What do you think?
Rate this book
The Falklands War: The Full Story
written and edited by: Paul Eddy and Magnus Linklater with Peter Gillman ; the Insight Team: John Ball, Michael Bilton, Robin Morgan ; with the British task force: John Shirley ; In Argentina: Isabel Hilton ; Defence Correspondent: Jon Connell ; contributors: Ian Jack, Simon Winchester ; Additional reporting: Will Ellsworth Jones [and others] ; researchers: Lee Chester and Therese Stanton ; graphics: Gordon Beckett [and others] ; picture design, David Gibbons.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1982
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
May 12, 2025
do not allow yourself to be struck by an Exocet missile
January 1, 2024
The Falklands War: 2 April 1982 - 14 June 1982.
The yawning expectation gap, whereby Argentina and Britain attempted to negotiate an agreement in March 1982 at a UN conference. The British objective was to stall negotiations, as nothing than total control of the Falklands was acceptable.
The Falklanders themselves were pro-British, yet when they saw Argentina offering them a better deal, the people attempted to bargain the two countries against each other to get an even better deal. Britain eventually allowed Argentinian “scrap metal men” to go to the Falklands, and recover rotting metal. In truth these men were spies, sent by the Argentinians to prepare for an invasion.
Argentina had been preparing for the invasion since Dec 1981 and had concluded that the US, under Ronald Regan would at the very least stay neutral if war broke out, but actually support Argentina due to America’s self-interest of expanding its influence in South America. As always never rely on American foreign policy, or base your decisions on a factor you cannot control. America always pursues its self-interests relentlessly.
Britain laid claim to the Falklands in 1592 (P36), however Argentina claims they deserted the Falkland in 1771, and had claim to the land as Spain had given the Islands to Argentina. Britain defeated Spain, so therefore it still had rights over the island. Britain eventually found use for the Island by transporting 450,000 sheep to boost the wool trade.
The invasion technically started on 23rd March 1982, when Argentina took South Georgia. When the penny finally dropped on April 1 1982, that Argentina were to invade on April 2 1982, Thatcher phoned Regan and announced that Britain was invading the Falklands. In the Commons the next day, the foreign secretary Lord Carrington resigned, Thatcher was denounced as taking her eye off the ball, and Labour attacked the Tories for not responding to threat of national security. The Daily Telegraph had a title of “Humiliation” which summed up the criticism of the Tories.
Immediately upon the invasion, Britain’ diplomatic network sprang into action by first persuading the security council, and then the UN to avoid criticising the UK. The UK even got the Common market to announce tariffs on Argentina, with the close support of France. “Britain is a Morris Minor country with a Rolls Royce Diplomatic service”. “All the best diplomats start out as something else”. “A country’s bargaining position has traditionally depended upon not only on the logic of its proposals, but also on the penalties that it can exact for the other sides failure to agree” Henry Kissinger.
By the 26 April the UK had retaken South Georgia. The US attempted once again to get Argentina to surrender before the UK launched its attack on the Falklands – while the UK cabinet was split as well. The sinking of the Belgrano was unlawful, yet it sent a strong signal to Argentina against sending any more battleships to attack the British, and may ultimately have saved more lives.
The attack on Goose Green was actually unnecessary, the UK could have just attacked Port Stanley, however the victory hit Argentinian moral.
Journalists were considered a nuisance during the war by soldiers as they often leaked, misreported, and required constant monitoring. Max Hastings was the only journalist who was clever enough to build relationships with the army commanders to gain their trust and was therefore allowed to follow them into battle. He was occasionally slightly bias, but that compromise gave him unique access.
The yawning expectation gap, whereby Argentina and Britain attempted to negotiate an agreement in March 1982 at a UN conference. The British objective was to stall negotiations, as nothing than total control of the Falklands was acceptable.
The Falklanders themselves were pro-British, yet when they saw Argentina offering them a better deal, the people attempted to bargain the two countries against each other to get an even better deal. Britain eventually allowed Argentinian “scrap metal men” to go to the Falklands, and recover rotting metal. In truth these men were spies, sent by the Argentinians to prepare for an invasion.
Argentina had been preparing for the invasion since Dec 1981 and had concluded that the US, under Ronald Regan would at the very least stay neutral if war broke out, but actually support Argentina due to America’s self-interest of expanding its influence in South America. As always never rely on American foreign policy, or base your decisions on a factor you cannot control. America always pursues its self-interests relentlessly.
Britain laid claim to the Falklands in 1592 (P36), however Argentina claims they deserted the Falkland in 1771, and had claim to the land as Spain had given the Islands to Argentina. Britain defeated Spain, so therefore it still had rights over the island. Britain eventually found use for the Island by transporting 450,000 sheep to boost the wool trade.
The invasion technically started on 23rd March 1982, when Argentina took South Georgia. When the penny finally dropped on April 1 1982, that Argentina were to invade on April 2 1982, Thatcher phoned Regan and announced that Britain was invading the Falklands. In the Commons the next day, the foreign secretary Lord Carrington resigned, Thatcher was denounced as taking her eye off the ball, and Labour attacked the Tories for not responding to threat of national security. The Daily Telegraph had a title of “Humiliation” which summed up the criticism of the Tories.
Immediately upon the invasion, Britain’ diplomatic network sprang into action by first persuading the security council, and then the UN to avoid criticising the UK. The UK even got the Common market to announce tariffs on Argentina, with the close support of France. “Britain is a Morris Minor country with a Rolls Royce Diplomatic service”. “All the best diplomats start out as something else”. “A country’s bargaining position has traditionally depended upon not only on the logic of its proposals, but also on the penalties that it can exact for the other sides failure to agree” Henry Kissinger.
By the 26 April the UK had retaken South Georgia. The US attempted once again to get Argentina to surrender before the UK launched its attack on the Falklands – while the UK cabinet was split as well. The sinking of the Belgrano was unlawful, yet it sent a strong signal to Argentina against sending any more battleships to attack the British, and may ultimately have saved more lives.
The attack on Goose Green was actually unnecessary, the UK could have just attacked Port Stanley, however the victory hit Argentinian moral.
Journalists were considered a nuisance during the war by soldiers as they often leaked, misreported, and required constant monitoring. Max Hastings was the only journalist who was clever enough to build relationships with the army commanders to gain their trust and was therefore allowed to follow them into battle. He was occasionally slightly bias, but that compromise gave him unique access.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 15, 2024
The Sunday Times Insight Team produced this paperback in 1982, not long after the end of the war, which was quite an achievement. The writing team consisted of Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman, though they were assisted several reporters and researchers; participants from both sides of the conflict were interviewed.
The book contains black-and-white photographs, diagrams and maps.
On the night of April 1, 1982 the first Argentine troops landed – variously called the Amphibious Commando Company or the Buzo Tactico - two distinct military groups; depends on whose report is true. According to this book the Argentines attacked Moody Brook barracks with indiscriminate bursts of automatic fire, using phosphorus grenades and riddling each room with bullets. Fortunately, the barracks had already been abandoned by the Royal Marines. ‘The Argentine government made much of the claim that its troops had gone to great lengths to ensure that the invasion was bloodless. That was largely the result but what happened at Moody Brook suggests it was not the intention’ (p15).
According to an Argentine officer, they only used tear gas and intended to take prisoners, and only fired their weapons to alert other troops converging on Government House. (The Argentine Fight for the Falklands by Martin Middlebrook (1989)).
Mid-morning on April 2 the Union flag was lowered, to be replaced by the blue and white flag of Argentina.
Chapter 2 covers some of the diplomatic events taking place at the UN building in February. Talks had been going on for about five years or more, with no headway being made. Talk was that if negotiations got nowhere there would be an invasion in July. Also ongoing was a dispute between Argentina and Chile regarding the Beagle Channel.
Chapter 3 relates the history of the Falkland Islands and the assorted occupiers, going back to the 1500s. In 1690 English Captain Strong stepped ashore and named the islands after Lord Falkland, the commissioner of the admiralty. Frenchmen came in his wake... The poet Byron’s grandfather sailed into a bay off West Falkland in 1765 and established Port Egmont. As it happened the French had set up a settlement on East Falkland in 1764, Port Louis. In 1767 the French sold Port Louis to Spain for £250,000. ‘Spain formally restored Port Egmont to the British – on September 16, 1771’ (p38).
In 1816 the United Provinces of the River Plate split from Spain and Argentina was born. In 1820 an Argentinian frigate took formal possession of the islands. Some argy-bargy ensued over the years, including the razing of Port Louis by the American corvette Lexington, and the establishment of a penal colony whose prisoners promptly murdered the colony’s new governor. At that point the British sloop Clio hove into sight and was mostly welcomed by the Port Louis settlers. The British raised their flag on January 2, 1833 and stayed. Argentina protested for almost 150 years thereafter, ultimately appealing to the UN whose resolution 1514 of 1960 ‘pledged to bring an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms’ (p41). The UN’s 1965 resolution pressed Britain and Argentina ‘to find a quick and peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the UN charter and the interests of the population of the said islands’ (p41).
In January 1982 scrap merchant Constantino Sergio Davidoff visited the British embassy in Buenos Aires to report his intentions: the scrap metal merchant had a contract to dismantle South Georgia’s four old whaling stations (which were closed in the early 1960s); they belonged to the Christian Salvesen shipping firm in Edinburgh. The Argentinians saw an opportunity to bring forward their intended invasion, using the scrap metal issue as both an excuse and a cover.
On March 19 four British Antarctic Survey scientists were on a field trip to Leith from their base in Grytviken (comprising about 30 BAS people). They spotted the Argentinian naval fleet auxiliary Bahia Buen Suceso anchored in the harbour. Onboard were a contingent of marines, arms, ammunition, radio equipment, field surgical kit and food supplies. The troops were led by a slim, boyish-looking man whose shock of fair hair earned him the nickname ‘el Rubio’: Captain Alfredo Astiz. (p68). Astiz was a particularly nasty character, responsible for torture and death. He landed about 50 men, some in paramilitary uniform, and raised the Argentinian flag. The BAS scientists reported this to the governor at Stanley.
On March 20 HMS Endurance, with a contingent of Royal Marines was directed from Stanley to South Georgia and authorised to use force if necessary. Three days later Endurance was redirected to Grytviken; however, two marines were landed surreptitiously to an observation post on a bluff overlooking Leith harbour and, on March 25, they noted the Bahia Paraiso arrive and disembark many troops and their equipment. They reported by radio to London via a satellite link; but it was kept a closely guarded secret – why?
MI6 had a base in Buenos Aires. ‘Every Wednesday a meeting is held after lunch time, attended by, among others, the naval and military attachés at the British embassy’ (p78). On March 24 their assessment was that something was up – naval exercises with the Uruguayan navy were not plausible, judging by first-hand intelligence from the naval bases. Their opposite numbers in the American embassy concluded that an invasion was due on April 1.
The machinations in the UN make for interesting reading as certain countries take sides. ‘Guyana, worried about the claims on her territory made by neighbouring Venezuela, was on the British side’ (p114). [And this situation is still contentious today!] Interestingly, the Russians abstained – the issue did not affect their interests. America sat on the fence initially, for Argentina supported the fight against Communism that was spreading in Latin America: ‘We’re friends on both sides,’ Reagan announced. (p115). Ultimately, the British ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, with the help of General Haig, brought the Americans on-side. ‘On April 30... America would be allying herself publicly with the UK. “Armed aggression of that kind must not be allowed to succeed” said the president’ (p137).
Chapter 12 – ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ – relates the travails and recovery of South Georgia and the surrender of the Argentinians based there.
The recapture of Port Stanley signalled the end of the conflict with the surrender of the Argentine forces on June 14.
There are sections on the air-battles and aircraft, the terrible loss of life, the sinkings, and the bravery on both sides. As a piece of ‘instant reportage’ it is a remarkable book. Granted, after all this time, as many more facts (and books) have surfaced some of this account will have been expanded upon and even corrected. Still, it’s a worthwhile read for an overview of the conflict.
It concludes: ‘At least the war has guaranteed one thing for the Falklanders on their remote rocks in the South Atlantic. No one will ever again underestimate the dangers they face’ (p265).
The book contains black-and-white photographs, diagrams and maps.
On the night of April 1, 1982 the first Argentine troops landed – variously called the Amphibious Commando Company or the Buzo Tactico - two distinct military groups; depends on whose report is true. According to this book the Argentines attacked Moody Brook barracks with indiscriminate bursts of automatic fire, using phosphorus grenades and riddling each room with bullets. Fortunately, the barracks had already been abandoned by the Royal Marines. ‘The Argentine government made much of the claim that its troops had gone to great lengths to ensure that the invasion was bloodless. That was largely the result but what happened at Moody Brook suggests it was not the intention’ (p15).
According to an Argentine officer, they only used tear gas and intended to take prisoners, and only fired their weapons to alert other troops converging on Government House. (The Argentine Fight for the Falklands by Martin Middlebrook (1989)).
Mid-morning on April 2 the Union flag was lowered, to be replaced by the blue and white flag of Argentina.
Chapter 2 covers some of the diplomatic events taking place at the UN building in February. Talks had been going on for about five years or more, with no headway being made. Talk was that if negotiations got nowhere there would be an invasion in July. Also ongoing was a dispute between Argentina and Chile regarding the Beagle Channel.
Chapter 3 relates the history of the Falkland Islands and the assorted occupiers, going back to the 1500s. In 1690 English Captain Strong stepped ashore and named the islands after Lord Falkland, the commissioner of the admiralty. Frenchmen came in his wake... The poet Byron’s grandfather sailed into a bay off West Falkland in 1765 and established Port Egmont. As it happened the French had set up a settlement on East Falkland in 1764, Port Louis. In 1767 the French sold Port Louis to Spain for £250,000. ‘Spain formally restored Port Egmont to the British – on September 16, 1771’ (p38).
In 1816 the United Provinces of the River Plate split from Spain and Argentina was born. In 1820 an Argentinian frigate took formal possession of the islands. Some argy-bargy ensued over the years, including the razing of Port Louis by the American corvette Lexington, and the establishment of a penal colony whose prisoners promptly murdered the colony’s new governor. At that point the British sloop Clio hove into sight and was mostly welcomed by the Port Louis settlers. The British raised their flag on January 2, 1833 and stayed. Argentina protested for almost 150 years thereafter, ultimately appealing to the UN whose resolution 1514 of 1960 ‘pledged to bring an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms’ (p41). The UN’s 1965 resolution pressed Britain and Argentina ‘to find a quick and peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the UN charter and the interests of the population of the said islands’ (p41).
In January 1982 scrap merchant Constantino Sergio Davidoff visited the British embassy in Buenos Aires to report his intentions: the scrap metal merchant had a contract to dismantle South Georgia’s four old whaling stations (which were closed in the early 1960s); they belonged to the Christian Salvesen shipping firm in Edinburgh. The Argentinians saw an opportunity to bring forward their intended invasion, using the scrap metal issue as both an excuse and a cover.
On March 19 four British Antarctic Survey scientists were on a field trip to Leith from their base in Grytviken (comprising about 30 BAS people). They spotted the Argentinian naval fleet auxiliary Bahia Buen Suceso anchored in the harbour. Onboard were a contingent of marines, arms, ammunition, radio equipment, field surgical kit and food supplies. The troops were led by a slim, boyish-looking man whose shock of fair hair earned him the nickname ‘el Rubio’: Captain Alfredo Astiz. (p68). Astiz was a particularly nasty character, responsible for torture and death. He landed about 50 men, some in paramilitary uniform, and raised the Argentinian flag. The BAS scientists reported this to the governor at Stanley.
On March 20 HMS Endurance, with a contingent of Royal Marines was directed from Stanley to South Georgia and authorised to use force if necessary. Three days later Endurance was redirected to Grytviken; however, two marines were landed surreptitiously to an observation post on a bluff overlooking Leith harbour and, on March 25, they noted the Bahia Paraiso arrive and disembark many troops and their equipment. They reported by radio to London via a satellite link; but it was kept a closely guarded secret – why?
MI6 had a base in Buenos Aires. ‘Every Wednesday a meeting is held after lunch time, attended by, among others, the naval and military attachés at the British embassy’ (p78). On March 24 their assessment was that something was up – naval exercises with the Uruguayan navy were not plausible, judging by first-hand intelligence from the naval bases. Their opposite numbers in the American embassy concluded that an invasion was due on April 1.
The machinations in the UN make for interesting reading as certain countries take sides. ‘Guyana, worried about the claims on her territory made by neighbouring Venezuela, was on the British side’ (p114). [And this situation is still contentious today!] Interestingly, the Russians abstained – the issue did not affect their interests. America sat on the fence initially, for Argentina supported the fight against Communism that was spreading in Latin America: ‘We’re friends on both sides,’ Reagan announced. (p115). Ultimately, the British ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson, with the help of General Haig, brought the Americans on-side. ‘On April 30... America would be allying herself publicly with the UK. “Armed aggression of that kind must not be allowed to succeed” said the president’ (p137).
Chapter 12 – ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ – relates the travails and recovery of South Georgia and the surrender of the Argentinians based there.
The recapture of Port Stanley signalled the end of the conflict with the surrender of the Argentine forces on June 14.
There are sections on the air-battles and aircraft, the terrible loss of life, the sinkings, and the bravery on both sides. As a piece of ‘instant reportage’ it is a remarkable book. Granted, after all this time, as many more facts (and books) have surfaced some of this account will have been expanded upon and even corrected. Still, it’s a worthwhile read for an overview of the conflict.
It concludes: ‘At least the war has guaranteed one thing for the Falklanders on their remote rocks in the South Atlantic. No one will ever again underestimate the dangers they face’ (p265).
August 9, 2020
Why is a bad and a good book. This was one of the first books about the war and for that reason had one sin in it: it was too early to know the true.
First, you must understand that you are reading one side of the conflict, that had good and bad points. In other part you must see that this wasn´t written by the persons that didn´t stay in the conflict and is based in interviews, for that reason this book had points that clash against other british books like "No Picnic" or "100 days".
Conclusion: It´s a book that must be read with caution if you are looking the real story, but its an obligatory source for the correct understood of the british perspective.
First, you must understand that you are reading one side of the conflict, that had good and bad points. In other part you must see that this wasn´t written by the persons that didn´t stay in the conflict and is based in interviews, for that reason this book had points that clash against other british books like "No Picnic" or "100 days".
Conclusion: It´s a book that must be read with caution if you are looking the real story, but its an obligatory source for the correct understood of the british perspective.
December 10, 2017
I have read a few books on the subject of the Falklands War. I suppose, as a British teenager in 1982 it was the war of my generation. This book taught me things that I didn't previously know.
August 16, 2019
Read this many years ago, excellent piece of journalism
January 25, 2017
”A sad and bloody business”
Published on the same year of the war, the book collects chapter after chapter the vision of the events from The Sunday Times point of view. The authors develop an interesting and all but a biased documentary, fair to the merits and errors made by both the Argentinian or the British governments. Diplomatic efforts and military operations intertwine with everyday life accounts in Britain, Argentina and Falklands, and are related in an agile, competent style, always respectful for the more than 1000 casualties the war costed to both nations. The extreme temporal proximity of the narrated events, while leaving to the reader the research of the “Falklands Effect” historical ripples ten, twenty, or thirty years later, gives this “journalistic object” a flavour of personal diary integrated with newspaper clippings.
* The quote in the title is part of a comment spoken by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse in April 1982.
Published on the same year of the war, the book collects chapter after chapter the vision of the events from The Sunday Times point of view. The authors develop an interesting and all but a biased documentary, fair to the merits and errors made by both the Argentinian or the British governments. Diplomatic efforts and military operations intertwine with everyday life accounts in Britain, Argentina and Falklands, and are related in an agile, competent style, always respectful for the more than 1000 casualties the war costed to both nations. The extreme temporal proximity of the narrated events, while leaving to the reader the research of the “Falklands Effect” historical ripples ten, twenty, or thirty years later, gives this “journalistic object” a flavour of personal diary integrated with newspaper clippings.
* The quote in the title is part of a comment spoken by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse in April 1982.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews