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Studies in Maritime History
The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy
A concise analysis of the decay of the merchant marine through the failed policies that have been imposed upon the industry
The Abandoned Ocean offers an in-depth appraisal of United States maritime policy from the establishment of a merchant marine immediately after the Revolutionary War through radical industry transformations of the late twentieth century. In this sweeping analysis of federal policies that promote, regulate, protect, and subsidize American shipping in coastal and foreign trade, Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan also examine the closely related fortunes of the shipbuilding industry and the intertwined activities of the merchant and military navies. The authors consider why, since the middle of the nineteenth century, United States maritime policy has been so strikingly unsuccessful in achieving its stated goal of promoting a commercially viable merchant marine engaged in foreign trade.
The Abandoned Ocean offers an in-depth appraisal of United States maritime policy from the establishment of a merchant marine immediately after the Revolutionary War through radical industry transformations of the late twentieth century. In this sweeping analysis of federal policies that promote, regulate, protect, and subsidize American shipping in coastal and foreign trade, Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan also examine the closely related fortunes of the shipbuilding industry and the intertwined activities of the merchant and military navies. The authors consider why, since the middle of the nineteenth century, United States maritime policy has been so strikingly unsuccessful in achieving its stated goal of promoting a commercially viable merchant marine engaged in foreign trade.
- GenresHistory
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First published March 1, 2000
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September 1, 2023
The first half of this book is a wonderful look at American shipping policy up through the Second World War, a period that encompassed the rise of the American merchant marine (from 1815 to 1860) and it's fall (during the Civil War and afterwards, with a brief revival during World War I.) The second half is a look at American shipping policy after 1945, where little changes, the merchant marine is less relevant, and the book descends into a series of acronyms of employers groups, unions, and federal administrations.
In the early nation the centrality of shipping was a commonly acknowledged fact. British blockage of American ships from trade with the West Indies in 1783 inspired a bunch of states to levy discriminating duties against foreign ships and foreign manufacturers, although states like New Jersey, with little shipping, scuttled the effort by keeping free ports. This was one of the reasons for the creation of the Constitution, and in 1789 Congress passed a bill with reduced tonnage duties for American ships and even reduced tariffs on some goods like tea if they came in American bottoms and this soon led to a boom in shipbuilding. The exclusion of all foreign vessels from US trade including coastal trade, later famous as the Jones Act, actually started in 1817 after a dispute with Canada that restricted sales of gypsum to its own ships (the US legislation included the exception that if other countries ended discrimination against the US free trade in foreign shipping was allowed.) In 1828 the US repealed tonnage tax on American vessels and offered the same deal for other countries that agreed to reciprocate. In 1830, Britain finally opened trade to the West Indies. This led to the golden age of American clipper ships capturing the seas.
Much of US shipping policy is about subsidies. One year after Samuel Cunard opened the first scheduled steam service across the ocean from Halifax to Great Britain, the British government in 1834 began signing contracts to carry the royal mail (Cunard got his subsidies in a few more years.) In 1845 Congress gave the postmaster general authority to subsidize ships. But both Edward Mills and Edward Collins had their respective steamship lines go bust after extensive subsidies, and the US stuck to wood and sail just as the rest of the country was moving away. After Confederate raiders devastated shipping, and others fled to foreign flags (Congress declared those who had left could not reflag afterwards), Congress tried some more subsidies, and the 1891 Ocean Mail Act set strict levels of subsidies depending on size and speed, but the US fleet became mainly coastal.
Woodrow Wilson did much to open up free trade in shipping. He repealed the Taft-approved provision of the Panama Canal Act which gave discriminatory rates to American ships, allowed non-US ships to be flagged here, and for the duration of the war allowed foreign ships in the coastal trade. But he also added subsidies and oversight. He created a Bureau of War Risk Insurance to underwrite shipping costs and passed the Shipping Act of 1916, which required filing of rates with the US Shipping Board, and created the Emergency Fleet Corporation which built hundreds of ships for World War I (about 1/3 of the keels laid after the war was over.) The Jones Act in 1920 attempted to transfer as much of the fleet to private ownership as possible, provided some loans to shipbuilding, and strengthened existing coastal shipping laws. Still, not a single ocean-going ship was built for years in the US. The 1936 Merchant Marine Act provided operating and construction subsidies and strengthened federal board oversight of the industry, but after the next war, the shipping building industry was devastated again and increasing subsidies did little to revive a competitive version of it. Later programs like PL 480, which required US aid to be carried only on US ships, also did little, and it was not until the 1980s that subsidies dried up and not until 1999 with the Ocean Shipping Reform Act that rate regulation of conferences (groups of shipping lines) stopped.
The period of this book that deals with the pre-World War II era reminds one that shipping was central to the American economy and central to its foreign policy. The postwar period reminds one how reams of subsidies and oversight can accomplish almost nothing.
In the early nation the centrality of shipping was a commonly acknowledged fact. British blockage of American ships from trade with the West Indies in 1783 inspired a bunch of states to levy discriminating duties against foreign ships and foreign manufacturers, although states like New Jersey, with little shipping, scuttled the effort by keeping free ports. This was one of the reasons for the creation of the Constitution, and in 1789 Congress passed a bill with reduced tonnage duties for American ships and even reduced tariffs on some goods like tea if they came in American bottoms and this soon led to a boom in shipbuilding. The exclusion of all foreign vessels from US trade including coastal trade, later famous as the Jones Act, actually started in 1817 after a dispute with Canada that restricted sales of gypsum to its own ships (the US legislation included the exception that if other countries ended discrimination against the US free trade in foreign shipping was allowed.) In 1828 the US repealed tonnage tax on American vessels and offered the same deal for other countries that agreed to reciprocate. In 1830, Britain finally opened trade to the West Indies. This led to the golden age of American clipper ships capturing the seas.
Much of US shipping policy is about subsidies. One year after Samuel Cunard opened the first scheduled steam service across the ocean from Halifax to Great Britain, the British government in 1834 began signing contracts to carry the royal mail (Cunard got his subsidies in a few more years.) In 1845 Congress gave the postmaster general authority to subsidize ships. But both Edward Mills and Edward Collins had their respective steamship lines go bust after extensive subsidies, and the US stuck to wood and sail just as the rest of the country was moving away. After Confederate raiders devastated shipping, and others fled to foreign flags (Congress declared those who had left could not reflag afterwards), Congress tried some more subsidies, and the 1891 Ocean Mail Act set strict levels of subsidies depending on size and speed, but the US fleet became mainly coastal.
Woodrow Wilson did much to open up free trade in shipping. He repealed the Taft-approved provision of the Panama Canal Act which gave discriminatory rates to American ships, allowed non-US ships to be flagged here, and for the duration of the war allowed foreign ships in the coastal trade. But he also added subsidies and oversight. He created a Bureau of War Risk Insurance to underwrite shipping costs and passed the Shipping Act of 1916, which required filing of rates with the US Shipping Board, and created the Emergency Fleet Corporation which built hundreds of ships for World War I (about 1/3 of the keels laid after the war was over.) The Jones Act in 1920 attempted to transfer as much of the fleet to private ownership as possible, provided some loans to shipbuilding, and strengthened existing coastal shipping laws. Still, not a single ocean-going ship was built for years in the US. The 1936 Merchant Marine Act provided operating and construction subsidies and strengthened federal board oversight of the industry, but after the next war, the shipping building industry was devastated again and increasing subsidies did little to revive a competitive version of it. Later programs like PL 480, which required US aid to be carried only on US ships, also did little, and it was not until the 1980s that subsidies dried up and not until 1999 with the Ocean Shipping Reform Act that rate regulation of conferences (groups of shipping lines) stopped.
The period of this book that deals with the pre-World War II era reminds one that shipping was central to the American economy and central to its foreign policy. The postwar period reminds one how reams of subsidies and oversight can accomplish almost nothing.
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