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The Caucasus Under Soviet Rule
The Caucasus is a strategically and economically important region in contemporary global affairs. Western interest in the Caucasus has grown rapidly since 1991, fuelled by the admixture of oil politics, great power rivalry, ethnic separatism and terrorism that characterizes the region. However, until now there has been little understanding of how these issues came to assume the importance they have today. This book argues that understanding the Soviet legacy in the region is critical to analysing both the new states of the Transcaucasus and the autonomous territories of the North Caucasus. It examines the impact of Soviet rule on the Caucasus, focusing in particular on the period from 1917 to 1955. Important questions covered include how the Soviet Union created ‘nations’ out of the diverse peoples of the North Caucasus; the true nature of the 1917 revolution; the role and effects of forced migration in the region; how over time the constituent nationalities of the region came to re-define themselves; and how Islamic radicalism came to assume the importance it continues to hold today. A cauldron of war, revolution, and foreign interventions - from the British and Ottoman Turks to the oil-hungry armies of Hitler’s Third Reich - the Caucasus and the policies and actors it produced (not least Stalin, Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Anastas Mikoyan) both shaped the Soviet experiment in the twentieth century and appear set to continue to shape the geopolitics of the twenty-first. Making unprecedented use of memoirs, archives and published sources, this book is an invaluable aid for scholars, political analysts and journalists alike to understanding one of the most important borderlands of the modern world.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
About the author
Alex Marshall
32 books9 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
June 24, 2019
Overall it was an informative book, though a few caveats. First, the title is incorrect, in that it implies a history of the entire Soviet rule of the Caucasus. Instead Marshall focuses on the North Caucasus until the early 1950s, and only offers token reference to the South Caucasus, or the latter half of the Soviet era. This was disappointing, as that was the expressed intent behind this purchase. That said it is highly in depth on that topic, though a clearer title and purpose would have been nice. The writing at times is also quite stilted, and very dry in places, so makes for some dreary sections despite some very interesting topics and events to discuss. Overall a book worth reading if one wants to learn about the North Caucasus, but not something for the South Caucasus at all.
December 17, 2019
This book is nothing more than a thinly-veiled anti-Georgian propaganda. A poorly researched and sloppily written at that. The author accuses Georgia of starting the 2008 war despite the fact that findings by Andrei Illarionov and other independent observers have clearly shown that it were the Russians and their separatist lackeys wo started the war by shelling Georgian villages and invading the country with army and "volunteer" units on 4-7 August, 2008. A condensed overview of this may be found in article by John B.Dunlop "The August 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Which Side Went First?" available here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10....
Furthermore, the author's bias (perhaps fueled by desire for monetary gain?) is evident in his utter lack of knowledge about the conflict in general. He sardonically remarks on Georgians calling the so-called "South Ossetia", a historical region of Georgia if there ever was any, what it was always called through out its rich history - Samachablo. He does not mention that Ossetian population are only newcomers who were actively supported by Russian and Soviet imperialism. Just how recent are these migrations is evident from the fact that supposed "capital" of the so-called "South Ossetia", Tskhinvali, had a whopping 8.8%(!) Ossetian population merely a century ago in 1917, while Georgians comprised 72.8% (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tskhinvali).
None of this is even mentioned in this disgusting, vitriolic, Pro-Kremlin op-ed piece.
Avoid it all costs! If I could have given it minus five stars, I would have done it in a heartbeat.
Furthermore, the author's bias (perhaps fueled by desire for monetary gain?) is evident in his utter lack of knowledge about the conflict in general. He sardonically remarks on Georgians calling the so-called "South Ossetia", a historical region of Georgia if there ever was any, what it was always called through out its rich history - Samachablo. He does not mention that Ossetian population are only newcomers who were actively supported by Russian and Soviet imperialism. Just how recent are these migrations is evident from the fact that supposed "capital" of the so-called "South Ossetia", Tskhinvali, had a whopping 8.8%(!) Ossetian population merely a century ago in 1917, while Georgians comprised 72.8% (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tskhinvali).
None of this is even mentioned in this disgusting, vitriolic, Pro-Kremlin op-ed piece.
Avoid it all costs! If I could have given it minus five stars, I would have done it in a heartbeat.
August 18, 2020
Where to begin?
The Caucasus under Soviet Rule was not only a disappointment, but feels simultaneously incomplete and falsely advertised. What quickly becomes clear is that Alex Marshall wrote chiefly about the North Caucasus while throwing a bone to the South Caucasus only occasionally, and with a heavy dose of disdain and recrimination. It feels as if he had written a shorter thesis on the North Caucasus and then been advised to flesh it out by broadening his scope to include the entire Caucasus region, though he essentially fails to do so. While possibly not Marshall's choice, the use of an Armenian and two Georgians on the cover comes across as ironic given the disproportionate focus on the North Caucasus.
From the introduction, I found myself dubious at the book, which seems like it needs another copyedit. Between my superficial complaints (like the bizarre and irregular use of russified transliterations of places and names) to substantive ones (such as the claim that 15th and 16th century European sailing innovations led to a flourishing of the Mediterranean as a trade hub), I found myriad apologist claims throughout the book. Marshall frequently places the blame for historical events at the victims' feet. In one case, he describes a community in Ingushetia being responsible for provoking murderous Bolshevik reprisals. Later he paints the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact as arising from Stalin's frustration that Western Europe won't treat with him. While both of these examples contain some truth, the superficiality with which Marshall treats them distorts reality to serve his message.
In another example, Marshall spends pages lavishly detailing the presence of German parachutist infiltration into the Caucasus as partially justifying the Soviet atrocities against its own people during and after WWII. Shortly thereafter, the penultimate chapter covers 1953-1991 in about 25 pages, 10 of which are devoted to an overall description of the state of the USSR prior to its collapse. No mention is made in this chapter of late 1980s Soviet brutality in Baku or Tbilisi or the reasons for which the South Caucasian SSRs would be at the vanguard of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It's important to read a diversity of viewpoints, especially on topics such as modern Russia. If you wish to expose yourself to the incomplete and poorly-covered topics contained in this book, I suggest you begin with the afterward. In it, Marshall admits the focus of the book is on the North Caucasus, touts Putin's accomplishments (including his triumphs over "neo-fascist" leadership in Georgia) while minimizing his shortcomings, and absolves the Russian(/Soviet) state for its role in major historic events of the 20th century.
*Note: The book was published in 2010 when talk of the BRICS countries remained high, Putin hadn't reclaimed the presidency, and the seizure of Crimea and war against Ukraine had not yet begun. Given his archaic use of "the Ukraine," the manner in which he talks about Khrushchev's gift of Crimea to Ukraine, and his dismissive attitude towards the Rose Revolution in Georgia, it's easy to imagine how Marshall might interpret events in the region since 2010.
The Caucasus under Soviet Rule was not only a disappointment, but feels simultaneously incomplete and falsely advertised. What quickly becomes clear is that Alex Marshall wrote chiefly about the North Caucasus while throwing a bone to the South Caucasus only occasionally, and with a heavy dose of disdain and recrimination. It feels as if he had written a shorter thesis on the North Caucasus and then been advised to flesh it out by broadening his scope to include the entire Caucasus region, though he essentially fails to do so. While possibly not Marshall's choice, the use of an Armenian and two Georgians on the cover comes across as ironic given the disproportionate focus on the North Caucasus.
From the introduction, I found myself dubious at the book, which seems like it needs another copyedit. Between my superficial complaints (like the bizarre and irregular use of russified transliterations of places and names) to substantive ones (such as the claim that 15th and 16th century European sailing innovations led to a flourishing of the Mediterranean as a trade hub), I found myriad apologist claims throughout the book. Marshall frequently places the blame for historical events at the victims' feet. In one case, he describes a community in Ingushetia being responsible for provoking murderous Bolshevik reprisals. Later he paints the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact as arising from Stalin's frustration that Western Europe won't treat with him. While both of these examples contain some truth, the superficiality with which Marshall treats them distorts reality to serve his message.
In another example, Marshall spends pages lavishly detailing the presence of German parachutist infiltration into the Caucasus as partially justifying the Soviet atrocities against its own people during and after WWII. Shortly thereafter, the penultimate chapter covers 1953-1991 in about 25 pages, 10 of which are devoted to an overall description of the state of the USSR prior to its collapse. No mention is made in this chapter of late 1980s Soviet brutality in Baku or Tbilisi or the reasons for which the South Caucasian SSRs would be at the vanguard of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It's important to read a diversity of viewpoints, especially on topics such as modern Russia. If you wish to expose yourself to the incomplete and poorly-covered topics contained in this book, I suggest you begin with the afterward. In it, Marshall admits the focus of the book is on the North Caucasus, touts Putin's accomplishments (including his triumphs over "neo-fascist" leadership in Georgia) while minimizing his shortcomings, and absolves the Russian(/Soviet) state for its role in major historic events of the 20th century.
*Note: The book was published in 2010 when talk of the BRICS countries remained high, Putin hadn't reclaimed the presidency, and the seizure of Crimea and war against Ukraine had not yet begun. Given his archaic use of "the Ukraine," the manner in which he talks about Khrushchev's gift of Crimea to Ukraine, and his dismissive attitude towards the Rose Revolution in Georgia, it's easy to imagine how Marshall might interpret events in the region since 2010.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews