Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy (so widely relied on in bioethics) are philosophically and ethically inadequate; they undermine rather than support relationships based on trust. Her arguments are illustrated with issues raised by such practices as the use of genetic information by the police, research using human tissues, new reproductive technologies, and media practices for reporting on medicine, science and technology. The study appeals to a wide range of readers in ethics, bioethics and related disciplines.
Onora Sylvia O'Neill, Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve CH CBE FBA FRS (born 23 August 1941) is a philosopher and a crossbench member of the House of Lords.
The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.
She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
Mainly limited to medical ethics, with a lot about new reproductive and genetic technologies. There is a long critical section about the media at the end.
I was intrigued by her concept from Kant of 'principled autonomy' – this did seem helpful and I can think of less awkward ways to interpret it without the language of law. She suggests that action/obligation is the best grounding for rights, which I also found helpful. What obligations for action are created when we define rights?
I couldn't really get a takeaway from the stuff about trust, and felt sometimes she was overly hostile to 'counter cultur[e]' but her realistic viewpoint, linking arguments and principles to real problems, make the discussion serious and worth thinking about. I think this is a relatively accessible philosophy book, and didn't have trouble following the arguments.
The best book I know on bioethics from a Kantian perspective, especially the first half on the meaning of autonomy in Kant and in Mill, and how both diverge from the meaning it has come to have in bioethics, so that neither can be used to support the principle of autonomy.