This work constitutes the second part of a three-volume set which analyzes the strategic and military problems of the era spanning the two world wars. This book covers the interwar period. The other two volumes in the set address World War I and World War II respectively.
A specialist in the history of American military policy and twentieth century wars and military institutions, Allan R. Millett is professor emeritus at The Ohio State University, where he taught form 1969 until his retirement in 2005.
This is a scholarly study of the military effectiveness of the various major powers in the period between WW1 and WW2. There are eight chapters, covering the each of the following nations in this order: Soviet Union, France, USA, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Germany. The final chapter is a review between all seven powers.
Each chapter is generally broken down into the following: an introduction, political effectiveness, strategic effectiveness, operational effectiveness, tactical effectiveness, a conclusion, then footnotes. The chapter discuss all three major aspects of warfare (air, land, & sea). In some cases, like Great Britain, it also discuss how the anti-war movement actually caused much damaged to the military's preparedness and how the Britain was less prepared to win a war in 1939 than it was in 1914.
This is a scholarly study of the military effectiveness of the various major powers in the period between WW1 and WW2. There are eight chapters, covering the each of the following nations in this order: Soviet Union, France, USA, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Germany. The final chapter is a review between all seven powers.
Each chapter is generally broken down into the following: an introduction, political effectiveness, strategic effectiveness, operational effectiveness, tactical effectiveness, a conclusion, then footnotes. The chapter discuss all three major aspects of warfare (air, land, & sea). In some cases, like Great Britain, it also discuss how the anti-war movement actually caused much damaged to the military's preparedness and how the Britain was less prepared to win a war in 1939 than it was in 1914.
This collection of scholarly essays on the military effectiveness of the major combatants in both world wars - volume II covering 1919 to 1939 - has become something of a classic, and it doesn't disappoint. The editors defined that effectiveness in terms of four levels of activity: political, strategic, operational and tactical, and each of the nations' armies and navies are examined thereby. The Interwar Period was an era in which militaries struggled to absorb the "lessons" of the Great War, considerably complicated by the rapid technological changes of the era that made the roles of aircraft, armor, submarines and poison gas particularly ambiguous. Since it is almost impossible to find a modern work on the military history of the 20th century that does not have this series in its bibliography, one must conclude that these books are authoritative. Some of the best minds in military history were recruited to write here as well. The only drawback is that the countries invoked (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and the United States) had to have been actively involved in both world wars, so unfortunately several important combatants in those wars didn't make the cut, such as Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and China, for example. But other than that, anyone with an interest in how various military and associated organizations functioned (or didn't) in the first half of the 20th century cannot afford to give this series a miss.