In October 1979, a series of potentially catastrophic events was set into President Park Chung-hee was assassinated, South Korean officers staged a coup d’état, and South Korean troops brutally suppressed civilian demonstrators during the controversial Kwangju uprising. Any one of these incidents could have sparked another major conflict on the Korean Peninsula. General Wickham contends war was avoided largely because of resolute action taken by the governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea, and because of the combat readiness of U.S. and South Korean forces. Moreover, he believes that this deterrent contributed to a political-economic evolution in South Korea and to subsequent peaceful transfers of power. Korea on the Brink sheds light on how political-military policy is formulated within the U.S. government and on how such policy is shaped and executed in the field” under trying circumstances.
Scholars of Korean history will be disappointed in this book.
While General Wickham provides some fascinating insights into the players of incidents such as; the assassination of President Park, the 12/12 incident, and the massacre in Kwanju, Wickham basically defends the US Government’s policies and his own decisions to support them.
In the midst of the crisis, he is basically a glorified spectator who is frequently consulted, but whose advice is never really heeded. However, as the General makes clear, he lacked the operational authority and tools to intervene in the Korean crisis. Wickham uses what influence he does have to try and keep the attention of the ROK military “focused north” to prevent the North Koreans from taking advantage of the political chaos in the south. His only truly decisive moment seems to be when he advised a South Korean General against mounting a counter coup to overturn the actions of the 12/12 incident.
This book takes the reader through the events immediately preceding President Park's assasination through to the administration of President Chun, as recalled by the author. General Wickham was Commander in Chief of CFC/UNC and Commanding General of USFK/8th Army from 1979-1982, and so his relationships and interactions with ROK and US statesmen, military leaders, and political leaders enabled him to write a thorough recounting of this period. The book is also written in a concise, easily digested manner allowing for a very quick read.
I read this book a few years after it was published, and re-read it after ROK Assemblyman Lee Kae Ho proposed the first legislation of the 21st National Assembly to be an amendment to the 5.18 Special Measures bill, banning speech that defames the 5.18 movement. The publishing of State Dept. cables from this period also prompted my re-reading of this memoirs. It's notable that in the epilogue to the book, Gen. Wickham indicated he believed that the ROK had succeeded in liberalizing, something the USG pushed for during the events in question. Unfortunately, that has proven to be mistaken.
As a memoir, Gen. Wickham allows his bias to bleed through the pages, but he did provide what I think are accurate representations of what President Chun and his supporters believed. Gen. Wickham clearly disagreed with their assessments, but he addressed this in good faith. I would definitely recommend this book.