If Europe is a mansion, then Russia and America are its outlying wings, connected, but with separate characteristics. Russia, back in the 900s and 1000s, was not that different from much of Europe, but its subsequent history severely affected social, political, cultural, and economic development in ways that created a different society. Two hundred years of Mongol (Tartar) rule, the increased centralization of power in Tsars (when Europe was already tending in the opposite direction), the lack of any self-regulating bourgoisie, no equality before the law, and the serfdom of the mass of people, all meant that Russia, by the 19th century, did not resemble Europe very much despite cultural and royal links at the top. Though Peter the Great was aware of European strengths, he failed to establish institutions of representative self-government. The serfs were freed in 1861, but the Bolsheviks brought back the propiska, (`residence permit' required to move from one place to another) which still exists. The Orthodox religion, unlike Protestantism in western Europe, did not encourage education. Unlike the European colonial empires found overseas, Russia's extended outwards from the borders of Russia itself and much of it stemmed from wars with powers often nearly as strong as Russia. Though Russian literature, art, and music came to be very much part of the European tradition (and in fact, often led the way in that tradition), in politics, economy, religion, and daily life, Russia did not resemble Europe. The period between 1885 and 1914 offered some hope that Russia would Europeanize itself, but instead, with the 1917 Revolution, it turned away from liberal social-democratic trends and became even more oppressive and isolationist in character. The book stops short of analyzing the Soviet period, however. The world is homogenizing, no doubt. The age of the Internet and social media is changing everything. Eventually, the question of whether Russia "is or is not European" will be moot.
Wittram's book tempts one to think about these many topics. It seems to offer an analysis of Russia's cultural links with Europe, but veers off, again and again, into discussion of Russia's political and military relations with Europe which are no doubt easier to discuss, but are much better known already. He calls Russia's adoption of European enlightenment ideas "incomplete, fragmentary, and superficial" but says that Russia's impact on international politics in Europe was huge. This might explain his direction. Though the author admirably used sources in German, French, English and Russian, he tends to be interested in the German role in the Baltic principalities and in the ethnic German officials of the Tsarist regime. I cannot say if it is unwarranted, but it is prominent. The large number of pictures and maps included in this Thames and Hudson series book is certainly a plus, but the short text, and the wooden nature of the translation, are minuses. There are probably books that tackle this most interesting subject more thoroughly.