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The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence
The The Great Powers and American Independence by Richard B. Morris.
572 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1965
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About the author
Richard B. Morris
147 books5 followersRichard Brandon Morris was Gouverneur Morris Professor of History at Columbia University & past president of the American Historical Association. He wrote more than 40 books spanning legal, labor, diplomatic, political & social history, including The Peacemakers: The Great Powers & American Independence, The Forging of the Union 1781-89, Witnesses at the Creation, Government & Labor in Early America & Studies in the History of American Law. He lectured throughout the world, serving as Fulbright Research Professor at the Sorbonne & Distinguished Professor at the John F. Kennedy Institute of the Free University of Berlin.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 14, 2013
An exhaustive account of the peace negotiations that ended the Revolutionary War.
The book’s greatest strength is also its main weakness. Morris recounts every aspect of the negotiations with exacting and excruciating detail. Morris demonstrates a good command of the intricacies of European power diplomacy, and his portrait of the various intrigues and secrecy surrounding the negotiations is masterful. But again, Morris recounts every single advantage, disadvantage, complication and subtlety of these intrigues, which makes for often tedious reading that makes the reader long for general summaries of the “big-picture.” But, of course, the big picture is always made up of many little ones.
After the victory at Yorktown, antiwar sentiment grew dominant among the British people. Antiwar factions took over in Parliament and prime minister Lord North resigned. King George III now faced a hostile parliament and almost abdicated.
The peace process was an international diplomatic struggle of colossal magnitude and Machiavellian intrigue. Britain, France and Spain were prepared to step all over America in pursuit of their own interests. France attempted to hijack the negotiations in order to grab British territory, and conspired with Spain to block American expansion. They were even willing to allow Britain to deny recognition of American independence.
The negotiations were full of complications: the British government at the time was divided as Charles James Fox and the Earl of Shelburne engaged in a tense rivalry. At one point there were even competing British delegates to the Paris negotiations. At the same time, the American commissioners Franklin, Adams, and Jay did not much like each other. However, the British did not like massive spending that a continued war would require.
The peace commissioners had instructions from Congress to sign any treaty that was reached in conjunction with France. The commissioners violated these instructions in order to achieve their aims, but nobody in Congress complained. In fact, Congress had little understanding of the situation in Paris during the negotiations.
The British sent Richard Oswald to deal with the American diplomats. Oswald was not trusted by King George and suspected of pro-American sympathies and so had to maximize the advantage to Britain that any treaty would give.
John Jay demanded that Britain recognize American independence as a precursor to any talks. This demand delayed the negotiations for two months. During this time, the British successfully defended Gibraltar from a Spanish fleet, thus strengthening their negotiating position. Franklin then insisted on Canada, an unrealistic demand that the British quickly rebuffed. After signing the preliminaries, America’s trouble with Britain was largely over.
The British eventually did acknowledge American independence, and then proceeded to drive a further wedge into the Franco-American alliance. The best way to do this, they judged, was a quick peace. The Americans won recognition of their independence, doubled their landmass by extending west to the Mississippi, and gained fishing rights off Newfoundland. The British also pushed for the Americans to compensate Loyalists for compensated property, but the Americans managed to stick the British with the bill. The French were not pleased when American made a separate peace. “The English buy peace rather than make it,” one Frenchman seethed. “Their concessions exceed all that I could have thought possible.”
The book’s greatest strength is also its main weakness. Morris recounts every aspect of the negotiations with exacting and excruciating detail. Morris demonstrates a good command of the intricacies of European power diplomacy, and his portrait of the various intrigues and secrecy surrounding the negotiations is masterful. But again, Morris recounts every single advantage, disadvantage, complication and subtlety of these intrigues, which makes for often tedious reading that makes the reader long for general summaries of the “big-picture.” But, of course, the big picture is always made up of many little ones.
After the victory at Yorktown, antiwar sentiment grew dominant among the British people. Antiwar factions took over in Parliament and prime minister Lord North resigned. King George III now faced a hostile parliament and almost abdicated.
The peace process was an international diplomatic struggle of colossal magnitude and Machiavellian intrigue. Britain, France and Spain were prepared to step all over America in pursuit of their own interests. France attempted to hijack the negotiations in order to grab British territory, and conspired with Spain to block American expansion. They were even willing to allow Britain to deny recognition of American independence.
The negotiations were full of complications: the British government at the time was divided as Charles James Fox and the Earl of Shelburne engaged in a tense rivalry. At one point there were even competing British delegates to the Paris negotiations. At the same time, the American commissioners Franklin, Adams, and Jay did not much like each other. However, the British did not like massive spending that a continued war would require.
The peace commissioners had instructions from Congress to sign any treaty that was reached in conjunction with France. The commissioners violated these instructions in order to achieve their aims, but nobody in Congress complained. In fact, Congress had little understanding of the situation in Paris during the negotiations.
The British sent Richard Oswald to deal with the American diplomats. Oswald was not trusted by King George and suspected of pro-American sympathies and so had to maximize the advantage to Britain that any treaty would give.
John Jay demanded that Britain recognize American independence as a precursor to any talks. This demand delayed the negotiations for two months. During this time, the British successfully defended Gibraltar from a Spanish fleet, thus strengthening their negotiating position. Franklin then insisted on Canada, an unrealistic demand that the British quickly rebuffed. After signing the preliminaries, America’s trouble with Britain was largely over.
The British eventually did acknowledge American independence, and then proceeded to drive a further wedge into the Franco-American alliance. The best way to do this, they judged, was a quick peace. The Americans won recognition of their independence, doubled their landmass by extending west to the Mississippi, and gained fishing rights off Newfoundland. The British also pushed for the Americans to compensate Loyalists for compensated property, but the Americans managed to stick the British with the bill. The French were not pleased when American made a separate peace. “The English buy peace rather than make it,” one Frenchman seethed. “Their concessions exceed all that I could have thought possible.”
January 19, 2018
A good, informative book. Detailed, though sometimes confusing in its presentation.
October 2, 2011
This is an important (and detailed) book about the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Paris (1783). Slightly too nationalistic, the account celebrates American exceptionalism at the expense of a more even account of the four American negotiators in contrast to their European counterparts. That being said, it is overall an important book that is richly researched to provide the best minute to minute account of the negotiations available.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews