Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco

by David L. Phillips

Things didn't go wrong in postwar Iraq because the United States lacked a plan. Things went wrong because the United States was blinded by ideology and ignored planning that was already underway. Losing Iraq tells the story of the tragedy of Iraq, from the first discreet meetings to plan the political transition through the debacle the United States finally created. Losing Iraq is a stunning and revealing look at our recent past--with a candid take on how we can prevent this sort of tragedy from happening again.

Genres: Nonfiction, Politics

304 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2005

About the author

David Phillips has 25 years of experience working on peace-building for the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations, academia, think-tanks, and as a foundation executive.

Phillips is currently Director of the Program on Peace-Building and Rights at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights.

Phillips has served as Foreign Affairs Expert and as Senior Adviser to the Bureau of South and Central Asian (2011-2013), Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs (2002-2003), and the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs (1999-2002) at the U.S. Department of State. He was also Senior Adviser to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Phillips has worked at academic institutions as Executive Director of Columbia University's International Conflict Resolution Program, Director of American University's Program on Conflict Prevention and Peace-building, Senior Fellow at Harvard University's Future of Diplomacy and Visiting Scholar at Harvard's Center for Middle East Studies, Phillips has also been a foundation executive, serving as President of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, Executive Director of the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity, and as Director of the European Centre for Common Ground. Phillips held positions at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo.

He has authored dozens of policy reports, and hundreds of articles in leading publications such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, and Foreign Affairs.

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a short part-memoir, part-analysis from a State Department advisor who was involved in planning for post-invasion Iraq. There's a lot of valuable material in here about the pre-invasion process of setting down principles with the opposition groups for the governance of Iraq. It then transitions into the process of creating a temporary governing council for Iraq, a transitional law, and a schedule of elections. He chronicles the rise of several insurgencies as the US lurched from plan to plan, having never established a clear plan of action before the invasion.

People who have read Fiasco and other major accounts of the Iraq War will be familiar with most of the material from the 2nd half of this book. The first half is a little niche, although valuable if you study the opposition. One things that emerges especially clearly in this book is the malign role of Ahmed Chalabi, whom Phillips had lots of experience with. Chalabi, as we all know, fed a distorted view of IRaq to the Bush administration and funneled lousy intelligence into the pre-war intel agencies. However, in this book you see him as a major sticking point of pre-war organization of the opposition. The other opposition groups hated Chalabi so much and were so afraid of INC domination that many of the prewar negotiations and planning sessions were hamstrung. Chalabi was clearly positioning himself to control to postwar governing council of Iraqis, which he then expected to use to vault himself into the prime ministership. His obvious self-aggrandizement meant that the opposition groups never really came together behind a coherent plan that might have provided more clarity after the invasion. Once the US was in Iraq, it turned out no one knew or liked Chalabi and that he had no base of support. At that point he became a sort of troll, trying to position himself in powerful spots, influencing the de-Baathification process to suit his own goals, and ultimately refashioning himself as an anti-occupation figure. He would be a joke if his actions weren't so destructive.

Overall this book is probably best for scholars of the occupation and Iraqi politics. It is fast-paced and informative, but most of the ground I was already familiar with. The main argument was that the Future of Iraq project had provided blueprints for IRaqi governance, including much faster elections, that the Bush administration simply ignored is valid, although the underlying assumptions that things might have worked out better if the FOIP's very general plans had been enacted is questionable.

[Bill · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is an ok book. Since I have read so many other books about Iraq and the lead up to the war most of the things in the books are not new to me. There are better books such as Imperial Life and Fiasco which cover the subject better and in a fuller scale.

[Kelly Lemieux · Rating 3 out of 5]

So, here is my pull-quote from the back cover of the 2006 paperback edition, 16 years ago: "Losing Iraq could not be more timely... It's a fascinating, unbiased read, from an author who has witnessed the events firsthand." See mama, I'm still local-famous, including the Westword newspaper years in the Y2k era. My name and face in print like the publicity gods said so... This book explains the Left's position with regards to the Iraq war 15 years ago.