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L'action - Die Tat 1893: Versuch Einer Kritik Des Lebens Und Einer Wissenschaft Der Praxis
L`Action" (1893) gilt als das Hauptwerk Blondels. In diesem "Versuch" entfaltet er, methodisch und thematisch, die Grundzuge eines "neuen Denkens". Das Ist-Zeichen in der Gleichsetzung des Parmenides ersetzt er durch die Tat, denn das abstrahierende Denken kann die konkrete Lebensrealitat nie erschopfend erfassen. Nur in unseren Taten vermogen wir uns mit der konkreten Wirklichkeit wechselseitig auszutauschen und zur Vollendung zu gelangen. Die Tat ist "concretum universale", Band und Bindeglied schlechthin. Alle Aspekte menschlichen Lebens sowie der gesamten Wirklichkeit sind der Tat als ihre Elemente immanent. Blondel entfaltet sie auf serielle Weise in einer umfassenden Philosophie des Willens. Er geht dabei ausdrucklich phanomenologisch vor. Was alles ergibt sich aus der blossen Tatsache, dass der Wille will? So zeigt er auch auf, dass religioses Tun eine philosophisch unleugbare Tatsache ist. Die phanomenologische Begrundung metaphysischer Wahrheit schliesst den Denkweg ab. Breiten Raum nehmen die Uberlegungen zum Entscheidungscharakter der Tat ein.
632 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1893
11 people are currently reading
362 people want to read
About the author
Maurice Blondel
87 books18 followersMaurice Blondel was a French philosopher, whose most influential works, notably L'Action, aimed at establishing the correct relationship between autonomous philosophical reasoning and Christianity.
Blondel was born in Dijon in 1861. He came from a family who were traditionally connected to the legal profession, but chose early in life to follow a career in philosophy. In 1881, he gained admission to the École Normale Supérieure of Paris. In 1893 he finished his thesis "L'Action" (Action), a critical essay of life and of a science of the practice. He was at this time refused a teaching post (as would have been his due) because his philosophical conclusions were deemed to be too 'Christian' and, therefore, "compromising" of philosophical reason. In 1895, however, with the help of his former teacher Emile Boutroux, he became a Maître de Conférences at Lille, then shortly after at Aix-en-Provence, where he became a professor in 1897. He would remain in Aix-en-Provence for the rest of his career.
In L'Action, Blondel developed a "philosophy of action" that integrated classical Neoplatonic thought with modern Pragmatism in the context of a Christian philosophy of religion. He held that action alone could never satisfy the human yearning for the transfinite, which could only be fulfilled by God, whom he described as the "first principle and last term."
His subsequent works, the Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, were also connected to the philosophical problem of religion. They unleashed an enormous controversy at the time of publication. Pope Pius X's 1907 encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, which targeted the 'Modernist' threat to Catholic thought, targeted Blondel to some degree, and for many years his thought remained associated (perhaps tenuously) with the Modernists. He did, however, have great influence on later Catholic thought, especially through ressourcement theologians such as Henri de Lubac.
His wife died in 1919 and in 1927 he retired for health reasons. Between 1934 and 1937 he published a trilogy dedicated to thought, being and action. In 1935, he published an essay of concrete and integrale ontology "L'être et les êtres" (The Being and the Beings) and in 1946 he published "L'esprit chrétien" (The Christian Spirit).
Blondel died in Aix-en-Provence in 1949.
Blondel was born in Dijon in 1861. He came from a family who were traditionally connected to the legal profession, but chose early in life to follow a career in philosophy. In 1881, he gained admission to the École Normale Supérieure of Paris. In 1893 he finished his thesis "L'Action" (Action), a critical essay of life and of a science of the practice. He was at this time refused a teaching post (as would have been his due) because his philosophical conclusions were deemed to be too 'Christian' and, therefore, "compromising" of philosophical reason. In 1895, however, with the help of his former teacher Emile Boutroux, he became a Maître de Conférences at Lille, then shortly after at Aix-en-Provence, where he became a professor in 1897. He would remain in Aix-en-Provence for the rest of his career.
In L'Action, Blondel developed a "philosophy of action" that integrated classical Neoplatonic thought with modern Pragmatism in the context of a Christian philosophy of religion. He held that action alone could never satisfy the human yearning for the transfinite, which could only be fulfilled by God, whom he described as the "first principle and last term."
His subsequent works, the Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, were also connected to the philosophical problem of religion. They unleashed an enormous controversy at the time of publication. Pope Pius X's 1907 encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, which targeted the 'Modernist' threat to Catholic thought, targeted Blondel to some degree, and for many years his thought remained associated (perhaps tenuously) with the Modernists. He did, however, have great influence on later Catholic thought, especially through ressourcement theologians such as Henri de Lubac.
His wife died in 1919 and in 1927 he retired for health reasons. Between 1934 and 1937 he published a trilogy dedicated to thought, being and action. In 1935, he published an essay of concrete and integrale ontology "L'être et les êtres" (The Being and the Beings) and in 1946 he published "L'esprit chrétien" (The Christian Spirit).
Blondel died in Aix-en-Provence in 1949.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 10, 2024
This is a (very) difficult book to understand, even though it has been translated very well from French into a readable English. It exemplifies the European style of philosophy which (to Anglo American readers) can sometimes seem convoluted to the point of incomprehension.
Even Blondel’s examiners found the book difficult, when it was submitted as his doctoral thesis in 1893. One of the examiners commented that he spent an hour reading and re-reading a single page of this book, and he was still none the wiser what Blondel was actually trying to say. Blondel responded by noting that apparent-clarity masks its own obscurities by potentially deceiving readers.
Even William James the well known philosopher of Pragmatism struggled with the book, noting that there were areas of similarities between Blondels thinking and his own, but that it was difficult to clarify the precise scope or implications of those similarities.
Although this is a difficult read, it is potentially an important book. Before Blondel the concept of ‘action’ was not considered a philosophical issue. That fact almost led to the philosophy faculty vetoing the suitability of Blondel’s thesis. However, after its publication ‘action’ became (and continues to be) a recognised issue within philosophy. That recognition arguably contributed to the development of Existentialism and aspects of political philosophy. So Blondel’s book sits in the history of philosophy, as a major potential source of inspiration and ideas to significant themes which emerged in its wake.
The book begins with the question of whether human life makes sense. Simplistically the book is an answer to that question, which argues that human life only makes sense if we recognise the implications of the human will. The will wills its fulfilment, or its perfection. That necessarily involves an openness to infinitude, as there is more to the will than specific human choices and actions can ever exhaust.
When humans settle for less than the perfection of the will, then they create idols and superstitions that substitute limitations for the unlimited nature of the will. When we look closely at the practical action of the willing of the will, we see (or we should be able to see) that it has a necessary orientation towards the infinite… which is God. So, a (correct) understanding of human action shows that humans cannot make sense of themselves and their lives without recognising and enacting their orientation towards God.
Part of what makes this book a difficult read, is that Blondel refuses to accept the adequacy of traditional philosophical distinctions. After Kant, the philosophical world largely accepted the distinction between an unknowable objective reality and an inner knowable subjective reality of ideas. And mainstream philosophy in the nineteenth century (largely) took the inner subjective turn of Idealism.
Blondel, accepts that there is an inner subjective reality of Idealism, and that there is an external objective reality of Realism, but he refuses to accept that there is a sharp distinction between them. Reality involves both realism and idealism.
This position is confusing and it is hard to see how it makes sense. That has meant that some of his readers have mis-understood and mis-characterised him as being a Kantian subjectivist. He does indeed say things that could support that reading, but that is because he (partially) accepts Idealism, albeit alongside its opposite of Realism.
Blondel’s focus on subjectivity has also meant that his thought has sometimes been confused with the subjectivising which we see in the Transcendental Thomism of Joseph Marechal and Pierre Rousselot. But there is an important difference. They focus upon the insights of reflecting upon consciousness, whereas Blondel focuses upon the implications of the human will. He does often use the language of consciousness but that is because we see the practical implications of our willing within our consciousness of the willing.
Does Blondel’s philosophy make sense? It is very difficult to answer that question, because the ideas are so complicated that it is hard for a reader to be sure that they have understood his position well enough to be able to accurately comment upon it.
However, where he does make specific claims, those claims are not (logically) necessary truths. They are open to challenge and rejection. Does the will really have an infinite orientation? Blondel assumes that that is an evident fact. But how much of that is due to his European cultural outlook? The very fact that this is a book which very clearly belongs to a specific philosophical style (of continental philosophy) is enough to show that what he takes as evident correct claims about the human person, may be just (potentially) culturally conditioned perspectives.
This means that Anglo American readers of the Analytic style of philosophy may well look at this book and just scratch their heads in incomprehension. Maybe Blondel is right, maybe he is wrong. How can we tell? Either readers ‘see’ what Blondel is claiming, or they dont. And that reaction is not dissimilar to Antisthenes reaction to Plato’s theory of forms when he told him: ‘I can see a horse Plato, but I can’t see horseness.’
When it comes to trying to give a star rating for Blondel’s L’Action it is very difficult to make a judgement. Readers within its philosophical cultural tradition will probably grade the book highly as a 5, as it offers wise insights about the implications of willing. Those outside of that tradition may well grade it as 1 or 2 stars as it makes incomprehensible claims which they cannot see the truth of.
However, another factor to bear in mind is that this is an English translation of the (French) book, and it has been well translated by an expert who has studied Blondel’s philosophy and written on it. The quality of the translation would warrant a 5 (or perhaps a 4 as there could have been more footnotes to identify differences between the different editions of this book and to support readers’ understanding). And the high quality of the translation should not be undermined by an overall low grading even if the actual content of the French book itself is deemed just a 1 or 2.
So, overall I am going to give this book a 4 even though I am unclear about the adequacy of the content and coherence of Blondel’s thinking, and even though it is not a book which I would recommend, except to a reader immersed in continental philosophy who has a lot of time for reading and re-reading passages from the book.
Even Blondel’s examiners found the book difficult, when it was submitted as his doctoral thesis in 1893. One of the examiners commented that he spent an hour reading and re-reading a single page of this book, and he was still none the wiser what Blondel was actually trying to say. Blondel responded by noting that apparent-clarity masks its own obscurities by potentially deceiving readers.
Even William James the well known philosopher of Pragmatism struggled with the book, noting that there were areas of similarities between Blondels thinking and his own, but that it was difficult to clarify the precise scope or implications of those similarities.
Although this is a difficult read, it is potentially an important book. Before Blondel the concept of ‘action’ was not considered a philosophical issue. That fact almost led to the philosophy faculty vetoing the suitability of Blondel’s thesis. However, after its publication ‘action’ became (and continues to be) a recognised issue within philosophy. That recognition arguably contributed to the development of Existentialism and aspects of political philosophy. So Blondel’s book sits in the history of philosophy, as a major potential source of inspiration and ideas to significant themes which emerged in its wake.
The book begins with the question of whether human life makes sense. Simplistically the book is an answer to that question, which argues that human life only makes sense if we recognise the implications of the human will. The will wills its fulfilment, or its perfection. That necessarily involves an openness to infinitude, as there is more to the will than specific human choices and actions can ever exhaust.
When humans settle for less than the perfection of the will, then they create idols and superstitions that substitute limitations for the unlimited nature of the will. When we look closely at the practical action of the willing of the will, we see (or we should be able to see) that it has a necessary orientation towards the infinite… which is God. So, a (correct) understanding of human action shows that humans cannot make sense of themselves and their lives without recognising and enacting their orientation towards God.
Part of what makes this book a difficult read, is that Blondel refuses to accept the adequacy of traditional philosophical distinctions. After Kant, the philosophical world largely accepted the distinction between an unknowable objective reality and an inner knowable subjective reality of ideas. And mainstream philosophy in the nineteenth century (largely) took the inner subjective turn of Idealism.
Blondel, accepts that there is an inner subjective reality of Idealism, and that there is an external objective reality of Realism, but he refuses to accept that there is a sharp distinction between them. Reality involves both realism and idealism.
This position is confusing and it is hard to see how it makes sense. That has meant that some of his readers have mis-understood and mis-characterised him as being a Kantian subjectivist. He does indeed say things that could support that reading, but that is because he (partially) accepts Idealism, albeit alongside its opposite of Realism.
Blondel’s focus on subjectivity has also meant that his thought has sometimes been confused with the subjectivising which we see in the Transcendental Thomism of Joseph Marechal and Pierre Rousselot. But there is an important difference. They focus upon the insights of reflecting upon consciousness, whereas Blondel focuses upon the implications of the human will. He does often use the language of consciousness but that is because we see the practical implications of our willing within our consciousness of the willing.
Does Blondel’s philosophy make sense? It is very difficult to answer that question, because the ideas are so complicated that it is hard for a reader to be sure that they have understood his position well enough to be able to accurately comment upon it.
However, where he does make specific claims, those claims are not (logically) necessary truths. They are open to challenge and rejection. Does the will really have an infinite orientation? Blondel assumes that that is an evident fact. But how much of that is due to his European cultural outlook? The very fact that this is a book which very clearly belongs to a specific philosophical style (of continental philosophy) is enough to show that what he takes as evident correct claims about the human person, may be just (potentially) culturally conditioned perspectives.
This means that Anglo American readers of the Analytic style of philosophy may well look at this book and just scratch their heads in incomprehension. Maybe Blondel is right, maybe he is wrong. How can we tell? Either readers ‘see’ what Blondel is claiming, or they dont. And that reaction is not dissimilar to Antisthenes reaction to Plato’s theory of forms when he told him: ‘I can see a horse Plato, but I can’t see horseness.’
When it comes to trying to give a star rating for Blondel’s L’Action it is very difficult to make a judgement. Readers within its philosophical cultural tradition will probably grade the book highly as a 5, as it offers wise insights about the implications of willing. Those outside of that tradition may well grade it as 1 or 2 stars as it makes incomprehensible claims which they cannot see the truth of.
However, another factor to bear in mind is that this is an English translation of the (French) book, and it has been well translated by an expert who has studied Blondel’s philosophy and written on it. The quality of the translation would warrant a 5 (or perhaps a 4 as there could have been more footnotes to identify differences between the different editions of this book and to support readers’ understanding). And the high quality of the translation should not be undermined by an overall low grading even if the actual content of the French book itself is deemed just a 1 or 2.
So, overall I am going to give this book a 4 even though I am unclear about the adequacy of the content and coherence of Blondel’s thinking, and even though it is not a book which I would recommend, except to a reader immersed in continental philosophy who has a lot of time for reading and re-reading passages from the book.
September 28, 2019
I was desperately looking for a copy of this book and found it online. I was told that this was the fulcrum of philosophy and theology in the 20th century, and I would agree, given the radicality of Blondel's claim. Will read this again outside scholarly work.
February 1, 2026
By far the finest piece of philosophical reasoning I have ever read. The book's difficulty mostly comes from the absolute beast that is Part III chapter 2, which presents a theory of how the mathematical sciences are not absolute solutions to the moral problemof human life. (The author knew it was very difficult and provides a summary and even suggests skipping it if one is not used to technical philosophy.) Blondel revised the book a lot before his dissertation and even rewrote the whole thing in his blind old age. This first version is a response to the positivism of Comte and assumes a very hostile reader trained in idealism and naturalism while the second version is more concerned with making the book's sympathies with catholic scholasticism more obvious. The second version has not been translated to English yet.
June 19, 2025
"the greatest Catholic philosopher of modern times" - Hans Urs von Balthasar in *Dare We Hope*
February 2, 2008
Christian action elaborated
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews