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United States Army in the Korean War #2
Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951
Ebb and Flow records an important chapter in the Korean War, the period from late November 1950 to early July 1951 when battle lines did indeed ebb and flow in pronounced surges. Billy C. Mossman begins with the last weeks of the pell-mell rush of United Nations forces to the Chinese border and goes on to chronicle in great detail the test of American military leadership and resources posed by the taxing retreat of the Eighth Army and X Corps across the frozen wastes of North Korea. He highlights the limitations imposed by terrain and weather on the fighting capabilities of an American army facing surprise attack from a large disciplined enemy. In addition, the operations he describes in such careful detail vivify the principles of war for those with an interest in studying the profession of arms.
High school students and above researching the Korean War may be interested in this book. Additioanlly, military leaders, strategists, historians, and political scientists may be interested in this volume about the Korean War.
High school students and above researching the Korean War may be interested in this book. Additioanlly, military leaders, strategists, historians, and political scientists may be interested in this volume about the Korean War.
572 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1990
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About the author
Billy C. Mossman
3 booksA graduate of Wayne State (Nebraska) College, Billy C. Mossman served as a platoon leader with the 381st Infantry, 96th Infantry Division, and participated in the Leyte and Okinawa campaigns in the Pacific theater. In the Korean War, he was a military historian with the Eighth Army; Army Forces, Far East; and United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission.
In 1954 Mossman joined the Office of the Chief of Military History as an Army officer in 1954 and became a civilian staff member in 1957. As a civilian staff member, he served successively as historian, deputy branch chief, branch chief, and acting division chief and authored a number of studies and monographs on U.S. Army operations in the Korean War.
In 1954 Mossman joined the Office of the Chief of Military History as an Army officer in 1954 and became a civilian staff member in 1957. As a civilian staff member, he served successively as historian, deputy branch chief, branch chief, and acting division chief and authored a number of studies and monographs on U.S. Army operations in the Korean War.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 13, 2024
Billy Mossman’s contribution to the United States Army’s official history of the Korean War picks up the story where the previous volume, Roy Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, left off, with the eve of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA)’s “Second Phase Offensive” on 25 November 1950. Though the American-led United Nations (UN) effort had been fighting Chinese forces for over a month by that point, the reduced number of contacts convinced American commanders that the threat of a massive intervention had passed. Their expectation was that one final offensive would be all that was necessary to complete the conquest of North Korea, with the American commander, Douglas MacArthur, suggesting publicly that American soldiers might even be home in time for Christmas.
The Second Phase Offensive soon dispelled such hopes. The PVA’s assault quickly overran South Korean forces at the Ch’ongch’on River, while to the east UN troops were encircled and attacked near the Chosin Reservoir. Within days the United States’s Eighth Army was in headlong retreat south, conceding all the North Korean territory that had been captured over the previous two months. Though the connotations of cowardice and dereliction of duty associated with the term lead Mossman to criticize the use of the phrase “bug-out” to describe the retreat, he notes the precipitous drop in morale among the soldiers as they withdrew. This pessimism reached all the way to the top, with Walton Walker, the Eighth Army’s commander, openly skeptical about the likelihood that the defense lines being established south of the 38th parallel would prove successful in stopping the combined Chinese-North Korean advance.
Walker’s death in a traffic accident on 23 December led to the appointment of Matthew Ridgway as his successor. Inheriting a deteriorating situation, Ridgway sought to restore the confidence of the men in his command as a first step to reversing offensive operations. Though he was forced to concede Seoul on 4 January to the PVA’s Third Phase Offensive, Mossman sees Ridgway’s leadership as critical to stabilizing the situation for UN forces. Aided by the overextension of the PVA advance, the Eighth Army was able to stabilize the front, and with the victory of Task Force Crombez at the battle of Chip’yong-ni in mid-February Ridgway was ready to go back on the offense. This involved a series of operations that gradually drove the PVA and the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) northward, retaking Seoul for the second and final time on 14 March.
By then the debilitated PVA and KPA units were in retreat themselves, thanks to the enormous casualties they had suffered over the preceding months. While Mossman’s book provides few accounts of company- and platoon-level actions, he notes throughout the text the toll UN firepower took on enemy forces. Lacking armor or air power, the PVA and KPA relied on overwhelming numbers of infantry in their operations. Though outnumbered, the UN forces proved more than able to offset this through both their air supremacy and their use of artillery and tanks, which inflicted heavy casualties on exposed units. By the spring of 1951, the losses left Chinese and North Korean commanders with little choice but to withdraw northward.
By April, UN forces had once again pushed the front lines north the 38th parallel. Seeking to avoid a further expansion of the war, the Truman administration halted further large-scale operations in the hope that restraint might encourage the Communist leaders to begin peace negotiations. MacArthur’s public criticism of this decision led Truman to replace him as supreme commander with Ridgway. It was under Ridgway’s leadership and that of his successor as Eighth Army commander, James Van Fleet, that the UN forces shifted from seizing territory to inflicting losses on enemy forces. This became the pattern of combat for the remaining of the two years of the war, and represents a fitting end point for Mossman’s book. The product of considerable research in official records and contemporary interviews with many of the key participants, it provides a comprehensive, if dry, account of not just Eighth Army operations, but those of the forces with which they worked. Supplemented as it is with excellent and clearly-reproduced maps, this is an indispensable study of nine key months in the Korean War, ones that set the terms for the remainder of the conflict.
The Second Phase Offensive soon dispelled such hopes. The PVA’s assault quickly overran South Korean forces at the Ch’ongch’on River, while to the east UN troops were encircled and attacked near the Chosin Reservoir. Within days the United States’s Eighth Army was in headlong retreat south, conceding all the North Korean territory that had been captured over the previous two months. Though the connotations of cowardice and dereliction of duty associated with the term lead Mossman to criticize the use of the phrase “bug-out” to describe the retreat, he notes the precipitous drop in morale among the soldiers as they withdrew. This pessimism reached all the way to the top, with Walton Walker, the Eighth Army’s commander, openly skeptical about the likelihood that the defense lines being established south of the 38th parallel would prove successful in stopping the combined Chinese-North Korean advance.
Walker’s death in a traffic accident on 23 December led to the appointment of Matthew Ridgway as his successor. Inheriting a deteriorating situation, Ridgway sought to restore the confidence of the men in his command as a first step to reversing offensive operations. Though he was forced to concede Seoul on 4 January to the PVA’s Third Phase Offensive, Mossman sees Ridgway’s leadership as critical to stabilizing the situation for UN forces. Aided by the overextension of the PVA advance, the Eighth Army was able to stabilize the front, and with the victory of Task Force Crombez at the battle of Chip’yong-ni in mid-February Ridgway was ready to go back on the offense. This involved a series of operations that gradually drove the PVA and the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) northward, retaking Seoul for the second and final time on 14 March.
By then the debilitated PVA and KPA units were in retreat themselves, thanks to the enormous casualties they had suffered over the preceding months. While Mossman’s book provides few accounts of company- and platoon-level actions, he notes throughout the text the toll UN firepower took on enemy forces. Lacking armor or air power, the PVA and KPA relied on overwhelming numbers of infantry in their operations. Though outnumbered, the UN forces proved more than able to offset this through both their air supremacy and their use of artillery and tanks, which inflicted heavy casualties on exposed units. By the spring of 1951, the losses left Chinese and North Korean commanders with little choice but to withdraw northward.
By April, UN forces had once again pushed the front lines north the 38th parallel. Seeking to avoid a further expansion of the war, the Truman administration halted further large-scale operations in the hope that restraint might encourage the Communist leaders to begin peace negotiations. MacArthur’s public criticism of this decision led Truman to replace him as supreme commander with Ridgway. It was under Ridgway’s leadership and that of his successor as Eighth Army commander, James Van Fleet, that the UN forces shifted from seizing territory to inflicting losses on enemy forces. This became the pattern of combat for the remaining of the two years of the war, and represents a fitting end point for Mossman’s book. The product of considerable research in official records and contemporary interviews with many of the key participants, it provides a comprehensive, if dry, account of not just Eighth Army operations, but those of the forces with which they worked. Supplemented as it is with excellent and clearly-reproduced maps, this is an indispensable study of nine key months in the Korean War, ones that set the terms for the remainder of the conflict.
May 26, 2019
Full Circle From/Back to The 38th Parallel..
A fascinating, but tedious at times, study of the Korean War after the first Chinese offensive ran out of steam and the second big one. I was surprised that the Allies were able to hold on and successfully counter attack such huge armies they were up against with the weakened forces on hand.
A fascinating, but tedious at times, study of the Korean War after the first Chinese offensive ran out of steam and the second big one. I was surprised that the Allies were able to hold on and successfully counter attack such huge armies they were up against with the weakened forces on hand.
February 27, 2020
Very poorly formatted for kindle and difficult to read
I think there is a lot of good content in the book but I very strongly recommend the hard copy as the kindle formatting is very poor.
I think there is a lot of good content in the book but I very strongly recommend the hard copy as the kindle formatting is very poor.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews