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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior.
This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
400 pages, Paperback
First published April 15, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
August 3, 2014
In Armed Servants, Peter Feaver, challenges Samuel Huntington’s civil-military relations theory with his Agent Theory, which is based on a principle-agent relationship.
To Huntington civ-mil relations are based on the need for the functional imperative (the need for a strong military to ensure security) and the societal imperative(the need to protect liberal values from the military). Huntington says civilian and military roles are distinct, the key to civilian control is professional military officers, and the key to ensuring professionalism is military autonomy.
Feaver argues that Huntington claim that state preferences adapt to military preferences, didn’t happen during the cold war. He says Huntington’s theory doesn’t account for the cost of monitoring, strategies of the actors, or the expectation of punishment.
Feaver’s Agent Theory claims the civilians have the right to be wrong. He removed the assumption of military obedience and describes civ-mil relations as a principal-agent problem where the agent, the military, makes the decision to work or shirk. Work is obedient following of civilian direction and shirk is avoidance of doing what’s been directed.
The examples that stuck with me are Truman’s firing of Macarthur regarding his autonomy during the Korean war, Powell dragging his feet on Clinton’s direction to go into the Balkans and Fogleman’s early resignation because of the Khobar Towers incident.
Consideration should be given to whether resignation is shirking or not. By swearing to support and defend the constitution, resigning could be considered shirking the responsibility to allow the civilian leaders the right to be wrong.
Some other points to ponder are who exactly is the principal? Is it the executive or the congress? Another interesting discussion could be centered on the value of the shirk, which Feaver does not see any value in.
To Huntington civ-mil relations are based on the need for the functional imperative (the need for a strong military to ensure security) and the societal imperative(the need to protect liberal values from the military). Huntington says civilian and military roles are distinct, the key to civilian control is professional military officers, and the key to ensuring professionalism is military autonomy.
Feaver argues that Huntington claim that state preferences adapt to military preferences, didn’t happen during the cold war. He says Huntington’s theory doesn’t account for the cost of monitoring, strategies of the actors, or the expectation of punishment.
Feaver’s Agent Theory claims the civilians have the right to be wrong. He removed the assumption of military obedience and describes civ-mil relations as a principal-agent problem where the agent, the military, makes the decision to work or shirk. Work is obedient following of civilian direction and shirk is avoidance of doing what’s been directed.
The examples that stuck with me are Truman’s firing of Macarthur regarding his autonomy during the Korean war, Powell dragging his feet on Clinton’s direction to go into the Balkans and Fogleman’s early resignation because of the Khobar Towers incident.
Consideration should be given to whether resignation is shirking or not. By swearing to support and defend the constitution, resigning could be considered shirking the responsibility to allow the civilian leaders the right to be wrong.
Some other points to ponder are who exactly is the principal? Is it the executive or the congress? Another interesting discussion could be centered on the value of the shirk, which Feaver does not see any value in.
January 18, 2025
Definitely worth reading and considering. My biggest beef with the book is that, with the strong focus on the executive branch as the “principal,” it misses the absolutely critical role of Congress being a check on both the executive and the military and thus having a “principal” role as well. With our three co-equal branches of government, the executive, while primary in Feaver’s principal-agent theory, should not be the sole check on military shirking. Congress, with the power of the purse, passing legislation, confirming appointees, and signing off on officer promotions, is critical in insuring America’s armed servants remain just that. Make Congress Competent Again.
July 18, 2023
It took a couple of years for the civil-military relations to find a successor for Huntington. Feaver is as self-confident and convincing as Huntington used to be. What´s more, his theoretical approach aged well.
Feaver claims that he has developed a new theory. I strongly oppose to that. Nevertheless, his analysis is solid and he is one of the last authors even trying to develop the theory of civil-military relations any further.
Feaver claims that he has developed a new theory. I strongly oppose to that. Nevertheless, his analysis is solid and he is one of the last authors even trying to develop the theory of civil-military relations any further.
May 1, 2016
Peter Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University. He has significant policy-making experience as a National Security Council staff member under two presidential administrations. He is an ideal candidate to write this incisive study of civil-military relations in the U.S. during the Cold War and the 1990’s.
Feaver centers his study on the civil-military problematique, presented in Chapter 1. He starts with the principle that civilians like the President must control the military because the civilians represent the citizenry, the ultimate source of sovereignty in a democracy. The dilemma here is how civilian authorities can ensure that the military, which possesses immense coercive power, does not threaten the lives and liberties of the society it is supposed to protect while retaining the power to protect that society.
In chapter 2, Feaver critiques Samuel Huntington’s professionalism model of civil-military relations, which has long dominated scholarship on civil-military relations. Huntington argued that civilians during the Cold War managed the military by respecting their professionalism, or their expertise in the use of force. In exchange, the military became politically neutral and voluntarily subordinated themselves to civilian authority. Huntington also feared that the tension between the liberalism of American society and the military’s conservative realism would eventually undermine American security unless society reduced its liberalism in order to better control the military. However, Feaver finds that polling data show that American society did not become more conservative over the course of the Cold War. In contrast to Huntington’s prediction, Feaver says that American national security did not falter and that the U.S. actually triumphed in the Cold War despite the failure to adopt Huntington’s solution. Feaver calls this contradiction the Cold War Puzzle.
Feaver introduces agency theory in Chapter 3 as a superior alternative to Huntington’s approach. In agency theory, the civilians in a democracy are the principals who have the authority to delegate the responsibility to ensure national security to the military agents. The principal has various means of ensuring that the agent’s obedience, including monitoring and punishment. The relationship “works” when the agent follows civilian instruction. In contrast, the agent “shirks” by not following civilian instruction in various ways, such as leaking information that undermines civilian policy. Feaver imagines civil-military relations as a “strategic interaction” between parties who share an interest protecting the society but frequently disagree on how this should be done (242). In Chapter 4, Feaver formally models civil-military relations within agency theory.
In Chapter 5, Feaver applies the principal-agent approach to civil-military relations in the Cold War and the 1990’s. His solution to the Cold War Puzzle is that civil-military relations reached a fairly functional balance in which civilians intrusively monitored and occasionally punished the military and the military worked most of the time. Feaver supports the claim about civilian monitoring by showing that an increase in civilian staffers at the Defense Department increased civilian monitoring capacity. Civilians also deterred the military from shirking through sporadic but high-level punishment, such as Truman’s firing of MacArthur during the Korean War. Finally, Feaver uses a data set of thirty-five civil-military disputes in which the military “unambiguously shirked” in only two cases to demonstrate that the military usually worked during the Cold War.
In contrast to this era of functional civil-military relations, Feaver argues in Chapters 6 and 7 that civil-military relations under Clinton declined into frequent military shirking despite intrusive civilian monitoring. Feaver identifies many causes of this shift, including personal antagonism between Clinton and the military, the military’s antipathy towards the policy of humanitarian intervention, the hesitation of civilians to punish popular military shirkers like Colin Powell. He charts five case studies (Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo) to demonstrate the military’s increased ability to resist and even alter civilian policy with impunity. For example, the military publically questioned civilian policy in several of these conflicts and inflated the troop levels needed to intervene in Bosnia in order to deter the Clinton administration from interceding.
Using rich qualitative and quantitative evidence, Feaver builds a convincing case that “the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents” (81). These disagreements and negotiations make more sense in Feaver’s flexible model than Huntington’s approach, in which little bargaining or disagreement occurs as long as professionalism remains intact. Feaver’s book makes crucial strides towards helping scholars, civilians, and military leaders understand how civil-military relations play out under different conditions, what methods are best for controlling the military and why it is so important for a democracy that the military works as often as possible.
Feaver centers his study on the civil-military problematique, presented in Chapter 1. He starts with the principle that civilians like the President must control the military because the civilians represent the citizenry, the ultimate source of sovereignty in a democracy. The dilemma here is how civilian authorities can ensure that the military, which possesses immense coercive power, does not threaten the lives and liberties of the society it is supposed to protect while retaining the power to protect that society.
In chapter 2, Feaver critiques Samuel Huntington’s professionalism model of civil-military relations, which has long dominated scholarship on civil-military relations. Huntington argued that civilians during the Cold War managed the military by respecting their professionalism, or their expertise in the use of force. In exchange, the military became politically neutral and voluntarily subordinated themselves to civilian authority. Huntington also feared that the tension between the liberalism of American society and the military’s conservative realism would eventually undermine American security unless society reduced its liberalism in order to better control the military. However, Feaver finds that polling data show that American society did not become more conservative over the course of the Cold War. In contrast to Huntington’s prediction, Feaver says that American national security did not falter and that the U.S. actually triumphed in the Cold War despite the failure to adopt Huntington’s solution. Feaver calls this contradiction the Cold War Puzzle.
Feaver introduces agency theory in Chapter 3 as a superior alternative to Huntington’s approach. In agency theory, the civilians in a democracy are the principals who have the authority to delegate the responsibility to ensure national security to the military agents. The principal has various means of ensuring that the agent’s obedience, including monitoring and punishment. The relationship “works” when the agent follows civilian instruction. In contrast, the agent “shirks” by not following civilian instruction in various ways, such as leaking information that undermines civilian policy. Feaver imagines civil-military relations as a “strategic interaction” between parties who share an interest protecting the society but frequently disagree on how this should be done (242). In Chapter 4, Feaver formally models civil-military relations within agency theory.
In Chapter 5, Feaver applies the principal-agent approach to civil-military relations in the Cold War and the 1990’s. His solution to the Cold War Puzzle is that civil-military relations reached a fairly functional balance in which civilians intrusively monitored and occasionally punished the military and the military worked most of the time. Feaver supports the claim about civilian monitoring by showing that an increase in civilian staffers at the Defense Department increased civilian monitoring capacity. Civilians also deterred the military from shirking through sporadic but high-level punishment, such as Truman’s firing of MacArthur during the Korean War. Finally, Feaver uses a data set of thirty-five civil-military disputes in which the military “unambiguously shirked” in only two cases to demonstrate that the military usually worked during the Cold War.
In contrast to this era of functional civil-military relations, Feaver argues in Chapters 6 and 7 that civil-military relations under Clinton declined into frequent military shirking despite intrusive civilian monitoring. Feaver identifies many causes of this shift, including personal antagonism between Clinton and the military, the military’s antipathy towards the policy of humanitarian intervention, the hesitation of civilians to punish popular military shirkers like Colin Powell. He charts five case studies (Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo) to demonstrate the military’s increased ability to resist and even alter civilian policy with impunity. For example, the military publically questioned civilian policy in several of these conflicts and inflated the troop levels needed to intervene in Bosnia in order to deter the Clinton administration from interceding.
Using rich qualitative and quantitative evidence, Feaver builds a convincing case that “the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents” (81). These disagreements and negotiations make more sense in Feaver’s flexible model than Huntington’s approach, in which little bargaining or disagreement occurs as long as professionalism remains intact. Feaver’s book makes crucial strides towards helping scholars, civilians, and military leaders understand how civil-military relations play out under different conditions, what methods are best for controlling the military and why it is so important for a democracy that the military works as often as possible.
January 1, 2022
A very interesting and probably accurate look at the issue -- I certainly found it valuable from a day-to-day practitioner's perspective.
April 22, 2015
Peter Feaver advances a compelling argument about how civilians control the military. He explains the civ-mil relationship through the principal-agent theory/framework, used by micro-economists to understand market behavior between principals who delegate and agents who enact their wishes. In this case, the principal (Executive, Congress) contracts the agent (the military) to achieve functional goals (e.g. national security) while also preserving relational goals (e.g. military subordination to civilian leaders). Because the military conducts its business abroad, in areas where it's difficult for civilian leaders to effectively monitor their actions, it is up to the military to "work" or "shirk" its obligations to civilian leaders. Shirking, in Feaver's case, does not mean laziness or shiftlessness. Instead, "shirking" means the military might enact civilian policy with all deliberate speed, take their protests and problems to the public, or inflating the costs in manpower or resources for a given mission. "Working" means that the military carries out civilian policy in good faith.
The military generally works when a) civilian monitoring and intrusion are high and the threat of punishment is high and b) when military and civilian interests align whether or not civilian oversight is also intrusive.
As much as I liked the ideas presented in this book, I was put off by the excessive jargon, theoretical language, and light historical evidence for many of Feaver's substantial claims in the various case studies. Alas, this is simply a difference between how historians and political scientists write on civ-mil relations and military history.
A fuller review will come soon...
The military generally works when a) civilian monitoring and intrusion are high and the threat of punishment is high and b) when military and civilian interests align whether or not civilian oversight is also intrusive.
As much as I liked the ideas presented in this book, I was put off by the excessive jargon, theoretical language, and light historical evidence for many of Feaver's substantial claims in the various case studies. Alas, this is simply a difference between how historians and political scientists write on civ-mil relations and military history.
A fuller review will come soon...
July 27, 2012
Good, but the framework is somewhat limited. Describes civ-mil relations in liberal democracy, specifically the US. Relies on an "internalized notion" by the military that they are subservient to, or agents of, their civilian "masters." While this is true, it is so central to the argument that I think more time could have been spent exploring this and where it comes from.
That said, it has an equation to explain civ-mil relations! With variables and charts and a proof and everything! Awesome!
That said, it has an equation to explain civ-mil relations! With variables and charts and a proof and everything! Awesome!
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews