Hegel is one of the most important modern philosophers, whose thought influenced the development of existentialism, Marxism, pragmatism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction. Yet Hegel's central text, the monumental Science of Logic , still remains for most philosophers (both figuratively and literally) a firmly closed book. The purpose of The Opening of Hegel's Logic is to dispel the myths that surround the Logic and to show that Hegel's unjustly neglected text is a work of extraordinary subtlety and insight. Part One of The Opening of Hegel's Logic argues that the Logic provides a rigorous derivation of the fundamental categories of thought and contrasts Hegel's approach to the categories with that of Kant. It goes on to examine the historical and linguistic presuppositions of Hegel's self-critical, "presuppositionless" logic and, in the process, considers several significant criticisms of such logic advanced by Schelling, Feuerbach, Gadamer, and Kierkegaard. Separate chapters are devoted to the relation between logic and ontology in Hegel's Logic and to the relation between the Logic itself and the Phenomenology . Part Two contains the text―in German and English―of the first two chapters of Hegel's Logic , which cover such categories as being, becoming, something, limit, finitude, and infinity. Part Three then provides a clear and accessible commentary on these two chapters that both examines Hegel's arguments in detail and relates his insights to those of other philosophers, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, and Levinas. The Opening of Hegel's Logic aims to help students and scholars read Hegel's often formidably difficult text for themselves and discover the wealth of philosophical riches that it contains. It also argues that Hegel's project of a presuppositionless science of logic is one that deserves serious consideration today.
Stephen Houlgate (PhD University of Cambridge) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick.
Houlgate's "interpretation of Hegel's logic and his philosophy more generally continues to be guided by his claim that speculative thought develops immanently and without systematic presuppositions." He "thus contest[s] Heidegger's assertion that Hegel thinks ‘in accordance with a predetermined idea of being’ (an assertion endorsed by Derrida and Deleuze, amongst others)."
"امر حقیقی، شادخواری باکخوس واری است که در آن هیچ عضوی ناهشیار نیست..."
هگل | پدیدارشناسی روح | پیشگفتار
منطق هگل دشوار است و حل کردن این دشواری تلاش ذهنی بسیاری می طلبد اما هیچ گاه نباید چنین تصوری از هگل و یا فلسفه اش داشت که گویی انسانی مالیخویایی در گوشه ای از اتاقی نشسته و کلماتی نامفهوم را پشت سر یکدیگر ردیف می کند، یا آنطور که شوپنهاور ادعا میکند، ذهن جوانان را با افیون فلسفه دیالکتیکی می آلاید. اما همچنین نباید اینطور به نظر برسد که فهمِ دشواری های فلسفهی هگل را تنها می توان از کسانی که ادعای پیامبری اش را دارند طلب کرد. پیامبرانی که در جغرافیایی که ما در آن زندگی می کنیم هر کدامشان تنها خود را برحق می داند و دیگران را طرد میکند. اگر که هگل و فلسفه اش را فرزند حقیقی روشنگری بدانیم، روشنگری ای که مضمون اساسی اش خطاب به انسان های زمانه اش "جرئت اندیشیدن داشتن است"، هگل با هیچ کدام از این پیامبران دروغین و غرورهای ورم کردشان نمیتواند نسبتی داشته باشد. شرح هولگیت از منطق هگل هر دوی این سوتفاهم را هدف گرفته. پروفسور هولگیت در شرحش از منطق هگل نشان می دهد که نه هگل برج عاج نشین بوده و نه اینکه فهمآن نسبتی به مراد و مرید پروری دارد...اما هگل چی میگوید؟ برای پاسخ به این سوال باید از کانت آغاز کرد
"کانت؛ کاشف دنیای نو"
حداقل برای من اینطور به نظر می رسد که فلسفهی کانت بیشتر از آنکه انقلابی کپرنیکی در فلسفه باشد، از جنس کشفی کریستف کلمبی است. کانت با چرخش انقلابی اش به سوی سوژه، امکانات بسیاری و همینطور سوالات تازه ای برای شاگردان پس از خود بالاخص ایدئالیست آلمانی به ارمغان آورد. بخاطر همین برای فهم هگل و کاری که در منطق انجام میدهد ناچاریم که از کانت سخنی به میان آوریم. کانت در نقد عقل محض دو پروژهی اساسی را دنبال میکرد. یک، پاککردن دامن متافیزیک از نظام های پوسیدهی عقلگریان سنتی، نظام هایی که تا سقف آسمان بالا می رفتند اما چندی بعد بواسطهی شک گرایان نیست و نابود می شدند. پس کانت عهده دار این خاک برداری شد با نشان داد مرزهای دانش به خودش، و اینکه عقل تا کجا میتواند پیش رود، و میش رفتن بیش از اینمرزها، جز خستگی سودی برایش ندارد. دو، بنیانی یافتن برای مشروعیت دادن به علم مدرن تا از امان شک گرایانی همچون هیوم در امان باشد. کانت نشان می دهد که تمام مقولات دانش از جمله، جوهر، عرض، علیت، کمیت و کیفیت و... و صورت های شهود همچون مکان و زمان در اصل شروط پیشینی تجربه هستند. شروطی که تجربه را امکان پذیر می کنند و خودشان توسط تجربه داده نشدند. بلکه در اصل کارشان شکل دادن هر گونه تجربه است. در اصل کانت شناخت را همچون ابزاری می بیند که بر روی ابژه های این جهان کار می کند و آن ها را تغییر می دهد تا قابل استفاده برای دانش بشری باشند. اما نتیجهی دیگری که کانت ناچار است بگیرد این است که ما نمی توانیم پا از خویش فراتر بگذاریم و جهان را آنچنان که هست به تصور در آوریم. ما با جهان آنچنان که بر ما پدیدار می شود آشناییم نه آنطور فی نفسه است. در اصل ما هیچ اطلاعی از شی فی نفسه نخواهیم داشت، چرا که شی فی نفسه هیج گونه نمودی در تجربیات ما ندارد. اما حقیقت این است که ما حتی نمی توانیم دلیلی برای وجود شی فی نفسه داشته باشیم. کانت ناچارا در ورطه نهیلیسم می غلطد و ایدئالیسم استعلایی اش نیز در ورطهی ایدئالیسمی سوبژکتیو.
اما این تنها ایراد بر کانت نبود. کانت هر چند که از نقش مقولات در شکل دادن به تجربیات ما سخن گفت اما هیچ گاه نشان نداد چرا این مقولات باید چنین باشند و نه به شکل دیگری. چرا ما باید جهان را ذیل این مقولات دوازده گانهی خاص بفهمیم و نه مقولاتی از جنس دیگر؟ چه ضرورتی برای وجود صورت های مکان و زمان وجود دارد؟
در اصل شاگردان کانت خود را با دو چالش اساسی رو به رو دیدند. فائق آمدن بر ایدئالیسم سوبژکتیو و نهیلیسم کانت و در عین حال نشان دادن ضرورت مقولات و صورت های شهودی که کانت ذکرشان را نقد عقل محض آورده بود. اینجاست که هگل پا پیش می گذارد.
"چرا هستی هست به جای آنکه نباشد؟"
پروژهی هگل در منطق را باید همچون تلاشی به فائق آمدن به چالش هایی دانست که کانت برای بازماندگانش به ارث گذاشت. هگل با "علم منطق" اش سعی دارد که هر دو چالش را در کنار هم رفع کند: غلبه بر نیهلیسم و نشان دادن ضرورت مقولات. پروفسور هولگیت معتقد است باید علم منطق هگل را نه صرفا تحقیقی در نشان دادن ضرورت مقولات در آگاهی دانست بلکه علم منطق در اصل نشان دادن ضرورت همین مقولات در واقعیت است. در اصل ادعای هگل این است که نباید صرفا مقولات آگاهی را به عنوان ابزاری برای شناخت هستی دانست بلکه این خود هستی است که این مقولات را پیش می گذارد. به همین علت هگل انگارهی شی فی نفسه کانتی را بی معنا می داند. شناخت و آگاهی ابزاری نیستند که با کار بر روی شی فی نفسه آن را قابل فهم سازند بلکه آگاهی و جهان از همان آغاز در یگانگی و ارتباطی با یکدیگر قرار دارند. اما هگل چگونه این یگانگی و ارتباط را توضیح می دهد؟ آگاهی چگونه می تواند به کنه هستی پی ببرد؟ و هستی چگونه ممکن است که بر روی آگاهی گشوده باشد؟ و درنهایت این پرسش اساسی: چرا چیزی هست به جای آنکه نباشد.
"در آغاز کلمه بود و آن کلمه خدا بود"
هگل برای اینکه بتواند به نقطه ای برسد که آگاهی و وجود با یکدیگر ارتباط و نسبتی پیدا می کنند خود را ناچار می بیند که ذهن خویش را از هر پیش فرضی برهاند. او باید فلسفهای بدون پیش فرض بنیان بگذارد. کاری که به نظر او فیلسوفان پیش از خودش از دکارت تا فیشته و شلینگ در انجام آن شکست خوردند. دکارت با شک روشی تلاش کرد به اصل اعلای فلسفه برسد. فکر میکنم پس هستم. اما هگل معتقد است که دکارت به اندازه کافی به عمق نرفته. دکارت منی که فکر می کند را پیش فرض گرفته. باید برای رسیدن به این عمق، اندیشه را از هر تعینی تهی کرد...در نهایت صورت پیراستهی اصل دکارت چنین می شود: [هست]...هستی ای از هر تعینی تهی، وجود محض...با رسیدن به چنین آغازی هگل ثابت می کند که وجود و آگاهی هر دو از یک نقطه آغاز میکنند. و در نتیجه به راه افتادن از این نقطه نه تنها سیری در آگاهی است بلکه به همان میزان سیری در وجود نیز هست. به همین علت، هولگیت منطق هگل را نه صرفا پژوهشی استعلایی که پژوهشی انتولوژبک در نظر میگیرد. اما هنوز پرسشی دیگر بی پاسخ مانده...چگونه از وجود محض می توان تمام مقولات منطق را استخراج کرد و ضرورتشان را اثبات؟ یا چگونه از مقوله وجود محض می توانیم به جهانی که در آن زندگی می کنیم برسیم؟
"دیالکیتک؛ فن قابلگی"
یکی از پرمناقشه ترین مفاهیمی که هگل به کار می برد، مفهوم دیالکتیک است. تقریبا می توان با اطمینان گفت اکثر کاربرد های روزمره ای که این لفظ در افواه روشنفکران وطنی دارد ارتباطی با دیالکیک نزد هگل ندارد. همچنین دیالکتیک هگل ارتباطی با تز؛ آنتی تز و سنتز نیز ندارد. اما دیالکتیک هگلی واقعا چیست؟ و در علم منطق چه نقشی ایفا میکند؟ به حدودا دو هزار و اندی سال پیش برگردیم. در آتن سقراط را خواهیم یافت که احتمالا جوانی را گیر انداخته و پژوهشی را با او شروع کرده. پژوهش شاید درباره مفهومدوستی باشد، یا فضیلت، یا عشق یا ... . مثلا سقراط می پرسد فضیلت چیست؟ جوان پاسخی را ارائه می دهد اما سقراط را با چند پرسش دیگر نشان می دهد این پاسخ چنان که باید پاسخ درستی نیست. جوان حالا تلاش دوباره می کند تا پاسخی بهتر از پاسخ قبلی ارائه دهد و به تعریف جدیدی از فضیلت برسد. سقراط این کار خویش را با استعارهی قابگی توصیف می کرد. در واقع او با پرسش های بی وقفه به جوان "مجال" می دهد تا خود قدم به قدم به پاسخ نهایی نزدیک شود. هیچ کدام نمی دانند تحقیق آن ها را بهکجا خواهند کشاند، سقراط پاسخ را در دهان جوانان نمی گذاشت، بلکه اجازه می دهد که لحظهی مناسب تولد در آگاهی پژوهشگر فرا برسد و او تنها به انتظار این لحظه می نشیند.
شاید فهم دیالکتیک هگل با این پیش زمینه آسانتر باشد. هگل نشان می دهد هر مفهوم درون خود غنا و امکانات بسیاری را حفظ کرده. کار فیلسوف نتیجتا از جنس قابلگی است، از جنس کشف است. فیلسوف باید اجازه دهد که منطق درونی هر مفهوم خودش را بروز دهد و آشکار کند. دیالکیتک در نهایت تبدیل امر ضمنی (implicit) به امر آشکار (explicit) درون هر مفهوم است. این اتتقال و تبدیل با دخالت فیلسوف اتفاق نمیافتد. در واقع فیلسوف نباید اجازه دهد که میش فرض هایش مانع حرکت درونی مفاهیم گردند. فیلسوف باید کاری نکردن را بلد باشد. در نهایت، هگل در علم منطق نشان می دهد که چگونه از دل وجود محض، ضرورتا تمام مقولات آشکار خواهند شد. غنای درونی وجود محض جهانی که در آن زندگی می کنیم می سازد. نه صرفا جهانی که در ذهن ماست، یا جهانی با مقولاتی تصادفی...بلکه جهان چنان که هست و ضرورتا باید چنین باشد...
This is probably the best "guide" to a text I have ever read. Not only because it succeeds at rendering intelligible the Logic, a notoriously difficult text. But also because Houlgate equips you to understand and articulate the differing interpretations of the Logic, to even go against the very reading that Houlgate provides here. With a little background in Kant and modern western philosophy, this book has made me more comfortable with the Logic and its arguments than I would have thought possible without a teacher, two essays, and an exam.
As the General Election fallout endures, and the British left settles back into familiar territory of recrimination and despair, I have decided to take refuge in abstruse metaphysics. There is something comforting in believing you can reconstruct this shitty world from first principles using nothing but deductive logic, thus avoiding the inconvenience of class struggle.
I've put off reading Hegel for years. ACTUALLY reading Hegel, mind. Not relying on secondary sources, such as flicking through Bertrand Russell’s cantankerous précis in his History of Western Philosophy, or rewatching for the squillionth time Bryan Magee’s whimsical, but ultimately superficial, BBC series from the 70s. But I shall prevaricate no more!
Only, upon reading the opening passages of the Science of Logic, it quickly becomes apparent that it’s not deductive logic you’re dealing with here. At least not in a recognisable Aristotelean sense. At first blush, the SoL presents a land of nonsense logic where a is not a, or is just as likely to vanish into b. Or something.
But if Hegel seems to be the hookah pipe smoking caterpillar spinning non sequiturs, British Hegelian Stephen Houlgate is Morpheus offering you a red pill, that is to say, a splendid close reading of the opening sections of the SoL. I'm not aware of any other author that's done a close reading of SoL in such detail, which is surprising, given that there is really no way to understand Hegel’s speculative method without parsing the primary text at a granular level. And for that you need the help of a master (Houlgate is a card carrying Hegelian and his devotion to the material is endearing if not, at times, quaint).
This is essential reading if you want to re-emerge from the Hegelian rabbit hole with your proverbial head still on your shoulders.
Hegel’s Science of Logic, the foundation for all subsequent Hegelian philosophy, is a difficult and often misunderstood text. In this volume, Stephen Houlgate, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, offers what some have called a revised metaphysical interpretation of Hegel that sticks closely to Hegel’s text and underscores its post-Kantian, hyper-critical character. That is, Houlgate stresses that, unlike Kant, Hegel philosophizes from a truly critical—i.e., presuppositionless—perspective from which the thought of indeterminate, immediate being immanently develops into more determinate categories such as determinate being, something and other, and finitude and infinity. In the first part of the book, Houlgate describes the project of the Logic as related to Kant, presuppositionless philosophy, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and what Houlgate claims are erroneous interpretations of Hegelian thought offered by the likes of Charles Taylor, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Gadamer. This first part defends the Logic as authentically presuppositionless and therefore rebuffs criticisms that Hegel artificially forces dialectic logic onto the supposedly immanent development of the categories, or that his dependence on language similarly renders his project determined in some way from the start. In the second part of the book, Houlgate reproduces the first two chapters of the first section of the Logic from being to infinity in German and English. Lastly, in the third and most helpful part of the book, Houlgate offers commentary on these chapters and patiently elucidates what Hegel really means. Like the first part, this third part defends Hegel’s derivation of the categories just as it explains logic’s movement from being to nothing to becoming, from becoming to determinate being to quality, from quality to something to other, and from determination, constitution, and limit to finitude and finally infinity. Houlgate’s careful explanations are invaluable: he renders Hegel’s dense prose lucid and makes salient Hegel’s often obscure claims. In short, Houlgate excavates from the Logic an extremely persuasive way to undertake philosophy and to see the world, one which uninitiated readers with little to no familiarity with Hegel may not be able to identify and understand themselves.
If Houlgate’s interpretation of Hegel is plausibly true to the Hegelian project, then many Hegelian commentators have evidently missed much of what Hegel actually means in the Science of Logic. In the conclusion to the book, Houlgate offers three questions to readers of the Logic who wish to evaluate its philosophical merit: “(1) Should philosophy try to be radically self-critical and take nothing for granted? (2) If so, should it begin from the thought of pure indeterminate being? (3) If so, does the category of pure being actually give rise to the further categories that Hegel sets out?” (437). Houlgate answers the first question in the affirmative, defends the idea that philosophy should start with the thought of pure being, and demonstrates that the Hegelian categories do indeed immanently derive from pure being. Other readers can and will, of course, answer these three questions differently. Yet Houlgate is correct to identify these questions as central to any critical assessment of the Logic. “Not everyone will agree with these theses, but they are surely quite intelligible and capable of being assessed publicly and rationally, just like the claims of most other philosophers,” Houlgate remarks. “Hegel’s Logic is not by any means as impenetrable or absurd a text as some would have us believe” (438). More provocatively, it seems fair to say that dubious interpretations of Hegel derive from one’s failure to seriously consider these questions as part of one’s critical assessment. To critique Hegel’s philosophy as teleological, for example, fails to address the fact that Hegel explicitly starts with the presuppositionless thought of pure being. Only later in the Logic, after the thought of pure being has developed into myriad other categories, does he arrive at the idea that infinite reason within nature and human history works toward self-consciousness. Such a critique therefore fails to address Hegel’s Logic on its own terms vis-a-vis the key questions Houlgate asks readers to consider. At their worst, criticisms of Hegel evidently presume Hegel derives the categories in bad faith—i.e., not immanently, which he insists the philosopher must do. Critics who claim that the thought of pure being is propelled forward by the presupposed power of dialectic, for example, ostensibly imply that Hegel either fails to live up to his promise to philosophize immanently without presuppositions or else self-consciously contradicts the very standard on which he himself insists. While the latter claim is so uncharitable one is tempted to dismiss it out of hand, it may be true that the Hegelian categories manifest in accordance with the presupposed power of dialectic. Still, to prove such a point one would need to contend with Houlgate’s proposed third question—whether the category of pure being actually gives rise to the further categories that Hegel sets out. If it does not, then perhaps Hegel has imposed dialectics on logic and ontology. Lastly, Houlgate helps demonstrate how all too many critics of Hegel object to the ideas presented in the Logic on the basis of presuppositions which Hegel himself would not allow. For these criticisms to be warranted, such critics would have to justify why philosophy should not be radically self-critical in the way Hegel insists it must be, and therefore without presuppositions. Otherwise, they would have to explain why their presuppositions are not presuppositions at all, but justified conclusions about fundamental features of the world.
The Opening of Hegel’s Logic is an essential volume for readers new to Hegel who want to learn more about the Hegelian system. Readers who are prepared to consider a new way to think will learn from and enjoy Houlgate’s commentary more than those whose assessment of Hegel is already predetermined. While there is much more to Hegel’s Logic than what Houlgate covers here, this introduction to Hegel provides a firm foundation from which readers can delve deeper into the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. One only wishes that Houlgate had authored such patient, detailed commentary for the entire Hegelian corpus.
Houlgate's work on Hegel has, at the very least, one highly estimable value - to render eminently clear the often turgid prose of Hegel. This work is an invaluable resource for those seeking to enter into the labyrinth of the Logic. Houlgate not only explicates Hegel's own text, but often provides glosses on other major interpretations of the passage in question, before explaining his own refutation of said interpretation.
The only drawback seems to be the fail safe position of "presuppositionlessness" which Houlgate falls back upon whenever explication and elucidation get tough. At times it appears as though Houlgate's argument for his position is "Hegel is presuppositionless, and therefore...," which, granted, is what Hegel himself wants to claim for the work, but it seems to me that the "presuppositionless beginning" remains, at the very least, an open question.
Warwick needs to give Houlgate a sabbatical or something, so he can complete a volume on the Doctrine of Essence. He has worked on it before, and has written various disjecta concerning it. The time for a concentrated reflection is nigh. Grandad Stephen isn't getting any younger - and neither are any of us. Only the text, perhaps, escapes the vicissitudes of time; though perhaps it has suffered its own neglect and oblivion already...
This is a clear and compelling account of the first chunk of Hegel's Science of Logic. Hegel's book is widely misunderstood, partially because it is so hard to read. Houlgate brilliantly explains Hegel's text in a way that corrects many, many misunderstandings, and he demonstrates the power and profundity of Hegel's thought. He also discusses fairly carefully the technicalities of Hegel's argument and language, (and the book includes a text and translation of the first chapters of Hegel's Science of Logic). This is mandatory reading for any student of Hegel, and would be a excellent selection for anyone with an interest in Hegel's thought.
Houlgate's book provides a comprehensive introduction to Hegel's complex and notoriously difficult work, and it focuses specifically on the opening section of the "Science of Logic," which is concerned with the categories of being and nothingness. Houlgate argues that this section is crucial to understanding the rest of Hegel's work, and he provides a detailed analysis of each concept and argument presented in the text.
The book is divided into two parts. Part I, "The Path to Infinity," provides an overview of Hegel's intellectual context and the philosophical issues that he was grappling with. Houlgate explores Hegel's relationship to his predecessors, such as Kant and Fichte, and he shows how Hegel developed his own distinctive approach to philosophy.
Part II, "The Categories of Being and Nothingness," is a detailed study of the opening section of the "Science of Logic." Houlgate provides a close reading of the text, and he explores each concept and argument in detail. He shows how Hegel's approach to philosophy is characterized by a movement from abstract concepts to more concrete ones, and how this movement ultimately leads to the concept of infinity.
Throughout the book, Houlgate emphasizes the importance of understanding Hegel's philosophy in its historical and intellectual context. He shows how Hegel's work is shaped by the philosophical debates and cultural trends of his time, and he argues that it is only by understanding this context that we can fully appreciate Hegel's contributions to philosophy.
Houlgate offer’s a compelling account of how Hegel seems to take the scope of his own project. The strengths of Houlgate, are in situating his reading of Hegel against other readers of Hegel, however his weakness is in the particular moments of how he reads Hegel. For example, by the time it gets into the final stretch of the book, it becomes apparent that the limits to Houlgate’s approach is clearly exemplified by the Pippin-Houlgate debate.
While it is important, as Houlgate stresses to read the Science of Logic as presuppositionless, the difficulty here is that Houlgate eschews how rational necessity in how the categories develop are grasped in their development, and instead favors how the categories themselves develop. Pippin, for what it’s worth, favors the inverse at the expense of reading the book as not presuppositionless and fails to deliver how the categories have logical necessity on the side of the categories themselves.
Perhaps when Houlgate finally delivers his work on the doctrine of the concept, I can see how he fares, but for now, I have to admit in spite of moments where Houlgate seems to overreach—while not being radical enough to see how Hegel delivers a generalized conditions of intelligibility with respect to intelligibles, that does succumb to the logical fetishism he seems to at times—it is still an excellent account.
Las palabras se me escapan al momento de intentar hacer un analisis o, por lo menos, una serie de observaciones mínimas acerca de este texto. En razón de esto, como opción solo me queda arrodillarme y ROGAR a todo aquel que esté interesado en la filosofía hegeliana —y que no la rechace a priori como falopa especulativa o 800 paginas de un tipo que está en "contra (!) del principio de no contradicción"— a leer este texto. De una claridad insospechada para un texto de esta magnitud intelectual y volumen de páginas. Estoy sin palabras, realmente somos enanos en hombros de gigantes. I get it now.
Besides being carefully reasoned, clear and as rigorous as one might expect from an introduction/guide, the book was very engaging. Also Houlgate knows how to make stuff click without dumbing it down. Highly recommended to anyone interested in Hegel's Logic. Too bad it covers so little.