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Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Examines the history of covert Middle Eastern negotiations and explores Arab attitudes towards Israel, Palestine, and the Oslo agreement
- GenresMiddle EastPolitics
572 pages, Paperback
First published February 19, 1996
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August 20, 2018
Talk Like An Egyptian
A fascinating resource. Heikal was the chief editor of Al Ahram during the time of Nasser and Sadat and a close confidant of both, and is authoritative enough to have been considered an official state spokesperson, at least up until Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Indeed on several occasions he acted as a diplomatic envoy and negotiator. Provided one can read between the lines there is a great deal of information that one can extract from what is said, and from what is glossed over, provided one knows the history. As a rule, discount anything Heikal states about motive, particularly about the Jordanian monarchy or rival Arab leaders, whom he tends to denigrate, or about Nasser whom he tends to aggrandize.
The book is essentially a political history with autobiographical overtones. Much of the material seems to be extracted from Heikal's personal notes and there are extremely few proper references to outside sources, nor is there a bibliography. Also he infers motivations based on his own preconceptions again largely without reference or justification. On the other hand he does let slip a number of intriguing details, such as Nasser's intent to carry out a long term war of attrition against Israel, the fact that on the eve of Nasser's death Egypt had 850,000 troops massed on the edge of the Suez canal waiting for orders to attack (pp161); that there was a breakdown of relations between Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War (Sadat referred to Assad as "my Mussolini" - wholly inappropriate, jokes Heikal, as this would cast Sadat as Hitler - pp188) and that the 1977 miniwar with Libya, poorly thought out, was basically about seizing Libya's oil to alleviate Egypt's debt. We also learn that Egypt as a "frontline state" received between $16-$22B dollars worth of aid from oil rich Arab nations after the YK war as compensation for their losses, which dwarved the amount given by the US after Camp David, however the $ "disappeared" in bad business investments (pp245). Jordan, Syria and the PLO received massive funds as well, paid for by the rest of the world in the run up of the price of oil resulting from the Arab oil cartels' embargo using the oil weapon in 1973.
We learn a lot about the Arab politics. The first theme of the book is on a near absolute taboo in the Arab world against even talking with the Israelis, and Heikal introduces a stream of at least a dozen or so prominent individuals including 5 Prime Ministers who were assassinated either for talking with Israel or even just talking about talking with Israel. Even foreign emissaries who had an Israeli stamp on their passport were barred from entering Arab countries. And, as promised in the title, there is ample discussion of "secret" negotiations. Rather than risking talking directly there were a number of approaches through Europeans, Soviets, the Socialist International (both Israel and many Arab states were members), journalists interested in becoming go-betweens and through European and American Jews. Early on it is suggested that Heikal contact Albert Einstein, a friend of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Einstein in turn offers to be a go between, which Nasser, fearing the negative consequences turns down. (pp96) There's an amusing misunderstanding where an Egyptian agent tries to recruit an Israeli attaché, whereas the attaché thinks he's made a diplomatic contact, the whole affair coming to a stop when the agent's expense account was examined and the value of the information that the attaché provided proved to have little value.
The middle part of the book emphasizes Sadat's shift away from Soviet dependency towards the US. In Sadat's estimation the Israelis were more likely to keep an agreement if it were endorsed by the Stars and Stripes rather than the weakening Hammer and Sickle. He also resented the presence of Soviet military advisers that made Egypt, ostensibly a leader in the Arab world, appear to be a client state. Sadat, who deeply loved his nation, felt that after not being defeated during the Yom Kippur war his major goals had been achieved, that of restoring Egypt's leadership position in the region, and establishing respect for Sadat as a leader, so that Sadat could turn his attention inward to the problems of Egypt.
The last 200 pages concern the emergence of the PLO and the uneasy relationship that it had with rest of the Arab world. The Palestinian blunder of supporting Saddam Hussein had major repercussions and as a result Arafat's funding from the Saudis and the Gulf States was cut off. While sympathetic to the Palestinians Heikal sees Arafat as an opportunist and a bumbler, incapable of statecraft. He's highly critical of the PLO, an organization that Egypt created back in '64, and related/rival organizations such as the PFLP as to a large extent they had become guns for hire and arms dealers. Though when the Libyan's asked PLO intelligence chief Abu Iyad to send a hit team to assassinate a former Libyan Minister of the Interior he complained to Qaddafi and refused. (pp339) There is also an excellent description of the evolution of the Oslo agreements.
From a historical perspective I enjoyed it because it did hilite some of the differences between a western and a Middle Eastern point of view. One can more fully understand the Arabs dedicated sense of humiliation at being defeated by Israel in '48 and '67, then has Sadat turn the idea around in '73 with a face saving apologetic that it was only American aid to the Israelis that prevented them from being defeated, and that he did not wish to humiliate the Israelis in turn. Says Sadat: "Egypt wishes to make clear it that it does not seek to humiliate Israel, because Egypt has tasted what humiliation is." (pp196) Heikal also points what he considers to be fundamental differences in Arab vs. Israeli styles of negotiations, though I don't think he appreciates that the Israelis understand this as well.
As other reviewers have rightly noted, there is a lot of depth and layering here, and if one looks close enough one finds that these go beyond the intentions of the author. In the final analysis, what we get is an unapologetic account of Arab rivalries and POVs, and an understanding of the failures that led to the death of pan-Arabism. Inshallah we can learn from our mistakes and find a better path.
A fascinating resource. Heikal was the chief editor of Al Ahram during the time of Nasser and Sadat and a close confidant of both, and is authoritative enough to have been considered an official state spokesperson, at least up until Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Indeed on several occasions he acted as a diplomatic envoy and negotiator. Provided one can read between the lines there is a great deal of information that one can extract from what is said, and from what is glossed over, provided one knows the history. As a rule, discount anything Heikal states about motive, particularly about the Jordanian monarchy or rival Arab leaders, whom he tends to denigrate, or about Nasser whom he tends to aggrandize.
The book is essentially a political history with autobiographical overtones. Much of the material seems to be extracted from Heikal's personal notes and there are extremely few proper references to outside sources, nor is there a bibliography. Also he infers motivations based on his own preconceptions again largely without reference or justification. On the other hand he does let slip a number of intriguing details, such as Nasser's intent to carry out a long term war of attrition against Israel, the fact that on the eve of Nasser's death Egypt had 850,000 troops massed on the edge of the Suez canal waiting for orders to attack (pp161); that there was a breakdown of relations between Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War (Sadat referred to Assad as "my Mussolini" - wholly inappropriate, jokes Heikal, as this would cast Sadat as Hitler - pp188) and that the 1977 miniwar with Libya, poorly thought out, was basically about seizing Libya's oil to alleviate Egypt's debt. We also learn that Egypt as a "frontline state" received between $16-$22B dollars worth of aid from oil rich Arab nations after the YK war as compensation for their losses, which dwarved the amount given by the US after Camp David, however the $ "disappeared" in bad business investments (pp245). Jordan, Syria and the PLO received massive funds as well, paid for by the rest of the world in the run up of the price of oil resulting from the Arab oil cartels' embargo using the oil weapon in 1973.
We learn a lot about the Arab politics. The first theme of the book is on a near absolute taboo in the Arab world against even talking with the Israelis, and Heikal introduces a stream of at least a dozen or so prominent individuals including 5 Prime Ministers who were assassinated either for talking with Israel or even just talking about talking with Israel. Even foreign emissaries who had an Israeli stamp on their passport were barred from entering Arab countries. And, as promised in the title, there is ample discussion of "secret" negotiations. Rather than risking talking directly there were a number of approaches through Europeans, Soviets, the Socialist International (both Israel and many Arab states were members), journalists interested in becoming go-betweens and through European and American Jews. Early on it is suggested that Heikal contact Albert Einstein, a friend of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Einstein in turn offers to be a go between, which Nasser, fearing the negative consequences turns down. (pp96) There's an amusing misunderstanding where an Egyptian agent tries to recruit an Israeli attaché, whereas the attaché thinks he's made a diplomatic contact, the whole affair coming to a stop when the agent's expense account was examined and the value of the information that the attaché provided proved to have little value.
The middle part of the book emphasizes Sadat's shift away from Soviet dependency towards the US. In Sadat's estimation the Israelis were more likely to keep an agreement if it were endorsed by the Stars and Stripes rather than the weakening Hammer and Sickle. He also resented the presence of Soviet military advisers that made Egypt, ostensibly a leader in the Arab world, appear to be a client state. Sadat, who deeply loved his nation, felt that after not being defeated during the Yom Kippur war his major goals had been achieved, that of restoring Egypt's leadership position in the region, and establishing respect for Sadat as a leader, so that Sadat could turn his attention inward to the problems of Egypt.
The last 200 pages concern the emergence of the PLO and the uneasy relationship that it had with rest of the Arab world. The Palestinian blunder of supporting Saddam Hussein had major repercussions and as a result Arafat's funding from the Saudis and the Gulf States was cut off. While sympathetic to the Palestinians Heikal sees Arafat as an opportunist and a bumbler, incapable of statecraft. He's highly critical of the PLO, an organization that Egypt created back in '64, and related/rival organizations such as the PFLP as to a large extent they had become guns for hire and arms dealers. Though when the Libyan's asked PLO intelligence chief Abu Iyad to send a hit team to assassinate a former Libyan Minister of the Interior he complained to Qaddafi and refused. (pp339) There is also an excellent description of the evolution of the Oslo agreements.
From a historical perspective I enjoyed it because it did hilite some of the differences between a western and a Middle Eastern point of view. One can more fully understand the Arabs dedicated sense of humiliation at being defeated by Israel in '48 and '67, then has Sadat turn the idea around in '73 with a face saving apologetic that it was only American aid to the Israelis that prevented them from being defeated, and that he did not wish to humiliate the Israelis in turn. Says Sadat: "Egypt wishes to make clear it that it does not seek to humiliate Israel, because Egypt has tasted what humiliation is." (pp196) Heikal also points what he considers to be fundamental differences in Arab vs. Israeli styles of negotiations, though I don't think he appreciates that the Israelis understand this as well.
As other reviewers have rightly noted, there is a lot of depth and layering here, and if one looks close enough one finds that these go beyond the intentions of the author. In the final analysis, what we get is an unapologetic account of Arab rivalries and POVs, and an understanding of the failures that led to the death of pan-Arabism. Inshallah we can learn from our mistakes and find a better path.
Displaying 1 of 1 review