Sense and sensibilia - reconstructed from manuscript notes by GJ Warnock

by J.L. Austin

A very nice book!

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Language, Linguistics, Classics

Paperback

First published August 1, 1962

About the author

John Langshaw Austin (March 26, 1911 – February 8, 1960) was a British philosopher of language, born in Lancaster and educated at Shrewsbury School and Balliol College, Oxford University. Austin is widely associated with the concept of the speech act and the idea that speech is itself a form of action. His work in the 1950s provided both a theoretical outline and the terminology for the modern study of speech acts developed subsequently, for example, by (the Oxford-educated American philosopher) John R. Searle, William P. Alston, François Récanati, Kent Bach, and Robert M. Harnish.

After serving in MI6 during World War II, Austin became White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. He occupies a place in philosophy of language alongside Wittgenstein in staunchly advocating the examination of the way words are used in order to elucidate meaning. Unlike many ordinary language philosophers, however, Austin disavowed any overt indebtedness to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. His main influence, he said, was the exact and exacting common-sense philosophy of G. E. Moore.

He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1956 to 1957.

Reviews

[Blakely · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cleverest title/author combo ever. A thousand little assaults on skepticism.

[Randal Samstag · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book presents Austin's lectures on the strange idea of 'sense data' put together after his death by G.J. Warnock from Austin's notes of talks that Austin had given at Oxford and the University of California in the late nineteen forties and fifties. The book is a thorough dismantling of Ayer's The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge and, to a lesser extent, of Price's Perception and Warnock's book on Berkeley. He sets up his target as follows: "The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.)."

He tells us right off what he thinks of this theory, "My general opinion about this doctrine is that it is a typically scholastic view, attributable, first, to an obsession with a few particular words, the uses of which are over-simplified, not really understood or carefully studied or correctly described; and second, to an obsession with a few (and nearly always the same) half-studied 'facts'." Pow!

My favorite bit from this little gem of a book is this one: "One of the most important things to grasp is that these two terms, 'sense-data' and 'material things', live by taking in each other's washing - what is spurious is not the one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself." In the rest of the book he takes apart Ayer's arguments one by one, first of all the 'argument from illusion'. "There is no simple way of doing this-partly because, as we shall see, there is is no simple 'argument'. It is a matter of unpicking, one by one, a mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies, of exposing a wide variety of concealed motives - an operation which leaves us, in a sense, just where we began." The technique is the archetype of the ordinary language argument by the master of the style.

Ayer meekly responded to Austin's fusillade in a paper, "Has Austin Refuted the Sense-datum Theory?", reprinted in his book Metaphysics & Common Sense. He goes through all seventeen of Austin's arguments. Unfortunately, this exercise just gets Ayer more deeply into the mire. Poor Freddy.

[Nat · Rating 5 out of 5]

Some people hate this book. But they're mistaken.

[saml · Rating 5 out of 5]

wonderful, wonderful, funny book. presents a serious challenge to philosophers who refuse to attend to what they say in any way other than those to which they have become accustomed, but more specifically a challenge to those that would push us off the straight and broad of realism. i read this because it was recommended in a footnote of ian hacking's, and then went away and got out my library's copy, only to discover it had been given to the university by bimal krishna matilal! it's so exciting when people you like like the same things!!!

[Antonia Faccini · Rating 5 out of 5]

Los ejemplos más simples e iluminadores que he leído de Austin. De verdad impresionante.

[Natek · Rating 3 out of 5]

don't piss of a philosopher of language he'll write a whole-ass book about why you're wrong

[Joey Z · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Rorty constructed a nice enough story about how Sellars and Quine respectively attacked the “Myth of the Given,” and I’d like to qualify Austin as fitting into this mix.

As the eminent “ordinary language” philosopher, Austin wants to help deflate the philosophically special senses given to words purportedly about our perceptual episodes and the language we use to articulate it, and especially their relationship to what can count as knowledge.

Towards the end of the book this is made explicit upon his reconstruction of Carnap and Ayer’s dispute between each other as well as the end bit about Warnock’s reconstruction of Berkeley.

Out the door is a two-stage model of translatability that begins with sense-perception episodes where one language (sense-content) serves as a foundation, and therefore the realm in which we fact-check our the entitlements to our claims made in the material-object language. Upon this realm of sense-content, so the empiricist story goes, we base our superstructure of knowledge, and recheck the foundations upon which our inferences are made when we find something wrong about a claim we make.

Problem: our sense organs cannot make inferences, but we do, and our literal sensory episodes cannot ever adequately serve as a normative standard for reasons without further justification (supposing our standards are indeed normative and not merely descriptive, and that those justifications are themselves not sense-episodes). Of course, we can pull reasons or properties out of these episodes, but that says nothing of the antecedent concepts at play that qualify those reasons or properties as reasons or properties that could entitle us to even be correct about them.

Of course discerning the sense of a sentence can be wholly independent of the sensory episode, just insofar as we are capable of understanding what someone else means (and presumably is also right about) without also having seen it for ourselves. In the empirical tradition, it is in principle possible that we could always check the joints of reality that cut through our words for ourselves, before reasonably assenting to the truth of a claim. However, the principle when pushed and pulled to its limits, shows us that the dogmas behind its elevated logical empiricist form, are indeed naked.

In essence, he means that there are many ways to say something (and thus many perspectives in which one thing can be said and be correct), but to suppose that there is a special class of uses (or even just one, and in this case sense-content language) that are antecedent to their normal use which consequently structures our epistemic entitlements, is just plain mistaken.

He does this by denying that there are special classes of sentences that are prima facie incorrigible, serve as evidence for other statements, and must also be checked so that the sentences that follow are true. This denial cuts at the core of the very empiricist claim that there is a foundational element of physical episodes, because this is not itself empirically veritable. Rather, this is a presupposition of the nature of knowledge that leads to some very bizarre (and what I believe to be incorrect) conclusions about the ways we ordinarily use language and are otherwise entitled to use when it falls outside of the empiricist principle of verifiability.

[David Gross · Rating 3 out of 5]

Having just read Ayer, I had to read the great anti-Ayer. Not quite as good, but almost as combatative, and it makes some good points. Unfortunately, it was cobbled together from the Austin's notes by someone else, so it doesn't cohere as well as it ought, and sometimes the counter-arguments seem to miss the point of the arguments.

[Zedder · Rating 5 out of 5]

People who hate this book really don't see what's at stake in doing philosophy.

[Chant · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book on Austin's conception of perception and critiquing Ayer's "sense-datum" conception of perception.

[Gerard Kornacki · Rating 5 out of 5]

Undoubtedly, Austin at his best.

[Jacob Bornheimer · Rating 4 out of 5]

A beautifully written critique of Ayer and Price on sense-data and scepticism that taught me as much about how to write an argument clearly and persuasively as it did to teach me about the philosophy of perception and knowledge. If only Austin himself was alive long enough to write and publish this work himself.

8/10

[Crito · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good philosophy, dead topic. His discussions about how we use the terms "material thing" and "real" are valuable, but it's diminished by the whole being couched in a tight Ayer critique, making this more often a historical read. I feel him on the exasperation over so much philosophy claiming to be on perception being barely disguised epistemology.

[Filippo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Worthy of note is the discussion of what I deem to be a pressing epistemological concern, namely the difference between a plain statement/question and one colored by the addition of the term 'really'. In particular, Austin makes a compelling case as to why standard epistemological tropes (such as the stick which 'looks' bent in water turns out to 'really' be straight) are based on linguistic misuses and afforded a semblance of plausibility only due to those discussing them conveniently leaning into said misuses as to warrant an attitude of mystified bewilderment which is largely inappropriate. There is in fact only a very limited range of situations in which the stick in the water can plausibly be said to 'look bent' and thereby labelled as 'deceitful', including perhaps a child or hypothetical primordial man who has never before come across an instance of a stick in a body of water. That being said, after briefly yet fairly conceding the time of day to these fringe cases, Austin highlights the presence of something more complex and interesting at the root of the puzzled epistemologist's attitude. The person who by all intents and purposes decides to let themselves be fooled by the stick in the water is a person who realizes that there are no logical obstacles preventing them from comparing the experience presently confronting them with the way in which said experience could plausibly be interpreted under a hypothetical set of circumstances which are not presently at hand. From this lack of resistance, all sorts of categorical verdicts are then pronounced. In other words, the mental process of someone being deceived by the stick runs as follows: "I can conceivably see how what is presently confronting me could fit a description derived from another 'situational genus' (i.e. a description derived from instances of witnessing a bent stick on the ground). Therefore, I can think of a logically-possible scenario (weakest kind of possibility) in which an observer such as myself may have ascribed the wrong descriptors to what is presently unfolding before me. Therefore, owing to this possibility for error (one which there are no obstacles in me conceiving of), I am now warranted in considering this scenario as categorically deceitful". It should be clear why this line of argument is fallacious, for 'possibly deceitful' does not by necessity entail 'actually deceitful', no more than reality being 'possibly a simulation' entails it being actually one. Another example which Austin deals with in an illuminating manner is the coin which looks round when directly faced, elliptical when looked at at an angle. Why should we consider this to be an instance of deceitful 'appearances'? It can only become one by fixing standard parameters in place for the ascription of the designator 'coin' to a prospective referent, and a condition of 'roundness' featuring among said parameters. Then, upon being confronted with an elliptical object, we might find adequate grounds to pretend as if we were baffled to find out that the designator 'coin' could and in fact did apply to it. But Austin correctly points out that it is rather adventurous (if not outright wrong) to suppose there to be such a thing as the 'real' (i.e. standard?) shape of a coin, no less than supposing there to be a real/standard shape of a cat. Why couldn't a coin be exactly the type of thing which looks round when faced directly and elliptical when looked at at an angle? This books is a very good example of how philosophy of language can be fruitfully applied to epistemological matters.

[Jacob Hurley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Austin makes an attack on attempted division between Sense-Data and the real world, with an implied Direct-Realism via Speech-Act theory running underneath. At first you get the sense that he just misunderstands Ayer, that when he goes off on say "Well when we use 'real' in conversation it has nothing to do with how Ayer is using the word", but after a while it becomes clear that he is making these assaults to expose the misguided nature which drew Ayer&co to this sort of verificationist, cryptophenomenological concern with reality. I think a lot of people (including mr Derrida and maybe(?) judith butler) got all excited about this because, among other reasons no doubt, you can sort of look at it in a Heideggerian way, as though Austin is trying to ground Dasein back on the horizon of communal language and tear it away from the positivist tricks that are abusing it and making it a hollow and ellaborately meaningless distortion of language. Is Austin an analytic trying to undo the Platonic-Peripatetic assault on our spirituality from within?? Is Austin's direct realism a kissing cousin of the Parmenidean-Heraclitean (alleged) doctrine of the Glory of Being ???? I would need, however, some PhDs and approximately 5 times the debt I currently do to be able to convince anyone of that (especially myself). On a soberer note, this book does seem to align somewhat neatly with late Wittgenstein, which is pleasant considering Austin delivers on concrete examples and analysis (although you have to wonder why his ad-hoc, common sense terminologies for analyzing ordinary language escapes the criticism that he makes of the positivists' lingo); He also seems to be a great predecessor of Rorty, moreso than Rorty's five mentions of his name in Mirror of Nature might indicate, as they share a very similar method of rounding up misapplied language and the conceptual baggage that it brings along with it, both for the case of rejecting the notion of a special sense-datum that the mind 'has'. Austin bases his in speech acts while Rorty's case is more a history of bureaucracy. I had fun with this

[ooderai · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading Sense and Sensibilia feels like watching a very eloquent academic roast.

J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia is a sharp, surgical takedown of the philosophical theory of sense-data [largely directed at Russell and Ayer]. His approach is grounded in ordinary language philosophy: the belief that how we actually talk about things reveals more than abstract theorizing. His sarcasm is refined, his analogies unexpected, and his prose is refreshingly unphilosophical in its clarity. Austin shows that philosophical problems often begin as linguistic ones, and that if you pay close attention to how words actually work, many of these problems dissolve.

That being said, if you’re expecting a step-by-step theory of perception to replace sense-data, you’ll be disappointed. Austin is more interested in clearing away confusion than constructing a grand alternative. But sometimes, demolition is more satisfying than design, and in Sense and Sensibilia, the demolition is exquisite.

“Few things are easier than to confuse oneself. One trick is to use a word with one meaning and forget that one is using it with another.”

[Julien · Rating 4 out of 5]

I picked this up somewhat at random from a display of used books at a park music event in LA.

I do not have an academic background in philosophy and merely dabble in the subject, but immensely enjoyed these 140 pages of J.L. Austin dismantling the theses of Ayer and Price.

There is an “everyman” sense of humanism in Austin’s writing… he effectively denounces the tendency of Ayer and Price (and philosophers generally, he makes quite clear) to ignore or remove the ordinary meanings of words before mapping on their own meanings.

Austin’s key thesis is that bifurcating the world into “sense data” and “material things” is a false dichotomy, and he doesn’t so much argue against the claim as pronounce it nonsensical from the start and explain why.

[Lettrice Scarsa · Rating 4 out of 5]

È una raccolta di lezioni tenute da Austin dove vengono criticati i presupposti da cui partono alcuni filosofi oggi poco noti (Ayer, Price, Warnock), che pensano al mondo come diviso in diverse dicotomie, la cui principale è oggetti materiali e dati sensoriali (sense-data).
Lui, un autore molto ironico.

[Iza Braun · Rating 3 out of 5]

the seamless takedown of A.J. Ayer was admittedly awesome but too witty. I understand we’re having a good time and all, but there’s something profoundly beautiful about the notion of historic common sense and humanity that Austin taps into, and when it’s delivered in this way it strips away all sincerity!! I think we can and should be emotional about this, it’s impactful! somehow has me preferring LTL despite a distaste for logical positivism.

[A. B. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Austin's clarity of thought and distinctive attention to natural language is quite refreshing. I did not find here the pedantry which I was expecting from Austin's reputation; but rather a crisp analysis of the flaws of the sense-data doctrine.

[Antoine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really, really good, intuitive discussion of perception in relation with the philosophy of language

[Damon · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Eat this shit, fundationalists!"

[Adrienne · Rating 3 out of 5]

After a semester reading the works of the analytic and continental philosophers was relieved to read this one. While I loved the reevaluation of our epistemological approaches by the other philosophers, I was depressed to see them explain away most of what we think we are certain of. Austin reestablishes common sense as a valid approach and finds fault with the idea that our minds are deceiving us.

[Vidit · Rating 3 out of 5]

While I enjoy these reconstructed lecture notes, Austin's position often wavers between forms of disjunctivism, naive/direct realism, and even accepting the existence of sense-data. However, the issues he discusses are central to theories of perception and this is, of course, a must read for anyone with an interest in metaphysics or epistemology.

[Will · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was assigned in the epistemology course I took my first semester at UC Berkeley. The author's name appeared on the cover as "J.L. Austen." I have always thought that its author and publisher hoped to sell a lot of copies to rubes who thought they were buying the popular novel Sense and Sensibility by Jane Austen. Can't blame 'em for trying.

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Austin's lectures present one of the most sophisticated analyses of what went wrong in the philosophical debate about perception and, more generally, the problems inherent in foundationalist epistemology. I will re-read this many times.

[laura · Rating 4 out of 5]

i'm pretty sure that i don't agree with a damn thing he says-- not a single point of substance-- but man, is JLA fun to read. loved it.

[Lysergius · Rating 2 out of 5]

Surprisingly readable.

[Conor · Rating 5 out of 5]

There are only a few books I've read entirely in one sitting (all short). This is one of them.

[Drew Sanderson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Warnock does a wonderful job of making clear Austin's views on language pertaining to the senses.