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Leavenworth Papers #22
Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign
This study examines the Huai Hai Campaign as an example of operational-level warfare as described in the 2001 version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. It also examines the campaign from the perspective of the military thought contained in the ancient Chinese military classic, The Art of War, and the Communist operational doctrine in effect at the time of the campaign. What emerges is a picture of what operational art can contribute to warfare. Communist commanders consistently maintained an awareness of the war situation as a whole and continually ensured that the objectives of their military operations were linked to strategic goals. The study shows that Su Yu, the acting commander of the East China Field Army, was an excellent practitioner of operational art and a general who was willing to speak out against military operations that would not contribute to achieving political, social, or economic goals. The study contains background material on the Communist mili-tary forces that fought the campaign and the commanders who led them in the field. Using messages sent between various Communist headquarters, the study describes and analyzes the operational decisions that were made. Much of this material has not appeared before in English. This enables readers to gain a fresh appreciation for the professional competence of military men who were among the founding generation of the People's Liberation Army and later played significant roles in building the military strength of the People's Republic of China.
- GenresHistory
318 pages, Paperback
Published June 1, 2010
14 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 24, 2020
Dr. Bjorge's paper looks at the crucial campaign of Huahai during the Chinese Civil war and the operational art of the PLA. Put simply, this may well be the definitive account of this campaign.
The table of contents is well laid out and the many maps clear and easy to follow.
Chapter four contains much detailed information on the organisation of both Nationalist and Communist as well as equipment. There are also very useful accompanying charts and tables, especially of the Nationalist Air Force. (There are also a few surprises!) The author also points out that PLA 'columns' were corps-sized formations of usually two to three divisions. He also goes on to say that Chinese army units and formations (both Nationalist and Communist) were often smaller than their name suggested. For example, a Chinese regiment may actually be a battalion.
Perhaps the most useful section of Ch. 4 is the one on topography. The campaign was fought on China's Central Plains; roughly around the city of Xuzhou. At this time, communications were, well, quite basic in an area that was, and still is, criss crossed with all manner of water obstacles. Roads, such as they were, were often little more than rammed earth and rubble. (Dr. Bjorge points out, in a memorable comparison, that the Central Plains made western Russia at the time of 'Barbarrossa' seem like western Europe.)
Furthermore, the absence of suitable roads for motor transport played into the hands of the PLA with its logistics organised around human and animal porters. The Nationalists, in contrast, relied on motor transport, rail and air-drops. The effect on Nationalist formations' ability to generate combat power as more and more of the road and rail network fell into Communist hands can well be imagined.
Dr. Bjorge also draws heavily from Sun Zi's 'Art of War' to illustrate just how 'Sunzian', a term coined by author (?), PLA operational art was. As the campaign unfolds, we can see just what a hard-fought struggle this campaign was. (Indeed, it is almost certainly one of the largest campaigns of the twentieth century few people have heard of.) After all, as the campaign unfolded, both sides realised that this was 'the battle for China'; a battle that would leave the vanquished in a virtually impossible position for final control.
What may come as a surprise to some is the way in which the PLA was able to integrate quickly captured Nationalist units, and, ultimately, whole formations, into the PLA. And this was not simply a matter of expediency: it was a part of the PLA's doctrine and operational art... and very 'Sunzian'.
The Nationalists were not so much out-fought: they were out-thought. All the more poignant, really, as the Nationalists were also very familiar with Sun Zi's 'Art of 'War'.
The table of contents is well laid out and the many maps clear and easy to follow.
Chapter four contains much detailed information on the organisation of both Nationalist and Communist as well as equipment. There are also very useful accompanying charts and tables, especially of the Nationalist Air Force. (There are also a few surprises!) The author also points out that PLA 'columns' were corps-sized formations of usually two to three divisions. He also goes on to say that Chinese army units and formations (both Nationalist and Communist) were often smaller than their name suggested. For example, a Chinese regiment may actually be a battalion.
Perhaps the most useful section of Ch. 4 is the one on topography. The campaign was fought on China's Central Plains; roughly around the city of Xuzhou. At this time, communications were, well, quite basic in an area that was, and still is, criss crossed with all manner of water obstacles. Roads, such as they were, were often little more than rammed earth and rubble. (Dr. Bjorge points out, in a memorable comparison, that the Central Plains made western Russia at the time of 'Barbarrossa' seem like western Europe.)
Furthermore, the absence of suitable roads for motor transport played into the hands of the PLA with its logistics organised around human and animal porters. The Nationalists, in contrast, relied on motor transport, rail and air-drops. The effect on Nationalist formations' ability to generate combat power as more and more of the road and rail network fell into Communist hands can well be imagined.
Dr. Bjorge also draws heavily from Sun Zi's 'Art of War' to illustrate just how 'Sunzian', a term coined by author (?), PLA operational art was. As the campaign unfolds, we can see just what a hard-fought struggle this campaign was. (Indeed, it is almost certainly one of the largest campaigns of the twentieth century few people have heard of.) After all, as the campaign unfolded, both sides realised that this was 'the battle for China'; a battle that would leave the vanquished in a virtually impossible position for final control.
What may come as a surprise to some is the way in which the PLA was able to integrate quickly captured Nationalist units, and, ultimately, whole formations, into the PLA. And this was not simply a matter of expediency: it was a part of the PLA's doctrine and operational art... and very 'Sunzian'.
The Nationalists were not so much out-fought: they were out-thought. All the more poignant, really, as the Nationalists were also very familiar with Sun Zi's 'Art of 'War'.
February 17, 2019
The author did his research in the 80's, well ahead of the curve. Before that, according to another author around 2009, the history (of CCP win over KMT) was largely written by the losers, instead of the winners. The reason was that the primary sources were mainly from Taiwan. In the last 3o years, the situation changed a little, several books were written in the light of new materials, and I'm planning to read two of them (other than this one).
This is the first major work focusing the pivotal campaign of the Chinese Civil War, the Huaihai Campaign, about ~1.4 million military forces from two sides were involved in 3 stages of fierce battle. KMT loss (even with man power advantage) decided the results of the war, which was no longer in any doubt. The remaining battle became pretty much a formality.
Previous authors mostly attributed the win by CCP to the ineptitude and corruption of the KMT government. However, the result was never destined. It's really easy to fall to confirmation bias. Bjorge broke new ground by performed an extensive study of the vital campaign. By doing so, a fuller, more complicated picture of the campaign emerged. Just as Moltke said, "no plan survives contact with the enemy." The roles played by the key figures were studied in detail, especially the foresight from Su Yu and Liu Bocheng. Su Yu's indispensable role was only realized by people outside of the military circle in recent years. Even today, it's still downplayed.
I'll try to add more materials later.
This is the first major work focusing the pivotal campaign of the Chinese Civil War, the Huaihai Campaign, about ~1.4 million military forces from two sides were involved in 3 stages of fierce battle. KMT loss (even with man power advantage) decided the results of the war, which was no longer in any doubt. The remaining battle became pretty much a formality.
Previous authors mostly attributed the win by CCP to the ineptitude and corruption of the KMT government. However, the result was never destined. It's really easy to fall to confirmation bias. Bjorge broke new ground by performed an extensive study of the vital campaign. By doing so, a fuller, more complicated picture of the campaign emerged. Just as Moltke said, "no plan survives contact with the enemy." The roles played by the key figures were studied in detail, especially the foresight from Su Yu and Liu Bocheng. Su Yu's indispensable role was only realized by people outside of the military circle in recent years. Even today, it's still downplayed.
I'll try to add more materials later.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews