Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy

by Richard N. Haass (Editor)

"Sanctions don't work" is an often-heard refrain. The reality, though, is more complex. Sanctions - mostly economic but also political and military penalties aimed at states or other entities to alter political and/or military behavior - almost always have consequences, sometimes desirable, at other times unwanted and unexpected. What cannot be disputed is that economic sanctions are increasingly at the center of American foreign policy: to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, discourage aggression, protect the environment, and thwart drug trafficking. Drawing on eight case studies - China, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and the former Yugoslavia - this edited volume presents lessons to be learned from recent American use of economic sanctions. It also provides specific guidelines designed to shape future decisions by Congress and the executive branch.

Genres: American, Nonfiction, Political Science, Economics

236 pages, Paperback

First published June 1, 1998

About the author

Dr. Richard Nathan Haass is in his fourteenth year as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, publisher and educational institution dedicated to being a resource to help people better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries.

In 2013, he served as the chair of the multiparty negotiations in Northern Ireland that provided the foundation for the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. For his efforts to promote peace and conflict resolution, he received the 2013 Tipperary International Peace Award.

From January 2001 to June 2003, Dr. Haass was director of policy planning for the Department of State, where he was a principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Confirmed by the U.S. Senate to hold the rank of ambassador, Dr. Haass also served as U.S. coordinator for policy toward the future of Afghanistan and U.S. envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. In recognition of his service, he received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award.

Dr. Haass has extensive additional government experience. From 1989 to 1993, he was special assistant to President George H.W. Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. In 1991, Dr. Haass was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal for his contributions to the development and articulation of U.S. policy during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Previously, he served in the Departments of State (1981–1985) and Defense (1979–1980), and was a legislative aide in the U.S. Senate.

Dr. Haass also was vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A Rhodes scholar, Dr. Haass holds a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College and master’s and doctorate degrees from Oxford University. He has also received numerous honorary degrees.

Dr. Haass is the author or editor of thirteen books on American foreign policy and one book on management. His latest book is A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, published in 2017 by Penguin Press.

Reviews

[Roy · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting collection of case studies of over a dozen times the US has attempted to use sanctions to achieve national security or geopolitical goals, with a final chapter that attempts general conclusions. Well worth the read.

I think the most important conclusion of the book is its argument that the sanctions are such challenging tools of national power, with such a major likelihood for creating major economic problems for the US and allies as well as for the target of the sanctions, that economic sanctions should be implemented only with deliberate thought comparable to the decision to use military force. This is rarely the case. Yet I think that is the right approach, the only one likely to create a sanction regime sustainable for the years required to ensure that sanctions have an impact.

Reading this after the sanctions placed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, and after the somewhat successful use of sanctions to bring Iran to the negotiating table on its nuclear program, does add cases that seem to make sanctions a little more effective than most of the cases covered in this book from twenty years ago. On the whole, I think many of the conclusions of the work are still worth considering.