Published in 1996, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is a valuable contribution to the field of Military Strategic Studies. The magnum opus of Carl von Clausewitz, On War, is a work frequently quoted (usually the one famous quotation) but often superficially read. The essays in this book were presented at an international conference 'On Clausewitz' held at the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania in April 1985.
This book is a collection of essays that came out of a conference on Clausewitz held at the Army War College. The entire book is extremely useful, but I found the most useful essays to be “The Eternal Clausewitz”, by Martin van Creveld, which argues that On War remains relevant because Clausewitz does not try to discover the existence of constants in an area where no scientific laws exist. Instead, he accepts ambiguity and uncertainty as the essence of war, and this proceeds logically to Herbig’s essay on uncertainty in On War. All of the essays from section II are very useful, as they spend time on the theoretical dimensions of war. Especially interesting were Kahn’s essay on Clausewitz and intelligence, Hahlweg’s essay on Clausewitz and guerrilla warfare and Herbig’s essay on Clausewitz and uncertainty. In her essay, Herbig discusses these concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty within the context of four issues: 1) the nature of war; 2) the military genius; 3) the link between chance and uncertainty; and 4) the alternatives for action.
Once you have read this book, and if your brain is still functioning, I suggest that you read “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War “, by Alan Beyerchen, and “Reclaiming the Clauswitzian Trinity”, by Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, which do a good job of supplementing Herbig’s essay and gives a clearer explanation on this uncertainty principle.
First, I should state that I have never read Clausewitz and after this book I probably never will. This book provides a collection of 14 papers first presented at an international conference on Clausewitz at the US Army War College in April 1985. Each paper discusses how Clausewitz stands up to modern issues in modern war or shows how Clausewitz was used, abused, misused, or ignored by a selection of the combatant nations during the early to mid-20th century world wars.
The areas I found most interesting were Chapter Two where Michael Handel, author of this chapter, and most of the last third of the book. In Chapter Two, Handel, who is also the compiler of the overall book, provides a summary of 12 of Clausewitz’s important points and a critique of their usefulness in the current environment. This was particularly helpful if you have not read Clausewitz. It would also benefit those familiar with Clausewitz as it provides opportunity to measure your own views against someone who is familiar with the subject.
The last portion of the book then covers practice and success of Clausewitz practice from 1871 to the 1980s. This includes especially the Great War and Second World War which are the wars and battles that I am the most familiar with. This familiarity made papers in this area much more interesting. When studying these battles, I am always brought to remember what a friend and professional soldier once told me: “Amateurs discuss strategy; professionals discuss logistics.“ This truism has probably never been truer. This section of the book also covers the importance of the issue of the military versus the political. There are examples showing how absurd it is to imagine these roles can be fully separated.
I did not enjoy this book; but then it was probably not written for enjoyment and I have not made war my profession. It is certainly possible to take some messages out of the book, however it is a painful way to gather these learnings for an amateur. If you are planning to lead an army, you should probably read Clausewitz and this book. Before you buy, you should carefully read the table of contents and the Introduction (31 pages) first.
It would not be proper for me to rate this book due to my lack of subject matter expertise.