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Churchill's Folly: Leros and the Aegean - The Last Great British Defeat of World War Two
Through vivid eyewitness accounts from British, German, and Italian veterans, along with many photographs (some never before published), follow the dramatic events of Churchill's doomed attempt to open up a new front in the Eastern Mediterranean. The clash took place in 1943 in Greece's Dodecanese Islands; with no air cover for the British troops, and the fierce opposition of Germany's most able soldiers, men and materiel were sacrificed in three months of operations that ended with the Aegean under Nazi control until the end of the war.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
March 6, 2022
Unfortunately, this was a short-term loan from an out-of-state library and reading time simply ran out.
The author was born on Malta and spent time there in childhood and during military service. After completing several books on the siege during WWII, Rogers decided to follow up on the defenders' post-siege service elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Rogers has taken advantage of current accessibility to official war records and to private sources becoming available, to provide a detailed description of the planning and execution of the battles once the Italian surrender put land they occupied up for graps. For the most part, however, there is little about individual participants other than known casualties from battles. This proves particularly telling as to non-military Greeks who, at the risk of their lives, aided the Allies.
The author was born on Malta and spent time there in childhood and during military service. After completing several books on the siege during WWII, Rogers decided to follow up on the defenders' post-siege service elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Rogers has taken advantage of current accessibility to official war records and to private sources becoming available, to provide a detailed description of the planning and execution of the battles once the Italian surrender put land they occupied up for graps. For the most part, however, there is little about individual participants other than known casualties from battles. This proves particularly telling as to non-military Greeks who, at the risk of their lives, aided the Allies.
April 14, 2025
Ο Τσώρτσιλλ στα απομνημονεύματά του (5ος τόμος) ανέφερε ότι η επιχείρηση κατάληψης των Δωδεκανήσων τον Οκτώβρη του 1943 (λίγο μετά την ιταλική συνθηκολόγηση) είχαν σκοπό να κεφαλαιοποιήσουν την συνθηκολόγηση των ιταλών πριν προλάβουν οι γερμανοί, να ανοίξουν το Αιγαίο και τα Δαρδανέλια στις νηοπομπές προς τη Σοβιετική Ένωση και να πιέσουν την Τουρκία να μπει στον πόλεμο. «Σπουδαία τρόπαια με ελάχιστο κόστος και λίγες προσπάθειες», χαρακτήρισε τη Ρόδο, Κω και Λέρο. Αποδείχτηκε πως όχι. Και φυσικά δεν ήταν αυτοί οι λόγοι που επιχειρήθηκε από τους βρετανούς η κατάληψη των νησιών. Ο λόγος ήταν πολιτικός και όχι στρατιωτικός (γι' αυτό το λόγο αντιδρούσε ο Αϊζενχάουερ): η Βρετανική Αυτοκρατορία ήθελε να εξασφαλίσει τον μεταπολεμικό έλεγχο της ανατολικής Μεσογείου και ειδικά της Ελλάδας. Έτσι αποφάσισε αυτήν την άκρως τυχοδιωκτική ενέργεια η οποία ήταν καταστροφική και σε τέτοιο βαθμό μάλιστα που διαμαρτυρήθηκε επισήμως ο πρωθυπουργός της Νέας Ζηλανδίας για τον θάνατο τόσων στρατιωτών της χώρας του, αφήνοντας σαφείς αιχμές προς τη βρετανική κυβέρνηση.
Το χρονικό των επιχειρήσεων εξιστορεί το παρόν βιβλίο, μόνο που έχει δύο μεγάλα μειονέκτηματα, παρά την σπουδαία δουλειά που έχει κάνει ο συγγραφέας του συλλέγονται και προφορικές μαρτυρίες άγγλων και γερμανών, λιγότερο ιταλών και καθόλου -δυστυχώς- ντόπιων ελλήνων: η εξιστόρηση δεν συνοδεύεται από σχεδιαγράμματα και η μη στρατιωτική όψη (η πολιτική) των γεγονότων είναι σχεδόν ανύπαρκτη. Σε πολλά δε σημεία η υπεραναλυτική αφήγηση είναι μπερδεμένη ή έτσι φαίνεται.
Το χρονικό των επιχειρήσεων εξιστορεί το παρόν βιβλίο, μόνο που έχει δύο μεγάλα μειονέκτηματα, παρά την σπουδαία δουλειά που έχει κάνει ο συγγραφέας του συλλέγονται και προφορικές μαρτυρίες άγγλων και γερμανών, λιγότερο ιταλών και καθόλου -δυστυχώς- ντόπιων ελλήνων: η εξιστόρηση δεν συνοδεύεται από σχεδιαγράμματα και η μη στρατιωτική όψη (η πολιτική) των γεγονότων είναι σχεδόν ανύπαρκτη. Σε πολλά δε σημεία η υπεραναλυτική αφήγηση είναι μπερδεμένη ή έτσι φαίνεται.
October 22, 2015
I reread this after a week's holiday in Kos, spending time in Kos town, which was largely destroyed in the last war. I wanted to find out exactly what happened, & why one of the surviving buildings had been built by the ruling Italian fascists in the 1920s (I found that out reading the first page, they claimed it as their own at that time). This book outlines the little known story of how, mainly on Churchill's say so, the British attempted unsuccessfully to take over the Aegean islands, including Kos, Rhodes & Leros. Badly planned & poorly resourced (hardly the best way to persuade the Turks to enter the war, "come on in, the war's lovely"), it was little short of a disaster, leading to losses that could have been avoided in both military & civilian lives.
Essentially, although this does go into details about how each island was won, & then lost again, it doesn't go into much detail about exactly who's fault it was - it might have been Churchill's idea in the first place, but someone else had to have made the decision to attempt the impossible with next to no resources at their disposal. So, ultimately, it is a good, but not great book. And Kos, in fact all of the Aegean islands I've visited, are lovely.
Essentially, although this does go into details about how each island was won, & then lost again, it doesn't go into much detail about exactly who's fault it was - it might have been Churchill's idea in the first place, but someone else had to have made the decision to attempt the impossible with next to no resources at their disposal. So, ultimately, it is a good, but not great book. And Kos, in fact all of the Aegean islands I've visited, are lovely.
July 16, 2018
Fascinating book about an unknown chapter of World War Two. Yet another cross against Winston Churchill in my mind too.
April 28, 2024
Very Good on the Mirco Level, not so Good on the Macro
This book is a kind of mixed bag on this battle. On the positive side, it has plenty of first hand accounts of the battle from the perspective of actual individual participants (both English and German). The book is very well researched from this angle, having made extensive use of original English and German and language sources. This is, by far, the best aspect of the book.
Unfortunately, the book also has many weaknesses. On is that, although very good from the perspective of individual participants, as just stated above, it is relatively week with respect to providing a strategic picture of how the battle transpired. It has a serious problem separating the trees from the forest.
Relating to the strategic higher-level picture, the book has a fair number of other serious weaknesses. One is that there is not a table of organization and equipment showing, at a minimum, what forces were available to each side at the beginning of the battle, never mind how this changed over the course of the battle. A second problem is that there is little discussion of analysis of strategic movement of forces, as opposed to tactical movement of small units.
A third problem is that even though there is a map showing the location of these islands, the map does not contain air base locations or circles showing ranges of aircraft. This is especially important as the German advantage of short-range aircraft, especially single seat fighters and relatively short-range Stukas, proved very important, if not decisive to this battle. The English, thanks to the long distance of their air bases, could only muster long-range twin-engine fighters and larger bombers that were at a severe disadvantage relative to the German’s single engine fighters.
Lastly, the book should have begun with a chapter setting up, at a high level, what the realities were for the Allies in actually achieving one of their main objectives – the goal of using a victory in this battle to get Turkey to join the allies. Churchill had high hopes here but considering the fact that the allies would have to provide other incentives to Turkey, that were probably not possible, to induce Turkey to enter the allied side this hope seems very unrealistic. What would the allies have been willing to provide Turkey as an incentive? The turning over of the Dodecanese to Turkey as a reward for entering the war on their side? French or British possessions in the Middle East? Parts of Bulgari or Mainland Greece (or other Greek islands)? None of these seemed even remotely realistic.
In addition, other very important strategic factors needed to be analyzed or, at the very least, been mentioned. For example, even if the allies were able to temporarily dislodge the Germans how defensible would their positions have been in the long run? How many forces would have been required to hold this position? Would the forces required been significant? More importantly, how would the forces required in this battle and in any ensuring victory reduce the forces available to the allies in Italy? It should be remembered that the battle covered in this book occurred in November 1943, after the battle of Salerno (September 1943) and before that of Anzio (January 1943) and during the northward push of the allies up the Italian peninsula. Churchill was correct in stated that the forces used int eh battle of Leros were “minor” but they definitely decreased what was available in Italy. Considering how contested these areas were, was this diversion worth it? This is especially important considering the fact that this expedition did not draw German forces away from other fronts (the German forces used were almost entirely stationed in Greece to begin with).
Also, of crucial importance was the issue of how reliable were the Italian garrisons on these islands, in terms of providing the English with support. Considering the number of Italian troops (and their political unreliability with respect to supporting the English) this expedition, for this this reason alone, was a very big risk. All these are very serious weaknesses of this book.
In short, a three-star book.
Addendum – Anthony Roger’s “Kos and Leros 1943: The German Conquest of the Dodecanese” is a good supplement to this book.
This book is a kind of mixed bag on this battle. On the positive side, it has plenty of first hand accounts of the battle from the perspective of actual individual participants (both English and German). The book is very well researched from this angle, having made extensive use of original English and German and language sources. This is, by far, the best aspect of the book.
Unfortunately, the book also has many weaknesses. On is that, although very good from the perspective of individual participants, as just stated above, it is relatively week with respect to providing a strategic picture of how the battle transpired. It has a serious problem separating the trees from the forest.
Relating to the strategic higher-level picture, the book has a fair number of other serious weaknesses. One is that there is not a table of organization and equipment showing, at a minimum, what forces were available to each side at the beginning of the battle, never mind how this changed over the course of the battle. A second problem is that there is little discussion of analysis of strategic movement of forces, as opposed to tactical movement of small units.
A third problem is that even though there is a map showing the location of these islands, the map does not contain air base locations or circles showing ranges of aircraft. This is especially important as the German advantage of short-range aircraft, especially single seat fighters and relatively short-range Stukas, proved very important, if not decisive to this battle. The English, thanks to the long distance of their air bases, could only muster long-range twin-engine fighters and larger bombers that were at a severe disadvantage relative to the German’s single engine fighters.
Lastly, the book should have begun with a chapter setting up, at a high level, what the realities were for the Allies in actually achieving one of their main objectives – the goal of using a victory in this battle to get Turkey to join the allies. Churchill had high hopes here but considering the fact that the allies would have to provide other incentives to Turkey, that were probably not possible, to induce Turkey to enter the allied side this hope seems very unrealistic. What would the allies have been willing to provide Turkey as an incentive? The turning over of the Dodecanese to Turkey as a reward for entering the war on their side? French or British possessions in the Middle East? Parts of Bulgari or Mainland Greece (or other Greek islands)? None of these seemed even remotely realistic.
In addition, other very important strategic factors needed to be analyzed or, at the very least, been mentioned. For example, even if the allies were able to temporarily dislodge the Germans how defensible would their positions have been in the long run? How many forces would have been required to hold this position? Would the forces required been significant? More importantly, how would the forces required in this battle and in any ensuring victory reduce the forces available to the allies in Italy? It should be remembered that the battle covered in this book occurred in November 1943, after the battle of Salerno (September 1943) and before that of Anzio (January 1943) and during the northward push of the allies up the Italian peninsula. Churchill was correct in stated that the forces used int eh battle of Leros were “minor” but they definitely decreased what was available in Italy. Considering how contested these areas were, was this diversion worth it? This is especially important considering the fact that this expedition did not draw German forces away from other fronts (the German forces used were almost entirely stationed in Greece to begin with).
Also, of crucial importance was the issue of how reliable were the Italian garrisons on these islands, in terms of providing the English with support. Considering the number of Italian troops (and their political unreliability with respect to supporting the English) this expedition, for this this reason alone, was a very big risk. All these are very serious weaknesses of this book.
In short, a three-star book.
Addendum – Anthony Roger’s “Kos and Leros 1943: The German Conquest of the Dodecanese” is a good supplement to this book.
March 21, 2022
Perfectly good history of a campaign - it just wasn't what I was interested in - which was Churchill's failures as a strategist - what you have is a history of a campaign - well written but not my cup of tea.
November 11, 2011
This story certainly has some moments and is interesting for the fact that this part of the war is relatively unknown. The book was very detailed and consisted of the text supported by numerous anecdotes from those who were there. It failed to keep my interest throughout, perhaps by trying to include too much or perhaps due to the lack of a legible series of maps of Leros on which to follow the activity. This book is for Second World War buffs only.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews