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String Theory and the Scientific Method
String theory has played a highly influential role in theoretical physics for nearly three decades and has substantially altered our view of the elementary building principles of the Universe. However, the theory remains empirically unconfirmed, and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. So why do string theorists have such a strong belief in their theory? This book explores this question, offering a novel insight into the nature of theory assessment itself. Dawid approaches the topic from a unique position, having extensive experience in both philosophy and high-energy physics. He argues that string theory is just the most conspicuous example of a number of theories in high-energy physics where non-empirical theory assessment has an important part to play. Aimed at physicists and philosophers of science, the book does not use mathematical formalism and explains most technical terms.
123 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2013
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November 25, 2020
Contemporary physics has provoked a controversy about the boundaries of science, or at least the boundaries of good science. As if the challenges that quantum physics poses to our “normal” sense of reality weren’t enough, physicists have increasingly pushed theory beyond testability, following mathematical and other purely theoretical considerations towards theories like supersymmetry, multiverse, anthropic theory, and string theory.
String theory seems to bring the controversy to a head. String theory promises a consistent, coherent, and complete theoretical unification of gravity and nuclear interactions. Its motivation is not provided by observations or experimental results, but by difficulties in prevalent quantum gravity theories.
I’m not a physicist, so no doubt I will get some of the details wrong. And I won’t try to summarize string theory. Dawid gives a brief, pretty comprehensible overview as background, but his concern is with its confirmation, or potential confirmation, more than with the details of the theory itself.
String theory is remarkable as a trusted theory, at least by string theorists themselves, because it is both incomplete and lacking in empirical testability. It seeks to solve the difficulty of unifying gravitational theory and quantum theory in a quantum theory of gravity. It isn’t the only attempt to do so, but it has emerged as a strong, and in some eyes, the strongest candidate.
The special insight of string theory is its departure from treating particles as point-like, instead attributing extension to them. In different varieties of string theory, particles are extended in differing numbers of dimensions, but that insight is common throughout.
No super-microscope is going to allow us to see strings in multiple dimensions. The significance of the theory is mathematical, not “physical” in the sense of conveying something we can picture in a model or see through a microscope. It affords a mathematical unification, much more so than anything we can conceptualize on the model of particles as picture-able objects.
As I said, string theory is incomplete and untestable. Being incomplete, it’s unclear exactly what empirical observations could confirm its validity. Maybe more to Dawid’s point, though, testing string theory would require experiments at energies many orders of magnitude beyond any colliders or other resources that exist or are even imagined today.
Empirical confirmation is the hallmark of modern scientific theories. The test of a theory’s validity, traditionally, is how it stacks up against empirical observations. Yet string theory has its strong adherents.
That is Dawid’s starting point — the conflict between string theory’s untestability and its status within physics today. It sits in a critical position within the inter-related and interdependent web of physical theories, giving it a kind of accepted status that it wouldn’t have on standard criteria for theory assessment.
Dawid suggests that, in order to understand the justifiability of accepting string theory as “valid” in some sense, we need to look to an evolution of the criteria by which we assess scientific theories — that in fact, the activities of the string theorists have led to a shift of that kind.
He offers three arguments for non-empirical assessment or confirmation, with the combination of the three taking a strong role in contemporary physics.
The three are —
- No alternatives argument (NAA) - i.e., the lack or scarcity of competing theories that account equally well for the current empirical observations
- Unexpected explanatory coherence (UEA) — i.e., that the theory explains phenomena that needed explanation beyond those phenomena it was initially intended to explain
- Meta-induction from success of other theories in the research program (MIA) — i.e., deriving credibility for the theory in question from the success (empirical or potentially otherwise) of other theories within the same research program
The three are distinguishable but work in combination to boost (or not) the assessment of any given theory.
Regarding NAA, string theory came about in part because of dissatisfaction with other theories, either their internal coherence and consistency or their inability to account for current empirical observations. Scientific theories are “underdetermined” in the sense that there are, at least in principle, other theories that could account for the same empirical data. In the case of string theory, there are alternative theories, but they are scarce.
Regarding UEA, string theory actually generates an explanation of gravity as emerging from an oscillation mode of a string, potentially a “deeper” explanation of gravity than what is available via other theories,
Regarding MIA, string theory derives from the “standard model” of particle physics, well-confirmed empirically, as some competing theories are not. It is a marriage of gauge theory and gravity.
String theory also derives from supersymmetry, although supersymmetry itself lacks empirical confirmation. Nevertheless we would imagine that its credibility contributes to the credibility of string theory as well (although we could argue whether it does so rightly or wrongly).
These three arguments work jointly, in the lack of empirical confirmation, to establish credibility for string theory. In Dawid’s terms, they “limit” the underdetermination of string theory as a scientific theory.
The three arguments, or considerations, for the acceptance of a theory are not, Dawid says, new to theoretical physics or to other sciences. But the role they play in relation to empirical confirmation is a modern development, he claims, within contemporary physics.
Twentieth century particle physics moved fast. The revolution in quantum theory and the resulting theoretical and mathematical momentum pushed theory development well ahead of experimentation. Often, as with the Higgs boson, theory was there, predicting phenomena decades before expensive high energy experiments could be constructed to test validity.
And, as theoretical physics has progressed with gauge symmetries and other mathematical tools pressing farther and farther, collider experiments require ever higher energy levels, surpassing anything currently feasible.
Dawid writes, “Fundamental physics has entered a stage in recent decades where the empirical evidence for new theoretical conceptions is scarce or remains entirely absent for many decades. It is often not clear whether conclusive empirical testing of a theory can be achieved at all or whether piecemeal empirical corroboration and circumstantial evidence is the maximum one can hope for. Those circumstances alter substantially the parameters of theory assessment and raise important new questions for the philosophy of science.”
Of course one possible response is to double down on empirical confirmation. In the absence of empirical testing, theorizing is idle speculation.
And that does seem to be the tenor of some responses to string theory’s prevalence. Lacking empirical confirmation, or even testability, it isn’t a scientific theory at all. Without empirical confirmation, it’s dead in the water, or should be, at least until it reaches some stage of testability. That stage of testability of course, for reasons already mentioned, isn’t anywhere in currently imaginable reach.
But consider, from an even broader perspective, what the job of science, physics and cosmology in particular, is taken to be — the description of the universe. The unavailability of empirical tests does not relieve us of that job. Instead we need new tools to replace those that have become unavailable.
Dawid does not propose to elevate non-empirical criteria to the same level as empirical ones. Rather, he proposes a continuum of “trustworthiness” — “Rather, empirically confirmed and empirically unconfirmed theory building should be placed on a continuum with respect to their trustworthiness. Empirically well-confirmed theories are very high up on that continuous scale under today’s circumstances.”
So empirical confirmation may still be the hallmark of confirmation, although Dawid goes on to speculate that, under some circumstances (other than “today’s”), empirically unconfirmed theorizing could rank more highly than empirically confirmed theorizing.
I’m not completely clear on what those circumstances might be, but you could imagine a situation in which empirical methods failed to discriminate between two theories, one of which was consistent with existing theoretical approaches (which themselves had very convincing records of empirical confirmation) while the other was wildly inconsistent. In such a case, that consistency with existing theoretical approaches might rule the day. But would it rule the day if the competing theory exceeded it in its record of empirical confirmation? Possibly so.
Dawid’s argument is in support of the “trustworthiness” of string theory, i.e., a justification of the status it holds within the current scientific community and research programs. Whether it is “true” or not is another matter. His argument is one in support of carrying forward with string theory as a critical piece of current theorizing.
That question of truth will come up in (the final) Part III of Dawid’s book. I’ve already written a long review, so I won’t try to go into depth on Part III. The arguments for non-empirical assessment prior to Part III are the heart of Dawid’s discussion.
Chapter 6 concerns the potential of string theory to constitute a “final theory,” that is, a theory which will not be superseded by a more complete, coherent, or accurate theory of physics. No physical theory could ever be “final” in the strictest sense, but a “final theory” might conceivably provide an ontological and descriptive structure that is in a strong sense “final” if its scope is “complete” (i.e., covers all scales and all phenomena of physics), is empirically sound over all of that scope, and is fully coherent and consistent.
I won’t try to present or analyze Dawid’s arguments on string theory’s potential as a “final theory.” The arguments pick up on his notions of local and global scientific underdetermination and on a specific aspect of string theory (“T-duality”) that requires substantial explanation. It’s certainly an interesting discussion, although not the core discussion of the book.
The final chapter concerns scientific realism. Dawid’s discussion is not conclusive, nor should it be. There are at least two problems.
If the proponents of string theory’s status as a “final theory” are right, the claim to scientific realism for string theory in particular would be bolstered. But we are a long way from that. Regardless of arguments for non-empirical confirmation, string theory is both incomplete and unconfirmed. Supersymmetry is unconfirmed. We just aren’t there yet.
But the overriding problem, at least to my mind, is the very idea of realism, scientific or otherwise. Dawid, as both a philosopher and a physicist, is well aware of the complexities of arguments about realism, in particular that there is a stubborn gap between empirical adequacy and “truth.”.
If string theory is indeed a “final theory,” then this gap is not itself supported by underdetermination — there simply are no alternative theories at that point. But underdetermination is only one argument, and one within a predisposition towards scientific realism, for the gap. Other philosophical arguments support that gap on other grounds, e.g., regarding the status of language and description relative to “reality.”
In addition, as Dawid discusses, modern physics has long departed from the ontology of everyday life — the “objects” of physics are nothing like the objects we are familiar with in everyday life, and the status of ontological claims based on physical theory are difficult to reconcile with familiar, traditional understandings of ontology.
Dawid’s discussion here is brief and really only a starting point. The interplay between “final theory” claims and “realism” claims is a new one to me, and I’m grateful to have it to play with now.
Who is the audience for the book? Dawid is, as I said, both a philosopher of science and a physicist. He explains in the preface the circumstances under which he left physics in 2000 to turn to philosophical questions arising within physics. As such, he provides a unique perspective for physicists as well as philosophers of science.
Physicists, of all scientists, seem especially drawn to philosophical questions, about both the ontological status of scientific theory and the boundaries of science itself. Despite some physicists’ disdain for modern philosophy, philosophical questions seem inevitable in the course of physics (as witnessed by Dawid’s own history). The reflective physicist, I think, will be interested in Dawid’s book.
Dawid doesn’t address in depth questions of how theories like some multiverse theories, or anthropic theory, might be assessed where testable observations are actually ruled out by the theory itself. It isn’t a matter of higher energies in which to conduct experiments, since the very idea invokes regions of a multiverse from which no light (or other signals) can reach us.
Are such theories “scientific?” I think Dawid’s arguments on non-empirical assessment provide some starting point for those arguments as well.
Over all, I think Dawid’s book, at least to me, is indispensable. It provides a perspective I don’t find elsewhere, on theory, empirical confirmation, and validity per se.
String theory seems to bring the controversy to a head. String theory promises a consistent, coherent, and complete theoretical unification of gravity and nuclear interactions. Its motivation is not provided by observations or experimental results, but by difficulties in prevalent quantum gravity theories.
I’m not a physicist, so no doubt I will get some of the details wrong. And I won’t try to summarize string theory. Dawid gives a brief, pretty comprehensible overview as background, but his concern is with its confirmation, or potential confirmation, more than with the details of the theory itself.
String theory is remarkable as a trusted theory, at least by string theorists themselves, because it is both incomplete and lacking in empirical testability. It seeks to solve the difficulty of unifying gravitational theory and quantum theory in a quantum theory of gravity. It isn’t the only attempt to do so, but it has emerged as a strong, and in some eyes, the strongest candidate.
The special insight of string theory is its departure from treating particles as point-like, instead attributing extension to them. In different varieties of string theory, particles are extended in differing numbers of dimensions, but that insight is common throughout.
No super-microscope is going to allow us to see strings in multiple dimensions. The significance of the theory is mathematical, not “physical” in the sense of conveying something we can picture in a model or see through a microscope. It affords a mathematical unification, much more so than anything we can conceptualize on the model of particles as picture-able objects.
As I said, string theory is incomplete and untestable. Being incomplete, it’s unclear exactly what empirical observations could confirm its validity. Maybe more to Dawid’s point, though, testing string theory would require experiments at energies many orders of magnitude beyond any colliders or other resources that exist or are even imagined today.
Empirical confirmation is the hallmark of modern scientific theories. The test of a theory’s validity, traditionally, is how it stacks up against empirical observations. Yet string theory has its strong adherents.
That is Dawid’s starting point — the conflict between string theory’s untestability and its status within physics today. It sits in a critical position within the inter-related and interdependent web of physical theories, giving it a kind of accepted status that it wouldn’t have on standard criteria for theory assessment.
Dawid suggests that, in order to understand the justifiability of accepting string theory as “valid” in some sense, we need to look to an evolution of the criteria by which we assess scientific theories — that in fact, the activities of the string theorists have led to a shift of that kind.
He offers three arguments for non-empirical assessment or confirmation, with the combination of the three taking a strong role in contemporary physics.
The three are —
- No alternatives argument (NAA) - i.e., the lack or scarcity of competing theories that account equally well for the current empirical observations
- Unexpected explanatory coherence (UEA) — i.e., that the theory explains phenomena that needed explanation beyond those phenomena it was initially intended to explain
- Meta-induction from success of other theories in the research program (MIA) — i.e., deriving credibility for the theory in question from the success (empirical or potentially otherwise) of other theories within the same research program
The three are distinguishable but work in combination to boost (or not) the assessment of any given theory.
Regarding NAA, string theory came about in part because of dissatisfaction with other theories, either their internal coherence and consistency or their inability to account for current empirical observations. Scientific theories are “underdetermined” in the sense that there are, at least in principle, other theories that could account for the same empirical data. In the case of string theory, there are alternative theories, but they are scarce.
Regarding UEA, string theory actually generates an explanation of gravity as emerging from an oscillation mode of a string, potentially a “deeper” explanation of gravity than what is available via other theories,
Regarding MIA, string theory derives from the “standard model” of particle physics, well-confirmed empirically, as some competing theories are not. It is a marriage of gauge theory and gravity.
String theory also derives from supersymmetry, although supersymmetry itself lacks empirical confirmation. Nevertheless we would imagine that its credibility contributes to the credibility of string theory as well (although we could argue whether it does so rightly or wrongly).
These three arguments work jointly, in the lack of empirical confirmation, to establish credibility for string theory. In Dawid’s terms, they “limit” the underdetermination of string theory as a scientific theory.
The three arguments, or considerations, for the acceptance of a theory are not, Dawid says, new to theoretical physics or to other sciences. But the role they play in relation to empirical confirmation is a modern development, he claims, within contemporary physics.
Twentieth century particle physics moved fast. The revolution in quantum theory and the resulting theoretical and mathematical momentum pushed theory development well ahead of experimentation. Often, as with the Higgs boson, theory was there, predicting phenomena decades before expensive high energy experiments could be constructed to test validity.
And, as theoretical physics has progressed with gauge symmetries and other mathematical tools pressing farther and farther, collider experiments require ever higher energy levels, surpassing anything currently feasible.
Dawid writes, “Fundamental physics has entered a stage in recent decades where the empirical evidence for new theoretical conceptions is scarce or remains entirely absent for many decades. It is often not clear whether conclusive empirical testing of a theory can be achieved at all or whether piecemeal empirical corroboration and circumstantial evidence is the maximum one can hope for. Those circumstances alter substantially the parameters of theory assessment and raise important new questions for the philosophy of science.”
Of course one possible response is to double down on empirical confirmation. In the absence of empirical testing, theorizing is idle speculation.
And that does seem to be the tenor of some responses to string theory’s prevalence. Lacking empirical confirmation, or even testability, it isn’t a scientific theory at all. Without empirical confirmation, it’s dead in the water, or should be, at least until it reaches some stage of testability. That stage of testability of course, for reasons already mentioned, isn’t anywhere in currently imaginable reach.
But consider, from an even broader perspective, what the job of science, physics and cosmology in particular, is taken to be — the description of the universe. The unavailability of empirical tests does not relieve us of that job. Instead we need new tools to replace those that have become unavailable.
Dawid does not propose to elevate non-empirical criteria to the same level as empirical ones. Rather, he proposes a continuum of “trustworthiness” — “Rather, empirically confirmed and empirically unconfirmed theory building should be placed on a continuum with respect to their trustworthiness. Empirically well-confirmed theories are very high up on that continuous scale under today’s circumstances.”
So empirical confirmation may still be the hallmark of confirmation, although Dawid goes on to speculate that, under some circumstances (other than “today’s”), empirically unconfirmed theorizing could rank more highly than empirically confirmed theorizing.
I’m not completely clear on what those circumstances might be, but you could imagine a situation in which empirical methods failed to discriminate between two theories, one of which was consistent with existing theoretical approaches (which themselves had very convincing records of empirical confirmation) while the other was wildly inconsistent. In such a case, that consistency with existing theoretical approaches might rule the day. But would it rule the day if the competing theory exceeded it in its record of empirical confirmation? Possibly so.
Dawid’s argument is in support of the “trustworthiness” of string theory, i.e., a justification of the status it holds within the current scientific community and research programs. Whether it is “true” or not is another matter. His argument is one in support of carrying forward with string theory as a critical piece of current theorizing.
That question of truth will come up in (the final) Part III of Dawid’s book. I’ve already written a long review, so I won’t try to go into depth on Part III. The arguments for non-empirical assessment prior to Part III are the heart of Dawid’s discussion.
Chapter 6 concerns the potential of string theory to constitute a “final theory,” that is, a theory which will not be superseded by a more complete, coherent, or accurate theory of physics. No physical theory could ever be “final” in the strictest sense, but a “final theory” might conceivably provide an ontological and descriptive structure that is in a strong sense “final” if its scope is “complete” (i.e., covers all scales and all phenomena of physics), is empirically sound over all of that scope, and is fully coherent and consistent.
I won’t try to present or analyze Dawid’s arguments on string theory’s potential as a “final theory.” The arguments pick up on his notions of local and global scientific underdetermination and on a specific aspect of string theory (“T-duality”) that requires substantial explanation. It’s certainly an interesting discussion, although not the core discussion of the book.
The final chapter concerns scientific realism. Dawid’s discussion is not conclusive, nor should it be. There are at least two problems.
If the proponents of string theory’s status as a “final theory” are right, the claim to scientific realism for string theory in particular would be bolstered. But we are a long way from that. Regardless of arguments for non-empirical confirmation, string theory is both incomplete and unconfirmed. Supersymmetry is unconfirmed. We just aren’t there yet.
But the overriding problem, at least to my mind, is the very idea of realism, scientific or otherwise. Dawid, as both a philosopher and a physicist, is well aware of the complexities of arguments about realism, in particular that there is a stubborn gap between empirical adequacy and “truth.”.
If string theory is indeed a “final theory,” then this gap is not itself supported by underdetermination — there simply are no alternative theories at that point. But underdetermination is only one argument, and one within a predisposition towards scientific realism, for the gap. Other philosophical arguments support that gap on other grounds, e.g., regarding the status of language and description relative to “reality.”
In addition, as Dawid discusses, modern physics has long departed from the ontology of everyday life — the “objects” of physics are nothing like the objects we are familiar with in everyday life, and the status of ontological claims based on physical theory are difficult to reconcile with familiar, traditional understandings of ontology.
Dawid’s discussion here is brief and really only a starting point. The interplay between “final theory” claims and “realism” claims is a new one to me, and I’m grateful to have it to play with now.
Who is the audience for the book? Dawid is, as I said, both a philosopher of science and a physicist. He explains in the preface the circumstances under which he left physics in 2000 to turn to philosophical questions arising within physics. As such, he provides a unique perspective for physicists as well as philosophers of science.
Physicists, of all scientists, seem especially drawn to philosophical questions, about both the ontological status of scientific theory and the boundaries of science itself. Despite some physicists’ disdain for modern philosophy, philosophical questions seem inevitable in the course of physics (as witnessed by Dawid’s own history). The reflective physicist, I think, will be interested in Dawid’s book.
Dawid doesn’t address in depth questions of how theories like some multiverse theories, or anthropic theory, might be assessed where testable observations are actually ruled out by the theory itself. It isn’t a matter of higher energies in which to conduct experiments, since the very idea invokes regions of a multiverse from which no light (or other signals) can reach us.
Are such theories “scientific?” I think Dawid’s arguments on non-empirical assessment provide some starting point for those arguments as well.
Over all, I think Dawid’s book, at least to me, is indispensable. It provides a perspective I don’t find elsewhere, on theory, empirical confirmation, and validity per se.
April 21, 2018
I came across the title of this book while reading an article on Quanta Magazine on Science and Philosophy debate and I straight away knew that I'll be buying this book given the context.
Dawid's idea was excellent. I was always interested in understanding the 'reality' of ideas behind the string theory. Undoubtedly, string theory being the foremost to be classified as the 'GUT' (with a crown on it) has issues which the author pointed out in the book - the biggest being, the lack of 'empirical evidence'. I liked the nice touch of explaining Quantum loop Gravity and Inflation theories and that these theories are too are far away from being established theories to give proper predictions.
However..
To be honest, the book is too complex for me. Most of the stuff went over my head and I had to skip a pages after pages. Maybe, I'll understand this book when I am in my thirties, for now I give up!
An advice to Dawid, please come up with an easier (comprehend-able) version of your work, even as a student of Physics, I had hard time understanding this book.
Dawid's idea was excellent. I was always interested in understanding the 'reality' of ideas behind the string theory. Undoubtedly, string theory being the foremost to be classified as the 'GUT' (with a crown on it) has issues which the author pointed out in the book - the biggest being, the lack of 'empirical evidence'. I liked the nice touch of explaining Quantum loop Gravity and Inflation theories and that these theories are too are far away from being established theories to give proper predictions.
However..
To be honest, the book is too complex for me. Most of the stuff went over my head and I had to skip a pages after pages. Maybe, I'll understand this book when I am in my thirties, for now I give up!
An advice to Dawid, please come up with an easier (comprehend-able) version of your work, even as a student of Physics, I had hard time understanding this book.
February 6, 2016
The book is a philosophical discourse on the problem of post-empirical science, that is when ideas are untestable. I applaud the author for bringing the problem into the open. Everything else in the book causes me a headache. Post-empirical science is an oxymoron. if a theory cannot empirically be tested it remains a belief. If the case for a physical theory can only be made in formal philosophical terms, it's no longer science. Ultimately, David's argument and conclusion in favor of science appear weak and driven by despair.
August 27, 2025
It has been 25 years since I coursed through String Theory and about a dozen years since formally studying philosophy. The direction tailspinned or else it'd have been a case of being stuck up in the Department of Space job. A coalescing of particle physics and philosophy with spices of mathematics is a path I generally take as an anomaly nowadays, and in this case, the particular accident is thanks to Sabine Hossenfelder's Lost in Math.
String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified description of all known natural forces. Focussing on implications for the realism debate in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles of that debate become untenable in the context of string theory. On one side the claim of underdetermination of scientific theories, which represents a pivotal element of empiricism, loses its appeal. On the other side the dissolution of any meaningful notion of an external ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of scientific realism.
A similar impasse between realist and anti-realist positions is witnessed in the context of philosophy of science characteristic of the metaphysical realism debate in analytical philosophy. A philosophical dissolution in this light underlines the emergence of a non-ontological realist concept as it is suggested by Consistent Structure Realism that might lead the way towards a new intermediate position in the metaphysical realism debate as well, thereby opening an exciting new interconnection between modern physics and core questions of analytical philosophy. Crucial for a successful formulation of a metaphysical form of Consistent Structure Realism would be the disentanglement of the compound of consistent structure and observation. This is a concession worth undertaking.
String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified description of all known natural forces. Focussing on implications for the realism debate in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles of that debate become untenable in the context of string theory. On one side the claim of underdetermination of scientific theories, which represents a pivotal element of empiricism, loses its appeal. On the other side the dissolution of any meaningful notion of an external ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of scientific realism.
A similar impasse between realist and anti-realist positions is witnessed in the context of philosophy of science characteristic of the metaphysical realism debate in analytical philosophy. A philosophical dissolution in this light underlines the emergence of a non-ontological realist concept as it is suggested by Consistent Structure Realism that might lead the way towards a new intermediate position in the metaphysical realism debate as well, thereby opening an exciting new interconnection between modern physics and core questions of analytical philosophy. Crucial for a successful formulation of a metaphysical form of Consistent Structure Realism would be the disentanglement of the compound of consistent structure and observation. This is a concession worth undertaking.
August 2, 2016
I have no confidence in fully comprehending this book,
...but I am certain by stumbling through his work , Richard Dawid has introduced a philosophical framework to me that I had no chance of thinking of before this. Again, this isn't a work for everyone, but a work that is well worth the struggle should you decide to take the chance.
...but I am certain by stumbling through his work , Richard Dawid has introduced a philosophical framework to me that I had no chance of thinking of before this. Again, this isn't a work for everyone, but a work that is well worth the struggle should you decide to take the chance.
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