Insurgencies, especially in the form of guerrilla warfare, continue to erupt across many parts of the globe. Most of these rebellions fail, but Four Rebellions that Shaped Our World analyzes four twentieth-century conflicts in which the success of the insurgents permanently altered the global political the Maoists in China against Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s; the Viet Minh in French Indochina from 1945 to 1954; Castro's followers against Batista in Cuba from 1956 to 1959; and the mujahideen in Soviet Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989.
Anthony James Joes illuminates patterns of failed counterinsurgencies that include serious but avoidable political and military blunders and makes clear the critical and often decisive influence of the international setting. Offering provocative insights and timeless lessons applicable to contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this authoritative and comprehensive book will be of great interest to policy-makers and concerned citizens alike.
Joes explores the histories of four successful insurgencies--the Viet Minh against the French, the Afghanis against the Soviets, Cubans for Castro against Batista and the Maoists against both the nationalists and the Japanese. But he is more interested in why the losers lost than why the victors won. One of the first mistakes was a lack of commitment to providing sufficient fighting forces. This was often aggravated by the alienation of locals and the fear of arming the natives (the French in Vietnam, for instance). "[R]ight strategy is indissolubly linked to right conduct. Rectitude is worth many battalions." Mao instructed his forces to treat locals and prisoners well. He knew that if they were treated badly, others would fight that much harder to avoid capture. Instead, the winning side often benefited from numerous desertions from the other side.
Related to the issue of the size of a fighting force is the importance, he says, of preventing the provision of supplies from outside allies. The losing side usually had insufficient troops to protect borders.
Two other major errors leading to defeat is deficient leadership (poor understanding of the terrain or the culture, poor logistics) and the absence of "a peaceful road to change." Again, the worse the counterinsurgents behaved, the harder the insurgents would fight and the less they would have to lose.
The book is good. It seems very factual and opposes great man theory, but it’s so obviously peppered with anti-communism language that it’s slightly distracting. Like most of the communist regimes are bad enough on their own because they’re semi-to-explicitly authoritarian that you don’t really need to get into it lol. But man this guy sure does hate him some commies.