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Rethinking Chinese Politics
Understanding Chinese politics has become more important than ever. Some argue that China's political system is 'institutionalized' or that 'win all/lose all' struggles are a thing of the past, but, Joseph Fewsmith argues, as in all Leninist systems, political power is difficult to pass on from one leader to the next. Indeed, each new leader must deploy whatever resources he has to gain control over critical positions and thus consolidate power. Fewsmith traces four decades of elite politics from Deng to Xi, showing how each leader has built power (or not). He shows how the structure of politics in China has set the stage for intense and sometimes violent intra-elite struggles, shaping a hierarchy in which one person tends to dominate, and, ironically, providing for periods of stability between intervals of contention.
250 pages, Hardcover
Published June 17, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
May 23, 2022
First and foremost: this book is not for everyone. Fewsmith has produced a great little volume aimed at the more wonkish China-watchers out there, chock full of interesting observations and analysis of the past few CCP Politburo Standing Committees. I think a great way to know how much you would enjoy this book is to ask yourself how interested you are in elite CCP party politics, and how compelling you would find thorough breakdowns of the memberships of the past 9 or so Politburos. This book gets pretty into the weeds, is what I’m saying. If you don’t know who, say, Zhou Yongkang is for instance, then that’s probably a good indicator that much of the material covered here might be a bit too niche for you.
All that being said, I thoroughly enjoyed this book. I learned a lot, and I was persuaded by one half of the author’s main thesis.
Fewsmith makes two separate but related main arguments: 1. Because of certain pathologies of it’s one-party system, the CCP has not “institutionalized” power in the same way Weberian-style bureaucracies have - I.e. it has not developed rules and regulations which consistently constrain behaviour and stem the personalization of power and the prevalence of factionalism. This lack of “institutionalization” is most notable when observing power transfers from one paramount CCP leader to the next. Moreover, “by focusing on “insitutionalization,” they (China scholars) miss some of the most important aspects of China’s political system.”
Broadly speaking, I am convinced by Fewsmith’s arguments here. He clearly has an excellent grasp of the ins and outs of the factionalism and elite pilots of the past 40 years and his narrative pretty compellingly demonstrates that there has been no consistent mechanism in the PRC whereby new leaders are selected and power passed to them. There are norms in the CCP, to be sure, but as Fewsmith writes: “in China, however, longevity has occurred through manipulation and violation of rules, not through the creation of binding institutions.”
While Fewsmith’s argument is convincing and his narrative does a great job of proving his point, his 2nd main argument is a little less convincing and probably could have been omitted entirely, namely, that: “Leninism remains the best term for describing the CCP…Using the concept of Leninism can tell us a great deal about China’s system, so there is no reason to discard what we know about Leninist systems just to confirm to political science currency.” Maybe. To be sure, it can obviously be descriptively correct to draw attention to the Leninist inheritance of the CCP - pointing out, for instance, all of the terminology and organizational innovations it borrowed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But to be equally sure, if it’s clear that the CCP can be described as an organizationally Leninist party, it’s less clear that it can be meaningfully described as ideologically Leninist (when considering things like class struggle, world revolution, capital etc).
In any case, regardless of whether or not we can define “Leninist” in such a way as to be an accurate descriptor of the CCP, it strikes me that it may not be so useful a concept as Fewsmith thinks. Wouldn’t it be better just to try and understand the CCP - and Xi Jinping - on their own terms rather than attempting to make them conform to a conceptual model from another century and continent? This is clearly more of an academic point I’m making, and it’s clearly a bit of a hobby horse, in different ways, for both Fewsmith and myself. All that being said, this doesn’t really impact Fewsmith’s overall argument much or detract from the narrative. I think his actual description of the state of things is pretty spot on, it’s just that I remain unconvinced there’s much utility to insisting on a framework of “Leninism” rather than one bespoke to the 21st century CCP.
On the point of the narrative - while it’s full of insightful analysis and interesting commentary, I did find at times that it tended to wander away from the main topic of rethinking Chinese politics. Telling me about increased surveillance, for instance, doesn’t really change how I think about Chinese politics one way or another. So the editing probably could have been a bit more aggressive.
In the final analysis, I would say this is an insightful and interesting analysis of elite Chinese politics and a good reference for China-watchers with a greater-than-passing interest in the subject matter.
All that being said, I thoroughly enjoyed this book. I learned a lot, and I was persuaded by one half of the author’s main thesis.
Fewsmith makes two separate but related main arguments: 1. Because of certain pathologies of it’s one-party system, the CCP has not “institutionalized” power in the same way Weberian-style bureaucracies have - I.e. it has not developed rules and regulations which consistently constrain behaviour and stem the personalization of power and the prevalence of factionalism. This lack of “institutionalization” is most notable when observing power transfers from one paramount CCP leader to the next. Moreover, “by focusing on “insitutionalization,” they (China scholars) miss some of the most important aspects of China’s political system.”
Broadly speaking, I am convinced by Fewsmith’s arguments here. He clearly has an excellent grasp of the ins and outs of the factionalism and elite pilots of the past 40 years and his narrative pretty compellingly demonstrates that there has been no consistent mechanism in the PRC whereby new leaders are selected and power passed to them. There are norms in the CCP, to be sure, but as Fewsmith writes: “in China, however, longevity has occurred through manipulation and violation of rules, not through the creation of binding institutions.”
While Fewsmith’s argument is convincing and his narrative does a great job of proving his point, his 2nd main argument is a little less convincing and probably could have been omitted entirely, namely, that: “Leninism remains the best term for describing the CCP…Using the concept of Leninism can tell us a great deal about China’s system, so there is no reason to discard what we know about Leninist systems just to confirm to political science currency.” Maybe. To be sure, it can obviously be descriptively correct to draw attention to the Leninist inheritance of the CCP - pointing out, for instance, all of the terminology and organizational innovations it borrowed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But to be equally sure, if it’s clear that the CCP can be described as an organizationally Leninist party, it’s less clear that it can be meaningfully described as ideologically Leninist (when considering things like class struggle, world revolution, capital etc).
In any case, regardless of whether or not we can define “Leninist” in such a way as to be an accurate descriptor of the CCP, it strikes me that it may not be so useful a concept as Fewsmith thinks. Wouldn’t it be better just to try and understand the CCP - and Xi Jinping - on their own terms rather than attempting to make them conform to a conceptual model from another century and continent? This is clearly more of an academic point I’m making, and it’s clearly a bit of a hobby horse, in different ways, for both Fewsmith and myself. All that being said, this doesn’t really impact Fewsmith’s overall argument much or detract from the narrative. I think his actual description of the state of things is pretty spot on, it’s just that I remain unconvinced there’s much utility to insisting on a framework of “Leninism” rather than one bespoke to the 21st century CCP.
On the point of the narrative - while it’s full of insightful analysis and interesting commentary, I did find at times that it tended to wander away from the main topic of rethinking Chinese politics. Telling me about increased surveillance, for instance, doesn’t really change how I think about Chinese politics one way or another. So the editing probably could have been a bit more aggressive.
In the final analysis, I would say this is an insightful and interesting analysis of elite Chinese politics and a good reference for China-watchers with a greater-than-passing interest in the subject matter.
February 19, 2022
Fewsmith provides an in-depth analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s internal politics since the death of Mao. He provides an insightful, coherent analysis describing problems in power transitions. All these have profound impacts on Xi’s domestic agenda. Highly recommended.
September 18, 2022
decent. got kinda lost in couple of chapters but each has a short conclusion so that helped
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews