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Elements of Military Art and Science Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, Infantry, ... Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.
Excerpt from Elements of Military Art and Science: Or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, &E; Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers
The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures, and delivered, during the past winter, before the Lowell Institute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best generals.
Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and Democratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence," published by order of Congress.
The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures, and delivered, during the past winter, before the Lowell Institute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best generals.
Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and Democratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence," published by order of Congress.
- GenresHistoryMilitary Fiction
370 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1846
72 people are currently reading
149 people want to read
About the author
Henry Wager Halleck
35 books1 followerHenry Wager Halleck (January 16, 1815 – January 9, 1872) was a senior United States Army officer, scholar, and lawyer. A noted expert in military studies, he was known by a nickname that became derogatory: "Old Brains". He was an important participant in the admission of California as a state and became a successful lawyer and land developer. Halleck served as the General in Chief of the Armies of the United States from 1862 to 1864.
Early in the American Civil War, Halleck was a senior Union Army commander in the Western Theater. He commanded operations in the Western Theater from 1861 until 1862, during which time, while the Union armies in the east were defeated and held back, the troops under Halleck's command won many important victories. However, Halleck was not present at the battles, and his subordinates earned most of the recognition. The only operation in which Halleck exercised field command was the siege of Corinth in the spring of 1862, a Union victory which he conducted with extreme caution. Halleck also developed rivalries with many of his subordinate generals, such as Ulysses S. Grant and Don Carlos Buell. In July 1862, following Major General George B. McClellan's failed Peninsula Campaign in the Eastern Theater, Halleck was promoted to general in chief. Halleck served in this capacity for about a year and a half.
Halleck was a cautious general who believed strongly in thorough preparations for battle and in the value of defensive fortifications over quick, aggressive action. He was a master of administration, logistics, and the politics necessary at the top of the military hierarchy, but exerted little effective control over field operations from his post in Washington, D.C. His subordinates frequently criticized him and at times ignored his instructions.
In March 1864, Grant was promoted to general in chief, and Halleck was relegated to chief of staff. Without the pressure of having to control the movements of the armies, Halleck performed capably in this task, ensuring that the Union armies were well-equipped.
Early in the American Civil War, Halleck was a senior Union Army commander in the Western Theater. He commanded operations in the Western Theater from 1861 until 1862, during which time, while the Union armies in the east were defeated and held back, the troops under Halleck's command won many important victories. However, Halleck was not present at the battles, and his subordinates earned most of the recognition. The only operation in which Halleck exercised field command was the siege of Corinth in the spring of 1862, a Union victory which he conducted with extreme caution. Halleck also developed rivalries with many of his subordinate generals, such as Ulysses S. Grant and Don Carlos Buell. In July 1862, following Major General George B. McClellan's failed Peninsula Campaign in the Eastern Theater, Halleck was promoted to general in chief. Halleck served in this capacity for about a year and a half.
Halleck was a cautious general who believed strongly in thorough preparations for battle and in the value of defensive fortifications over quick, aggressive action. He was a master of administration, logistics, and the politics necessary at the top of the military hierarchy, but exerted little effective control over field operations from his post in Washington, D.C. His subordinates frequently criticized him and at times ignored his instructions.
In March 1864, Grant was promoted to general in chief, and Halleck was relegated to chief of staff. Without the pressure of having to control the movements of the armies, Halleck performed capably in this task, ensuring that the Union armies were well-equipped.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
January 25, 2013
OK, so I gave this five stars. Not because it's scintillating reading or any thing (seriously, if you thought that might be it just check out the full title again to see the error of your ways). No, it got five stars because I find it to be an interesting insight into the state of the American military profession in general and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in particular in the mid-19th century, and those are my current professional research interests. Otherwise it's dry as all hell!
May 22, 2022
A Must Read for Researchers of the Civil War
Halleck became Grant's immediate commander soon after the start of the Civil War. To understand this relationship requires the reading of this book. Do not skip the additional comments at the end. This work was written before the war with Mexico and the Crimean War, (observed by McClellan). It therefore states the most current military thinking at the start of the Civil War.
Halleck became Grant's immediate commander soon after the start of the Civil War. To understand this relationship requires the reading of this book. Do not skip the additional comments at the end. This work was written before the war with Mexico and the Crimean War, (observed by McClellan). It therefore states the most current military thinking at the start of the Civil War.
July 6, 2024
A detailed but dry detailing on the organization of an army. It covers the officer corps, the pros and cons of fortifications, etc. It covers logistics, how to plan for a war as well as specific campaigns. The book covers the proper roles of infantry, cavalry and artillery. It discusses battles between land artillery batteries under attack by naval forces. It places these relationships in historical contexts to illustrate how and why battles, campaigns and wars were won or lost.
October 11, 2017
Tough read... The people who wrote in the 19th century certainly used a vast amount of unnecessary words to make a point.
April 10, 2013
Pretty dry for how interesting it is... or pretty interesting for how dry it is. Henry W. Halleck would become (in)famous in the Civil War for his administration of the Union armies (his effectiveness in the role is debated but is usually characterized as ineffective), but he originally made his mark as a military engineer and theorist.
In Elements of Military Art and Science, based on a series of lectures he gave at the prestigious Lowell Institute of Boston, Halleck summarizes a great deal of what was known of the art of war in the first half of the 19th Century. He opens by justifying war against charges of its immorality, and of military defenses against efforts to save money by neglecting the military establishment. He then summarizes the arts of strategy, tactics, logistics, and engineering, the importance of intelligent military policy, discusses the state of defenses of the United States at that time (pre-Mexican War), the principles of organization of an army and its components (infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers), and goes into some detail on permanent and temporary fortifications. A final chapter strongly endorses the military academy system as a way of training professional officers.
Halleck makes no claim to originality, clearly stating that he is drawing his ideas and information from others, and provides reading-lists (primarily in French-language sources) for those wishing to delve deeper. But he does a pretty fair job of summarizing the art of war as it was known at the time, and relating it specifically to the interests of the young United States. Elements of Military Art and Science will never replace Clausewitz or Sun Tzu as a classic of military literature, but for an understanding of pre-Civil War American military thinking, it's a good primer. (If dry.)
In Elements of Military Art and Science, based on a series of lectures he gave at the prestigious Lowell Institute of Boston, Halleck summarizes a great deal of what was known of the art of war in the first half of the 19th Century. He opens by justifying war against charges of its immorality, and of military defenses against efforts to save money by neglecting the military establishment. He then summarizes the arts of strategy, tactics, logistics, and engineering, the importance of intelligent military policy, discusses the state of defenses of the United States at that time (pre-Mexican War), the principles of organization of an army and its components (infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers), and goes into some detail on permanent and temporary fortifications. A final chapter strongly endorses the military academy system as a way of training professional officers.
Halleck makes no claim to originality, clearly stating that he is drawing his ideas and information from others, and provides reading-lists (primarily in French-language sources) for those wishing to delve deeper. But he does a pretty fair job of summarizing the art of war as it was known at the time, and relating it specifically to the interests of the young United States. Elements of Military Art and Science will never replace Clausewitz or Sun Tzu as a classic of military literature, but for an understanding of pre-Civil War American military thinking, it's a good primer. (If dry.)
December 28, 2021
Great book for insights in old warfare.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews