and how the people react to them when they don't work for the people. That being said, this is definitely a text book and reads like I would imagine a doctoral thesis paper would, especially the first several chapters. It was dry and very difficult for a layperson like myself to get through. Once we got to the case studies, it was much more approachable and I really enjoyed seeing how these events unfolded especially since they either happened before I was born or when I was young enough to not really be paying attention to the world outside my neighborhood. I vaguely remember something happening in the Philippines and the talk about Imelda Marcos's shoes but that's really it. I know a little about what is going on in Israel and Palestine and I have a very basic understanding of the root issues and while this didn't go much into all that, it was interesting to see some of what has happened there over the years.
May 5, 2021
Why Civil Resistance Works feels like one of the most important books I'll read this year (yes, I know it's only February). It's incredibly well cited and researched, and I don't know enough about statistics to judge whether they're used well, but I trust Erica Chenoweth, so I believe her when she tells me what they mean.
The basic thesis of Why Civil Resistance Works is that with non-violent resistance, there is a wider base of participation, due to lower informational, moral, and commitment barriers. With that wider participation comes a higher variety of tactics, due to the greater diversity of participants, an increased likelihood of regime defections, due to increased likelihood of familial bonds, AND the moral cost of violent suppression of non-violent resistance. It is also easier for negotiations to take place, and governments resulting from nonviolent resistance are much more likely to be stable democracies than governments resulting from violent resistance. This is not always true, such as in the case study example of Iran, which had a successful non-violent resistance, but did not remain a stable democracy for long, but the numbers Chenoweth were finding were pretty astonishing.
I'll admit that I struggled my way through the book -- it's very dense and very dry, but absolutely worth it. I feel that I understand more about the specific countries used in the case studies, and I now have a better understanding of what makes resistance effective. This feels like important information to have, just in general, but with so many people throwing around the #resistance, I felt I should know a little more about what actually makes things work, rather than just showing up for a march every once in a while.
Also, if you like graphs, there's tons of graphs. All in all, it's a great book, I learned a ton, but you have to be ready to put the work in to reading it.
The basic thesis of Why Civil Resistance Works is that with non-violent resistance, there is a wider base of participation, due to lower informational, moral, and commitment barriers. With that wider participation comes a higher variety of tactics, due to the greater diversity of participants, an increased likelihood of regime defections, due to increased likelihood of familial bonds, AND the moral cost of violent suppression of non-violent resistance. It is also easier for negotiations to take place, and governments resulting from nonviolent resistance are much more likely to be stable democracies than governments resulting from violent resistance. This is not always true, such as in the case study example of Iran, which had a successful non-violent resistance, but did not remain a stable democracy for long, but the numbers Chenoweth were finding were pretty astonishing.
I'll admit that I struggled my way through the book -- it's very dense and very dry, but absolutely worth it. I feel that I understand more about the specific countries used in the case studies, and I now have a better understanding of what makes resistance effective. This feels like important information to have, just in general, but with so many people throwing around the #resistance, I felt I should know a little more about what actually makes things work, rather than just showing up for a march every once in a while.
Also, if you like graphs, there's tons of graphs. All in all, it's a great book, I learned a ton, but you have to be ready to put the work in to reading it.
August 9, 2020
(In the interest of full disclosure, I am co-worker of one of the co-authors of this book at the US Institute of Peace, but we don't work on the same team and I haven't discussed this book with her.)
This is a clearly-written account of how nonviolent resistance movements have succeeded in achieving their goals, which based on the authors' data has occurred at a rate exceeding those of violent resistance movements. While the choice of tactics is not in and of itself predictive of certain success — both kinds of movements still regularly fail — the authors make the case that nonviolent resistance movements are able to draw greater participation from across different segments of society, which ultimately increases their tactical flexibility, broadens their base of support, and makes it more difficult for incumbent regimes to suppress them. The adoption of nonviolence also makes it easier for resistance movements to split the incumbent regime, pulling apart regime bases of support (particularly by facilitating security force defections) rather than backing them into a unified corner (less likely to occur if the potential defectors are also facing violent attacks). The authors further note that regime transitions that emerge from nonviolent movements are more likely to produce governing systems that avoid violent breakdowns and civil wars, unlikely violent movements that achieve their goals.
This is a clearly-written account of how nonviolent resistance movements have succeeded in achieving their goals, which based on the authors' data has occurred at a rate exceeding those of violent resistance movements. While the choice of tactics is not in and of itself predictive of certain success — both kinds of movements still regularly fail — the authors make the case that nonviolent resistance movements are able to draw greater participation from across different segments of society, which ultimately increases their tactical flexibility, broadens their base of support, and makes it more difficult for incumbent regimes to suppress them. The adoption of nonviolence also makes it easier for resistance movements to split the incumbent regime, pulling apart regime bases of support (particularly by facilitating security force defections) rather than backing them into a unified corner (less likely to occur if the potential defectors are also facing violent attacks). The authors further note that regime transitions that emerge from nonviolent movements are more likely to produce governing systems that avoid violent breakdowns and civil wars, unlikely violent movements that achieve their goals.
February 17, 2017
A very excellent study about the efficacy of nonviolent civil resistance.
My only beef with it is that the definitions of "nonviolent" and "violent" resistance campaigns is not given a lot of analysis. Early on in the book, the authors correctly state that "Few campaigns, historically, have been purely violent or nonviolent, and many resistance movements [...] have had violent and nonviolent periods. Armed and unarmed often operate simultaneously in the same struggle." Unfortunately, this complexity isn't reflected in the case studies, which depict nonviolent movements never using violence at all, while the violent movements in the same struggles never utilize nonviolent methods. I think the data speaks for itself on the effectiveness of nonviolence and why it succeeds, it's just disappointing that the book doesn't problematize the dichotomy between violence and nonviolence.
My only beef with it is that the definitions of "nonviolent" and "violent" resistance campaigns is not given a lot of analysis. Early on in the book, the authors correctly state that "Few campaigns, historically, have been purely violent or nonviolent, and many resistance movements [...] have had violent and nonviolent periods. Armed and unarmed often operate simultaneously in the same struggle." Unfortunately, this complexity isn't reflected in the case studies, which depict nonviolent movements never using violence at all, while the violent movements in the same struggles never utilize nonviolent methods. I think the data speaks for itself on the effectiveness of nonviolence and why it succeeds, it's just disappointing that the book doesn't problematize the dichotomy between violence and nonviolence.
April 24, 2019
This book I read a few years ago and it’s really cool and interesting. The authors analyze case studies of nonviolent resistance movements from the past 100 years or so to identify what makes these movements effective (more so than violent uprisings). I think this topic is complicated, and it’s easy as person with more privilege/less experiences of oppression to advocate for nonviolent resistance, so I appreciate this book attempting to look more objectively at how effective these movements are and in what ways.
July 31, 2012
Excellent and well laid-out research on the facts surrounding the efficacy of nonviolence in social movements ranging from national revolutions to small-scale worker's strikes. There were times though where I had disagreements with the exact reasons used to name a particular movement as a "success" or "failure". However, researchers looking for empirical evidence to back up theories on nonviolent vs. violent change will find much to use here.
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