Political Institutions under Dictatorship

by Jennifer Gandhi

Often dismissed as window-dressing, nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, play an important role in non-democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes. She examines how and why these institutions are useful to dictatorships in maintaining power, analyzing the way dictators utilize institutions as a forum in which to organize political concessions to potential opposition in an effort to neutralize threats to their power and to solicit cooperation from groups outside of the ruling elite. The use of legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition results in significant institutional effects on policies and outcomes under dictatorship.

Genres: Nonfiction, Political Science

258 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2008

Reviews

[Kat]

Was given this by a professor to read as I try to figure out some grad school stuff. Very interesting research that gave me a lot to think about. Very academic in some parts but otherwise quite readable. I'm not rating this but if you're interested, I would recommend this.

[Marianna Altabbaa · Rating 5 out of 5]

قد يعتقد البعض أن الأنظمة الديكتاتورية لا تحتاج لمؤسسات وأن الآمر الناهي هو الديكتاتور والنخبة الحاكمة المحيطة به، سواءا كانت هذه النخبة هي عائلة الملك (في الأنظمة الملكية) أو المجلس العسكري الأعلى (في الأنظمة العسكرية) أو القيادة العليا للحزب الحاكم (في الأنظمة التي تتواجد عليها حزب حاكم مسيطر)، جميعهم بحاجة لمؤسسات بدرجات متفاوتة.

إلا أن الحاجة للمؤسسات ليس لترسيخ حكم القانون وخلق دولة مؤسسات حديثة بل لأجل احتواء أي معارضة قد تواجه حكم الديكتاتور.

فعند وجود كيان معارض مهدد للنظام السياسي القمعي، يقوم النظام بمنح "rents" والمقصود بها غنائم مادية أو تعيينات معينة تجني فوائد مادية، هذا في حال يوجد موارد غنية في الدولة.
في حال كانت الدولة لا تمتلك هذه الغنائم لتوزيعها على المعارضة واسكاتها، فتقوم بالقمع والاضطهاد، هذا الخيار أيضا مستبعد ومكلف ويحتاج لموارد وأجهزة قمعية كبيرة. الخيار الثالث هو تقديم تنازلات في السياسات العامة، أي منح المعارضة بعض من مطالبها بشكل لا يهدد مباشرة الحكم الديكتاتوري أو مصالحه بشكل كبير، قد يأخذ شكل: قانون إعلام جديد أو قانون أحزاب أو أي تعديل سياساتي.

تركز غاندي في كتابها على المؤسسة التشريعية والأحزاب السياسة كمؤسستين يتم فيها التنازلات بشكل رئيسي، وبالتالي تلعب هاتان المؤسستان دورا هاما في بقاء النظام الديكتاتوري في السلطة ومنحه شرعية أكبر.

[Kw Estes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Though in all honesty I only read a few chapters of the book (one of the more bothersome things about grad school reading lists), the key points were made clear to me and Gandhi proved the theory she set out to prove fairly well. That is, in certain circumstances (ie when 'dictators' have less access to mineral resources and when there is a unified opposition) authoritarian regimes are more likely to allow democratic-style institutions such as legislatures and multiple-party systems. Also does well to explain the different propensities toward such moves among the different subtypes of authoritarian regimes. The only complaint that I have is one that can be applied to most such works that are intended to explicate some rather grand theory and prove it with extensive empirical tests: many of the operationalizations of concepts are rather awkward and seem to be more out of convenience than anything (such as operationalizing 'policy preference polarization' between the regime and the opposition with ethnic polarization indices--assumes that ethnic difference is an inherently conflictual political axis in all cases).

Overall, though, worthwhile and well-written. Especially enjoyable and illustrative of the larger theory were the case studies of Morocco, Kuwait, and 1970s Ecuador.