In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie – The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge – as ‘…a child of crises, above all of …the crisis of physics.’ Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper, FRS, rose from a modest background as an assistant cabinet maker and school teacher to become one of the most influential theorists and leading philosophers. Popper commanded international audiences and conversation with him was an intellectual adventure—even if a little rough—animated by a myriad of philosophical problems. He contributed to a field of thought encompassing (among others) political theory, quantum mechanics, logic, scientific method and evolutionary theory.
Popper challenged some of the ruling orthodoxies of philosophy: logical positivism, Marxism, determinism and linguistic philosophy. He argued that there are no subject matters but only problems and our desire to solve them. He said that scientific theories cannot be verified but only tentatively refuted, and that the best philosophy is about profound problems, not word meanings. Isaiah Berlin rightly said that Popper produced one of the most devastating refutations of Marxism. Through his ideas Popper promoted a critical ethos, a world in which the give and take of debate is highly esteemed in the precept that we are all infinitely ignorant, that we differ only in the little bits of knowledge that we do have, and that with some co-operative effort we may get nearer to the truth.
Nearly every first-year philosophy student knows that Popper regarded his solutions to the problems of induction and the demarcation of science from pseudo-science as his greatest contributions. He is less known for the problems of verisimilitude, of probability (a life-long love of his), and of the relationship between the mind and body.
Popper was a Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the British Academy, and Membre de I'Institute de France. He was an Honorary member of the Harvard Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, and an Honorary Fellow of the London School of Economics, King's College London, and of Darwin College Cambridge. He was awarded prizes and honours throughout the world, including the Austrian Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold, the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, and the Sonning Prize for merit in work which had furthered European civilization.
Karl Popper was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965 and invested by her with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982.
Popper’s early work on induction and demarcation. Note (i) debt to neo-Kantianism and transcendental epistemology; (ii) methodological character of falsification.
Karl Popper's 'The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge' is a fascinating read that dives deep into some big questions about knowledge and science. It's not your average science book; it's more about how we think and make sense of the world. Popper explores two main ideas: how we create broad theories from just a few observations and how to differentiate real science from other concepts.
The cool part about this book is Popper's unique approach. He argues that science isn't just about observing things and making generalizations. Instead, he believes science starts with specific problems. Scientists come up with bold theories to solve these problems and then put these theories to the test. The catch is that for a theory to be scientific, it must be possible to prove it wrong, which Popper calls 'falsifiability.' It's a game-changer in understanding what counts as science.
While the book is clear, the concepts can be a bit dense, especially if you're not into science or philosophy. But it's still really engaging if you're curious about how scientific ideas are formed and tested. Popper's ideas have had a huge impact on how we view science and its role in expanding our knowledge.
Overall, this book is a great pick for anyone who's into big ideas and wants to see science in a new light. It challenges the way we think about knowledge and how we come to understand our world. Definitely worth a read if you're up for something a bit different!
Bom livro do grande filósofo que dispensa apresentações. Nele, o autor, trata de dois grandes problemas filosóficos do conhecimento: 1. O problema da indução ou problema de Hume. Como saber mais do que já sei. 2. O problema da demarcação ou problema de Kant. O que separa a ciência da não-ciência?
According to Popper, the two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge are the problems of induction and of demarcation. Both originated with Kant; and Popper here acknowledges and gives a lot of credit to Kant and his entire critical and epistemological program. The context and the opponents for Popper are logical positivism and German Idealism. Against logical positivism and its claim of induction, Popper opposes deduction as the only valid scientific method. Against German Idealism and other metaphysics, Popper proposed scientific theories that can expose themselves to empirical falsification. Both these two issues and solutions converge in Popper’s criterion of falsifiability. His fellow logical positivists - and especially Wittgenstein - are continuously attached and denounced in this book. Despite his critical and rational approach, Popper appears here as an intolerant person that goes way too far in promoting his theory and attacking those of his opponents. His theory makes sense in the context of physical science and especially for the transition from Newton to Einstein; but not so much in other sciences. In fact, Kuhn will eventually propose a much better theory when compared with Popper’s. My overall impression is that for Popper the method in science is far more important than science itself.