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Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era by two officers-one from the Philippines and the other from America-who fought as guerrillas against the Japanese occupation and went on to defeat the Huk rebellion after World War II. Unlike many other accounts of counterinsurgency operations that focus on theoretical principles and their tactical applications, the authors examine the means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of insurgencies. An enduring contribution of this book is its emphasis on the importance of intelligence in combating insurgent movements. With a new foreword prepared by Kalev Sepp.
244 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1962
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March 6, 2019
„Counter-Guerrilla Operations“ by Valeriano and Bohannon describes the understanding of guerrilla warfare as it was practiced in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion and provides a good account of the general tactics used during the conflict and lessons derived from it.
Designed as a lessons learned handbook in the aftermath of the Huk Rebellion the authors do not make an effort to delineate the history of the campaigns they derive their lessons from. Rather they try to provide a static analysis of the conflict defining their understanding of guerrillas, assessing the terrain, the situation of the enemy and own forces and then going into details about counter-guerrilla tactics. Although addressing primarily a military audience using a format and wording close to military planning processes the authors translate the approach of an interdepartmental government operation very well. Stating objectives for the administration, justice department and economic development they provide a very comprehensive and modern understanding of population-centric counterinsurgency.
The three cornerstones of the tactics discussed by the authors are to deliberately deny the enemy information, to find the enemy with intelligence-lead, targeted operations and to fight to enemy effectively without letting him escape. Again this is a rather modern understanding of counterinsurgency as counterintelligence, operational security and deception is to be utilized to deny the guerrilla the constant monitoring of security forces the public has grown to expect of him. Intelligence lead operations are not only based on a wide network of contacts and constant collection of basic intelligence but also on a network of routine operations like patrols and checkpoints to force the enemy into a certain behavior and develop patterns of live for the area of operations. Effectively fighting the enemy in the opinion of the authors is best done with specially trained small patrols, able to penetrate enemy controlled territory undetected and surprise him with sudden attacks. Thus the authors do not advocate large sweeping operations or intense firepower but well trained jungle fighters aggressively keeping the enemy off balance.
The handbook goes on to list tasks and measures concerning the civilian population in the area of operations and the national public at large again demonstrating their intent to advocate for an integrated approach utilizing all governmental capabilities. Going into practical details the appendices even provide an SOP for the conduct of a patrol as well as a table of organization for a specialized battalion to fight guerrillas. The organizational chart reflects the themes stated throughout the book as the unit mainly relies on light infantry to operate in platoon or company size with organic air support and heavy weapons and designated intelligence support on all levels. To provide additional information on the topic a reading list is also provided at the end of the book.
Overall the approach taken by the authors is a very modern version of an integrated governmental campaign to engage in population-centric counterinsurgency and fight the insurgents in a targeted and intelligence lead way. As the original work is from 1962 it would have done much good had the leadership of U.S. forces in the RVN taken the lessons provided herein to hart. Despite its more than 50 years this book is still very much relevant to counterinsurgency planning and operations today and should be widely read.
Designed as a lessons learned handbook in the aftermath of the Huk Rebellion the authors do not make an effort to delineate the history of the campaigns they derive their lessons from. Rather they try to provide a static analysis of the conflict defining their understanding of guerrillas, assessing the terrain, the situation of the enemy and own forces and then going into details about counter-guerrilla tactics. Although addressing primarily a military audience using a format and wording close to military planning processes the authors translate the approach of an interdepartmental government operation very well. Stating objectives for the administration, justice department and economic development they provide a very comprehensive and modern understanding of population-centric counterinsurgency.
The three cornerstones of the tactics discussed by the authors are to deliberately deny the enemy information, to find the enemy with intelligence-lead, targeted operations and to fight to enemy effectively without letting him escape. Again this is a rather modern understanding of counterinsurgency as counterintelligence, operational security and deception is to be utilized to deny the guerrilla the constant monitoring of security forces the public has grown to expect of him. Intelligence lead operations are not only based on a wide network of contacts and constant collection of basic intelligence but also on a network of routine operations like patrols and checkpoints to force the enemy into a certain behavior and develop patterns of live for the area of operations. Effectively fighting the enemy in the opinion of the authors is best done with specially trained small patrols, able to penetrate enemy controlled territory undetected and surprise him with sudden attacks. Thus the authors do not advocate large sweeping operations or intense firepower but well trained jungle fighters aggressively keeping the enemy off balance.
The handbook goes on to list tasks and measures concerning the civilian population in the area of operations and the national public at large again demonstrating their intent to advocate for an integrated approach utilizing all governmental capabilities. Going into practical details the appendices even provide an SOP for the conduct of a patrol as well as a table of organization for a specialized battalion to fight guerrillas. The organizational chart reflects the themes stated throughout the book as the unit mainly relies on light infantry to operate in platoon or company size with organic air support and heavy weapons and designated intelligence support on all levels. To provide additional information on the topic a reading list is also provided at the end of the book.
Overall the approach taken by the authors is a very modern version of an integrated governmental campaign to engage in population-centric counterinsurgency and fight the insurgents in a targeted and intelligence lead way. As the original work is from 1962 it would have done much good had the leadership of U.S. forces in the RVN taken the lessons provided herein to hart. Despite its more than 50 years this book is still very much relevant to counterinsurgency planning and operations today and should be widely read.
October 10, 2014
This edition presents the principles of counter insurgency that were practiced in the 1940-50's by the US Army in the Philippines after WW2. The first edition version was used at the US Army Command College at Leavenworth Kansas. I found the book helpful to my understanding of how American coalitions are dealing with today's Middle East insurgencies.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews