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The Making of the Second World War
First published in 1979. In this text the Adamthwaite aims at leading students through the maze of documentation surrounding the Second World War. His book combines a critical assessment of recent research and writing with a painstaking selection of the key documents needed for a clear understanding of the policies that led to war. It contains the first student selection of British, French, German, Italian and Soviet documents, many of which are translated for the first time. Though emphasis falls on the years 1935-9, material is also included for the period 1929-35.
- GenresHistory
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1977
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June 3, 2025
"Thus it remained to Hitler and Stalin, unfettered by the past and driven by their lusts for power, to blow away the house of cards assembled by the well-meaning, peace-loving, and essentially timid statesmen of the interwar period."
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy
Anthony P. Adamthwaite’s The Making of the Second World War offers a clear-eyed, richly sourced exploration of how cascading crises and diplomatic failures led Europe into catastrophe between 1932 and 1939. It is solid, dependable, and accurate.
There are three parts.
Adamthwaite opens with an enlightening essay discussing problems with historiography and sources: multiple points of view; voluminous versus misleading versus incomplete documentation; and the role of dominant ideologies. It concentrates upon the period, but the problems are universal in all historical writings.
Following the historiography is a well-written narrative of the lead-up to the war. The author sees a series of crises which reinforced each other and sped up as they progressed. He highlights several themes. World War Two was a European civil war that reflected a breakdown in European civil society. Ideological divisions were of fundamental importance not only between countries but within them, and it is therefore important to look at how domestic politics influenced and was influenced by international relations. Personalized diplomacy between leaders could not overcome these fundamental divisions. Lastly, the Second World War could have been avoided if different decisions had been made. A formal British- French alliance could have deterred Hitler, and the main mistake these countries made in their policy of appeasement was that they did not demand anything in return for concessions.
The last part of the book is a selection of relevant primary documents outlining the thoughts and movements of the most important actors in Europe at the time. They successfully support the main points of the essays and almost tell the story themselves. I thought the selections very successfully highlighted Hitler's lies. Telling the German general staff directly to get ready for a war that he will initiate while lying to the British that he desires peace. It is a reminder that statesmen lie, but some lie more than others and to worse effect.
Here are two other points I thought Adamthwaite’s book drove home. When countries make threats, believe them. Further, unlike what some realists claim, morality in international relations is important, but unfortunately for many liberals, morality without power is just empty gestures.
My only significant criticism is Adamthwaite’s reliance on counterfactual reasoning—especially the claim that a stronger Anglo-French alliance might have deterred Hitler. While such speculation can be provocative, it often invites more questions than it answers. For instance, had France and Britain acted against Germany during the Rhineland crisis, would Hitler have fallen—or would a more radical regime have taken his place? Counterfactuals can help illuminate missed opportunities, but they lack the evidentiary foundation of narrative and causal analysis.
Adamthwaite’s synthesis of narrative, thematic analysis, and primary documents makes this book rewarding reading for students of 20th-century history. I have never read a book like this about any topic and I found doing so illuminating.
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy
Anthony P. Adamthwaite’s The Making of the Second World War offers a clear-eyed, richly sourced exploration of how cascading crises and diplomatic failures led Europe into catastrophe between 1932 and 1939. It is solid, dependable, and accurate.
There are three parts.
Adamthwaite opens with an enlightening essay discussing problems with historiography and sources: multiple points of view; voluminous versus misleading versus incomplete documentation; and the role of dominant ideologies. It concentrates upon the period, but the problems are universal in all historical writings.
Following the historiography is a well-written narrative of the lead-up to the war. The author sees a series of crises which reinforced each other and sped up as they progressed. He highlights several themes. World War Two was a European civil war that reflected a breakdown in European civil society. Ideological divisions were of fundamental importance not only between countries but within them, and it is therefore important to look at how domestic politics influenced and was influenced by international relations. Personalized diplomacy between leaders could not overcome these fundamental divisions. Lastly, the Second World War could have been avoided if different decisions had been made. A formal British- French alliance could have deterred Hitler, and the main mistake these countries made in their policy of appeasement was that they did not demand anything in return for concessions.
The last part of the book is a selection of relevant primary documents outlining the thoughts and movements of the most important actors in Europe at the time. They successfully support the main points of the essays and almost tell the story themselves. I thought the selections very successfully highlighted Hitler's lies. Telling the German general staff directly to get ready for a war that he will initiate while lying to the British that he desires peace. It is a reminder that statesmen lie, but some lie more than others and to worse effect.
Here are two other points I thought Adamthwaite’s book drove home. When countries make threats, believe them. Further, unlike what some realists claim, morality in international relations is important, but unfortunately for many liberals, morality without power is just empty gestures.
My only significant criticism is Adamthwaite’s reliance on counterfactual reasoning—especially the claim that a stronger Anglo-French alliance might have deterred Hitler. While such speculation can be provocative, it often invites more questions than it answers. For instance, had France and Britain acted against Germany during the Rhineland crisis, would Hitler have fallen—or would a more radical regime have taken his place? Counterfactuals can help illuminate missed opportunities, but they lack the evidentiary foundation of narrative and causal analysis.
Adamthwaite’s synthesis of narrative, thematic analysis, and primary documents makes this book rewarding reading for students of 20th-century history. I have never read a book like this about any topic and I found doing so illuminating.
Displaying 1 of 1 review